Williamson et al v. Prince Georges County of Maryland et al

Filing 10

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/25/2014. (c/m to all pro se pla 7/25/14 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
LAFAYETTE WILLIAMSON, et al.
Plaintiffs,
v.
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY OF
MARYLAND, et al.
Defendants.

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* CIVIL ACTION NO. DKC-14-1592
*

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*****
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This civil rights complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief was received for filing on
May 15, 2014. The complaint is signed by multiple residents of Prince George’s County, Maryland.
Plaintiffs seek to file the matter as a “class-action” under the civil rights statutes against the Prince
George’s County Executive, Councilmembers, and Chief of Police. (ECF No. 1). 1 Plaintiffs also
submitted a “Petition for Stay of Execution and Temporary Restraining Order” and have moved for
injunctive relief. (ECF Nos. 2 & 3).
Plaintiffs did not supply summonses for the defendants and none were issued for service of
process. Nonetheless, Defendants Toles and Franklin have moved to dismiss the complaint on
grounds of insufficient service and lack of personal and subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 4, 6
& 7). On July 2, 2014, the clerk mailed Roseboro notices to Plaintiffs, which advised them of the
pendency of the motions, their entitlement to respond within seventeen (17) days from the date of
the letter, and cautioned them that their case may be dismissed if they do not timely file a written
1

Class certification will be denied. Among the requirements which litigants must meet in order to
maintain a class action is that the Arepresentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class.@ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). As self-represented litigants, Plaintiffs cannot represent others in a class
action. See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975).

response. Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 1975). Plaintiffs have not responded.
The complaint is a far cry from a model of clarity. Plaintiffs seemingly allege that their
freedoms of liberty and speech were violated due to the enactment of Council Bill 18-2011. The
ordinance established regulatory licensing requirements related to the operation and maintenance of
specified “dance halls” within Prince George’s County. Plaintiffs allege that the legislation restricts
their ability “to dance in a legal public or private place of [their] choice, because of [their] race,
creed, color and culture.” 2 (ECF No. 1, at 4-5). Plaintiffs contend that the bill “deprives the entire
black race within the Prince George’s County, Maryland, from exercising the freedom of expression
through dance” and “acts to destroy a culture, deny a particular group of people, and deny any
person completing his/her debt to society, the true experience of freedom.” (Id. at 9-10).
As noted above, summonses have not been issued and whatever efforts Plaintiffs purport to
have made to serve defendants are plainly insufficient. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated
standing, absent which, a party cannot invoke a court’s jurisdiction. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984); Southern Walk at Broadlands Homeowner’s Assoc. Inc. v. Openband at

2

The full bill, approved unanimously by the Prince George’s County Council on July 19,
2011, accompanies the complaint. (See ECF No. 1-1). The Act states that it is:
For the purpose of amending County regulations concerning dance
hall premises, owners, lessors, operators, managers, promoters and
patrons, establishing license requirements, setting penalties for
violators, declaring specific legislative intent to establish reasonable
and uniform laws to reduce the number of violent crimes that occur
as a result of events at dance halls and to promote the health, safety,
and welfare of the citizens and residents of: Prince George's County
and declaring that a public emergency exists affecting the public
health, safety, and welfare.
2

Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 85 (4th Cir. 2013). Any plaintiff seeking to invoke the jurisdiction
of a federal court must establish standing. The doctrine of standing consists of two distinct
“strands”: constitutional standing pursuant to Article III and prudential standing. See Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004). The requirements for constitutional standing
reflect that Article III “confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’”
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
560 (1993) (“[S]tanding is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement
of Article III[.]”). To establish Article III standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:
(1) [he] has suffered an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and
particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action
of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Doe v. Obama, 631 F.3d 157, 160 (4th Cir.2011) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81(2000)).
In addition to satisfying constitutional standing requirements, a plaintiff must also
demonstrate that his claims are not barred by prudential limitations on a federal court’s exercise of
jurisdiction. See Doe v. Sebelius, 676 F.Supp.2d 423, 428 (D.Md.2009) (citing Elk Grove Unified
Sch. Distr., 542 U.S. at 12). In contrast to Article III standing, prudential standing “‘embodies
judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’” Elk Grove Unified Sch.
Distr., 542 U.S. at 11. One such limitation is that “a plaintiff generally must assert his own legal

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rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.”
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). This limitation serves to
“preclude a court from deciding ‘questions of broad social import in cases in which no individual
rights will be vindicated’” and to ensure that “‘access to the federal courts [is] limited to those
litigants best suited to assert the claims.’” Buchanan v. Consolidated Stores Corp., 125 F.Supp.2d
730, 738 (D.Md.2001) (quoting Mackey v. Nationwide Ins. Cos., 724 F.2d 419, 422 (4th Cir.1984)).
Plaintiffs have not satisfied any of the requirements to demonstrate standing. There are
simply no concrete facts alleged to show any injury to Plaintiffs directly related to the bill. The
complaint does not allege that any of the Plaintiffs were denied a license to operate or maintain a
dance hall or explain how the regulatory and licensing requirements inhibited Plaintiffs’ ability to
engage in recreational dance. In any event, Plaintiffs’ alleged inability to engage in recreational
dancing is not protected conduct under the Constitution. See City of Dallas v. Staglin, 490 U.S. 19,
23-28 (1989); Willis v. Town of Marshall, N. C., 426 F.3d 251, 257-261 (4th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, the motions to dismiss will be granted. A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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