Manzur v. Daney et al

Filing 17

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 4/29/2015. (C/M 4/29/15)(kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Le’BRAYYA MANZUR, #925692
Plaintiff

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v.
DANISHA DANEY1
TARA BARRIS-STEWART

CIVIL ACTION NO. PWG-14-2268

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Defendants

CORRECTED MEMORANDUM
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights action seeks money damages against two correctional
officers. Plaintiff Le’Brayya Manzur (“Manzur”), a Maryland Division of Correction (“DOC”)
prisoner currently incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women (“MCI-W”),
claims that on April 26, 2013, she objected when Officer Tara Barris-Stewart (“Barris-Stewart”)
placed her in handcuffs that were too tight. The verbal exchange became heated. Manzur states
that Sergeant Danisha Daney (“Daney”) then entered the cell and pushed Manzur, who was
handcuffed, causing her to fall over a box on the floor in her cell. Manzur, who alleges her cries
for help were ignored for close to an hour, sustained a broken arm that required surgical repair as
a result of the fall. ECF No. 1, at 3–8.
Defendants, through counsel, have filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment, as supplemented (ECF Nos. 8 and 13) which is opposed by
Manzur (ECF No. 12). Defendants contend that Manzur was belligerent, complaining about the
tightness of the handcuffs.
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When she would not calm down, she was denied a shower.

The Clerk shall amend the docket to reflect the full and proper spelling of defendants’ names.

Defendants allege that no contact between corrections officers and Manzur occurred; Manzur
simply tripped over a box in her cell, and promptly was taken to the medical department without
further incident. Defendants provide documents (including declarations under oath) concerning
the investigation of the incident as well as relevant medical records, and they argue that
Manzur’s allegations should be dismissed because they were not fully addressed through the
prison administrative remedy process.
For the reasons that follow, defendants’ motion, construed as a motion for summary
judgment, IS DENIED.
Standard of Review
“‘The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion [to dismiss] is to test the sufficiency of a
complaint.’” McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). A
Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by the defendant that, even if the facts that plaintiff
alleges are true, the complaint fails, as a matter of law, “to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Therefore, in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a court must “‘accept[ ] as true the well-pled facts in the complaint and view[] them in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.’” Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 505 (4th Cir.
2011) (citation omitted).
Defendants’ motion, however, relies on materials outside the pleadings, and is construed
as a motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),
which provides in part:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

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The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will
defeat the motion: By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported
motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis omitted). “The party
opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere
allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d
514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in
her favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness credibility.” Dennis v.
Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 644–45 (4th Cir. 2002). Because Manzur is
self-represented, her submissions are liberally construed. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007). But the court must also abide by the “‘affirmative obligation of the trial judge to
prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial.’” Bouchat, 346 F.3d
at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th
Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)).
Analysis
Defendants have raised an affirmative defense to Manzur’s claims of excessive use of
force and denial of prompt medical care. They allege that the complaint must be dismissed in its
entirety due to Manzur’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. ECF No. 8-1, at 8–11.2
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Applicability of administrative remedies
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This Memorandum reflects the pagination assigned by the court’s electronic docketing system.

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No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
As a prisoner, Manzur is subject to the strict requirements of the exhaustion provisions.
It is of no consequence that she is aggrieved by a single incident, as opposed to asserting a
general conditions-of-confinement claim. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 528 (2002) (no
distinction is made with respect to exhaustion requirement between suits alleging
unconstitutional conditions and suits alleging unconstitutional conduct). Exhaustion also is
required even though the relief sought is not attainable through resort to the administrative
remedy procedure. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 (2001).
A claim that has not been exhausted may not be considered by this court. See Jones v.
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 220 (2007). Administrative remedies must, however, be available to the
prisoner and this court is “obligated to ensure that any defects in administrative exhaustion were
not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478
F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007). The Fourth Circuit has addressed the meaning of “available”
remedies:
[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner,
through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it. See
Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 478 F. 3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); Kaba v.
Stepp, 458 F. 3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). Conversely, a prisoner does not
exhaust all available remedies simply by failing to follow the required steps so
that remedies that once were available to him no longer are. See Woodford v.
Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006). Rather, to be entitled to bring suit in federal court, a
prisoner must have utilized all available remedies “in accordance with the
applicable procedural rules,” so that prison officials have been given an
opportunity to address the claims administratively. Id. at 87. Having done that, a
prisoner has exhausted his available remedies, even if prison employees do not
respond. See Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006).

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Moore v. Bennette, 517 F. 3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008).
Thus, Manzur’s claims must be dismissed if defendants raise the affirmative defense and
also prove that she has failed to exhaust available remedies. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 216–17
(failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense and inmates are not required to demonstrate
exhaustion in their complaints).

The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement is designed so that

prisoners pursue administrative grievances until they receive a final denial of the claims,
appealing through all available stages in the administrative process. Chase v. Peay, 286 F. Supp.
2d 523, 530 (D. Md. 2003); Booth, 532 U.S. at 735 (affirming dismissal of prisoner’s claim for
failure to exhaust where he “never sought intermediate or full administrative review after prison
authority denied relief”); Thomas v. Woolum, 337 F.3d 720, 726 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that a
prisoner must appeal administrative rulings “to the highest possible administrative level”); Pozo
v. McCaughtry, 286 F. 3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (prisoner must follow all administrative
steps to meet the exhaustion requirement, but need not seek judicial review).
Defendants assert that on July 16, 2013, Manzur filed an Internal Grievance Office
(“IGO”) grievance alleging she was pushed by Daney. The grievance was administratively
dismissed on September 30, 2013, when Manzur failed to respond to a request for additional
documents. Declaration of Scott S. Oakley ¶ 3, ECF No. 8-10.
This assertion is specious; once the Department of Public Safety and Correctional
Services’ Internal Investigations Unit (“IIU”) initiates investigation, the matter no longer is
subject to the ARP process. See Oliver v. Harbough, No. ELH-11-996, 2011 WL 642044, at *4
(D. Md. Dec. 19, 2011). I therefore find that the claims concerning the alleged shoving incident
and the delay in providing medical treatment have been exhausted. It is clear from the evidence
submitted by Defendants that, because the matter was deemed a serious incident and

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immediately was referred to the Internal Investigation Unit (“IIU”), administrative remedies
were unavailable to Manzur for purposes of this claim. See Moore, 517 F. 3d at 725 (“an
administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of
his own, was prevented from availing himself of it”). Thus, Defendants’ invocation of the
affirmative defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies fails, and Manzur’s Eighth
Amendment claim alleging excessive use of force must be examined on the merits.
Whether force used by prison officials was excessive is determined by inquiring if “force
was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and
sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U. S. 1, 6-7 (1992). This Court must
look at the need for application of force; the relationship between that need and the amount of
force applied; the extent of the injury inflicted; the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates as reasonably perceived by prison officials; and any efforts made to temper the severity
of the response. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U. S. 312, 321 (1986). Here, the parties agree that
Manzur sustained a serious injury as a result of her fall, but dispute whether Defendants were
responsible for the fall. Thus, there exists a genuine dispute of material fact that requires
credibility determinations not appropriate for resolution on summary judgment. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).
With regard to Manzur’s medical claim, the Eighth Amendment prohibits “unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain,” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976), and scrutiny under
the Eighth Amendment “is not limited to those punishments authorized by statute and imposed
by a criminal judgment.” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F. 3d 630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). In the
context of delay or denial of medical care, an Eighth Amendment violation arises when the
actions of a defendant, or the failure to act, amount to deliberate indifference to a serious medical

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need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105–06 (1976). Deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need requires proof that, objectively, the prisoner plaintiff was suffering from a serious
medical need and that, subjectively, the prison staff were aware of the need for medical attention
but failed either to provide it or to ensure the needed care was available. See Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
Manzur claims that she was not provided prompt medical treatment for her serious injury
and that defendants laughed at her and ignored her, rather than calling immediately for help. The
exhibits provided by defendants indicate that the incident occurred around 9:15 a.m. ECF No. 83, at 5. By 10:39 a.m. Manzur’s arm had been x-rayed by prison medical staff, the fracture
diagnosed, and plans for transportation to an outside hospital were underway. ECF No. 8-8, at
2–3. The reason for any delay between the time of injury and the time Manzur was taken to the
medical department is not adequately explained by defendants, precluding the granting of
summary judgment on this claim.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment filed on behalf of Defendants will be
denied. A separate order, setting further deadlines, follows.

April 29, 2015_
(Date)

_____/s/____________
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge

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