Alexander v. UIP Property Management

Filing 43

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 1/12/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
TIFFANY ALEXANDER
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2469

:
UIP PROPERTY MANAGEMENT, INC.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

disability discrimination case are: cross-motions for summary
judgment

filed

by

Defendant

UIP

Property

Management,

(“Defendant”)

(ECF

No.

28)

and

Plaintiff

(“Plaintiff”)

(ECF

No.

36);

and

Defendant’s

discovery (ECF No. 28).
briefed,

and

the

court

necessary.

Local

Rule

Defendant’s

motion

for

Tiffany

Inc.

Alexander

motion

to

stay

The relevant issues have been fully
now

rules,

no

hearing

105.6.

For

the

summary

judgment

being

deemed

following

reasons,

will

granted.

be

Defendant’s motion to stay discovery will be denied as moot, and
Plaintiff cross-motion for summary judgment will be denied.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background1

Plaintiff
property
1

was

manager

employed

from

by

January

Defendant
5

until

as

an

December

assistant
31,

2012.

The following facts are uncontroverted, alleged
Plaintiff, or construed in the light most favorable to her.

by

Plaintiff was diagnosed with hyperthyroidism in October 2012,
and

she

medical

later

learned

conditions

that

affect

she

has

the

Graves’

proper

disease.

functioning

These
of

the

endocrine system, and Plaintiff was referred for further testing
and

treatment.

supervisor,

In

Katrina

October
Crews,

2012,

that

Plaintiff

she

requiring ongoing medical treatment.

had

informed

“thyroid

her

issues”

Plaintiff kept Ms. Crews

informed regarding her treatment needs and presented Ms. Crews
with a schedule of appointments from October 2012 to January
2013.

Until

Plaintiff’s

Plaintiff’s

requests

for

dismissal,

leave

from

Ms.

work

to

Crews

granted

attend

medical

appointments.
On December 29, 2012, Ms. Crews informed Plaintiff that
Plaintiff’s position was to be eliminated due to budget cuts,
effective December 31, 2012.

Ms. Crews met with Plaintiff alone

in the leasing office, instructing others to leave the room.
Ms. Crews also locked the door from the inside of the office.
Ms.

Crews

presented

to

Plaintiff

a

three-page

Agreement and General Release (the “Agreement”).
29-1).

Separation

(See ECF No.

In the second amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that

“Ms. Crews’ oppressive distractions led to [Plaintiff] signing
the Agreement without knowingly and voluntarily realizing that
she

would

Defendant.”

be

waiving

any

legal

(ECF No. 27 ¶ 46).
2

claims

she

had

against

In the Agreement, Defendant

offered
weeks’

Plaintiff
pay

Defendant.

–

in

more

than

exchange

three

for

a

(ECF No. 29-1 ¶¶ 2, 8).

thousand
release

of

dollars
claims

–

three

against

According to the Agreement:

The
release
of
employment-related
Claims includes, but is not limited to: any
Claims under any local, state or federal
laws
prohibiting
discrimination
in
employment, including without limitation,
the federal Civil Rights Acts, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, the Older
Workers
Benefit
Protection
Act,
the
Americans with Disabilities Act; Claims
under
the
Employee
Retirement
Income
Security Act or the Family Medical Leave Act
. . . ; or any other Claim alleging a legal
restriction on the [Defendant’s] right to
terminate any of its employees.
(Id. ¶ 9).

Plaintiff alleges that she took no part in the

drafting of the Agreement and that Ms. Crews did not inform her
that

she

Agreement.

could

consult

with

counsel

(ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 41, 43, 48).

before

signing

The Agreement, however,

provides that:
[Plaintiff]
acknowledges
that
[Defendant] has advised [her] to consider
this agreement carefully, and advised [her]
of [her] right to consult an attorney before
signing
the
agreement.
Employee
also
acknowledges that [she] has been afforded 21
days from the day that [she] received the
document to consider the agreement prior to
signing it.
[Plaintiff] has the right to
revoke the agreement for a period of 7 days
after signing this agreement by giving
written notice to [Defendant] . . . .
By
signing
this
Agreement,
[Plaintiff]
acknowledges that [she] freely, voluntarily,
and without coercion, entered into the

3

the

agreement
terms.
(ECF

No.

29-1

¶

and

agreed

12).

The

to

be

by

signed

parties

bound

its

the

Agreement

on

December 29, 2012 and Plaintiff’s last day in the employ of
Defendant

was

December

Agreement

within

31.

seven

days

Plaintiff
of

its

did

not

execution,

revoke

and

the

Plaintiff

retained the consideration she received.
Plaintiff

also

alleges

that,

several

weeks

after

her

employment was terminated, she learned that her position was not
eliminated,

but

that

a

position with Defendant.
B.
On

new

employee

had

taken

her

former

(ECF No. 27 ¶ 50).

Procedural History
June

29,

2013,

Plaintiff

contacted

the

U.S.

Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to report allegations
of discrimination and retaliation.

On April 30, 2014, the EEOC

issued a right to sue letter, which Plaintiff received on May 5.
Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a complaint on August
4, 2014.

(ECF No. 1).

Defendant moved to dismiss the first

amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the
Agreement bars Plaintiff from pursuing her claims.
13; 14).
Defendant

(ECF Nos.

The court denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because
could

not

demonstrate

affirmative

defense

is

foreclosed

complaint.”

(ECF No. 19, at 6).

4

that
by

“any
the

rejoinder

to

the

allegations

in

the

Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint
asserting five counts: termination of Plaintiff’s employment in
violation
(“ADA”),

of
42

against

the

Americans

U.S.C.

Plaintiff

§

12101

for

with
et

Disabilities

seq.

requesting

an

(Count

Act

I);

of

1990

retaliation

accommodation

for

her

disabilities (Count II); interference with Plaintiff’s rights
under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et
seq. (Count III); interference with Plaintiff’s prospective FMLA
rights

(Count

IV);

and

retaliation

against

Plaintiff

attempting to exercise her FMLA rights (Count V).
Defendant

moved

(ECF No. 28).

for

summary

judgment

and

to

for

(ECF No. 27).

stay

discovery.

Plaintiff filed her response and cross-motion for

summary judgment on the claims asserted in the second amended
complaint.

(ECF No. 36).

Defendant replied and responded (ECF

No. 40), and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 41).
II.

Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
A.

Standard of Review

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P.

56(a);

Celotex

Anderson

v.

Corp.

Liberty

v.

Catrett,

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

317,

322

(1986);

477

U.S.

242,

250

(1986);

Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

Summary

judgment is inappropriate if any material factual issue “may
5

reasonably

be

resolved

in

favor

of

either

party.”

Liberty

Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash. Sports
Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact.

However, no genuine

dispute of material fact exists if the nonmoving party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his or her
case as to which he or she would have the burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23.

Therefore, “[a] party opposing a

properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [the] pleadings,’ but
rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.’”

Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football

Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting former
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).

“A mere scintilla of proof . . . will not

suffice to prevent summary judgment.”
F.3d

307,

314

(4th

Cir.

2003).

“If

Peters v. Jenney, 327
the

evidence

is

merely

colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment
may be granted.”
omitted).

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations

At the same time, the court must construe the facts

that are presented in the light most favorable to the party
opposing the motion.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007);

Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.

6

“When

cross-motions

for

summary

judgment

are

before

a

court, the court examines each motion separately, employing the
familiar standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”

Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, 630 F.3d

351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).

The court must deny both motions if it

finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact, “[b]ut if
there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment.”
10A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure §
2720 (3d ed. 1998).
B.

Analysis

The Agreement contains a release provision that, if valid,
would bar the claims Plaintiff now asserts against Defendant.
To

determine

whether

the

release

provision

forecloses

Plaintiff’s claims, the court must examine whether she signed
the

Agreement

voluntarily.

under

duress

and

executed

it

knowingly

and

Randolph v. Caruso Homes, Inc., No. RWT–13–2069,

2014 WL 4661985, at *4–5 (D.Md. Sept. 16, 2014).

In resolving

Defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court determined that, based
on

the

allegations

in

the

complaint,

“the

totalities

of

circumstances [were] not so clearly established on the . . .
record”
however,

to

warrant

Defendant

dismissal.
moves

for

(ECF
summary

No.

19,

at

6).

Here,

judgment

on

Plaintiff’s

second amended complaint, arguing that evidence from Plaintiff’s
7

sworn deposition establishes that there is no factual basis to
dispute the applicability of the Agreement’s release provisions.
(ECF No. 29, at 1).
1.

Duress
In Maryland, duress is “a wrongful act
which deprives an individual of the exercise
of his free will.” Eckstein v. Eckstein, 38
Md.App. 506, 512 (1978).
The wrongful act
may take the form of an “improper threat
which leaves the victim with no reasonable
alternative
other
than
to
execute
the
agreement.”
Employers Ins. Of Wasau v.
Bond, No. HAR-90-1139, 1991 WL 8431, *2
(D.Md. Jan. 25, 1991).
This can take the
form
of
“economic
duress,”
which
is
apparently the basis of [the plaintiff’s]
assertion of duress here. Id. However, the
potential financial impact from the loss of
a job is not, by itself, sufficient to set
aside a contract for duress.
See Cassiday
v. Greenhorne & O’Mara, Inc., 220 F.Supp.2d
488, 492 (D.Md. 2002).
Otherwise, nearly
every
settlement
ending
an
employment
dispute would be voidable at the election of
the employee. See id.

Randolph, 2014 WL 4661985, at *4 (footnote omitted).
Plaintiff’s

meeting

with

Ms.

Crews

took

place

in

the

leasing office, which is apparently an apartment living room.
(ECF No. 29-2, at 14, 22).

Ms. Crews entered the room, asked

other people to exit, locked the door from the inside, made
copies of the contract on the copy machine, and then sat down in
front of the leasing office desk.

(Id. at 22).

Plaintiff was

sitting at the desk she normally occupied and Ms. Crews sat
across from her.

(Id. at 14, 22, 24).
8

According to Plaintiff,

Ms. Crews expressed regret that she had “to do this.”
36-3, at 23).

(ECF No.

Ms. Crews explained the 2013 budget and said, “At

this time your position is being eliminated.

This is something

that UIP has decided.

You’ll have three

weeks of pay.”

Here’s the agreement.

(Id. at 24).

Plaintiff had several questions

for Ms. Crews:
I told her this was completely coming out of
nowhere for me because I had recently gotten
a $2,000 bonus, and you know, was looking
forward to going into the 2013 season and
was looking forward to the changes that we
were making at the property. I asked her if
there would be any way that I could, you
know, possibly stay on or if there was, you
know, anything else I could do.
If there
was anything that could be talked about, and
she said, no, this is just what they’ve
decided.
(Id.).

Shortly thereafter, Ms. Crews asked Plaintiff for her

keys.

(Id.

at

25).

The

meeting

lasted

approximately

ten

minutes (id. at 24; ECF No. 29-2, at 28), and “eventually . . .
[Plaintiff] left” the room (ECF No. 29-2, at 24).
These facts do not support a claim of duress, and, in fact,
show that there was no duress.
place

of

Crews.

employment

and

Plaintiff was at her normal

conversed

with

her

supervisor,

Ms.

During the course of the meeting, Plaintiff did not try

to leave the room.

(Id. at 25, 29).

Ms. Crews did not appear

to have any weapons on her person (id. at 16), and Plaintiff
does

not

recall

whether

Ms.

Crews

9

touched

her

at

any

point

during the meeting (id. at 18).

Although Ms. Crews asked people

to leave the room and locked the door from the inside so that
others

could

not

easily

enter,

there

is

Plaintiff could not leave if she had wished.

no

evidence

(Id. at 29).

door could be unlocked and opened from the inside.

that
The

(Id. at 30).

The conversation proceeded in a normal tone of voice (id. at
32), and Plaintiff was able to ask questions, which Ms. Crews
answered (id. at 26).
Plaintiff argues that she signed the Agreement because Ms.
Crews intimidated her and “oppressively distracted [her] from
reading

the

Agreement.”

(ECF

No.

36-2,

at

9).

However,

Plaintiff did not read the Agreement during the meeting because
Ms. Crews was speaking, informing Plaintiff of the budget cuts
and separation payment.

(ECF No. 29-2, at 27).

Plaintiff was

told that she had to sign the Agreement in order to receive
three weeks of severance benefits, but she never asked and was
not expressly told that she had to sign immediately or even that
day, although she assumed that she had to.

Moreover, Plaintiff

only assumed that she had to sign the Agreement immediately
because Ms. Crews placed a pen on top of the Agreement when she
presented it to Plaintiff.

(Id. at 33).

Defendant was under no

obligation to give Plaintiff an extensive period of time to
consider the Agreement, and, in any event, its terms afforded
her twenty-one days to sign the Agreement and seven days to
10

reconsider and revoke consent.

(ECF No. 29-1 ¶ 12).

Given

these undisputed facts, Plaintiff’s assertion that she signed
the Agreement under duress is without merit.
2.

Knowing and Voluntary Execution

Plaintiff also argues that she did not sign the Agreement
knowingly or voluntarily.

(ECF No. 36-2, at 4).

Even if [the plaintiff’s] execution of
the [agreement] was not obtained under
duress, her execution . . . must still have
been knowing and voluntary.
See, e.g.
Cassiday,
220 F.Supp.2d at 493.
The
validity of the [agreement] is determined by
reviewing the totality of the circumstances
surrounding its execution. Id. at 494. The
factors to be considered are (1) [the
plaintiff’s]
education
and
business
experience; (2) the respective roles of [the
defendant]
and
[the
plaintiff]
in
determining the terms and conditions of the
[agreement];
(3)
the
clarity
of
the
[agreement]; (4) the time [the plaintiff]
had to study the [agreement]; (5) whether
[the plaintiff] had the advice of counsel;
(6) whether the employer encouraged the
employee to seek the advice of counsel and
whether the employee had sufficient time to
do so; and (7) the waiver’s consideration.
Id.
The list of factors is non-exclusive,
and no single factor is determinative. Id.
Randolph, 2014 WL 4661985, at *4.
Here,

upon

circumstances,
voluntarily

the

waived

severance payment.

consideration
court
her

finds
rights

of

the

that
in

totality

Plaintiff

exchange

for

of

knowingly
an

the
and

adequate

Plaintiff, a high school graduate, had more

than a decade of experience in property management.
11

(ECF No.

29-2, at 2).

As an assistant property manager, Plaintiff often

worked with leasing agreements and understood the importance of
reviewing contracts before signing them.

(Id. at 12-13).

At

the termination meeting with Ms. Crews, Plaintiff was presented
with the Agreement, which she signed.

There is no indication

that Plaintiff had any involvement in establishing the terms of
the Agreement.

However, the Agreement is only three pages long

and

releases

expressly

all

employment-related

Plaintiff might have against Defendant.

claims

that

(ECF No. 29-1 ¶¶ 8-9).

After the meeting with Ms. Crews, Plaintiff took a copy of the
Agreement with her and reviewed it at home, eventually reading
the entire document.

(ECF No. 29-2, at 5-7).

Although she did

not receive advice of counsel and had not previously signed a
separation agreement, Plaintiff recognized that she was signing
a contract (id. at 9) and understood the purpose of a separation
agreement (id. at 7-8).

Furthermore, the Agreement provided for

a seven-day revocation period during which Plaintiff could have
sought legal counsel.

(ECF No. 29-1 ¶ 12).

As consideration

for executing the Agreement and releasing her claims, Plaintiff
received $3,173 as separation payment, which she has retained.
(ECF No. 29-2, at 11).
The

evidence

voluntarily
revoke it.

in

shows

executing

that
the

Plaintiff
Agreement

acted
and

knowingly

deciding

not

and
to

The Agreement itself expressly provides Plaintiff
12

the opportunity to revoke consent within seven days.

She never

did so, and to this day has not tendered back the severance
payment she received.

While Plaintiff was taken by surprise

when her employment was terminated, she calmly spoke with Ms.
Crews,

asked

pertinent

questions,

informed

Ms.

Crews

of

an

upcoming visit by a vendor (ECF No. 36-3, at 25), tendered her
keys, and took a copy of the Agreement with her upon leaving the
office.
other

Understandably, Plaintiff was occupied by looking for

employment

after

the

termination

meeting,

but

she

had

ample time to read the Agreement, consult with an attorney if
she wished, and decide whether to revoke consent within the
ensuing seven days.

In addition, three weeks’ pay constitutes

adequate consideration for Plaintiff’s release of claims.
Randolph,

2014

WL

4661985,

at

*5

(“[The

plaintiff]

See

received

adequate consideration for her waiver of claims in the form of
two weeks of pay.”).
Plaintiff
Agreement,

and

was

not

the

under

evidence

knowingly and voluntarily.
to

revoke

it,

and

duress

when

demonstrates

she
that

executed
she

did

the
so

“By signing the [Agreement], failing

accepting

payment

under

it,

she

chose

to

forego the uncertainty and expense of a lawsuit in favor of the
certainty of a severance payment.”

Id.

record

that

undermines

the

conclusion

That is, nothing in the
the

Agreement

was

a

bargained-for release foreclosing Plaintiff’s ability to bring
13

claims
[c]ourt

related
will

to
not

her
allow

employment

against

[Plaintiff],

Defendant.

having

“The

knowingly

and

voluntarily waived her rights in exchange for a payment she has
long since accepted, . . . to assert those rights now.”
Accordingly,

under

the

Agreement,

Plaintiff

is

barred

Id.
from

bringing claims against Defendant under the ADA and the FMLA.
Summary judgment will be entered in favor of Defendant.2
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment is granted.
be

denied

as

moot,

Defendant’s motion to stay discovery will
and

judgment will be denied.

Plaintiff’s

cross-motion

for

summary

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

2

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the merits of
her claims will be denied.
14