Alexander v. UIP Property Management

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 3/30/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
TIFFANY ALEXANDER
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2469

:
UIP PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

disability discrimination case is Defendant’s motion to dismiss
the amended complaint.

The issues have been fully briefed, and

the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule

105.6.

For

the

following

reasons,

the

motion

Local

will

be

denied.
I.

Background
In

her

amended

complaint,

Plaintiff

Tiffany

Alexander

asserts that Defendant UIP Property Management, Inc. (“UIP” or
“Defendant”)

violated

her

rights

under

the

Americans

with

Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.,
and the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §
2601, et seq.

Plaintiff, who suffers from hyperthyroidism and

Graves’ Disease, was employed as an assistant property manager
for UIP from January 6, 2011 until her termination on or about
December

29,

2012.

(ECF

No.

12-1

¶¶

18-19,

24).

Between

October

2012

and

her

termination,

Plaintiff

informed

her

supervisor, Katrina Crews, of her “thyroid issues” that required
ongoing medical treatment for the next two to three years.
¶ 29).

(Id.

Plaintiff tried to schedule her appointments on days off

from work, but informed her supervisor that she might need to
take several hours off from work every few weeks.

(Id. ¶ 30).

Plaintiff’s requests for time off for medical appointments in
October, November, and December were approved.

(Id. ¶¶ 32-33).

Plaintiff alleges that on December 29, 2012, Ms. Crews told
her that effective December 31, 2012, her position was being
eliminated due to budget cuts.

The amended complaint alleges:

35.
That
same
day,
[the
supervisor]
instructed other individuals present to exit
the office where Ms. Alexander was located,
leaving [the supervisor] and Ms. Alexander
alone.
36. [The supervisor] then locked the office,
barring the only exit from the room.
37. Ms. Alexander did not consent to be held
in a locked office with [the supervisor.]
38.
[The
supervisor]
then
handed
Ms.
Alexander a Separation Agreement and General
Release
(“Agreement”)
in
the
Columbia
Heights location’s office.
39. Ms. Alexander took no part in drafting
the Agreement.
40. [The supervisor] held out a pen and told
Ms. Alexander that she had to sign the
Agreement to receive a severance payment.
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41. Ms. Alexander was not told that she
could consult counsel before signing the
Agreement and still receive the severance
payment.
42. Ms. Alexander was not given any time to
read the Agreement.
In fact, while she
attempted to read the document she had just
been given, [the supervisor] distracted Ms.
Alexander by explaining to her that she was
being terminated due to budget cuts, and
that she had to sign the form to get a small
severance payment.
43. Plaintiff was not permitted time to
consult with an attorney so that she could
understand what she was signing.
44.
[The
supervisor’s]
oppressive
distractions led to Ms. Alexander signing
the
Agreement
without
knowingly
and
voluntarily realizing that she would be
waiving any legal claims she had against the
Defendant.
45. [The supervisor’s] conduct led Ms.
Alexander to believe that she had to sign
the Agreement.
46. [The
Alexander
attorney,
document.

supervisor] did not inform
that
she
could
consult
after Ms. Alexander signed

Ms.
an
the

47.
Defendant’s
severance
payment
was
insubstantial in comparison to a waiver of
all claims by Ms. Alexander.
Several weeks later, Plaintiff learned that her position
had not been eliminated, but a new employee had taken her former
position.

(Id. ¶ 48).

Plaintiff alleges, on information and

belief, that Defendant did not terminate a co-worker who was
3

also

suffering

accommodation.

from

a

disability,

but

who

did

not

seek

an

(Id. ¶ 49).

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she was
terminated in violation of the ADA because of her disabilities
(count I); that Defendant retaliated against her for requesting
an

accommodation

Defendant

for

interfered

her
with

disabilities
her

FMLA

(count

II);

rights

and

(count

that
III).

Defendant has moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(6),

contending

that

the

release

signed bars her from pursuing the claims waived.
14).

Plaintiff

(ECF Nos. 13 &

Plaintiff opposed the motion (ECF No. 15), and Defendant

replied (ECF No. 16).
II.

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Presley v. City of
Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff’s complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
4

a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).
In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court may consider
allegations

in

the

complaint,

matters

of

public

record,

and

documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are integral to
the complaint and authentic.

See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l

Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

While affirmative

defenses may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule
12(b)(6),

such

a

motion

should

be

granted

only

in

the

rare

circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative
defense clearly appear on the face of the complaint.
PraxAir,

Inc.,

494

F.3d

458,

464

(4th

Cir.2007)

Goodman v.
(en

banc).

Moreover, a movant cannot merely show that the elements of the
defense

appear

on

the

face

of

the

complaint

or

in

properly

considered documents, but must also “show that the plaintiff’s
potential rejoinder to the affirmative defense was foreclosed by
the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 466.
III. Analysis
Although in her amended complaint Plaintiff refers to the
Agreement she signed, she did not attach a copy.

Defendant,

however, has provided a copy as an exhibit to its motion to
dismiss, (ECF No. 14-1), contending it is authentic and integral
5

to the complaint, and thus can be considered on a motion to
dismiss.

Plaintiff counters that the release is invalid because

it

executed

was

under

duress,

and

thus

disputes

its

“authenticity.”
An affirmative defense, such as release, is not ordinarily
considered on a motion to dismiss because the plaintiff is not
required to negate it in the complaint.
Agreement

is

or

is

not

authentic,

Whether the copy of the

Defendant

has

failed

to

establish that the affirmative defense that the parties entered
into a valid release is apparent on the face of Plaintiff’s
amended

complaint.

As

noted,

even

if

the

elements

of

the

defense appear on the face of the complaint, or in properly
considered
rejoinder

documents,
to

the

the

movant

affirmative

allegations in the complaint.

must

defense

also
is

show

that

foreclosed

by

any
the

Defendant has not done so here.

To determine whether the release forecloses her claims, the
court must examine whether it was signed under duress, or was
knowing and voluntary.

Randolph v. Caruso Homes, Inc., Civ.

Case No. RWT-13-2069, 2014 WL 4661985, at *4-5 (D.Md. Sept. 16,
2014).

Unlike the situation in Randolph, which was resolved on

summary judgment and not on a motion to dismiss, the totalities
of circumstances are not so clearly established on the current
record.

As set forth above, the amended complaint alleges that
6

the Agreement was presented to Plaintiff under a “take it or
leave it” scenario, that Plaintiff was locked in a room with her
supervisor

who

distracted

her

from

fully

reading

and

understanding the Agreement, and contrary to Paragraph 12 of the
Agreement, Plaintiff purportedly was not advised about her right
to consult an attorney before signing the release.

(See ECF No.

14-1, at 4; ECF No. 12-1 ¶¶ 41-43).
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss

will be denied.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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