Quattlebaum v. Bank of America, N.A. et al

Filing 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 3/10/2015. (c/m 3/10/15)(kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

TERRY D. QUATTLEBAUM,
Plaintiff,

v.
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
COUNTRYWIDE 1I0ME LOANS, INC.,
and
DELL FRANKLIN fiNANCIAL, LLC,

Civil Action No. TIJC-14-2688

Defendants.

MEMORANIJUM

OI'INION

This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, ECF No.7,

Defendant

Bank of America, N.A. and Defendant Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No.8,

Plaintiff's Motion to Compel, ECF No. 18, and Plaintitrs

Motion for Summary

Judgment, EeF No. 20. Having reviewed the briefs, the Court finds no hearing necessary.

See

Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion to Remand is
DENIED, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, the Motion to Compel is DENIED, and the
Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED.
IIACKGROUNIJ
Plaintiff Terry D. Quattlebaum ("Quattlebaum")

proceeds in this action pro se.

The

Court reads his filings to allege the following. On May 31, 2006, Quattlebaum acquired an
undivided interest in 6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, located in Greenbelt, Maryland,
when his wife Anna Quattlebaum, nee Obee. deeded that property to herself and him as tenants
by the entirety.

Compl. at I. ECF No.2.

see Prince George's County Land Records, Book

25812 at 18, available at http://mdlandrec.net.1

At that time, the property was encumbered by a

mortgage owned by Arlington Capital Mortgage Corporation in the amount of $165,851.00.
Prince George's County Land Records, Book 25812 at 21. On January 23, 2008, Quattlebaum
refinanced the property with Dell Franklin Financial ("Dell"), taking out a mortgage in the
amount of $188,028.00.
170.

CompI. at 1; Prince George's County Land Records, Book 29446 at

On February 21, 2008, that mortgage was sold to Countrywide

("Countrywide").

Home Loans, Inc.

Compl. at 2. Quattlebaum notes that he himself "did not initiate" this sale of

his mortgage to Countrywide.

Id. At some point, the Consumer Protection Division of the

Office of the Attorney General, presumably of Maryland, detennined

that Countrywide

had

engaged in "predatory lending and servicing schemes." Id. Quattlebaum does not identify any
particular fraud or illegality on the part of Countrywide affecting his own mortgage.
2008, Bank of America acquired Countrywide.

CampI. at 2; Mot. Dismiss at 1 n.l.

In July

On August

12,2010, Dell dissolved as a corporate entity. See Notice Removal, Ex. I, at I, ECF NO.1-I.
According to Quattlebaum,

at various points from 2009 to 2012, he made on-time

mortgage payments, but Bank of America "erroneously reported" those payments as late and
thus assessed late fees against him. CampI. at 3. On January 31, 2012, Quattlebaum filed for
bankruptcy pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

S

701, el seq. See /n Re: Quall/ebaum, No. TJC-12-J 1569

(Bankr. Md. 2012). In the February 2012 Summary of Schedules, Quattlebaum's apartment was
valued at $145,500.00, his outstanding mortgage debt was reported as $185,006.00, and Bank of
America (abbreviated as "BAC") was identified as the holder of that mortgage.
Sched. at I & 9, Bankruptcy Docket Entry ("BOE") No. 17. Quattlebaum's

Id., Sum. of

eligible debts were

discharged on May 9, 2012, and his bankruptcy was finalized on May 15,2012.

See id., Order

I The Court takes judicial notice ofland records and court proceedings pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
201(b)(2).

2

Discharging Debtor, HDE No. 23, and Final Decree, HDE No. 25. Quattlebaum's
not one of the debts discharged.

mortgage was

Compl. at 3. Quattlebaum ultimately restructured his mortgage

with Bank of America to lower his monthly payments. In Re: Quattlebaum. Letter to Court from
Quattlebaum, BDE No. 26.
On August 7, 2012, the assignment to Bank of America of the deed of trust for 6970
Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, was executed. Prince George's County Land Records, Book
33943 at 22. That executed assignment was then filed in the land records office on September
10,2012. Id.; CampI. at 2.
On May 22, 2014, Quattlebaum filed suit in the District Court of Maryland for Prince
George's County against Bank of America, Countrywide, and Dell seeking to quiet title to 6970
Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, and seeking damages of $4,372.48 and a reduction of his
outstanding mortgage balance to $94,414.00 for defendants' alleged violation of the Truth In
Lending Act ("TILA"),

15 U.S.c.

("RESPA"),

S

12 U.S.C.

S

1601, el seq., the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act

2601, et seq., Uniform Commercial Code ("U.c.c.")

S

3-501, and

unspecified aspects of "State Common Law." Compl. at 1,4.
Bank of America and Countrywide removed the case to this Court on August 20, 2014 on
the basis of both diversity jurisdiction and federal-question jurisdiction.
ECF NO.1.

See Notice of Removal,

On August 26, 2014, Quattlebaum filed a Motion to Remand the case to state court.

ECF NO.7. On August 27, 2014, Bank of America and Countrywide filed a Motion to Dismiss
for Failure to State a Claim. ECF NO.8. On September 3, 2014, Quattlebaum filed his Response
in Opposition, ECr No. 10, which he amended on September 5, 2014 to correct various "clerical
errors."

Am. Resp. in Opp'n at I, ECF No. 12. On September 22,2014,

Countrywide filed their Reply to Quattlebaum's Response. ECF No. 17.

3

Bank of America and

On October 8, 2014, Quattlebaum filed a Motion to Compel in which he asks the Court to
order Defendants "to produce to Plaintiff the Original Note."

Mot. Compel at 1, ECF No. 18.

On October 24, 2014, Bank of America and Countrywide filed their Response in Opposition to
that Motion.
Judgment.

ECF No. 19. On October 30, 2014, Quattlebaum filed a Motion for Summary

ECF No. 20. Bank of America and Countrywide filed their Response in Opposition

on November 13, 2014, ECF No. 22, and Quattlebaum filed his Reply to that Response on
November 19, 2014, ECF No. 23.
DISCUSSION
l.

Claims Against Dell Franklin

Financial

Dell dissolved as a corporation on August 12, 2010. The capacity ora corporation to sue
or be sued is determined by the laws of the state where the corporation was organized.

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 17(b)(2). Dell was incorporated in Maryland, so its capacity to be sued now that it has
dissolved is governed by Maryland law.
dissolved corporation
"extinguished."

See Notice Removal, Ex. 1 at 2. In Maryland, a

is a "legal non.entity,"

and thus its "power to sue or be sued" is

Dual Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 857 A.2d 1095, \10\ (Md. 2004). Dell is

therefore not a proper party to this lawsuit, so it is dismissed as a defendant.
II.

Quattlebaum's

Motion to Remand

"tAlny civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
,

States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant ... to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing where such action is pending." 28 U.S.c. ~
1441(a) (2012).

Here, Bank of America and Countrywide assert that this Court has original

jurisdiction on two bases: (1) federal-question jurisdiction, meaning that the case involves an
issue of federal law, see 28 U.S.C. ~~ 1331 and 1441(c), and (2) diversity jurisdiction, meaning,

4

as relevant here, that the parties in the case are citizens of different states and the amount in
controversy exceeds $75,000, see 28 U.S.C.

SS

1332 and 1441(b).

Quattlebaum

moves to

remand because the "claim (that] there is complete diversity among the parties is not accurate."
Mot. Remand

7. Quattlebaum does not challenge Defendants' assertion of federal.question

jurisdiction, and indeed reiterates in his Motion to Remand that Defendants did not comply with
TILA or RESPA. ld. , . 12.13. Because Quattlebaum essentially concedes that his case involves
a federal question, his Motion to Remand is denied.
III.

Bank of America and Countl)wide's
Quattlebaum's

Motion to Dismiss

primary legal theory underlying his causes of action seems to be that the

sale of his mortgage from Dell to Countrywide, and then the transfer of the mortgage from
Countrywide to Bank of America, were both fraudulent trdllsactions made in violation of TILA,
RESPA, and state common law. See CampI. at 2, 4. Based on the premise that the transfers
were fraudulent, Quattlebaum argues that Bank of America's ownership of the deed of trust to
6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, is "(c]louded." Resp. in Opp'n. Mot. Dismiss at 3.
More specifically. Quattlebaum argues that while Bank of America may have the deed of trust,

see Resp. in Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at 7, it does not have the original promissory note that
Quattlebaum signed when first taking out the mortgage.

Id at 8. Quattlebaum explains that

\\ithout the note, Bank of America cannot "enforce ... the Deed of Trust" to 6970 Hanover
Parkway, Apartment 101. ld. at 3. This contention leads him to assert additional allegations of
fraud. He claims that because Bank of America cannot produce the note, it has falsified various
documents "to reverse-engineer
Specifically,

the chain of title."

Resp. in Opp'n

Mot. Dismiss at 7.

he alleges that Bank of America has used "[r]obo-signing,

... [fJalse notary

signatures, (and] submission of questionable, inaccurate or patently counterfeit affidavits" to

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fraudulently establish its ownership of Quattlebaum's mortgage. /d

He concludes that Bank of

America is obligated to show that it possesses the "original note," "not a copy, not an electronic
entry," and that unless Bank of America can "Produce the [original] Note," it cannot enforce his
mortgage obligation.

Id at 5, 8. Bank of America and Countrywide move the Court to dismiss

Quattlebaum's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because, in their
estimation, he fails to plead facts sufficient to state a claim for relief as to any of these causes of
action.

A. Le~alStandard
To overcome a Rule l2(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege enough facts to state a
plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

A claim is plausible

when "the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

/d

Legal conclusions or conclusory

statements do not suffice and are not entitled to the assumption of truth. /d. In evaluating the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims, the Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider
the factual allegations in the complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of
Comm'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005).

Complaints filed by pro se

plaintiffs are "to be liberally construed" and "must be held to less stringent standards than fonnal
pleadings drafted by lawyers,"

Erickson v, Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).

However, the

complaint must contain more than "legal conclusions, elements of a cause of action, and bare
assertions

devoid

of

further

factual

enhancement."

ConsumerajJairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009).

6

Nemet

Chevrolet,

Ltd.

v.

In addition, because Quattlebaum's allegations sound in fraud, he is subject to the
heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(h). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) ("In alleging fraud or
mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.").
Under this heightened pleading standard, Quattlebaum must allege '"the time, place, and
contents" of the fraudulent representation, the identity of the person who made the
misrepresentation, and "what he obtained thereby." See Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah
River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999).
B. Quiet Title
A quiet title action enables a plaintiff possessing real property to challenge the validity
of, as relevant here, a defendant's claim "to hold any lien encumbrance" on that same property.
Md. Code Ann., Real Prop.

S

14-108(a). A plaintiff bringing a quiet title action must make two

showings. First, he must show that the defendant with a competing claim has an interest that is
"actually defective, invalid, or ineffective." Kasdon v, G. W. Zierden Landscaping, Inc" 541 F.
Supp. 991, 995 (D. Md. 1982). He must then show that his claim of entitlement to the property
at issue is valid, which requires that he demonstrate he has both possession of the property and
"legal title by 'clear proof.'''

Porler v. Schaffer, 728 A.2d 755, 766--67 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.

1999) (quoting Steward v. May, 73 A. 460 (Md. 1909)). Even taking his allegations as true and
construing them liberally, Quattlebaum fails to offer sufficient allegations on either point and
therefore fails to plead a plausible claim that he is entitled to have title to his apartment quieted
in his favor.
Turning first to the alleged defects in Defendants' claim of title, Quattlebaum appears to
assert that the sale of his mortgage by Dell to Countrywide, and the transfer of the mortgage
from Countrywide to Bank of America, were fraudulent, and thus that Bank of America's

7

entitlement to his property is suspect.
plausible claim.

Quattlebaum's

allegations, however. do not establish a

On the sale of his mortgage from Dell to Countrywide, Quattlebaum alleges

only that he himself did not initiate the sale and that Countrywide was found in other instances to
have engaged in predatory lending practices. The fact that Quattlebaum did not initiate the sale
reveals nothing improper.

It is the lender who

lender who is entitled to receive Quattlebaum's
that entitlement-whether

"O\\o1)S"

the mortgage, in the sense that it is the

payments.

What the lender cbooses to do with

to keep it or to sell it to another financial institution-is

Quattlebaum has no standing to challenge.

a decision

Wolfv. Fed. Nal'/ Morlg. Ass'n, 512 F. App'x 336,

342 (4th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (holding that a mortgagor lacks standing to challcnge the
propriety of the assignment of the note). Nor can one infer fraud from the fact that Countrywide
has been identified as a predatory lender.

Quattlebaum provides no facts specific to his

0\\01)

situation that suggest that Countrywide used predatory practices when purchasing his mortgage
from Dell.

He thus fails to satisfy either the pleading requirements

of Rule 8(a) or the

particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).
Quattlebaum's

allegations relating to the transfer of his mortgage from Countrywide to

Bank of America are equally sparse.

Quattlebaum says nothing about the actual transfer.

Instead, he seems to argue that one can infer that the transfer was fraudulent for two reasons: (l)
during his bankruptcy proceedings, Bank of America "failed to file a proof of claim [to 6970
Hanover Parkway, Apartment

101] for consideration to enforce a valid lien" pursuant to II

U.S.c. ~ 501, which he apparently interprets as a sign that Bank of America was aware it was not
validly entitled to that property, Resp. in Opp'n Mot. Dismiss at I O~ and (2) Bank of America
11;
has falsified a series of documents in an effort to establish its valid entitlement to 6970 Hanover
Parkway, Apartment

101.

As to the first argument, 11 U.S.C.

8

S

501(a) provides that in a

bankruptcy proceeding,

a creditor "may file a proof of claim."

The statute is therefore

permissive, not mandatory, and in practice creditors generally file such a proof of claim only
when the list of creditors and debts provided by the debtor is inaccurate.
note (1978 Acts) ("This subsection is permissive only[.]

See 11 U.S.C.

9

501

It permits filing where some purpose

would be served, such as where a claim ... was incorrectly stated or listed as disputed,
contingent, or unliquidated .... n).

Because Bank of America was not required to file a proof of

claim under II U.S.C. ~ 501, its failure to do so cannot be interpreted

as an implicit

acknowledgment of a defect in its entitlement to 6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101. As to
the second argument, Quattlebaum makes only bare assertions with no factual enhancement.

He

specifies no particular documents that he believes were falsified and necessarily then also cites
no particular evidence pointing to the alleged falsification.

His pleading therefore lacks the

requisite details regarding time, place, and fraudulent contents required under Rule 9(b).
Quattlebaum also asserts that Bank of America's entitlement to 6970 Hanover Parkway,
Apartment 101, is defective because the note (the promissory note obliging him to pay the
amount of his mortgage) and the deed of trust (the title to the property used to secure his
payment of the mortgage) have been separated.

First, Quattlebaum cites no facts to support his

conclusion that the note and the deed have been separated.

Even accepting his premise as true,

Quattlebaum's legal conclusion does not follow. Quattlebaum seems to assert that the separation
of the note and the deed in and of itself renders his mortgage invalid. In Maryland, however, the
right to enforce the deed of trust automatically follows the note, making the two inseparable.
Deutsche Bank Nat. Trust Co. v. Brock, 63 A. 3d 40, 48 (Md. 2013) ("[OJ nee the [promissory]
note is transferred, the right to enforce the deed of trust follows." (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). Courts in this district have therefore repeatedly and appropriately rejected the

9

"separation theory" as a basis for invalidating mortgages. See AfcNeil v. Bank of Amer., No.
DKC-I3-2162,

2014 WL 1831115, at *3 (D. Md. May 7, 2014) ("[Clourts in this district have

rejected this 'separation theory."'); Reed v. PNC Mor/g., No. AW-I3-1536,

2013 WL 3364372,

at *3 (D. Md. July 2, 2013) ("Courts in this district have rejected similar claims based on the
alleged separation of a note from the deed of trust."); Parker v. Deutsche Bank Nat '[ Trust Co.,
No. WMN-12-3358, 2013 WL 1390004, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 3, 2013) (rejecting the separation
theory because the "rights under the Deed of Trust follow the Note").
Quattlebaum's

related assertion that his mortgage is valid only if Bank of America can

produce the original promissory note is also incorrect. Because, in Maryland, the deed and note
cannot be split, "[tJhe title to any promissory note ... conclusively is presumed to be vested in
the person holding the record title to the mortgage."

Md. Code, Real Property, ~ 7-103(a). Bank

of America was assigned the deed of trust to 6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, on August
7, 2012, and therefore is "conclusively presumed" to have the right to enforce the promissory
note attached to that deed of trust. Courts in this district have therefore also repeatedly rejected
this "show me the note" argument. See Jones v. Bank of N. Y Mellon, No. DKC-13-3005, 2014
WL 3778685, at *4 (D. Md. Jul. 29, 2014); Harris v. Household Finance Carp., RWT-14-606,
2014 WL 3571981, at *2 (D. Md. Jul. 18, 2014) (explaining that "there is no recognizable claim"
that a mortgagor must "produce 'wet ink' signature documents" in order for a mortgage to be
valid).
Quattlebaum thus fails to allege facts that would support the conclusion that Bank of
America's entitlement to 6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, is actually defective, invalid,
or ineffective.

Because Quattlebaum relies on flawed legal theories to support the claim that he

has clear title, he cannot allege a plausible quiet title claim.

10

Furthermore, Quattlebaum's challenges to Bank of America's claim in fact underscore
his lack of legal title. Quattlebaum's claim is not that his mortgage was fraudulently erellled;
rather, it is that it was fraudulently transferred to m'o different scrvicers. While Quattlebaum
takes issue \\ith the transfers of his mortgage to Countrywide and Bank of America. he at no
point casts any doubt on the validity of his original mortgage agreement with Dell. Indeed,
Quattlebaum's own claim for relief-to reduce his mortgage balance to $94,4l4.0D-implicitly
admits that his property remains encumbered by a valid lien. When an individual takes out a
mortgage, he transfers legal title of the mortgaged property to the lender, who retains title until
the underlying debt is satisfied. Fagnani v. Fisher, 15 A.3d 282, 289 (Md. 2011).

With

Quattlebaum's own allegations establishing that 6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101,
remains encumbered by a valid mortgage, Quattlebaum cannot plausibly claim that he has clear
legal title, a necessary predicate to succeed on a quiet title claim.
Thus, even ifliberally construed, Quattlebaum's allegations provide no basis to conclude
that Bank of America's entitlement to 6970 Hanover Parkway, Apartment 101, is defective and
therefore that title to that property should be quieted in Quattlebaum's favor.

Because

Quattlebaum's underlying legal theories are invalid, any amendment of this claim would be
futile. Accordingly, Count I is dismissed with prejudice. See U.S. Airline Pilots A,\'S'n v.
Awappa, LLC, 615 F. 3d 312, 320 (4th CiT.2010) (explaining that when any alteration to a cause

of action would be "futile" and have "no impact on the outcome of the motion to dismiss," the
district court need not grant leave to amend).
C. Violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act

Quattlebaum alleges that Defendants failed to adhere to the Truth-in-Lending Act, which
requires that:

11

not later than 30 days after the date on which a mortgage loan is sold or
otherwise transferred or assigned to a third party, the creditor that is the
new owner or assignee of the debt shall notify the borrower in writing of
such transfer, including
(A) the identity, address, telephone number of the new creditor;
(8) the date of transfer;
(e) how to reach an agent or party having authority to act on behalf of
the new creditor;
(D) the location of the place where transfer of ownership of the debt is
recorded; and
(E) any other relevant information regarding the new creditor.
15 U.S.C. ~ 1641(g)(I).
While Quattlebaum provides some facts relating to his theory that the two transfers of his
mortgage were fmudulent, he lays out no facts whatsoever regarding whether he was timely
informed of those transfers as required by TILA. He therefore fails to allege sufficient facts to
establish a plausible claim that the lenders failed to comply with the statute.
Quattlebaum
enhancement,"

provides

nothing

other

than

"bare

assertions

the Court dismisses this claim without prejudice.

devoid

of

further

Because
factual

Nemel Chevrolel, LId., 591

F.3d at 255.
D. Violation of RESPA
The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act was enacted to ensure that mortgage servicers
provide consumers with "greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the
settlement process" and that consumers "are protected from unnecessarily
charges caused by certain abusive practices."

12 U.S.C.

* 2601(a).

high settlement

Although Quattlebaum

alleges that Defendants violated RESPA, he does not specify what provision of the statute is at
issue, instead citing to the statute as a whole. See CompI. at 4 (citing to "12 U.S.C. ~ 2602 et
seq"). Nor does he make clear what actions or inaction on the part of Defendants amounted to
RESPA violations. By not identifying the particular statutory provision or actions at issue,
12

Quattlebaum deprives the Defendants of adequate notice of the substance of his allegations and
prevents this Court from evaluating the merits of his claim. Accordingly, this count is dismissed
without prejudice.
E. Failure to Comply with V.C.C. ~ 3-501

Quattlebaum asserts that Bank of America and Countrywide violated V.C.C. ~ 3-501.
Because the V.C.e. is a model code, it has no legal effect in and ofitsdf.

However, it has been

codified in Maryland as the Commercial Law. See Md. Code Commercial Law ~ 1-103. See
also Harifiird Fire Ins. Co. v. Maryland Nat. Bonk, N.A.• 671 A. 2d 22. 32 (Md. 1996)
(referencing "Maryland's
Quattlebaum's

adoption of the VCC").

The Court accordingly construes

v.e.e. ~ 3-501 claim as a state-law claim made pursuant to Commercial

Law

~ 3-501, which is identical to the V.e.e. provision in all respects. Quattlebaum's allegations on
this count consist only of his claim that "Defendants failed to comply with VCC 3-501[.]"
Compl. at 1. lie nowhere explains how Defendants allegedly violated S 3-501 or connects that
provision with any of the facts he sets out. As with his RESPA claim, then, Quattlebaum
deprives Defendants of adequate notice of the substance of his allegations as to ~ 3-501 and
prevents this Court from evaluating the merits of his cause of action. Accordingly, this count is
dismissed without prejudice.
F. State Common Law

Finally. Quattlebaum alleges that Defendants violated state common law, but other than
asserting a quiet title claim, see supra part III.B, does not specify any particular common-law
cause of action. With Quattlebaum providing no specific legal theory on whieh to base liability,
this cause of action must be dismissed.

13

IV.

Quattlebaum's

Motion to Compel

In his Motion to Compel, Quattlebaum asks the Court to "direct(] Defendants to produce
to Plaintiff the Original Note." Mot. Compel at 1. Quattlebaum's Motion is premature.

Under

Local Rule I 04.4, "discovery shall not commence" until a scheduling order is issued, which does
not occur until after an Answer is filed.

Because Quattlebaum cannot yet propound any

discovery requests, there is no basis to compel responses to those requests.

The Motion to

Compel is therefore denied.

v.

Quattlebaum's

Motion for Summary Judgment

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court must grant summary judgment if
the moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Here, as outlined
above, Quattlebaum has failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plausible claim for relief. He
therefore necessarily fails to establish that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The
Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

14

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Motion to Remand is DENIED, the Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED, the Motion to Compel is DENIED, and the Motion for Summary
Judgment is DENIED. Dell Franklin Financial, LLC is no longer a party in this case.
Quattlebaum is granted leave to amend his Complaint within 21 days of the date of the

Order, but may allege only claims under TILA, RESPA, and V.C.C. ~3-501 against Bank of
America, N.A. and Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. No other claims will be permitted.
A separate Order follows.

Date: March 10, 2015
THEODORE D. CI

A

United States District u ge

15