Maddox v. USA -2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION as to Laray Anthony Maddox. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/12/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LARAY ANTHONY MADDOX
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-1936
Criminal No. DKC 08-0430-002

:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

are:

(1)

a

motion filed by Petitioner Laray Anthony Maddox (“Petitioner”)
to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 134);
(2) a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s motion to vacate filed by
Respondent

United

States

of

America

(“Respondent”)

(ECF

No.

165); and (3) an unopposed motion to seal filed by Respondent
(ECF No. 166).

The issues have been briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the motion to correct sentence will
be denied, the motion to dismiss will be granted, and the motion
to seal will be granted.
I.

Background
On

December

4,

2008,

Petitioner

pleaded

guilty

to

conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
fifty or more grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846 and felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

(ECF No. 56).

On June 8, 2009, Petitioner

was sentenced.

Based on two prior Maryland convictions for

second degree assault, he was found to be a career offender and
received a sentence enhancement pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”) § 4B1.1.
sentenced to 180 months.

He was

(ECF No. 165, at 1-2).

On March 19, 2014, Petitioner’s sentence was reduced to 92
months because of a change in the Sentencing Guidelines made
retroactive pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(u).

(ECF No. 128).

On

June 14, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to correct sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
issues

presented”

and

The motion did not “fully brief the
requested

petition at a later time.”

“leave

to

(ECF No. 134).

supplement

this

On November 21,

2014, Petitioner’s sentence was reduced to 77 months because of
another change in the Sentencing Guidelines.

(ECF No. 157).

On

May 18, 2015, Petitioner began a five-year term of supervised
relief.
On

(ECF No. 157).
August

3,

2016,

when

Petitioner

had

still

not

supplemented his motion after more than two years, Petitioner
was ordered to show cause as to why his motion should not be
denied as moot noting that Petitioner had served his term of
imprisonment.

(ECF No. 161).

Petitioner responded arguing that

the petition was not moot because his supervised release was a
form of custody.

He asserted timeliness on the ground that

Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), established a
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new right and he had filed the petition within one year of the
decision.

Based on his interpretation of Descamps, he requested

the court reduce his term of supervised release because he was
no longer a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.
(ECF No. 162).

In its response, Respondent argued that the

motion was untimely because Descamps had not established a new
right, the claim was procedurally defaulted, challenges to the
application of the career offender guidelines are not cognizable
in a collateral review, and the term of supervised release was
appropriate.
II.

(ECF No. 165).

Analysis
A

one-year

petitions

filed

statute
under

of

28

limitations

U.S.C.

§

2255.

shall

run

applies

to

Section

provides that:
The limitation
latest of—

period

from

the

(1) the date on which the judgment of
conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to
making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by
such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively
applicable
to
cases
on
collateral review; or
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habeas
2255(f)

(4) the date on which the facts
supporting the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Here, Petitioner asserts timeliness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f)(3) arguing that Descamps established a new right made
retroactively applicable.

Descamps, however, only “clarified

whether courts may apply the modified categorical approach to
assess, for [Armed Career Criminal Act] sentencing enhancement
purposes, the violent nature of a defendant’s prior conviction
under

an

indivisible

criminal

statute[.]”

Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2013).
stated

outright

modified

that

categorical

a

sentencing

approach

Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2285.
resolve[d]” the issue, id. at

States

v.

In Descamps, the Court

court

for

United

an

could

not

indivisible

use

the

statute.

There, precedent had “all but
2283, and a different result

“would [have] contravene[d] [the Court’s] prior decisions and
the principles underlying them,”

id. at 2282.

Thus, Descamps

did not establish a new rule of law but applied an existing one.
United States v. Morgan, 845 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2017) (“We
agree with our sister courts that Descamps did not establish a
new rule.”); Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 734 (11th Cir.
2016)

(“Descamps

merely

did

clarified

not

announce

existing

a

new

precedent.”);

rule

—

Headbird

its
v.

holding
United

States, 813 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We agree with other
circuits

that

the

decision

in Descamps
4

was

dictated

by

the

general principles set forth in existing precedent and did not
establish a new rule.”); Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762,
766 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme Court did not announce a new
rule in Descamps.”); United States v. Montes, 570 F.App’x 830,
831 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Descamps decision did not recognize a new
right.”); United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir.
2014) (“The Supreme Court in Descamps explained that it was not
announcing a new rule”).

Therefore, Petitioner’s motion, filed

more than five years after judgment was entered, will be denied
as untimely, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), and Respondent’s motion
to dismiss will be granted.

(ECF No. 165).

III. Motion to Seal
Because Respondent’s motion to dismiss has limited public
value, much of the information is already available, and it
contains personal and confidential information, the unopposed
motion to seal Respondent’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
See In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1984).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to correct sentence

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner will be denied, the
motion to dismiss filed by Respondent will be granted, and the
motion to seal filed by Respondent will be granted.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court is also required to issue or
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deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.

A certificate of appealability is a

“jurisdictional

prerequisite”

earlier order.

United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 659 (4th

Cir. 2007).

to

an

appeal

from

the

court’s

A certificate of appealability may issue “only if

the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”
motion

is

denied

appealability
demonstrate
debatable

on

will

both

whether

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(B)(2).
procedural

not

“(1)
the

issue

that

grounds,
unless

jurists

petition

of

states

a

the

certificate
petitioner

reason
a

Where a

would

valid

claim

of
can

find
of

it
the

denial of a constitutional right and (2) that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.”

Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th

Cir. 2001) (internal marks omitted).
Upon review of the record, the court finds that Petitioner
does not satisfy the above standards. Accordingly, the court
will decline to issue a certificate of appealability on the
issues which have been resolved against Petitioner.
A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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