Webb-El v. Stewart et al
Filing
12
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/21/2014. (c/m 11/21/14 ca2s, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
KEITH BRYAN WEBB-EL,
*
Petitioner,
*
v.
*
TIMOTHY S. STEWART,
*
Civil Action No. PWG-14-1961
*
Respondent.
***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending are the Response to Show Cause Order and Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.6, and
Motion to Seal Records, ECF NO.8, that Respondents Warden Timothy S. Stewart and the
United States Parole Commission (the "Commission") filed, as well as Petitioner Keith Bryan
Webb-EI's Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's dismissal of his constitutional claims, ECF
No. 10.
Petitioner also seeks an order to hold this case in abeyance while he exhausts
administrative
claims,
and he opposes
Respondents'
motions.
Id. Respondents
oppose
Petitioner's motion insofar as it seeks reconsideration and stay and abeyance, but concede that
redacted copies of the records sought to be sealed may be filed on the Court's public docket.
ECF No. 11. On that basis, Respondents'
follow,
Respondents'
Motion
Motion to Seal will denied.
to Dismiss
will be granted,
For the reasons that
and Petitioner's
Motion
for
was sentenced to serve life imprisonment
on
Reconsideration will be denied.
By way of background,
Petitioner
September 19, 1985, after he was convicted of the second-degree murder of his six-year-old
stepson.
He currently
is incarcerated
at the Federal
Correctional
Institution
(FCI) in
Cumberland, Maryland, and he filed his Petition to challenge the Commission's decision to deny
his mandatory parole. Pet., ECF NO.1.
Specifically, he asserts that the construct of the federal
parole statute entitles him to mandatory parole following service of thirty years on his life
sentence and, in the event he is not paroled, he must be provided a reason. Id.; see 18 U.S.c.
S 4206(d);
28 C.F.R.
S 2.53(a).
The initial decision provided to Petitioner did not contain a
statement explaining why parole was denied. Notice, Pet. Ex. B, ECF No. 1-2.
On initial review, I dismissed Petitioner's constitutional claims, such that the sole issue
remaining for response is whether he was entitled to mandamus relief regarding the statement of
a reason for the denial of his mandatory parole. Mem. & Order, ECF Nos. 4 and 5. The parties
agree that Petitioner now has received a statement of a reason for the decision to deny parole.
However, as noted, Petitioner seeks reconsideration of my earlier decision dismissing his
constitutional claims. He contends that I improperly construed the constitutional claims raised.
According to Petitioner, he raised two constitutional claims.
S 4206( d) creates
First, he claimed that 18 U.S.C.
a protectable liberty interest because it contains mandatory terms for release on
parole. He cites Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979) in support of his assertion it is a violation of his right to due process to deny his release on
parole. Pet.'s Mot. 3-4.
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court examined the parole consideration procedures in place
in Nebraska and observed:
There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence. The natural
desire of an individual to be released is indistinguishable from the initial
resistance to being confined. But the conviction, with all its procedural
safeguards, has extinguished that liberty right: "[G]iven a valid conviction, the
criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty." Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976).
Decisions of the Executive Branch, however serious their impact, do not
automatically invoke due process protection; there simply is no constitutional
guarantee that all executive decision-making must comply with standards that
assure error-free determinations. See id., at 225; Montanye v. Haymes, 427
2
U.S. 236 (1976); Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 n. 9 (1976). This is
especially true with respect to the sensitive choices presented by the
administrative decision to grant parole release.
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7. While the Court recognized that a statutory scheme may give rise to a
liberty interest if there are provisions requiring certain results or limiting the material considered
by a paroling authority, that sort of statutory scheme is not present in this case. The operable
statutory language in this case is as follows:
Any prisoner, serving a sentence of five years or longer, who is not earlier
released under this section or any other applicable provision of law, shall be
released on parole after having served two-thirds of each consecutive term or
terms, or after serving thirty years of each consecutive term or terms of more
than forty-five years including any life term, whichever is earlier. Provided,
however, that the Commission shall not release such prisoner if it determines
that he has seriously or frequently violated institution rules and regulations or
that there is a reasonable probability that he will commit any Federal, State,
or local crime.
18 U.S.C. ~ 4206(d) (emphasis supplied).
The Commission retains not only the power, but a
duty to deny release on parole of any prisoner the Commission determines is likely to re-offend.
In Petitioner's case, that determination was made. See Post Hr'g Assessment 3, Respondents'
Mot. Ex. 28, ECF No. 7-13 ("This Examiner finds there is a reasonable probability the subject
would commit new federal, state or local crimes upon release, based on the information noted.").
The statute does not create a reasonable expectation of release on parole simply by virtue of the
passage of time.
Petitioner states that his second claim is "that the Parole Commission violated his
substantive, and procedural due process and equal protection of the law Fifth Amendment
Constitutional rights [w]hen the Commission denied him mandatory parole ... without providing
him with a valid statement ofreasons."
Pet.'s Mot. 4. The failure of the Commission to comply
3
with a ministerial act is not a constitutional claim, but, as I noted in my prior decision, is a basis
for mandamus relief. Therefore, Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration will be denied.
In light of the undisputed fact that the ministerial act now has been performed and
Petitioner has been provided a reason for the Commission's decision, there is no further remedy
available from this Court. "A habeas corpus petition is moot when it no longer presents a case or
controversy under Article III,
9
2, of the Constitution."
Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691
(10th Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). "This case-or-controversy
requirement subsists through 'all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate."
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990). The parties must continue to have a
"personal stake in the outcome" of the lawsuit. Id. at 478 (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95, 101 (1983)).
Thus, Petitioner's remaining claim is moot and will be dismissed.
See
Aragon, 144 F.3d at 691.
Petitioner's
Commission's
request for "stay and abeyance" pending his administrative appeal of the
decision appears to be based on his concern that he will be denied a judicial
remedy if this case is dismissed. A stay and abeyance is available only in limited circumstances
and may be granted only rarely, as it effectively excuses a failure to exhaust a claim. See Rhines
v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 277 (2005). Petitioner made no effort to exhaust administrative review
of his claim prior to filing his Petition, and the mandamus relief sought has been provided.
Accordingly, the Petition must be dismissed by se arate
rder, which follows.
Paul W. G imm
United States District Judge
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