Maddox v. USA -2255
Filing
2
MEMORANDUM OPINION as to Laray Anthony Maddox. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 9/12/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LARAY ANTHONY MADDOX
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 14-1936
Criminal No. DKC 08-0430-002
:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
are:
(1)
a
motion filed by Petitioner Laray Anthony Maddox (“Petitioner”)
to correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (ECF No. 134);
(2) a motion to dismiss Petitioner’s motion to vacate filed by
Respondent
United
States
of
America
(“Respondent”)
(ECF
No.
165); and (3) an unopposed motion to seal filed by Respondent
(ECF No. 166).
The issues have been briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the motion to correct sentence will
be denied, the motion to dismiss will be granted, and the motion
to seal will be granted.
I.
Background
On
December
4,
2008,
Petitioner
pleaded
guilty
to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute
fifty or more grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
846 and felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
(ECF No. 56).
On June 8, 2009, Petitioner
was sentenced.
Based on two prior Maryland convictions for
second degree assault, he was found to be a career offender and
received a sentence enhancement pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”) § 4B1.1.
sentenced to 180 months.
He was
(ECF No. 165, at 1-2).
On March 19, 2014, Petitioner’s sentence was reduced to 92
months because of a change in the Sentencing Guidelines made
retroactive pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(u).
(ECF No. 128).
On
June 14, 2014, Petitioner filed a motion to correct sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
issues
presented”
and
The motion did not “fully brief the
requested
petition at a later time.”
“leave
to
(ECF No. 134).
supplement
this
On November 21,
2014, Petitioner’s sentence was reduced to 77 months because of
another change in the Sentencing Guidelines.
(ECF No. 157).
On
May 18, 2015, Petitioner began a five-year term of supervised
relief.
On
(ECF No. 157).
August
3,
2016,
when
Petitioner
had
still
not
supplemented his motion after more than two years, Petitioner
was ordered to show cause as to why his motion should not be
denied as moot noting that Petitioner had served his term of
imprisonment.
(ECF No. 161).
Petitioner responded arguing that
the petition was not moot because his supervised release was a
form of custody.
He asserted timeliness on the ground that
Descamps v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2276 (2013), established a
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new right and he had filed the petition within one year of the
decision.
Based on his interpretation of Descamps, he requested
the court reduce his term of supervised release because he was
no longer a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines.
(ECF No. 162).
In its response, Respondent argued that the
motion was untimely because Descamps had not established a new
right, the claim was procedurally defaulted, challenges to the
application of the career offender guidelines are not cognizable
in a collateral review, and the term of supervised release was
appropriate.
II.
(ECF No. 165).
Analysis
A
one-year
petitions
filed
statute
under
of
28
limitations
U.S.C.
§
2255.
shall
run
applies
to
Section
provides that:
The limitation
latest of—
period
from
the
(1) the date on which the judgment of
conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to
making a motion created by governmental
action in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States is removed, if the
movant was prevented from making a motion by
such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right
asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively
applicable
to
cases
on
collateral review; or
3
habeas
2255(f)
(4) the date on which the facts
supporting the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Here, Petitioner asserts timeliness pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255(f)(3) arguing that Descamps established a new right made
retroactively applicable.
Descamps, however, only “clarified
whether courts may apply the modified categorical approach to
assess, for [Armed Career Criminal Act] sentencing enhancement
purposes, the violent nature of a defendant’s prior conviction
under
an
indivisible
criminal
statute[.]”
Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2013).
stated
outright
modified
that
categorical
a
sentencing
approach
Descamps, 133 S.Ct. at 2285.
resolve[d]” the issue, id. at
States
v.
In Descamps, the Court
court
for
United
an
could
not
indivisible
use
the
statute.
There, precedent had “all but
2283, and a different result
“would [have] contravene[d] [the Court’s] prior decisions and
the principles underlying them,”
id. at 2282.
Thus, Descamps
did not establish a new rule of law but applied an existing one.
United States v. Morgan, 845 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2017) (“We
agree with our sister courts that Descamps did not establish a
new rule.”); Mays v. United States, 817 F.3d 728, 734 (11th Cir.
2016)
(“Descamps
merely
did
clarified
not
announce
existing
a
new
precedent.”);
rule
—
Headbird
its
v.
holding
United
States, 813 F.3d 1092, 1097 (8th Cir. 2016) (“We agree with other
circuits
that
the
decision
in Descamps
4
was
dictated
by
the
general principles set forth in existing precedent and did not
establish a new rule.”); Ezell v. United States, 778 F.3d 762,
766 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The Supreme Court did not announce a new
rule in Descamps.”); United States v. Montes, 570 F.App’x 830,
831 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Descamps decision did not recognize a new
right.”); United States v. Davis, 751 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir.
2014) (“The Supreme Court in Descamps explained that it was not
announcing a new rule”).
Therefore, Petitioner’s motion, filed
more than five years after judgment was entered, will be denied
as untimely, see 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), and Respondent’s motion
to dismiss will be granted.
(ECF No. 165).
III. Motion to Seal
Because Respondent’s motion to dismiss has limited public
value, much of the information is already available, and it
contains personal and confidential information, the unopposed
motion to seal Respondent’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
See In re Knight Pub. Co., 743 F.2d 231, 236 (4th Cir. 1984).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to correct sentence
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner will be denied, the
motion to dismiss filed by Respondent will be granted, and the
motion to seal filed by Respondent will be granted.
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court is also required to issue or
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deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order
adverse to the applicant.
A certificate of appealability is a
“jurisdictional
prerequisite”
earlier order.
United States v. Hadden, 475 F.3d 652, 659 (4th
Cir. 2007).
to
an
appeal
from
the
court’s
A certificate of appealability may issue “only if
the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.”
motion
is
denied
appealability
demonstrate
debatable
on
will
both
whether
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(B)(2).
procedural
not
“(1)
the
issue
that
grounds,
unless
jurists
petition
of
states
a
the
certificate
petitioner
reason
a
Where a
would
valid
claim
of
can
find
of
it
the
denial of a constitutional right and (2) that jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling.”
Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th
Cir. 2001) (internal marks omitted).
Upon review of the record, the court finds that Petitioner
does not satisfy the above standards. Accordingly, the court
will decline to issue a certificate of appealability on the
issues which have been resolved against Petitioner.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
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