Montague v. Corcoran et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 4/15/2014. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 4/16/14)

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I£CEMD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

,

LONNIE MONTAGUE, #350-807

,

v

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DAYENACORCORAN,WARDEN
L. V. HAMMERER, MCTU
A. DUNNING, MCTU
GREGG HERSHBERGER, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND'
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES

AT~T

Civil Action No. PWG-14-1074

,
,
,

Defendants

'"

MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff, a Maryland prisoner, seeks "[t]o hold the parties liable for damages caused by
their negligence and violation of [his] constitutional rights and civil liberties. without provocation
or legal justification."

In support of this request, he states that in June of 2013, correctional

transportation officers V. Hammerer and A. Dunning were transporting him from the Maryland
Correctional

Institution

at Jessup (hereinafter "MCI-J")

\"

a.ElIC ILl. DIITIIlCT COURT
DISlIlI:T Of IIAJMAND QEPlI1V

,

Plaintiff

APR 162014

to a court appearance.

Although

Plaintiff was wearing shackles and handcuffs, Hammerer and Dunning failed to help him while
exiting the van. As a result, Plaintiff fell, sustaining injury to his face, wrist and knees. Comp!.
at 3, ECF No. I.! In addition to Officers Hammerer and Dunning, Plaintiff names Defendants
MCI-J Warden Dayena Corcoran and Gregg Hershberger, Secretary of Maryland's Department
of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS").
A federal district court must conduct a preliminarily review of complaint allegations
before service of process and dismiss them if satisfied that the complaint has no factual or legal
I Included with the complaint is Plaintiffs
motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Plaintiff is indigent, his motion shall be granted.

As it appears that

basis. See 28 U.S.C.

S

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Thus, I am obliged by 28 U.S.C. 13l915A to screen

prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint that is frivolous or malicious or fails to state a
claim-upon-which-relief-may
beyond the complaint's

be granted.

allegations.

..

In so deciding, "[t]hedistrict

court need not look

It must, however, hold the pro se complaint to less

stringent standards than pleadings drafted by attorneys and must read the complaint liberally."
White v. White, 886 F. 2d 721, 722-723 (4th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff makes no claim against the Warden or the Secretary of DPSCS.

A defendant

must have been personally involved in the allegedly unconstitutional action or omission to act to
be liable in a

S

1983 action. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985). Presumably he

names them in his lawsuit based on his belief that they are liable for their subordinates' conduct,
otherwise known as the doctrine of respondeat superior. The law in the Fourth Circuit is well
established that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in 13
1983 claims. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 94
(1978); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F. 3d 766, 782 (4th Cir. 2004) (no respondeat superior liability
under

S

1983); see also Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F. 3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001) (no respondeat

superior liability in a Bivens suit). Liability of supervisory officials "is not based on ordinary
principles of respondeat superior, but rather is premised on 'a recognition that supervisory
indifference or tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the
constitutional injuries they inflict on those committed to their care.'" Baynard v. Malone, 268 F.
3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Slakan v. Porter, 737 F. 2d 368, 372 (4th Cir. 1984».
Supervisory liability under

S

1983 must be supported with evidence that: (1) the supervisor had

actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed a
pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) the

2

supervisor's response to the knowledge was so inadequate as to show deliberate indifference to
or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices; and (3) there was an affirmative causal
lin]cbetween~the~supervisor's

inaction~and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the

plaintiff. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F. 3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to suggest
such misconduct on the part of Defendants Corcoran and Hershberger.

Both are entitled to

dismissal from suit.
Plaintiff has set forth an allegation of negligence on the part of Defendants Hammerer
and Dunning. Negligence, without more, does not constitute a violation of civil rights actionable
under 42 U.S.C.

S

1983. See generally Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975);

Donlan v. Smith, 662 F. Supp. 352, 361 (D. Md. 1986) (mere negligence or malpractice does not
rise to a constitutional level).
Not every negligence claim can be pursued in federal court. A federal court has limited
original jurisdiction,

and is not empowered to review every claim related to alleged tortious

conduct involving non-federal parties.2 It only has authority to review such claims if the claims
are sufficient to establish federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.
invoke diversity jurisdiction under

S

When a party seeks to

1332, he bears the burden of demonstrating that the grounds

for diversity exist and that diversity is complete. See Advani Enterprises, Inc. v. Underwriters at
Lloyds, 140 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 1998). The requirement of complete diversity of citizenship
mandates that each plaintiff meet the diversity requirements
Newman-Green,

Inc. v. Aljonzo-Larrain,

490

u.s.

as to each defendant.

826, 829 (1989);

Stouffer

See

Corp. v.

Breckenridge, 859 F.2d 75, 76 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
267 (1806)).

At the time of his most recent arrests, Plaintiff resided in Wicomico County,

This court does not have original subject maner jurisdiction over negligence cases involving non-federal parties.
Further, there are no facts to suggest a federal civil rights question is presented pursuant to 28 u.s.c. 9 133 J.

2

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Maryland; he currently is incarcerated in a Maryland prison located in Jessup, Maryland, and he
provides the address for that prison as the address for three of the named Defendants.
element~of~diversitrjurisdiction-does

not appear to be satisfied.

This

Diversity jurisdiction also

requires that the controversy involve a minimum amount of damages. Plaintiff does not claim an
actual amount of damages in controversy, and thus does not satisfy this second requirement
diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C:

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l332(a).

There is no basis for this court to exercise

diversity jurisdiction over this case.
Plaintiffs
U.S.C.

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claim must be dismissed without service of process on Defendants.

Title 28

19l5(e), provides that:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may
have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
eourt determines that (A)
(B)

the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
the action or appeal(i)
is frivolous or malicious;
(ii)
fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted; or
(iii)
seeks monetary relief against a defendant
who is immune from such relief.

This action seeks damages from based on a state tort over which this court lacks
jurisdiction.

It will be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

constitute Plaintiffs

"first strike" under the statute.

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19l5( e)(2)(B)(iii).

This dismissal will

Plaintiff is advised that once three such

dismissals are entered against him, he may be barred from filing new cases unless he first
submits the entire civil filing fee, pursuant to 28 U .S.C.

S

1915

A separate order shall be entered in accordance with

Q!iillif

Paul W. rimm
United States District Judge

(Date)

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