Austin v. Ford

Filing 12

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 3/31/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/31/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ALEXIS V. AUSTIN
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2426

:
EUGENE FORD, SR.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is
an unopposed motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Eugene Ford,
Sr. (ECF No. 10).
African

American

According to the complaint, Plaintiff, an
female,

was

employed

by

Community

Foundation until her termination in June 2009.
4).
her

Services

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 1,

Plaintiff believes that Mr. Ford terminated her because of
religion

(Id. ¶ 1).
differently
provides

and

failure

attend

“Angela

Bowen’s

Church.”

Plaintiff asserts that her supervisor treated her
from

similarly

no

additional

Furthermore,

Plaintiff

Foundation

to

discriminated

situated

details

to

contends
against

employees,
support
that

her

by

although

this

she

allegation.

Community
“denying

Service
her

[a]

reasonable accommodation for her stress” in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act.

(Id. ¶ 16).

On July 30, 2014, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a
complaint against Eugene Ford, Sr. – the purported owner of

Community Service Foundation - asserting claims for religious
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq..
Plaintiff also asserts a failure to accommodate claim under the
Rehabilitation Act, although nowhere in the complaint does she
identify a disability that substantially limits one or more of
her

major

life

activities

or

the

accommodation

Defendant moved to dismiss on October 31, 2014.

requested.

(ECF No. 10).

Defendant contends, inter alia, that: (1) there is no basis for
imposing

liability

on

Mr.

Ford

individually;

complaint fails to state a viable claim.

and

(2)

the

Plaintiff was provided

with a Roseboro notice (ECF No. 11), which advised her of the
pendency of the motion to dismiss and her entitlement to respond
within

seventeen

(17)

days

from

the

date

of

the

letter.

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310 (4th Cir.1975) (holding
pro

se

plaintiffs

should

be

advised

of

their

right

responsive material to a motion for summary judgment).

to

file

To date,

Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to the motion, and the
time

for

her

to

do

so

has

long

expired.

See

Local

Rule

105.2(a).
Because

Plaintiff

failed

to

file

an

opposition

to

the

motion, the undersigned has the discretion to dismiss the case
without

reaching

the

merits.

Judge

Hollander

dismissed

the

complaint in White v. Wal Mart Stores, Inc., Civil Action No.
2

ELH-13-00031, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2 (D.Md. Apr. 4, 2014), where
a

pro

se

dismiss.

plaintiff

failed

to

oppose

defendant’s

motion

to

Judge Hollander stated that “[w]hen a plaintiff fails

to oppose a motion to dismiss, a district court is ‘entitled, as
authorized, to rule on the . . . motion and dismiss [the] suit
on

the

uncontroverted

bases

asserted’

in

the

motion.

Id.

(quoting Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir.
2004)); Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children’s Guild, 742 F.Supp.2d
772,

777

(D.Md.

2010)

(“By

her

failure

to

respond

to

[defendant’s] argument” in a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff
abandons [her] claim.”).
Although the district court also has discretion to decline
to “grant a motion to dismiss based on the failure to file a
timely opposition when the motion is plainly lacking in merit,”
this is not the case here.

White, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2

(quoting United States v. Sasscer, Civ. No. Y-97-3026, 2000 WL
1479154, at *2 n.6 (D.Md. Aug. 25, 2000)).

Moreover, a district

court has “the inherent authority . . . to dismiss a lawsuit sua
sponte for failure to prosecute.”

United States v. Moussaoui,

483 F.3d 220, 236 (4th Cir. 2007); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370
U.S. 626, 629 (1962); White, 2014 WL 1369609, at *2 (“[i]n light
of plaintiff’s failure to oppose the [m]otion, I can only assume
that plaintiff concedes that her Complaint is deficient for the
reasons stated by defendant.”).
3

There is no obvious lack of

merit in Defendant’s motion given the allegations contained in
Plaintiff’s complaint.
Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

4