Joy v. United of Omaha Life Insurance Company

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/28/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
GERALD JOY
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2447

:
UNITED OF OMAHA LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is
a

motion

to

seal

Insurance Company.

filed

by

Defendant

(ECF No. 16).

hearing being deemed necessary.

United

of

Omaha

Life

The court now rules, no

Local Rule 105.6.

For the

following reasons, the motion to seal will be granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Gerald Joy filed a complaint on July 31, 2014

against United of Omaha Life Insurance Company alleging he was
denied short term disability benefits for which he believes he
is eligible.

(ECF No. 1).

On September 18, 2014, the parties

filed a stipulation of dismissal subject to conditions.
No. 6).

(ECF

The parties agreed that Plaintiff would submit, and

Defendant would review, a long term disability application.
the

event

that

long

term

disability

benefits

were

In

denied

Plaintiff, and after Plaintiff exhausted all his administrative

remedies,

then

Defendant

would

waive

service

of

process

and

consent to the reopening of this case.
On May 2, 2016, the parties filed a consent motion to reopen
and amend which was granted.

(ECF No. 8).

Plaintiff filed an

amended complaint (ECF No. 11) and Defendant thereafter filed an
answer (ECF No. 12).
On June 8, 2016, the court convened a telephone conference
with counsel.
the

The parties reported that they intended to file

administrative

record,

that

it

was

Defendant would be moving to seal it.

voluminous,

and

that

At that time Plaintiff

consented to the sealing of the administrative record.

The

parties also agreed to participate in mediation and agreed to a
briefing schedule with respect to summary judgment motions.

As

anticipated, Defendant filed the instant consent motion to seal
on July 7 (ECF No. 16) and a paper copy of the administrative
record (consisting of two banker boxes) on July 11, 2016.
Analysis
“The right of public access to documents or materials filed
in a district court derives from two independent sources:
common law and the First Amendment.”

the

Va. Dep’t of State Police

v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th Cir. 2004).

“The common

law presumes a right of the public to inspect and copy ‘all
judicial records and documents,’” id. at 575 (quoting Stone v.
Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855 F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988)),
2

although

this

presumption

“can

be

rebutted

if

countervailing

interests heavily outweigh the public interests in access.”

Id.

(quoting Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249,
253 (4th Cir. 1988)); see also Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589, 597–99 (1978).

Under this common law balancing

analysis, “[t]he party seeking to overcome the presumption bears
the burden of showing some significant interest that outweighs
the presumption.”
under

the

common

Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253.
law[,]

the

decision

“Ultimately,

whether

to

grant

or

restrict access to judicial records or documents is a matter of
a district court’s ‘supervisory power,’ and it is one ‘best left
to the sound discretion of the [district] court.’”

Va. Dep’t of

State Police, 386 F.3d at 575 (quoting Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598–
99) (second alteration in original).
In addition to the public’s common law right of access, the
First Amendment provides a “more rigorous” right of access for
certain “judicial records and documents.”

Va. Dep’t of State

Police, 386 F.3d at 575-76; see also In re Application of the
United

States

2703(D),

707

“significant”

for
F.3d

an

Order

283,

distinction

290

Pursuant
(4th

between

Cir.
the

to

18

2013)
two

U.S.C.

Section

(explaining

rights

of

the

access).

Where the First Amendment does apply, access may be denied “only
on the basis of a compelling governmental interest, and only if

3

the

denial

is

narrowly

tailored

to

serve

that

interest.”

Stone, 855 F.2d at 180.
“For a right of access to a document to exist under either
the First Amendment or the common law, the document must be a
‘judicial record’” in the first instance.
707

F.3d

at

290.

The

Fourth

Circuit

In re Application,
held

that

judicially

authored or created documents are “judicial records,” as are
documents

filed

with

the

court

that

“play

a

role

in

adjudicative process, or adjudicate substantive rights.”

the
Id.

(citing Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252; In re Policy Mgt. Sys. Corp.,
67 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision)).
example,

“the

more

rigorous

standard

should

.

.

.

apply

For
to

documents filed in connection with a summary judgment motion in
a civil case.”

Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d at 578

(quoting Rushford, 846 F.3d at 253) (alteration in original).
The Fourth Circuit also recently reminded us that:
It is well settled that the public and press
have a qualified right of access to judicial
documents and records filed in civil and
criminal
proceedings.
See
Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
580 n. 17, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973
(1980);
Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306, 55
L.Ed.2d 570 (1978); Media Gen. Operations,
Inc. v. Buchanan, 417 F.3d 424, 428 (4th
Cir. 2005). The right of public access
springs from the First Amendment and the
common-law tradition that court proceedings
are presumptively open to public scrutiny.
Va. Dep't of State Police v. Wash. Post, 386
4

F.3d
567,
575
(4th
Cir.
2004).
“The
distinction between the rights of access
afforded by the common law and the First
Amendment is significant, because the common
law does not afford as much substantive
protection to the interests of the press and
the public as does the First Amendment.” In
re United States for an Order Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 2703, 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th
Cir. 2013) (quoting Va. Dep't of State
Police, 386 F.3d at 575) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The common-law presumptive
right of access extends to all judicial
documents and records, and the presumption
can be rebutted only by showing that
“countervailing interests heavily outweigh
the public interests in access.” Rushford,
846 F.2d at 253. By contrast, the First
Amendment secures a right of access “only to
particular judicial records and documents,”
Stone, 855 F.2d at 180, and, when it
applies, access may be restricted only if
closure is “necessitated by a compelling
government interest” and the denial of
access is “narrowly tailored to serve that
interest,” In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d
383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Press–
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
510, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Doe v. Public Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 265-66 (4th Cir. 2014).
Thus,

as

a

substantive

matter,

when

a

district

court

is

presented with a request to seal certain documents, it must
determine two things:

(1) whether the documents in question are

judicial records to which the common law presumption of access
applies; and (2) whether the documents are also protected by the
more

rigorous

Application,

First

707

F.3d

Amendment
at

290;

5

right
see

of

also

access.

Va.

Dep't

In
of

re

State

Police,
requires

386
the

F.3d

at

party

576.

seeking

In

addition,

sealing

to

Local

include

Rule
“(a)

105.11

proposed

reasons supported by specific factual representations to justify
the sealing and (b) an explanation why alternatives to sealing
would not provide sufficient protection.”
In the instant motion, Defendant states that the record
includes

numerous

medical

records

and

other

documents

which

contain sensitive and private information of the Plaintiff such
as his date of birth and social security number.

Upon careful

consideration, any alternative to sealing the record such as
redacting identifying and other sensitive personal information
to protect Plaintiff’s privacy interest would be burdensome and
so extensive that it would render meaningless anything revealed.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s consent motion to
seal will be granted.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

6