Pawlak v. United States Department of Education et al

Filing 24

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 21 motion for rehearing (c/m to Appellant 4/1/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 4/1/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
IN RE: ELIZABETH JULIA PAWLAK
:
_________________________________
:
ELIZABETH JULIA PAWLAK
Appellant

:

v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2326

:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION
Appellee

:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

bankruptcy appeal is a motion for rehearing filed by Appellant
Elizabeth J. Pawlak (“Ms. Pawlak” or “Appellant”) (ECF No. 21).
The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule 105.6.

See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8012; Local

For the reasons that follow, the motion will be

denied.
I.

Background
The facts and procedural history in this bankruptcy appeal

have been explained in a prior opinion and need not be repeated.
(See ECF No. 18).

This case involves an appeal from two orders

of the bankruptcy court concerning a discovery dispute in an
adversary
loan.

On

proceeding
October

regarding
16,

2014,

dischargeability
the

court

issued

of
a

a

student

memorandum

opinion and order construing Appellant’s timely-filed notice of
appeal from discovery-related orders entered by United States
Bankruptcy Judge Wendelin I. Lipp as a motion for leave to file
an interlocutory appeal, and denying the motion.
19).

(ECF Nos. 18 &

Appellant filed a motion for rehearing on October 30,

2014, which she supplemented on October 31, 2014.
& 21).

(ECF Nos. 20

Appellee opposed the motion (ECF No. 22), and Appellant

replied (ECF No. 23).
II.

Standard of Review
The United States District Court for the District of South

Carolina identified the appropriate standard in considering a
motion for rehearing in Baurnhaft v. McGuffin, C/A No. 4:06-CV3617-RBH, 2007 WL 3119611, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007):
Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8015 provides that “a motion
for rehearing may be filed within 1[4] days
after entry of the judgment of the district
court . . .”
“The purpose of Rule 8015 is
to provide recourse to a party . . . after a
district court . . . has overlooked or
misapprehended some point of law or fact.”
10 Collier on Bankr.P. 8015.01 (15th ed.rev.
2004).
Although Rule 8015 does not specify
the standard for ruling on a petition for
rehearing, it appears that most courts have
looked by analogy to Fed.R.App.P. 40. . . .
Appellate Rule 40 provides that petitions
for rehearing must include points which the
court
allegedly
overlooked
or
misapprehended.
Petitions for rehearing
should not simply reargue the plaintiff’s
case or assert new grounds. See Sierra Club
v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1100-01 (10th Cir.
1988).

2

At base, motions for rehearing are “designed to ensure that the
appellate court properly considered all relevant information in
rendering its decision.”

In re Zegeye, Civ. No. DKC 04-1387,

2005 WL 544763, at *1 (D.Md. Mar. 4, 2005).
III. Analysis
Appellant

believes

that

the

court

“misapprehended

the

standard set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), in order to determine
whether to grant leave to hear a bankruptcy appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3).”

(ECF No. 21, at 3).

As explained in

the prior opinion, leave to file an interlocutory appeal should
be

granted

only

when:

1)

the

order

involves

a

controlling

question of law, 2) as to which there is substantial ground for
a

difference

of

opinion,

and

3)

immediate

appeal

materially advance the termination of the litigation.

would

See KPMG

Peat Marwick, LLP v. Estate of Nelco, Ltd., Inc., 250 B.R. 74,
78 (E.D.Va. 2000).
not

the

test

the

Although Appellant insists that “[t]his is
Court

used

here,”

this

was

precisely

the

standard the court applied in determining whether to grant Ms.
Pawlak’s motion.

The opinion explained:

The Fourth Circuit has previously stated
that
the
rule
against
review
of
interlocutory orders applies with particular
force in the discovery context, as allowing
immediate
appeal
of
orders
resolving
discovery disputes would only disrupt court
proceedings and clog the appellate courts
with matters more properly managed by the
court familiar with the parties and their
3

controversy.
See MDK, Inc. v. Mike’s Train
House, Inc., 27 F.3d 116, 119 (4th Cir.
1994);
see
generally
Murphy
v.
Inmate
Systems, 112 F.App’x 882, 883 (4th Cir. 2004)
(dismissing for lack of jurisdiction an
appeal of the district court’s denial of a
discovery motion).
Other district courts
have also held that an order granting or
denying discovery is ordinarily a nonappealable interlocutory order under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b).
See, e.g., McCann v.
Commc’ns Design Corp., 775 F.Supp. 1506,
1534 (D.Conn. 1991) (“[A]n order granting or
denying discovery is ordinarily a nonappealable interlocutory order which is
reviewable only upon final judgment or order
and in the circumstances presented does not
involve such a controlling question of law
as to allow immediate appeal under section
1292(b).”).
The discovery orders issued by
Judge Lipp do not involve a controlling
question of law.
(ECF No. 18, at 13-14).

The court determined that Appellant did

not satisfy any of the three factors above.

Ms. Pawlak largely

attempts to reargue the points raised in her appeal, which the
court considered and rejected.
the

court’s

application

of

Appellant’s disagreement with

the

relevant

standard

does

not

provide a basis for rehearing.
Based on the foregoing, it is this 1st day of April, 2015,
by

the

United

States

District

Court

for

the

District

of

Maryland, ORDERED that:
1.

The motion of Appellant Elizabeth Pawlak for rehearing

(ECF No. 21) BE, and the same hereby IS, DENIED; and

4

2.
foregoing

The

clerk

Memorandum

is

directed

Opinion

and

to

transmit

this

Order

copies
to

of

the

counsel

for

Appellee and directly to Appellant Elizabeth J. Pawlak.

________/s/__________________________
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

5