Beauchamp et al v. State of Maryland et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 7/13/2015. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 7/14/15)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

EDITH J. BEAUCHAMP,
DR. VIRGINIA WALCOTT BEAUCHAMP,
and
K.C.B. and AJ.B., two minor children of Edith
Beauchamp,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND,
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL
SERVICES,
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND MENTAL HYGIENE,
CITY OF GREENBELT, MARYLAND,
THEODORE (TED) DALLAS, Secretary of
Human Resources,
JOSHUA M. SHARFSTEIN, M.D., Secretary
of Health and Mental Hygiene,
GLORIA L. BROWN, Director of Prince
George's County Department of Social
Services,
MICHAEL MCLAUGHLIN, City Manager,
City of Greenbelt,
DOUGLAS F. GANSLER, Attorney General
of Maryland,
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES,
DAVID E. BELLER, Principal Counsel,
Maryland Department of Human Resources,
SHIREEN BLAIR, and
SANDRA 1. BARNES,

Civil Action No. TDC-14-2667

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In 2009, Plaintiff Edith J. Beauchamp became the subject of a child protective services
investigation and was found responsible for child neglect.

She has since been listed in a state

registry of perpetrators of child neglect or abuse. Beauchamp now files suit alleging violations
of her constitutional rights.

Listed as Defendants in this action are the State of Maryland; the

Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene ("MDHMH"); Joshua M. Sharsftein, M.D.,
the Maryland Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene; the Maryland Department of Human
Resources ("MDHR");

Theodore Dallas, the Maryland Secretary of Human Resources;

the

Prince George's County Department of Social Services ("PGCDSS"); Gloria L. Brown, Director
of the Prince George's County Department of Social Services; Douglas F. Gansler, the Attorney
General of Maryland; Sandra 1. Barnes, Assistant Attorney General of Maryland; and David E.
Beller, Principal Counsel of the Maryland Department of Human Resources (collectively, the
"State Defendants,,).l

Beauchamp has also filed suit against the City of Greenbelt, Maryland;

Michael McLaughlin, the City Manager of Greenbelt, Maryland; and Shireen Blair, a Crisis
Counselor for the City of Greenbelt (collectively, the "Greenbelt Defendants").
Currently pending are the State Defendants and the Greenbelt Defendants'
Dismiss.

Also pending is Beauchamp's

Defendants'
Leave");

Motions to

Motion Requesting Additional Time to Respond to

Recent Filings and Special "Attorney" Access to the Pacer System ("Motion for

and Motion

to Request this Court's

Order to Defendants'

to Cooperate

with

Depositions, Requesting a Bench Conference Due to Dispute Over Complying with Discovery,

1 As of the date of this Memorandum
Opinion, Samir Malhotra is the current Secretary of
Human Resources, Van T. Mitchell is the current Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene, and
Brian E. Frosh is the current Attorney General of Maryland. When a government official is sued
in an official capacity and subsequently leaves office, the official's successor is automatically
substituted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). Here, Beauchamp has indicated her intent to pursue
claims against the named government officials in their official capacity. See Pl.'s Ans. Mot.
Two Mots. Dismiss at 7, ECF No. 27. Were this case to continue beyond these Motions, it
would appropriate to substitute in the successors of the named government officials.

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and Requesting the Court's Assistance or Permission to Issue Summons for Additional Records
to Supplement the Complaint ("Motion to Compel").
The motions are ripe for disposition, and no hearing is necessary.
(D. Md. 2014).
Beauchamp's

See Local Rule 105.6

For the reasons that follow, the Motions to Dismiss

are GRANTED.

Motion for Leave is DENIED as to the request to file additional memoranda and

DISMISSED AS MOOT as to the request for access to the electronic court filing system.

The

Motion to Compel is DISMISSED AS MOOT.

BACKGROUND
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are presented as alleged in the Complaint and
the Notarized Statement and Amended/Supplemental

Complaint (the "Amended Complaint").

ECF Nos. 1, 5. This case follows PGCDSS's finding that Beauchamp was responsible for child
neglect based on unsuitable living conditions at the home where she lived with her two minor
children. See Beauchamp v. Prince George's Cnty. Dep'( of Soc. Servs., No. 0523, slip op. at 1
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 21, 2013). On September 16, 2009, police discovered the conditions
while investigating

burglaries in the area.

They alerted PGCDSS shortly afterward.

On

December 12, 2009, after failed attempts to get Beauchamp to improve the conditions, Shamar
Rouse, a Child Protective Services investigator, made a finding that Beauchamp was responsible
for child neglect, and that she had failed to provide her children with proper care and attention.
After conducting a hearing, an administrative law judge ("ALJ") affirmed the findings on June
21,2010.
On April 18, 2012, the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, Maryland upheld the
ALJ's decision. Beauchamp appealed the Prince George's County Circuit Court decision to the
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, where she argued that there was not substantial evidence

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of child neglect because her children had not been placed at a substantial risk of harm. She also
argued that the State did not properly serve her with the record prior to the hearing, and that the
ALJ abused her discretion by limiting Beauchamp's

presentation of evidence and refusing to

admit as evidence certain materials offered by Beauchamp.

On October 12, 2013, the Court of

Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, concluding that substantial

evidence

supported the finding of child neglect, that the State followed proper procedures in serving
Beauchamp with the record, and that the ALJ did not abuse her discretion.

Id at 11-15.

The

Court of Appeals of Maryland denied certiorari on March 24, 2014.
On August 18,2014, Beauchamp, proceeding pro se, filed this action?

ECF No. 1. In

the present case, Beauchamp disputes that the living conditions for her children were unsuitable
. or established a substantial risk of harm. She alleges that the children lived with her mother from
August to October 2009 while Beauchamp

recovered

from a knee injury.

Beauchamp

acknowledges that her house "temporarily was left in a mess" after she injured her knee, but she
maintains that the children did not return to the home until she had obtained Rouse's approval.
Am. Compl. ~ 33, ECF NO.5.
Although Beauchamp does not delineate specific causes of actions against Defendants,
she asserts three categories of claims. First, she alleges a series of errors in the administrative

The Complaint lists Beauchamp, her mother Dr. Virginia Walcott Beauchamp, and her two
minor children as Plaintiffs. The Complaint was signed by Beauchamp only, but a second filing,
which the Court construes as an Amended Complaint, was signed by Beauchamp's mother only.
Collectively, the pleadings seek redress for actions taken entirely against Beauchamp.
The
inclusion of Beauchamp's mother and two minor children as plaintiffs, and the manner in which
the filings were prepared and submitted, present myriad standing and procedural issues. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (concluding that standing requires
plaintiffs in civil cases to have suffered an articulable injury-in-fact); Local Rule 101. 1(a) (D.
Md. 2014) ("Individuals who are parties in civil cases may only represent themselves.").
Because the Court has other legal grounds upon which to dismiss this action and must liberally
construe pro se filings, the filings in this case will be construed as submitted by Beauchamp
alone for the purposes of resolving the pending motions.

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and state court proceedings resulting in the finding of child neglect.

For example, she alleges

that during the state court proceedings, "fraudulent" hearsay evidence was admitted against her.
Compl. at 2, ECF NO.1.

Specifically, she claims that in 2009, Blair fabricated fraudulent

documents and statements that were used in the state proceedings.

Beauchamp also alleges that

she was not allowed to submit her own evidence, was not properly given copies of the evidence
against her, and was not given equal time to present her case.

She alleges that Rouse was

improperly allowed to testify as an expert witness, even though she had not yet taken her
licensing exam.

Beauchamp also alleges that Barnes, the Assistant Attorney General who

represented the PGCDSS before the Court of Special Appeals, fought to exclude the exculpatory
evidence that Beauchamp wanted to present.
Second, Beauchamp alleges that she was falsely arrested by the Prince George's County
Sheriff s Department when she was taken to a hospital for an emergency evaluation on August
18, 2011, based on allegations by Blair that Beauchamp had made "eye contact" with Blair
outside the government building where Blair worked.

Am. Compl. ~ 21. Court filings, which

Beauchamp attached to her memorandum in opposition to the Motions to Dismiss, indicate that
on August 17, 2011, both a Petition for Emergency Evaluation and a Petition for Peace Order
were filed with the District Court for Prince George's County, Maryland.

In the Petition for

Emergency Evaluation, the police officer filing the petition stated that Beauchamp "has been
writing threatening
employees,"

emails to City officials and researching

the history

and address

of

and that Beauchamp "sought out [Blair]' entering a rec. facility illegally, and

confronting [Blair]." Pl.'s Ans. Mot. Two Mots. Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp.") Ex. 6, ECF No. 28-6. In
the Petition for Peace Order, seeking a form of restraining order against Beauchamp, Blair
marked the check boxes for "stalking" and "other: multiple emails to various agencies and

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persons maligning Ms. Blair" as bases for the petition. Id. at 3. In the section provided for
further details, Blair stated that Beauchamp:
Appeared fully clothed in shower area of [the] pool where Blair was showering
and vulnerable and engaged in threatening direct eye contact sustained for several
seconds and sent emails over the course of April - August 2011 accusing Ms.
Blair of various insane acts against her and demanding retaliatory acts against
Blair. . .. She has threatened me personally by approaching me in my most
vulnerable position [while] showering and is accusing me to multiple agencies
and persons of malicious absurd acts demanding they retaliate viciously against
me.

Id.

.

The Prince George's County District Court found probable cause to believe that
Beauchamp "has shown the symptoms of a mental disorder and presents a danger to the life or
safety of the evaluee or others" and ordered law enforcement to take Beauchamp to receive an
emergency evaluation by a physician. PI.'s Opp. Ex. 15 at 3, ECF No. 28-15. Also on August
17, the district court granted a temporary peace order against Beauchamp, finding "reasonable
grounds to believe" that Beauchamp had placed Blair "in fear of imminent serious bodily harm"
and was "likely to commit a prohibited act against [Blair] in'the future." PI.'s Opp. Ex. 6 at 7.
After the district court granted the Petition for an Emergency Evaluation, a sheriff s deputy
"arrested" Beauchamp and transported her to the hospital, from which she was released "a few
hours later." Am. Compi. ~ 21.
Third, she alleges ,a constitutional violation because she is listed in the Central Registry
for Child Protective Services (the "Registry") as a result of the finding of child neglect, and
because there is no means by which to have her name expunged from the registry. Beauchamp
asserts that the Registry does not differentiate between cases involving child neglect or child
abuse, "does not differentiate between criminal charges or ... civil matter[s], and is reportable
nationwide despite these significant lapses in definition or information." Compi. at 4. She
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claims injury from her listing in the Registry because she has been prevented from volunteering
in the classroom with her children and serving as a chaperone or driving a carpool for school
trips, sports activities, and a church youth group. She also claims that she lost her federal
security clearance as a result of the listing.
As relief, Beauchamp seeks an unspecified amount of damages, an injunction ordering a
"Federal review" of the Registry and the alleged violation of Beauchamp's rights, and restoration
of her "reputation and Federal clearances." Id at 6. She also seeks "Justice Department
assistance with a Federal Attorney" to assist Beauchamp to "prosecute this case against the State
and the local municipality." Id Beauchamp also requests expungement of her name from the
Registry and restoration of her reputation.
DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standards
Defendants move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the

Rooker-Feldman

doctrine precludes this Court from reviewing the state court proceedings. A

defendant may by motion seek dismissal of a complaint based on a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l). When a defendant asserts that the complaint fails to
allege facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction can be based, the facts alleged "are taken as
true, and the motion must be denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject
matter jurisdiction." Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (4th Cir. 2009). Generally, when
considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court "may evaluate
the pleadings as evidence on the issue and may consider other evidence in the record without
converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment." Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech.,

7

Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 531 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Velasco v. Gov't of Indon., 370 F.3d 392, 398
(4th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants also move to dismiss for failure to state a claim on a number of grounds,
including Eleventh Amendment immunity, absolute and qualified immunity, and the statute of
limitations.

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the

complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow the Court "to draw the
reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged."

Id.

Legal

conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice. Id. The Court must examine the complaint
as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual
allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
(1994); Lambeth v. Bd. ofComm'rs

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268

of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266,268 (4th Cir. 2005). Pro

se complaints must be liberally construed and are held to a less stringent standard than
documents drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,94 (2007) (per curiam).
The parties have attached multiple exhibits to their memoranda briefing the Motions. For
example, Beauchamp

has attached the ALJ's

opinion, various letters and emails, hospital

records, excerpts of state laws, documentation

that she applied for a handicapped

parking

placard, and pictures of her family. Typically, when deciding a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion, the court
considers only the complaint and any attached documents "integral to the complaint."

Sec

y

of

State for Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007). Because Rule
12(d) requires courts to treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56 where matters outside the pleadings are considered and not excluded, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d),
the Court generally excludes such exhibits from consideration.

8

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as public records of the state court proceedings subject to judicial notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201; see
Lo/avar v. de Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221,224 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005).

II.

Immunity of State Defendants
A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

To the extent that the claims are directed against the State of Maryland, MDHMH,
MDHR, and PGCDSS, and against Sharfstein, Dallas, Gansler, Barnes, Beller, and Brown in
their official capacity, those claims are dismissed because these State Defendants are entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity.

The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of

the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment immunizes
states, state agencies, state instrumentalities, and state officials sued in their official capacities
from suit by private parties in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 389-91 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that
federal court claims for damages against a state official in his official capacity are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment).

Claims against the State of Maryland are dismissed because it is a state,

and claims against MDHMH and MDHR are dismissed because they are state agencies.
PGCDSS is a unit of MDHR and is also a state agency entitled to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.

See Horridge v. St. Mary's Cnty. Dep't o/Soc. Servs., 854 A,2d 1232, 1238 (Md.

2004) (stating that a local department of social services in Maryland is a state agency); Walker v.
Human Resources, 842 A.2d 53, 57 (Md. 2004) (stating that a local department of social services
is a unit of the MDHR).

Because Dallas, Sharfstein, Gansler, Barnes, Beller, and Brown are

state officials, any claims against them are dismissed to the extent that they are sued in their

10

official capacities. Beauchamp has clarified that all of these state officials are sued in their
official capacity only, with the exception of Barnes, who is sued in both her official and
individual capacities. Thus, all claims for damages against Dallas, Sharfstein, Gansler, Beller,
and Brown, and against Barnes in her official capacity, are dismissed.3
B.

Absolute Immunity

To the extent that Barnes is sued in her individual capacity, Beauchamp alleges that
Barnes, as the attorney representing the PGCDSS in the child neglect proceedings, withheld
exculpatory evidence from the tribunals, fought to exclude Beauchamp's evidence, and used
false evidence against Beauchamp in the state-court proceedings. As an attorney or advocate for
the government serving in what Beauchamp acknowledged was a "prosecutorial" role, Am.
Compl. ~ 42, Barnes is entitled to absolute immunity for her decisions and actions in connection
with the child neglect proceedings. Springmen v. Williams, 122 F.3d 211, 214 (4th Cir. 1997);
Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1989). Thus, the Court

dismisses all claims against Barnes in her individual capacity.
III.

Claims Relating to the Child Neglect Proceedings
With respect to the first category of claims, Beauchamp's allegations of errors associated

with the state court child neglect proceedings, Defendants contend that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine bars this Court from hearing those claims. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal
courts from reviewing state court judgments. Washington v. Wilmore, 407 F.3d 274, 279 (4th
Cir. 2005) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005».
"[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate
review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim
Beaucha~p's claim seeking an injunction, which would not be subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity, see Bland, 730 F.3d at 390, is addressed below in Part V.

3

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that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1005-06 (1994).

If applicable, the Rooker-Feldman

exercising subject matter jurisdiction.
Although
proceedings,

Beauchamp

doctrine prevents the Court from

See Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 292.

argues that she does not seek review

of the state court

but rather seeks only damages for the "failures of the City and the State" to

investigate the alleged fraud and deceit by government employees, Pl.'s Opp. at 12, ECF No. 27,
her claims of errors associated with the state court proceedings effectively seek appellate review
of the state court rulings.

Beauchamp raises numerous irregularities with the administrative

proceedings,

including

that fraudulent

documents

and statements were used in the state

proceedings.

She raises the same issues here that she previously raised before the Maryland

Court of Special Appeals, including that she was not allowed to submit her own evidence, and
that she was not given equal time to present her case.

She takes issue with the admission of

expert testimony and the exclusion of allegedly exculpatory evidence.
Beauchamp also challenges the state court's ultimate determination that she engaged in
child neglect and claims injury from that determination.

Beauchamp insists that the child neglect

finding cannot possibly be true, based on a theory that the children were never removed from the
home by PGCDSS.

She claims that the state finding of child neglect, which resulted in her

placement in the Registry, is effecting the harm of preventing her from participating

in her

children's activities. In substance, therefore, Beauchamp's claims relating to the finding of child
neglect seek review of the state court's determination on that issue and allege an injury resulting
from that finding. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars such claims.
To the extent that Beauchamp raises other irregularities with the determination,
Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars those claims as well.

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The Rooker-Feldman

the

doctrine prohibits

"federal claims that are inextricably intertwined with the state court decisions" such that "the
federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before
it." Allstate Ins. CO.

V.

W. Va. State Bar, 233 F.3d 813, 818-19 (4th Cir. 2000) (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

Any additional arguments for overturning the child neglect

finding that can be gleaned from Beauchamp's pleadings would require the Court to conclude
that the ALl and state courts erred in reaching their decisions. Thus, under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Beauchamp's
finding of child neglect and the state proceedings.

IV.

claims relating to the

Those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

Harassment and False Arrest
Beauchamp also asserts claims centering on alleged fraud, harassment, and false arrest by

Crisis Counselor Blair in that she purportedly submitted false information in support of the child
neglect investigation and facilitated a false arrest of Beauchamp when she filed a petition for a
"peace order" (restraining

order) and provided

information

emergency order that resulted in the Prince George's

leading to a petition

for an

County Sheriff s Department

taking

Beauchamp to a hospital for a mental health evaluation. Although Beauchamp does not identify
a specific cause of action, the Court construes these allegations as asserting constitutional claims
under 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983. Section 1983 allows individuals to sue in federal court any person who
violates their federal protected rights while acting under the color of law.
(2012).

42 U.S.c. ~ 1983

For the following reasons, however, these claims are dismissed for failure to state a

claim.

A.

Statute of Limitations

As a threshold issue, to the extent that Beauchamp asserts claims based on fraud or
harassment based on events prior to August 17, 2011, those claims are barred by the statute of

13

limitations.

Because Section 1983 does not contain its own statute of limitations, courts must

draw from the most analogous state law cause of action to determine the appropriate statute of
limitations.

Owens v. BaIt. City State's Atty's Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). Maryland

law provides a general three-year limitations period for civil actions.

Md. Code Ann., Cts. &

Jud. Proc. ~ 5-101 (West 2015). Beauchamp alleges that Blair engaged in fraud and harassment
against her between 2009 and 2011, beginning in 2009 when she allegedly altered documents
fraudulently and faxed them to government officials as part of the child neglect investigation and
culminating in August 2011 when she petitioned for a peace order against Beauchamp and
allegedly' arranged for a false arrest of Beauchamp.

Because Beauchamp filed the original

Complaint on August 18, 2014, any claims relating to Blair's alleged conduct occurring more
than three years earlier is time barred.
The only alleged conduct by Blair that is not time-barred is her submission of a petition
for a peace order against Beauchamp and her contribution to a petition for an emergency
evaluation of Beauchamp, which Beauchamp characterizes as a causing false arrest. Although
Blair filed the petition for a peace order on August 17, 2011, the final day of the three-year
limitations period (August 17, 2014) fell on a weekend.

Beauchamp satisfied the statute of

limitations by filing this action the next workday (August 18, 2014). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)
("When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time ... include the last day of the period,
but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the
end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.").

Cf Owens, 767 F.3d at

388 ("Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations for ~ 1983 claims,
federal law governs the date on which that limitations period begins to run." (citing Wallace v.

14

Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007))). Thus, claims relating to the petitions for a peace order and an
emergency evaluation are not time-barred.

B.

Municipal Governments and Officials

To the extent that Beauchamp asserts claims relating to the petitions for a peace order and
an emergency evaluation against the City of Greenbelt and McLaughlin or Blair in their official
capacities, the claim is dismissed because municipalities and municipal officials are only liable
for constitutional
custom.

violations if the violations occur as a result of a governmental

policy or

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978);

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Beauchamp does not allege
that the City of Greenbelt established a policy or custom that caused the alleged false arrest.
Rather, Beauchamp seeks to hold the City and the municipal officials liable for the filing of
petitions that allegedly resulted in Beauchamp being taken to the hospital for an emergency
evaluation, which are isolated incidents.

Because Beauchamp does not claim that the conduct

resulted from an expressed or implied government custom or practice, any claims relating to the
petitions against the City of Greenbelt, and against McLaughlin and Blair in their official
capacities, are therefore dismissed.
To the extent that Beauchamp alleges that McLaughlin is liable in his individual capacity,
the claims are also dismissed because there is no allegation that he had any personal involvement
in the petitions.

Any claim would be based on his role as a supervisor or manager over others.

But there is no respondeat superior or vicarious liability under Section 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 676-77. Accordingly, any such claim is dismissed.

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C.

Qualified Immunity

The only remaining defendant on claims of harassment and false arrest is Blair, the Crisis
Counselor who filed a petition for a peace order against Beauchamp on August 17, 2011.

She

did not, however, file the petition for an emergency evaluation that resulted in the Sheriffs
Department taking Beauchamp to the hospital for an evaluation.

That petition was filed by a

police officer. Defendants claim that Blair is entitled to qualified immunity from these claims.
Government officials sued in their individual capacity may invoke qualified immunity.
Bland v. Roberts, 730 F.3d 368, 391 (4th Cir. 2013). "Qualified immunity protects government
officials from civil damages in a

9

1983 action insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
Id. (quoting Edwards, 178 F.3d at 250) (internal quotation marks omitted). To overcome a claim
of qualified immunity from a Section 1983 claim, there must be a showing that (I) the
government official violated a federally protected right of the plaintiff; and (2) that right was
clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, in that a "reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right."

Id.

Because one of the purposes of

qualified immunity is to "protect public officials from the 'broad-ranging discovery' that can be
'peculiarly

disruptive of effective government,'"

the Supreme Court has "emphasized

that

qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of a litigation."
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (citations omitted). If the Court determines
that the government official took actions that a reasonable officer could have believed were
lawful, then the official is entitled to dismissal before discovery. Id.
On August 17,2011, Blair submitted a petition for a peace order in which she alleged that
Beauchamp had appeared fully clothed in the shower area where Blair was showering, made

16

sustained eye contact with Blair, sent emails over several months accusing Blair of various acts,
made repeated requests to Blair's employer to take retaliatory actions against her, and had
threatened Blair. In Maryland, an individual may petition a state court for a peace order if she
alleges under oath that, within the previous 30 days, she has been subjected to an "act that places
the petitioner in fear of imminent serious bodily harm" or another of the enumerated bases for a
peace order. Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. ~~ 3-1503(a)(2), 3-1503(a)(7) (West 2015). A
temporary peace order may only be granted after a hearing and after "a judge finds that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has committed, and is likely to commit in the
future" the acts alleged in the petition. ~ 3-1504(a)(1).
That same day, after Blair had appeared before a judge of the District Court for Prince
George's County, the court issued a temporary peace order barring Beauchamp from committing
or threatening to commit "an act which causes serious bodily harm, an act that places Petitioner
in fear of imminent serious bodily harm; assault; rape, attempted rape, sexual offense, or
attempted

sexual offense; false imprisonment;

harassment;

stalking; trespass;

or malicious

destruction of property," Pl.'s Opp. Ex. 6, at 7. It also prohibited Beauchamp from contacting or
harassing Blair, or entering Blair's residence or place of employment.

A final peace order

hearing was scheduled for August 25, 2011, but Blair requested that the petition be dismissed
prior to the hearing.
Beauchamp has failed to demonstrate how Blair's filing of the petition, apparently in
accordance with the legal requirements, violated any law, let alone a clearly established federal
right, especially where court approval was required and granted before any further action.
Although the resulting peace order temporarily barred Beauchamp from engaging in threatening
behavior toward Blair, she does not have a federal right to engage in such activity. Beauchamp

17

certainly has not shown any "clearly established" federal right to be free from a peace order
entered by a state judge. Thus, Blair is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.4
To the extent that the claim is based on a false arrest by the Sheriffs Department when it
took Beauchamp to a hospital for a court-ordered emergency evaluation, Blair is similarly
entitled to qualified immunity.

Maryland law provides that any individual may petition for the

emergency psychological evaluation of another person "if the petitioner has reason to believe
that the individual: (1) Has a mental disorder; and (2) The individual presents a danger to the life
or safety of the individual or of others." Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. ~ 10-622(a) (West 2015).
To safeguard individuals from detention without probable cause, the statute also provides that,
when a petition is filed by someone not licensed in the practice of medical or mental health care,
"the petitioner shall present the petition to the court for immediate review."

~ 1O-623(a). An

emergency evaluation can only be ordered "if the court finds probable cause to believe that the
emergency evaluee has shown the symptoms of a mental disorder and that the individual presents
a danger to the life or safety of the individual or of others." ~ 10-623 (b).
Here, Blair did not personally detain Beauchamp. Although Beauchamp claims that Blair
submitted the petition for an emergency evaluation, the documents she submitted indicate that
the petition was actually submitted by a police officer, not Blair. She therefore did not engage in

Beauchamp's claim is more akin to a claim for common law abuse of process, which prohibits
"the improper use of civil or criminal process in a manner not contemplated by law." Campbell
v. Lake Hallowell Homeowners Ass'n, 852 A.2d 1029,1044 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (quoting
One Thousand Fleet Ltd. P'ship v. Guerriero, 694 A.2d 952, 956 (Md. 1997) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Such a claim, however, would require a showing that Blair did not merely
initiate civil proceedings against Beauchamp, but that there was also some "definite act or threat
not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process."
Id. (quoting One Thousand Fleet, 694 A.2d at 956) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
the facts alleged, Blair did nothing more than file a petition, which would be insufficient to
sustain an abuse of process claim. See id. (concluding that even a bad faith filing of a petition
for a peace order, without more, does not constitute abuse of process).
4

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a false arrest, and she did not submit the equivalent of an affidavit in support of an arrest warrant.
Rather, Beauchamp appears to allege that Blair effectively engaged in a false arrest by virtue of
the fact that she was a source of information for the officer's petition, which was then evaluated
by a state judge and deemed to establish probable cause for the emergency evaluation, and was
then executed by law enforcement officials. Beauchamp has not articulated how Blair's conduct
in providing information toa law enforcement officer at the beginning of this chain of events.
constituted a violation of a clearly established federal right.

Under these circumstances,

the

Court will dismiss the claims on qualified immunity grounds.

v.

The Registry
Beyond her claims for damages, Beauchamp complains about the fact that her name

remains on the Registry, which lists perpetrators of child neglect and child abuse, and that there
is no means by which one's name can be expunged from the list. The Court construes these
allegations as seeking to assert a Section 1983 claim for due process violations.
alleged violations

relating to the Registry,

Beauchamp

As relief for the

seeks an injunction

requiring

an

"investigation" and "Federal review" of the Registry, including "conven[ing] depositions," and.
"Justice Department assistance with a Federal Attorney to help the family prosecute this case."s
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no "State [shall] deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process oflaw."
procedural and substantive components.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, ~ 1. Due process has

Procedural due process requires states to use fair

5 Claims for injunctive relief are not affected by the qualified immunity of government officials.
Lefemine v. Wideman, 672 F.3d 292, 303-04 (4th Cir. 2012). Where qualified immunity is
asserted, federal injunctive relief is an "extreme remedy" only awarded under Section 1983 if the
plaintiff shows "that there is a real or immediate threat that he will be wronged again in a similar
way." Raub v. Campbell, 785 F.3d 876, 885-86 (4th Cir. 2015) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).

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procedures when they deprive a citizen of a liberty, or property interest, which typically requires
"notice and an opportunity to be heard." Kendall v. Balcerzak, 650 F.3d 515, 528-29 (4th Cir.
2011) (quoting Wolfv. Fauquier Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 555 F.3d 311, 323 (4th Cir. 2009)).
Substantive due process asks whether the substance of the state action is permissible "regardless
of the fairness of the procedures" employed.

See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for the City of

BaIt., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,331 (1986))
(internal quotation maiks omitted).
To the extent that Beauchamp is asserting a procedural due process claim on the basis
that she was not afforded adequate means to contest her child neglect designation and to dispute
her inclusion on the Registry, she does not present a viable issue for this Court's review.
Assuming that she had a liberty interest, it is undisputed that Beauchamp was afforded a full
administrative and judicial process to challenge the finding that she was responsible for child
neglect, including an initial determination by the agency, review by an ALl, and review by
Maryland state courts up to the Court of Appeals of Maryland.
George's Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0523, slip op. at 5-6.
procedures.

That Beauchamp

disagrees with the determination

See Beauchamp v. Prince
She availed herself of these
does not mean that her

procedural due process rights were violated.
To the extent that Beauchamp brings a substantive due process claim that her continued
inclusion on the Registry is unconstitutional, she has identified no liberty interest that has been
violated.

Substantive

due process does not prohibit the State from listing Beauchamp's

information in the Registry. See Wildauer v. Frederick Cnty., 993 F.2d 369,373 (4th Cir. 1993)
("The publication of information regarding child abuse or neglect to entities authorized by law to
receive such reports does not state a claim under ~ 1983."). Although Beauchamp claims thatthe

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inability to expunge her entry on the Registry also violates due process, the Fourth Circuit has
noted that expungement of an arrest or criminal record is "a discretionary function of the court,
rarely utilized absent extreme circumstances," and that even though arrest and criminal records
are "matters of public record, easily obtained upon request," there is "no automatic right to
expun(gement]" of such records even when the individual's name has been cleared. See Hodge
v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157,166 (4th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, the Hodge court held that there was no
due process violation arising from the failure to expunge a report of a child neglect investigation
where the allegations proved to be unsubstantiated.

Id. at 166-67. Here, there was a finding of

child neglect that was later affirmed by the Maryland state courts, including the Maryland Court
of Special Appeals, and there is a statutory mechanism by which findings are removed from the
Registry after seven years.

See Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law ~ 5-714(e)(2) (West 2015) ("The

Department without the necessity of a request shall remove from the name of an individual ...
the identification of that individual as responsible for abuse or neglect if no entry has been made
for that individual for 7 years after the entry of the individual's name in a registry.").
Although Beauchamp asserts that her continued presence on the Registry has cost her a
federal security clearance, as well as the ability to volunteer in her children's

school and

community activities, the Hodge court rejected the claim that impact on a security clearance
constituted a property interest that would support a due process claim based on the failure to
expunge a child neglect investigative report. Hodge, 31 F.3d at 165. Under these circumstances,
there is no cognizable due process claim relating to the inability of Beauchamp to have her name
removed from the Registry.

Beauchamp's

due process claims relating to the Registry are

therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim. Because the Court does not find a viable due

21

process claim, it need not address whether it would have the authority to order the Justice
Department or another federal agency to conduct an investigation or review of the Registry.

VI.

Remaining Motions
In the Motion for Leave, Beauchamp requests (l) an extension of time to file a response

to Defendants' memoranda in reply to her opposition to their Motions to Dismiss, and (2) access
to the Court's electronic case filing system.
additional memorandum

Beauchamp's

first request is for leave to file an

even though the Motions to Dismiss are fully briefed.

The Court

construes the request as a motion for leave to file a surreply. "Unless otherwise ordered by the
Court, surreply memoranda are not permitted to be filed." Local Rule 105.2(a) (D. Md. 2014).
Surreply briefs are permitted when "the moving party would be unable to contest matters
presented to the court for the first time in the opposing party's reply." Khoury v. Meserve, 268 F.
Supp. 2d 600, 605 (D. Md. 2003). Here, Defendants' reply briefs reiterate the arguments that
they made in support of the Motions to Dismiss and respond directly to the arguments raised in
Beauchamp's

memorandum

in opposition.

Because

Defendants

raise

no new

Beauchamp's

request for leave to file a surreply brief is denied.

Beauchamp's

claims against Defendants, the Court dismisses as moot Beauchamp's

issues,

Having dismissed all of
second

request, for access to the electronic court filing system.
In the Motion to Compel, Beauchamp asks the Court to require Defendants to participate
In depositions

and other forms of discovery.

Discovery,

commence until the Court issues a scheduling order.

including depositions,

See Local Rule 104.4.

may not

Beauchamp's

Motion was untimely because the Court has not issued a scheduling order in this case.
Nevertheless,

because all claims have been dismissed against the Defendants, the Motion to

Compel is dismissed as moot.

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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 14, and the
Greenbelt Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 15, are GRANTED.

Beauchamp's

Motion

for Leave ECF No. 33, is DENIED, as to leave to file a surreply brief and DISMISSED AS
MOOT as to access to the electronic case management system. Beauchamp's Motion to Compel,
ECF No. 35, is DISMISSED AS MOOT. A separate Order follows.

Date: July

'3, 2015
THEODORE D. C
United States Distn

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