Laguerra v. U.S. Department of Treasury et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 6/20/2016. (c/m 06/20/2016 bus, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MARGARET A. LAGUERRA,
Plaintiff,
v.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE and
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

Civil Action No. TDC-14-2701

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Margaret A. Laguerra has filed suit against Defendants

the United States

Department of the Treasury ("Treasury"), the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), and the United
States Equal Employment
alleging discrimination

Opportunity Commission

and retaliation

("EEOC")

(collectively,

under the Age Discrimination

"Defendants"),

in Employment

Act

("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. ~~ 621-634 (2012), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII"), 42 U.S.C. ~~ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012). Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment.
and ripe for disposition.

The Motion is fully briefed

No hearing is necessary to resolve the issues.

See D. Md. Local R.

105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Laguerra, the nonmoving
party:

I.

Alleged Discrimination
Margaret Laguerra, who is 68 years old and African American, began working for the

IRS in 1987.

In 1997, she was transferred to the Cincinnati, Ohio Benefits and Services

Retirement Group ("BeST").

Although her supervisor and most of her BeST colleagues were

based in Cincinnati, Laguerra and two others worked at an office in Landover, Maryland, known
as the District of Columbia post-of-duty ("D.C. POD").

In 2003, Laguerra became a Human

Resources Assistant with BeST. In that position, Laguerra prepared retirement benefit estimates
for federal employees.
In December 2005, Sandra Nahrgang, who had served as a Team Lead for Laguerra's
previous supervisor since 2004, became Laguerra's supervisor. Nahrgang and Laguerra became
progressively dissatisfied with each other. Nahrgang harbored concerns about the accuracy and
efficiency of Laguerra's work, and those concerns grew with time. For her part, Laguerra came
to believe that Nahrgang wanted to drive her out of her job because of Laguerra's age. Nahrgang
is about two years older than Laguerra.

She never made any comments about Laguerra's age,

but Laguerra perceived age-related hostility when Nahrgang denied her back-up coverage at the
office, excluded her from office meetings, and behaved in a "standoffish" manner towards her.
Mot. Summ. J. Ex. 7, 2010 Laguerra Dep. at 53-57.

Laguerra also contends that Nahrgang

treated her differently than the other Human Resources Assistants at BeST, Lamour Ushery and
Diann Love. Ushery and Love were approximately 44 and 49 years old, respectively, as of2005.
Both worked in Cincinnati.
Nahrgang sometimes compared Laguerra's performance to that of Ushery and Love.
Laguerra claims that this comparison was unfair since Ushery and Love had a lighter workload
and better training opportunities.

Specifically, Laguerra asserts that she had more work than

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Ushery and Love because she had administrative duties and they did not. The D.C. POD had no
dedicated clerical staff. Laguerra's two co-workers in that office were both Benefits Specialists,
who handled complicated retirement cases and were not assigned administrative tasks.
result, mail sorting fell to Laguerra.

As a

That task involved date stamping the mail, logging it in

BeST's tracking system, reviewing lengthy official personnel files to ensure that they were
complete (even when they were not Laguerra's cases), and ordering missing information for
those files when necessary.
responsibilities.

At some point, Laguerra complained to Nahrgang about these

Nahrgang reduced them, but Laguerra claims that they continued to consume a

large portion of her time. By contrast, Ushery and Love did not have to handle the mail because
Lana Gabbard, who was also a Human Resources assistant with BeST but at a lower General
Schedule grade than Laguerra, Ushery, and Love, processed mail for the Cincinnati office.
Although Laguerra had administrative duties that Ushery and Love did not, Laguerra
handled fewer retirement cases than Ushery or Love.
December

For instance, between June 1, 2010 and

10, 2010, Laguerra was assigned 53 cases.

approximately

300 cases each.

Ushery and Love were assigned

From January 1, 2011 to mid-March 2011, Laguerra was

assigned 38 cases, while Love was assigned 359. Nevertheless, Laguerra claims she shouldered
a "double workload" because she had the dual responsibilities of case work and mail sorting.
2010 Laguerra Dep. at 53.
Laguerra also claims that Ushery and Love benefited from better training opportunities.
Specifically, they were permitted to "shadow" Benefits Specialists.

PI.'s Mem. Resp. Mot.

Dismiss ("Resp.") Ex. 14, Laguerra Training Decl. at 7-8. By observing their more experienced
colleagues, Ushery and Love could improve their job skills without committing errors that would
be recorded in their personnel files. Laguerra was never allowed to shadow a Benefits Specialist.

3

Instead, Laguerra's work was "100 percent quality reviewed," which meant that BeST Team
Leads Loretta Dean and Clarence Lehigh reviewed every assignment
provided her with written feedback about her mistakes.

she completed

and

Although Nahrgang, Dean, and Lehigh

contend that this quality review system was necessary given the persistent errors in Laguerra's
work, Laguerra protests that all of her errors were logged in her personnel file, while the
shadowing by U shery and Love did not generate a paper trail of their mistakes.

Laguerra also

notes that Team Leads "provide mentorship and training" to the Human Resources Assistants in
Cincinnati, but since "there is no one in a managerial capacity at the Washington, D.C. office"
Laguerra has "not had the benefit of such managerial mentorship and training."
Laguerra perceives age discrimination in these disparate training opportunities.

Id. at 8.
She asserts,

"Management does not believe it will recoup the money it spends to train me because of my age
and thus it does not offer me any training sessions." Id.
Laguerradid

receive training during her tenure with BeST. She attended formal sessions

in 1999, 2003, 2005, and 2007. Laguerra also submitted documentation of 25 training sessions
she completed between 1998 at 2006. Nahrgang contends that Laguerra's formal training equals
or exceeds that received by other Human Resources Assistants.
training sessions with Nahrgang

Laguerra also had one-on-one

and Team Leads on several occasions

in Landover

and

Cincinnati. She regularly asked Nahrgang, Team Leads, and Benefits Specialists questions about
her assignments.

The quality review process also generated a steady flow of feedback on her

work over the course of several years. Laguerra disputes that this training offered a meaningful
opportunity for her to improve her performance, arguing that the formal sessions were too
advanced or irrelevant and the quality review feedback was unhelpful.

4

II.

2008 EEO Complaint
From 2001 until 2007, Laguerra received annual performance reviews that generally

rated her work at approximately 3.0 points on a 5.0-point scale, considered "fully successful."
On June 30, 2008, Nahrgang issued a performance review that dropped Laguerra's rating from
3.2 to 1.6, considered "unacceptable."

Of the 229 cases assigned to Laguerra during the

evaluation period, she completed only 22. Of the 22 completed, Laguerra finished only nine
within internal deadlines. Laguerra's unfinished work had to be reapportioned among other
BeST employees. Over that same period, Ushery and Love completed 492 and 206 cases,
respectively. Customers complained that Laguerra did not return their calls or emails. Laguerra
continued to make the same types of mistakes even after they were pointed out to her. Laguerra
claims that she received no advanced notice of the negative performance review. She also
counters that one of the reasons her work was late was because she often did not receive case
files until after the internal deadline for processing them had already passed.
On July 16,2008, Laguerra went out on extended sick leave. For several pay periods in
2008 and 2009, Laguerra's leave status was classified-incorrectly, according to her-as

either

absent without leave or leave without pay. Laguerra also claims that she did not accrue th~ sick
and annual leave to which she was entitled during this period. Nahrgang counters that Laguerra
was put on absent without leave status because she had not provided adequate medical
documentation. Then, Laguerra was put on leave without pay because she had exhausted her
accumulated and donated leave.
On November 14, 2008, while out on sick leave, Laguerra filed an Equal Employment
Opportunity ("EEO") complaint with Treasury. Laguerra returned to work on February 3, 2009,
when she discovered that a color printer had been removed from her cubicle. Because other

5

printers were not working, it had been moved to a location where the Benefits Specialists could
access it.
When Laguerra came back from sick leave, she asked for and received 90 days to retrain.
She did not handle live cases during this period. After 90 days, she was assigned one new case
per day, a case assignment rate lower than that of other Human Resources Assistants. On July 1,
2009, Nahrgang issued another annual appraisal rating Laguerra's performance as unacceptable.
On July 9, 2009, she amended the November 2008 EEO complaint after receiving her
performance rating. The amended complaint alleged that she had been subjected to a ~ostile
work environment on the basis of race, color, age, and retaliation for prior EEO activity. She
cited the 2008 performance review, training and workload disparities between her and her coworkers, and Nahrgang's denial of back-up office coverage as evidence of the hostile work
environment. She also claimed she was retaliated against through the improper calculation and
classification of her sick leave, the removal of the printer, and her 2009 performance rating.
The IRS conducted an investigation and, on August 11, 2011, an EEOC Administrative
Judge ("AJ") granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment. The IRS issued a final order
adopting the AJ's decision.

On May 28, 2014, the EEOC's Office of Federal Operations

affirmed the agency's decision. The Office of Federal Operations found that Laguerra failed to
show that IRS management took the actions about which she complained for discriminatory or
retaliatory reasons.
III.

2010 EEO Complaint

Laguerra claims that while her 2008 EEO complaint was pending, she was subjected to
additional retaliation. In her annual appraisal in June 2010, Nahrgang again rated Laguerra's
performance as unacceptable. During the relevant evaluation period, Laguerra was assigned 127

6

cases. Of the 92 she completed, 53 contained errors, and 90 percent were not finished on' time.
On October 31, 2010, Laguerra filed another EEO complaint with Treasury.
In February 2011, Laguerra's
Erroneous

Retirement

Coverage

request to attend a training session on the Federal

Corrections

Act ("FERCCA")

Specialist from the D.C. POD attended that training.

was denied.

A Benefits

Nahrgang contends that the training was

irrelevant to Laguerra's job duties since FERCCA cases are handled by Benefits Specialists, not
Human Resources Assistants. In March 2011, Nahrgang removed Laguerra from her Alternative
Work Schedule.

IRS policy prohibits employees whose work has been rated unacceptable to

work such schedules.
On March 8, 2011, Laguerra had a call with Nahrgang about Laguerra's performance.
Days later, she learned that others had been listening to the call but had not been annoUnced.
Laguerra felt that her privacy had been violated.

Also in March 2011, Nahrgang increased the

rate at which Laguerra was assigned cases from one per day to two per day. N ahrgang asserts
that a rising caseload for all of BeST necessitated the increase. Even with the increase, Laguerra
was still being assigned fewer cases than other Human Resources Assistants, whom Nahrgang
expected to complete three to five cases per day.
On April 5, 2011, Laguerra amended the October 2010 EEO Complaint.

The amended

complaint alleged that Laguerra was subjected to a hostile work environment on the basis of age
and as retaliation for prior EEO activity. She cited her 2010 performance review, the denial of
FERCCA training, her removal from the Alternative Work Schedule, her telephone call with
unannounced participants, and her increased workload.

On October 15, 2014, an EEOC AJ

dismissed the complaint as duplicative of this lawsuit, which Laguerra filed on August 21,2014.

7

On December 11, 2014, the IRS affirmed the dismissal, and, on March 19, 2015, the EEOC
Office of Federal Operations did the same.
IV.

Performance Improvement Plan and Retirement
Following the 2010 performance review, Nahrgang did not perceive an improvement in

Laguerra's work. Between June 1, 2010 and May 16, 2011, Laguerra completed just 41 cases,
with 26 having been prepared incorrectly.

Laguerra responds that she actually completed 48

cases, 28 of which contained minor errors. She claims that she closed additional cases but did
not receive credit for that work. On May 16,2011, Nahrgang placed Laguerra on a Performance
Improvement Plan ("PIP"), giving her 60 days "to demonstrate at least minimally successful
performance"

or face termination.

Mot. Summ. 1. Ex. 3, 2010 EEO Compl. Report of

Investigation at 417. Over the course of the next month, BeST team members provided Laguerra
with 12 refresher training sessions, each about one hour in length.
sessions were too short to be helpful.

Laguerra contends that the

In July of 2011, Nahrgang retired.

Laguerra received a fourth consecutive

annual performance

On July 29, ,2011,

appraisal rating her work as

unacceptable (1.4 points out of 5.0). The appraisal stated that Laguerra was assigned 232 cases
during the appraisal period, 70 of which had to be reassigned because they were still pending one
to three months after internal deadlines had passed.

Of the 60 cases Laguerra completed, 42

contained errors. On October 31, 2011, Laguerra filed an EEO complaint with the IRS alleging
that her 2011 performance review created a hostile work environment and was issued in reprisal
for past EEO activity.
On February 13,2012, Michelle Hamilton, Associate Director of Benefits and Workforce
Restructuring

Services, and Paul Needham,

Chief of the Benefits and Services Division,

informed Laguerra that her performance had not sufficiently improved and that if she dj,d not

8

retire, she would be terminated.

They gave her two days to decide. On February 15, 2012, she

chose to retire, effective February 28, 2012. On February 28, Laguerra sent an email stating that
she had changed her mind and did not want to retire.

The following day, on February 29,

Needham sent to Laguerra a Notice of Proposed Action, stating, with specific examples, that
Laguerra was to be terminated for incomplete, inaccurate, and untimely work and an inability to
work with minimal supervision.

Later that day, Laguerra changed her mind once more and sent

an email tendering her resignation, effective immediately.

v.

Post-Retirement Appeal and Complaint
The IRS informed Laguerra that, if she believed she had been forced into retirement, she

could appeal that action to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB").

If she also wished to

allege discrimination, she could file that claim with the MSPB or with the IRS discrimination
complaint

system.

Laguerra did both.

involuntary retirement to the MSPB.

On March 15, 2012, she appealed her allegedly
On April 18, 2012, she added a retirement-related

discrimination claim to the EEO complaint she had filed on October 31, 2011. Treasury held the
complaint in abeyance while the first-filed MSPB appeal was pending.
The AJ for Laguerra's MSPB appeal questioned whether the MSPB had jurisdiction.

The

AJ observed that when a federal agency presents an employee with the ultimatum of retirement
or termination and the employee chooses to retire, the MSPB has jurisdiction to review that
decision only if the employee can show that the retirement was involuntary, which can be
established by a showing that the agency had no reasonable grounds for threatening termination.
The AJ gave Laguerra an opportunity to present evidence that her retirement was involuntary.
After reviewing that evidence, the AJ concluded that Laguerra had not met her burden to prove
that her retirement was involuntary under the standards applied by the MSPB, so he dismissed

9

the case for lack of jurisdiction. Laguerra appealed the decision to the MSPB, which on June 13,
2012 affirmed the AJ's decision. The MSPB's order informed Laguerra that she could appeal
the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The order made no
mention of appeal to a United States District Court. Laguerra then appealed the MSPB's order to
the Federal Circuit. On January 13,2014, the Federal Circuit affirmed the MSPB's dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction. Laguerra v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd, 551 F. App'x 1007, 1010 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
After the Federal Circuit ruled, the IRS resumed processing Laguerra's pe,nding
complaint.

On May 19, 2014, the IRS issued an order rejecting Laguerra's allegations of

discrimination and retaliation related to her 2010 performance evaluation and retirement.
VI.

Procedural History
On August 21,2014, Laguerra filed her Complaint in this case. After Laguerra's Motion

for Leave to Amend the Complaint was docketed as a Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, the case
was stayed until the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded it to this
Court with instructions to consider Laguerra's filing as a Motion for Leave to Amend the
Complaint.

On October 5, 2015, Laguerra filed a Corrected Amended Complaint.

The

Amended Complaint reiterates the allegations made in the three EEO complaints discussed
above. It seeks an unspecified amount of damages, revision of Laguerra's performance reviews
to reflect successful performance, removal of her performance records from the internet, and
investigations into the IRS's Human Capital Office and its use of PIPs. On October 19, 2015,
Laguerra filed a Motion to Supplement the Amended Complaint, which the Court now grants.
Based on the Amended Complaint's references to the EEO complaints filed by Laguerra with
Treasury in 2008, 2010, and 2011, the Court construes the Amended Complaint as alleging

10

claims of hostile work environment and retaliatory termination under the ADEA and Title VII, as
well as discriminatory termination under the ADEA.
On November 23, 2015, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment.

On January 4, 2016, Laguerra filed a Response.

On January

21, 2016, Defend,ants submitted a Reply. On February 10, 2016, Laguerra submitted a Motion
for Leave to File Surreply, which the Court denies because it responds to arguments raised in
Defendants'

opening brief that Laguerra could have addressed in her Response.

Khoury v.

Meserve, 268 F. Supp. 2d 600, 605 (D. Md. 2003) (stating that a motion for surreply should be
denied when it does not address "matters presented to the court for the first time in the opposing
party's reply").
DISCUSSION
Defendants

move to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. They argue that Laguerra
has waived any claim for constructive discharge, that she has not alleged damages recoverable
under the ADEA, that she has not stated a plausible claim of hostile work environment, and that
no reasonable juror could conclude that the IRS's explanation for forcing her into retirement was
pretext for age discrimination or retaliation.
I.

Legal Standards
A.

Motion to Dismiss

Defendants' arguments regarding waiver, ADEA damages, and hostile work environment
are properly considered as the subjects of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the
complaint must allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

11

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when the facts pleaded allow "the Court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."

Id

Although

courts should construe pleadings of self-represented litigants liberally, Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89,94 (2007), legal conclusions or conclusory statements do not suffice, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. The Court must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the
complaint as true, and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd ofComm'rs

of Davidson Cty., 407

F.3d 266,268 (4th Cir. 2005).

B.

Motion for Summary Judgment

Both parties have attached numerous exhibits to their briefs relevant to Laguerra's claims
of discriminatory and retaliatory discharge.

The Court cannot consider these materials unless it

converts the Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to these
claims.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). In her Response, Laguerra argues that Defendants'

summary

judgment motion is premature because discovery has not yet occurred.
Although a party may move for summary judgment

before the commencement

of

discovery, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b), "summary judgment [must] be denied when the nonmovant
'has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition. '" Pisano
v. Strach, 743 F.3d 927, 931 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ingle ex reI. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439
F.3d 191, 195 (4th Cir. 2006)). The proper procedure for seeking additional time for discovery is
to file an affidavit pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) explaining why, "for
specified reasons," the party needs discovery to oppose a summary judgment motion.

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(d); Harrods Ltd v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214,244 (4th Cir. 2002).
Although the nonmovant's failure to file a Rule 56(d) affidavit is a sufficient reason to decide a

12

pre-discovery motion for summaryjudgment, the Court may still consider a request for discovery
presented in the nonmovant's memorandum of law opposing summary judgment. See Harrods,
302 F.3d at 244-45. A court may deny a Rule 56(d) motion or its equivalent "when the
information sought would not by itself create a genuine issue of material fact" sufficient to
preclude summary judgment. Pisano, 743 F.3d at 931.
Laguerra has not submitted a Rule 56(d) affidavit, but her Response to the Motion asserts
that she needs discovery to uncover facts essential to her opposition. Significantly, however, the
record before the Court is already voluminous and comprehensive, containing materials
compiled through the IRS's investigations of three of Laguerra's EEO complaints as well as
numerous exhibits submitted by Laguerra.

Courts have properly proceeded to summary

judgment without discovery under similar circumstances. See Landino v. Sapp, 520 F. App'x
195, 199 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court's denial of a Title VII plaintiffs Rule 56(d)
motion in part because the plaintiff did not identify necessary evidence not contained In the
"robust" administrative record); Boyd v. Gutierrez, 214 F. App'x 322, 323 (4th Cir. 2007)
(same).
Laguerra offers only one specific reason to forego ruling on the summary judgment
motion. She seeks discovery regarding the IRS's alleged agency-wide pattern and practice of
using PIPs to terminate older workers or force their retirement. Although evidence of an
employer's pattern and practice of age discrimination can be relevant to an individual
employee's discrimination claim to support an inference of discrimination or pretext, "statistics
alone cannot establish a prima facie case of individual disparate treatment, for all four elements
of a prima facie case must be established." Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742,
760-61 (4th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). Here, even if Laguerra

13

could somehow uncover evidence that the IRS has deployed PIPs as a tool of discrimination
against older workers, there would still be no genuine issue of material fact regarding her age
discrimination claim because of the overwhelming evidence, as detailed below, that Laguerra's
supervisors instituted her PIP in response to acute and longstanding deficiencies in her work
performance, and the lack of any direct evidence of age discrimination or retaliatory motivation.
Laguerra identifies no other specific reasons for discovery and otherwise makes only a
general request for the need to uncover additional evidence.

Such general requests are

insufficient grounds to support a request under Rule 56(d). See Mercer v. Arc of Prince
George's Cty., Inc., 532 F. App'x 392, 400 (4th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court's grant of

summary judgment before discovery where a plaintiffs memorandum opposing summary
judgment did not state the specific reasons why she needed discovery). Thus, the Court finds
that Laguerra has not shown that discovery is necessary to present facts essential to her
opposition to the Motion. Consequently, the Court will construe Defendants' Motion as a
Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to Laguerra's claims of discriminatory and
retaliatory termination.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the
moving party demonstrates there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). The Court may rely only on facts supported in

the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Bouchat v. Bait. Ravens Football Club, Inc.,
346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003). The nonmoving party has the burden to show a genuine

14

dispute on a material fact. Matsushita E/ec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986).

A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.

A dispute of material fact is only "genuine" if

sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return a verdict for
that party. Id. at 248-49.
II.

Waiver
Defendants first argue that when Laguerra appealed the MSPB' s dismissal of her case to

the Federal Circuit, she waived any claim for age discrimination or retaliation stemming from
her forced retirement. This argument fails because the MSPB dismissed Laguerra's case for lack
of jurisdiction, not on the merits. A review of the options available to Laguerra for challenging
her retirement helps explain why.
A federal employee alleging discrimination or retaliation under the ADEA or Title VII
may file an EEO complaint with the employing agency. 29 C.F.R.

S

1614.103 (2015). Such an

employee may appeal the final agency decision on that complaint to a United States District
Court directly, or to the EEOC first and then to federal district court. 42 U.S.c.
29 C.F.R.

SS

S 2000e-16(c);

1614.401(a), 1614.407; Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 416 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2006).

If a federal employee has also challenged an employment action over which the MSPB has
jurisdiction and alleges that such action was the result of discrimination, the employee may file a
so-called "mixed case appeal" of the final agency decision with the MSPB.

S 7702(a)(1)

(2012); 29 C.F.R.

S

5 U.S.C.

1614.302; Conforto v. Merit Sys. Prot. Rd, 713 F.3d 1111,

1115 (Fed. Cir. 2013). If the MSPB rules against the employee on the merits of a mixed case,
the employee may appeal the MSPB decision to either the Federal Circuit or a United States
District Court. 5 U.S.C.

S 7703(b);

Pueschel v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 563 (4th Cir. 2009). If an

15

employee pursues a mixed case appeal with the Federal Circuit, however, the employee
abandons the discrimination claim "because the Federal Circuit lacks jurisdiction to entertain
discrimination claims." Pueschel, 577 F.3d at 563. Before appealing a dismissal on the merits to
the Federal Circuit, an employee must complete a certification form acknowledging
abandonment of any discrimination claims pursued before the MSPB. See id at 564; Chappell v.
Chao, 388 F.3d 1373, 1379 (lIth Cir. 2004).

Although an MSPB dismissal on the merits may be appealed either to the Federal Circuit
or a federal district court, the Federal Circuit has concluded that MSPB dismissals for lack of
jurisdiction are appealable only to the Federal Circuit. Conforto, 713 F.3d at 1118. If the
Federal Circuit reverses the MSPB, then the case is remanded to the MSPB. ld at 1120. If the
MSPB then rules against the employee on the merits, the employee could then appeal to district
court and preserve her discrimination claims or to the Federal Circuit and abandon them. ld
But if the Federal Circuit affirms the MSPB's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, the employee
may still pursue discrimination claims through the employing agency, the EEOC, and a district
court. ld; see also 29 C.F.R. ~ 1614.302 ("If a person files a mixed case appeal with the MSPB
instead of a mixed case complaint [with the employing agency] and the MSPB dismisses the
appeal for jurisdictional reasons, the agency shall promptly notify the individual in writing of the
right to contact an EEO counselor within 45 days of receipt of this notice and to file an EEO
complaint, subject to ~ 1614.107."). Consequently, Laguerra did not waive any discriminat~onor
retaliation claims when she appealed the MSPB order to the Federal Circuit.
This outcome. is consistent with the information that the MSPB provided to Laguerra.
The MSPB order dismissing Laguerra's case stated that she could appeal to the Federal Circuit.
It made no mention of a right to proceed to district court. Nor have Defendants presented

16

evidence that Laguerra expressly abandoned

any discrimination

claims as a condition

of

appealing to the Federal Circuit. Cf Pueschel, 577 F.3d at 564 (finding that a federal employee
expressly waived discrimination claims when she signed a Federal Circuit form certifying that
she was abandoning any discrimination claims raised before the MSPB).
Defendants

also imply that the Federal Circuit's

collateral estoppel effect in this proceeding.

jurisdictional

determination

has

However, "[ c]ourts have uniformly stated that the

decision of the [MSPB], or of [the Federal Circuit], holding that the [MSPB] lacks jurisdiction
over the employee's

appeal, would not be given collateral estoppel effect in a discrimination

action brought in district court."

Conforto, 713 F.3d at 1120 nA (citing Powell v. Dep't of

Defense, 158 F.3d 597, 599 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1998), and Sloan v. West, 140 F.3d 1255, 126~ n.20
(9th Cir. 1998» Defendants offer no authority or argument to the contrary.

Thus, the Federal

Circuit's decision that the MSPB lacked jurisdiction over Laguerra's case does not preclude this
Court's assessment of the merits of her discrimination and retaliation claims.

III.

Failure to Assert Compensable Damages
Defendants next argue that Laguerra's ADEA claims should be dismissed because federal

employees may only recover economic damages for ADEA violations, and, absent the damages
Laguerra sustained as a result of her involuntary retirement, she does not allege any economic
damages.

This argument hinges on the flawed premise that Laguerra waived the discrimination

claims connected to her retirement.

Since she has not waived those claims, Defendants have no

basis to argue that she has not alleged damages recoverable under the ADEA.
ADEA claims will not be dismissed on these grounds.

17

Therefore, her

IV.

Hostile Work Environment
Laguerra's Amended Complaint makes no mention of a hostile work environment.

The

Amended Complaint does, however, refer to Laguerra's 2008, 2010, and 2011 EEO complaints,
filed with Treasury, which included allegations that she had been subjected to a hostile work
environment based on age, race, and protected activity. Those complaints pointed to Laguerra's
"unacceptable" rating in her annual performance evaluations, her lack of training opportunities,
her heavy workload compared to other Human Resources Assistants, the failure to provide her
with back-up office coverage, her removal from the Alternative Work Schedule, and the
telephone call with unannounced participants as the conduct creating a hostile work environment
at the D.C. POD. Out of an abundance of caution, the Court construes the Amended Complaint
as alleging hostile work environment claims under the ADEA and Title VII.
To state a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must allege offending behaviqr that
was (1) unwelcome, (2) based on a protected category such as race, age, or having engaged in a
protected activity, such as filing an EEO complaint, (3) "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of her employment and create an abusive atmosphere," and (4) imputable to the
employer.

Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 207-08 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting

EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167, 175 (4th Cir. 2009)); Baqir v. Principi, 434 F.3d
733, 745-46 & n.14 (4th Cir. 2006) (recognizing a hostile work environment claim under the
ADEA); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 869-70 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII for retaliatory harassment), abrogated on other grounds
by Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
Laguerra's claim quickly falters on the third prong. A hostile work environment is one
that is "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe

18

or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment."
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleu Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 277 (4th Cir. 2015).

Among the relevant

considerations are whether there was any "physically threatening or humiliating" conduct in the
workplace. Jd. Laguerra alleges that her work environment was unpleasant because she had too
much work and not enough support or training to meet her employer's expectations.
failed to meet those expectations, her employer gave her negative performance
removed her from the Alternative Work Schedule, as required by IRS policy.
violation that Laguerra believes she suffered when co-workers

When she
ratings and
The privacy

listened in on a call with

Nahrgang regarding Laguerra's performance is also insufficient to create an objectively hostile
work environment.

The co-workers were responsible for reviewing Laguerra's

Laguerra does not claim that she discussed any topics other than her performance.

work, and
She does not

allege that supervisors or co-workers threatened or intimidated her or that they ever commented
on her race, age, or protected activity.

The Amended Complaint therefore does not plausibly

allege that Laguerra was a victim of severe or pervasive harassment sufficient to establish a
hostile work environment.

v.

Discriminatory and Retaliatory Termination
Laguerra claims that her forced retirement was the result of both age discrimination and

retaliation for her 2008 EEO complaint.

I

She offers no direct evidence to support either theory,

so both claims proceed under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 250 (4th Cir.

To the extent that Laguerra intended to allege that actions leading up to her termination
constituted distinct acts of discrimination or retaliation, the Court finds that these claims would
fail for the same reason that her claims of discriminatory and retaliatory discharge fail: her
inability to present evidence showing that the IRS's legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory explanations for these actions were pretext for discrimination or retaliation.
19

2015); Laber, 438 F.3d at 430. She must first establish aprimafacie

and retaliation.

case of age discrimination

Foster, 787 F.3d at 250; Laber, 438 F.3d at 430.

In the case of age

discrimination, a prima facie case consists of a showing that the plaintiff: (1) was over 40 years
old; (2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) was performing at a level that met her
employer's legitimate expectations; and (4) the position was filled by a substantially younger
individual with comparable qualifications. See Warch v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 435 F.3d 510, 513
(4th Cir. 2006). In the case of retaliation, a prima facie case consists of a showing that (l) the
plaintiff engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took an adverse action against the
plaintiff; and (3) a causal relationship existed between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. Foster, 787 F.3d at 250. Then the burden shifts to Defendants to offer
legitimate, nondiscriminatory and non-retaliatory reasons for forcing her to retire. Id.; Laber,
438 F.3d at 430. If they present such reasons, the burden shifts back to Laguerra who must show
that those reasons were not her employer's true reasons but instead pretext for discrimination and
retaliation. Foster, 787 F.3d at 250; Laber, 438 F.3d at 430-31.
Defendants do not directly challenge whether Laguerra has established a prima facie case
of age discrimination or retaliation, but they offer one specific, nondiscriminatory reas.on to
explain Laguerra's forced retirement: her poor job performance. Defendants have presented
extensive evidence in support of this reason. Nahrgang and the Team Leads who reviewed her
work found it to be persistently untimely and inaccurate, which necessitated having other BeST
staff correct most cases and take over others. For example, Laguerra was assigned 127 cases
during the 2009-2010 evaluation period. She completed 92 of those cases, but more than half
contained errors, and 90 percent were late. Of the 48 cases Laguerra completed between June 1,
2010 and May 16, 2011, only 20 were error-free. Laguerra closed 60 cases between May 16,

20

2011 and July 29, 2011, but she made errors in 42 of those cases, and 70 of the 232 cases
assigned to her during that period had to be reassigned because Laguerra had missed internal
deadlines for their completion by one to three months. Laguerra performed poorly despite the
fact that she carried a significantly lighter case load than her colleagues. She was assigned 53
cases between June 1, 2010 and December 10, 2010, while Ushery and Love were assigned
approximately 300 cases each. During the first three months of2011, Laguerra was assigned 38
cases compared to Love's 359. Throughout her tenure at BeST, Laguerra continued to make the
same mistakes despite receiving extensive feedback explaining her errors and how to correct
them. Each of the four performance appraisals Laguerra received between 2008 and 2011 rated
her work as unacceptable. After being placed on a PIP and undergoing additional training,
Laguerra's supervisors still concluded that her performance was not minimally adequate.
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary judgment because, even upon consideration
of Laguerra's evidence of pretext, no reasonable jury could conclude that the IRS's real reason
for terminating Laguerra was age discrimination or retaliation and not her job performance.
A.

Age Discrimination

Laguerra cannot show that the decision to terminate her if she did not retire was a pretext
for age discrimination. First, she offers no direct evidence of any discriminatory motive, such as
a statement by her supervisor, Nahrgang, exhibiting any negative animus based on her age.
Furthermore, Laguerra does not dispute the information and statistics provided by DefeQdants
regarding her deficient performance, or that her work fell below her employer's stated
expectations.

Instead, she argues that Nahrgang and others at the IRS concocted those

expectations as pretext for age discrimination. See Warch, 435 F.3d at 518 (noting that a Title
VII plaintiff who did not meet her employer's expectations may still meet that element of a

21

prima facie case by showing that those "expectations were a 'sham designed to hide the
employer's discriminatory purpose' or were somehow not 'legitimate"') (quoting Brummett v.
Lee Enters., Inc., 284 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted)).

By

overburdening and undertraining her, the IRS ensured that Laguerra would fail and that it would
be able to rid itself of an older worker. This, at least, is Laguerra's theory of pretext.
The problem with this theory is that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to
Laguerra, at most shows that Nahrgang's expectations were unreasonable, not that they were the
product of a discriminatory motivation. Laguerra offers evidence to show that she could not
possibly have processed the cases assigned to her in a timely fashion when, unlike her colleagues
located in Cincinnati, she had to process mail coming into the D.C. POD each week and she
often received case files after the deadline for completing them had already passed. She also
posits that, without the proper training, she lacked the knowledge to produce error-free work.
Defendants rebut Laguerra's evidence on these points, noting her significantly lower caseload
than other Human Resources Assistants and the numerous forms of training she had received,
both formal and informal. At best, Laguerra may have established a dispute of fact on whether
she could have performed her job in a satisfactory manner had she been relieved of her
administrative duties and received additional training.
But even if Nahrgang's expectations were unreasonable given Laguerra's workload and
training, there is no evidence that they were not Nahrgang's actual expectations or that they were
the product of age-related bias. TeIIingly, Laguerra submitted a statement by Lana Gabbard, a
younger Human Resources Assistant, who, like Laguerra, handled both case work and
administrative duties. Gabbard stated that Nahrgang's "expectations exceed my training and her
lack of knowledge of what I actually perform skews her perception." Resp. Ex. 15, Gabbard

22

Dec!. at 1. The fact that a younger worker similarly believed that Nahrgang had unrealistic
expectations for her work tends to refute Laguerra's contention that Nahrgang singled her out
because of her age.
Laguerra's primary evidence in support of an inference of age discrimination is the
alleged disparate treatment of Laguerra as compared to her younger colleagues, Ushery and
Love, both of whom were over 40 years old during the relevant time period. The evidence does
show that Laguerra worked under different conditions from her fellow Human Resources
Assistants, but it does not show that those differences are attributable to age discrimination.
First, Laguerra observes that she had to handle both case work and clerical work, while Ushery
and Love could focus on their case work. This disparity, however, was a function of location.
The D.C. POD had only three BeST employees and no clerical support. Processing the mail fell
to Laguerra. The Cincinnati office was larger, and it had an employee, Gabbard, dedicated to
administrative tasks. Laguerra was assigned to the D.C. POD in 1997, long before Nahrgang
became her supervisor, and she does not contend that this assignment was the product of age
discrimination.

Moreover, Laguerra consistently was assigned fewer cases that Ushery and

Love.
Laguerra also asserts that Ushery and Love received superior training which stemmed
from Nahrgang's favoritism towards younger workers.

Specifically, Laguerra claims that

Ushery and Love benefited from the mentorship of managers and the opportunity to shadow
Benefits Specialists. Again, these differences arose because Ushery and Love worked at the
Cincinnati office, where they had ready access to managers and colleagues to shadow. Laguerra
was based at the D.C. POD, in a different office than her supervisor, Nahrgang, who was located
in Cincinnati. Defendants dispute that shadowing is the transformative training experienc,ethat

23

Laguerra makes it out to be, but even if it is a significant benefit that could improve a worker's
performance, Laguerra's lack of shadowing opportunities does not support an inference of age
discrimination,

because

the record

demonstrates

that

Laguerra's

Nahrgang, committed considerable resources to training Laguerra.

supervisors,

including

She attended formal training

sessions in 1999, 2003, 2005, and 2007 and had multiple in-house sessions in Landover and
Cincinnati with Nahrgang and other BeST staff. Laguerra frequently sought out the advice of
Nahrgang, Team Leads, and Benefits Specialists regarding her assignments.

For several years,

Team Leads reviewed every assignment Laguerra completed and provided her with written
feedback on her mistakes.

This extensive and sustained, if ultimately unsuccessful, investment

of staff time and resources in Laguerra's

professional

development

contradicts

Laguerra's

assertion that the IRS avoided training her because of her age.
Finally, Laguerra asserts that because of the advantages afforded to Ushery and Love,
Nahrgang's unfavorable comparison of her work to that ofUshery and Love was discriminatory.
Although Laguerra's

performance reviews did draw attention to the gulf in productivity and

accuracy separating Laguerra's work from that of Ushery and Love, there is no evidence to
suggest that Laguerra was identified for termination because she could not keep pace with
Ushery and Love.

Nahrgang assigned to Laguerra considerably fewer cases than Ushery and

Love. For instance, from June 1, 2010 to December 10, 2010, Laguerra was assigned 53 cases.
Ushery and Love were assigned about 300 cases each. In fact, when Laguerra's case assignment
rate doubled in March of 2011, she still carried a substantially lighter caseload than other Human
Resources Assistants.
assigned to her.

Laguerra's

supervisors expected her to be able to complete the cases

Instead, Laguerra's cases often had to be reassigned because she could not

complete them within internal deadlines.

Seventy of Laguerra's 232 cases had to be reassigned

24

between May 16, 2011 and July 29, 2011. The cases she did complete were often late and
contained errors. During that May to July 2011 period, Laguerra made mistakes in 42 of the 60
cases she completed. The Notice of Proposed Action to terminate Laguerra makes no reference
to other Human Resources Assistants. Instead, it finds that Laguerra's work was objectively
unacceptable. Given Laguerra's documented inability to complete a lower than typical caseload,
on time, and with minimal errors, there is no basis to find that this conclusion was based on age
discrimination.
Even if Laguerra's supervisors expected too much of her, unreasonable workplace
standards are not necessarily unlawful discriminatory standards. See Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc.,
203 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen an employer gives a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for discharging the plaintiff, 'it is not our province to decide whether the reason was wise,
fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the reason for the plaintiffs
termination."') (quoting DeJarnette v. Corning Inc., 133 F.3d 293, 299 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Laguerra has not shown that discrimination, rather than her record of poor performance,
motivated the IRS's decision to terminate her if she did not retire. There is no genuine issue of
material fact regarding pretext, so Defendants are entitled to summaryjudgment.
B.

Retaliatory Termination

Although Laguerra filed EEO Complaints in 2008, 2010, and 2011, and the Notice of
Action arguably constituted an adverse employment action, the evidence does not support a
finding that there was a causal relationship between that protected activity and the decision to
terminate Laguerra in 2012. Instead of emphasizing disparities in workload and training as she
does for her discrimination claim, Laguerra follows a different chain of events to the conclusion
that the stated reason for the decision to terminate, her poor performance, was a pretext for

25

retaliation. Laguerra identifies a series of adverse incidents that followed her filing of an EEO
Complaint on November 14, 2008 as evidence of a retaliatory motive. First, Laguerra claims
that for several pay periods in 2008 and 2009, her sick leave was misclassified as absent without
leave and leave without pay. She also notes that when she returned from sick leave on February
3, 2009 a color printer had been removed from her cubicle. Laguerra further asserts that in
February 2011, her request to attend a training session on FERCCA was denied; on March 8,
2011, her privacy was violated when unannounced co-workers listened in on a call with
Nahrgang about her work performance; on March 14, 2011, the rate at which she was assigned
cases doubled from one per day to two per day; and on March 28,2011, Nahrgang informed her
that she was being removed from her Alternative Work Schedule. She also notes that all of her
performance evaluations after the November 2008 EEO Complaint contained ratings of
unacceptable.

According to Laguerra, these actions were all retaliatory precursors to her

placement on a PIP and the decision to terminate her.
Defendants present a legitimate, non-retaliatory explanation for each of these actions:
1. Nahrgang states that some of Laguerra's sick leave was classified as absent without leave
because Laguerra did not respond to Nahrgang's request for required medical
documentation. In other pay periods, Laguerra was placed on leave without pay because
she had exhausted her accrued and donated leave. Notably, at least some of the pay
periods in which Laguerra claims that her leave was misclassified preceded her first EEO
complaint against Nahrgang.
2. The printer was removed from Laguerra's cubicle because there were printer problems at
the D.C. POD and other co-workers needed to access it.
3. Laguerra was not sent to the FERCCA training session because FERCCA cases are
handled by Benefits Specialists, not Human Resources Assistants like Laguerra.
4. Human Resources Specialists Loretta Dean and Clarence Lehigh participated in the
phone call between Nahrgang and Laguerra because they were responsible for reviewing
Laguerra's work and could help answer Laguerra's questions.

26

5. Laguerra's caseload increased because the caseload for all of BeST had risen, and two
years after returning from sick leave, Laguerra was still carrying a substantially lighter
caseload than other Human Resources Assistants.
6. Nahrgang removed Laguerra from an Alternative Work Schedule because IRS policy
does not permit employees with unacceptable performance ratings to work such a
schedule.
7. Nahrgang issued Laguerra her first unacceptable performance rating on June 30, 2008,
before Laguerra had even filed an EEO complaint against Nahrgang.
Laguerra offers no rebuttal to the explanations relating to the alleged leave
misclassification, the printer, the increase in workload, the phone call, or the Alternative Work
Schedule. As for the FERCCA training, she rejoins that it was relevant to her job duties.
Perhaps it was, but that fact would not prove that Nahrgang denied the training to retaliate
against Laguerra. Nahrgang sent a Benefits Specialist, not a Human Resources Assistant, to that
training, indicating that she genuinely believed that the training was not appropriate or necessary
for a Human Resources Assistant. The only link Laguerra makes between the FERCCA training
and her 2008 EEO complaint is that the former occurred after the latter-two-and-a-half

years

after.
Beyond the reasonable and largely uncontested explanations for each of the allegedly
retaliatory acts, there is no evidence that Nahrgang or any other supervisor commented
negatively on Laguerra's EEO activity or otherwise expressed an intent to retaliate.
Accordingly, even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to Laguerra, no
reasonable juror could conclude that retaliation was the real reason for the decision to terminate
Laguerra.

27

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion
for Summary Judgement is GRANTED. A separate Order shall issue.

Date: June 20, 2016
THEODORE D.
U
United States Distnc

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