Anderson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. et al

Filing 31

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 1/6/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
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JENNIFER ANDERSON,
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Plaintiff,
v.

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Case No.: GJH-14-02615

HOME DEPOT U.S.A, INC.,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is a negligence action brought by Plaintiff Jennifer Anderson (“Plaintiff”) against
defendants Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (“Home Depot”), Clifford Chapman (“Chapman”), and
ClosetMaid Corporation (“ClosetMaid”) (collectively, “Defendants”) arising from injuries
sustained by Plaintiff while shopping at a Home Depot store in Maryland on October 30, 2011.
This Memorandum and accompanying Order address ClosetMaid’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No.
22. The Court finds that a hearing is unnecessary in this case. See Local Rule 105.6 (Md.). For
the reasons stated below, ClosetMaid’s Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
I.

BACKGROUND
On October 30, 2011, Plaintiff was shopping at the Home Depot located at 12050

Jefferson Farm Place, Waldorf, Maryland. See ECF No. 13 at ¶ 1. While shopping, Plaintiff was
removing an item from a shelf when a bracket came loose and struck her on the head causing
Plaintiff injuries. See id. at ¶ 3. Plaintiff alleges that ClosetMaid improperly installed the bracket
that came loose and injured Plaintiff. See id. at ¶¶ 32-39. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed a

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negligence action against ClosetMaid in the Circuit Court of Maryland for Charles County.1 See
ECF No. 2. On August 15, 2014, Home Depot removed that action to this Court. See ECF No. 2.
Home Depot has filed its answer. See ECF No. 15. Chapman and ClosetMaid have both filed
separate motions to dismiss. See ECF Nos. 19 & 22. This Memorandum Opinion and
accompanying Order address only ClosetMaid’s motion.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint if it

fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule’s
purpose “is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the
facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Presley v. City of Charlottesville,
464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). To that end, the Court bears in mind the requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009), when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a
complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and must state “a plausible claim for relief,” as
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
III.

DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, ClosetMaid moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint because

it asserts a cause of action for “agency,” which it contends is not a legally cognizable claim in
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Plaintiff also contends that Home Depot and Chapman were negligent in failing to take steps to
prevent her injuries. See ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 1-31.
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Maryland. See ECF No. 22-1 at 4-5. While it is true that Plaintiff has captioned Count IV of her
amended complaint as a claim for “agency,” it is clear that, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s erroneous
title, she is attempting to state a negligence action against ClosetMaid for its alleged failure to
properly install the shelving bracket. See ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 32-39. The Court, under the liberal
pleading standards set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), will construe Count IV as a claim for
negligence against ClosetMaid.
For Plaintiff to state a prima facie claim in negligence, she must allege facts
demonstrating “(1) that the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2)
that the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and (4)
that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty.” Remsburg v.
Montgomery, 376 Md. 568, 831 A.2d 18, 26 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). For
purposes of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has satisfied this initial pleading burden.
First, when viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, she has
adequately alleged that ClosetMaid was under a duty to protect her from injury. Although not a
model of clarity, Plaintiff appears to allege that by undertaking to perform services for Home
Deport that were necessary for the protection of its customers, ClosetMaid owed Plaintiff a duty
of care. See ECF No. 13 at ¶¶ 33-37. This is sufficient to establish a duty under Maryland law. In
Maryland, “[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another
which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of a third person or his things, is
subject to liability to the third person for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise
reasonable care to protect his undertaking, if . . . (b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed
by the other to the third person[.]” In re Sabin Oral Polio Vaccine Products Liab. Litig., 774 F.
Supp. 952, 954 (D. Md. 1991) aff’d, 984 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Restatement (Second)

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of Torts § 324(A) (1965)); see also Miller v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 2d 604, 609 (D. Md.
2004) (recognizing that “[w]hile Maryland appellate courts have not explicitly adopted [this]
section[] of the Restatement, case law holds that they are recognized as part of Maryland law”)
(citing E.G. Rock, Inc. v. Danly, 98 Md.App. 411, 423, 633 A.2d 485 (1993)). It is clear that the
Home Depot, as a storekeeper, was under a legal duty to exercise reasonable care in regard to the
safety of its business invitees, and that pursuant to its arrangement with ClosetMaid, ClosetMaid
had undertaken to perform a certain aspect of this duty on Home Depot’s behalf – namely the
safe installation of its shelving. See Tucker v. KFC Nat. Mgmt. Co., 689 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D.
Md. 1988) (a “storekeeper owes his business invitee the duty to maintain his premises in a
reasonably safe condition and to warn of latent defects or, stated somewhat differently, the duty
of reasonable care for the protection of the business invitee”), aff’d, 872 F.2d 419 (4th Cir.
1989). ClosetMaid therefore owed a duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care in the
installation of its shelving. See Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 12-0753,
2014 WL 3428931, at *7 (D. Md. July 10, 2014) (“By undertaking to repair and install the
refrigerator . . . Sears and its sub-contractor Liberty had a duty to exercise reasonable care in
installing and repairing the refrigerator.”) (emphasis added); Klein v. Dougherty, 200 Md. 22, 29,
87 A.2d 821, 825 (1952) (hired installers had duty to exercise reasonable care in performing
installation work).
Second, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that ClosetMaid breached its duty to protect
Plaintiff from injury by failing “to properly train and supervise their employees and make
diligent and reasonable efforts to ensure that its employees, upon completion of the installation
of the shelf bracket, secured it and inspect[ed] it to confirm that it was not in a dangerous
conditions [sic] for Plaintiff and others who were reasonably expected to come into contact with

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it.” ECF No. 13 at ¶ 35; see also id. at ¶ 37. Third, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that she was
injured (see id. at ¶¶ 4, 39) and, fourth, that those injuries were proximately caused by
ClosetMaid’s negligent hiring, training, supervision, and performance of services (see id. at ¶
38). Plaintiff has therefore alleged a prima facie claim for negligence against ClosetMaid.
ClosetMaid’s motion to dismiss must therefore be denied.
IV.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, Defendant ClosetMaid’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 22) is

DENIED. A separate Order follows.

Dated: January 6, 2015

/S/
George Jarrod Hazel
United States District Judge

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