Landaverde Castro v. De Marne & Day, Inc et al

Filing 16

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 6/15/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

EDUARDO LANDEV ARDE CASTRO,
Plaintiff,
v.
de MARNE & DAY, INC., and
ALFRED GOLDSCHMIDT, in his individual
capacity,

Civil Action No. TDC-14-2746

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

OPINION

Plaintiff Eduardo Landevarde Castro filed this action against Defendants de Marne &
Day, Inc. ("de Marne & Day") and Alfred Goldschmidt alleging disparate treatment, a hostile
work environment. and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII"), 42 U.S.C. ~~ 2000e el seq. (2012). Castro also brings a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("lIED").

Presently pending are Defendants' Motion to Strike Paragraphs 38

and 39 of the Complaint and Motion to Dismiss Count IV (the lIED claim) under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 lbe motions are fully briefed and ripe for disposition.

No hearing is

1 On November 18,2014,
19 days after the filing of these Motions, Castro filed an Amended
Complaint providing additional allegations relating to Count IV. A plaintiff can amend the
complaint once as a matter of course within 21 days after a motion to dismiss is filed. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(I)(B). In their Reply Memorandum on the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants
acknowledged the filing of the Amended Complaint and stated that "since the repleaded count
continues to be deficient for the same reasons as original Count IV. a new motion to dismiss is
unnecessary." Defs: Reply to Mot. Dismiss at I, n.l, ECF No. 14. Because Defendants do not
oppose the filing of the Amended Complaint and affinnatively stand on their Motion to Dismiss,
the Court considers the Amended Complaint to be the pleading subject to the Motions. The

necessary to resolve the issues. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons that
follow, the Motions are DENIED.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are set forth as alleged in the Amended Complaint and are taken as
true for the purposes of resolving the Motions. Castro was employed as a mason worker for de
Marne & Day. He alleges that Goldschmidt, his supervisor, levied abusive insults and profanity
against Hispanic employees and subjected Hispanic employees to inferior working conditions.
Castro is Hispanic, and Goldschmidt is white. Castro specifically alleges that Goldschmidt
called Hispanic employees "fucking idiots" and "little pieces of shit," and that he called Castro a
"motherfucker," a "son of a bitch," and "trash." Am. Compl. 1 19, ECF No. 13. Goldschmidt
commented that the Hispanic employees "didn't speak any English" and that the only thing they
"were good for was digging." Id. He refused to allow Hispanic workers to speak Spanish on the
job and threatened that they could "go home" or "go back to their countries" if they did. Id.

22.

Goldschmidt also made the Hispanic employees work in extreme heat and torrential ram,
including while using slippery equipment and scaffolding. He refused to provide them protective
gear, such as gloves and dust masks to wear during insulation removal.
Castro alleges that as a result of Goldschmidt's conduct, he experienced high blood
pressure, psoriasis, and low self-esteem. He suffered from chronic insomnia, which caused him
to wake up 15 to 20 times during the night, and frequent nightmares relating to the abuse. Castro
started to "withdraw from family, friends, and social settings" and was diagnosed with anxiety,
severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder, for which he continues to receive
treatment. ld. 140, 43, 44.
Motion to Strike is construed as seeking to strike paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Amended
Complaint, which contain the same language as paragraphs 38 and 39 of the original Complaint.
2

Despite Castro's internal complaints, de Marne & Day did nothing to address the verbal
abuse and working conditions. Castro filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") on August 12, 2009. On August 27, 2009, nearly two weeks afier
alerting de Marne & Day of his EEOC complaint, Castro was tenninated. In Paragraphs 46 and
47 of the Amended Complaint, Castro described the results of the EEOC process as follows:
46.

On July 28, 2013 the EEOC issued a Detennination letter with a
"reasonable cause" finding.

47.

On May 30, 2014 the EEOC issued a Notice of Failure to Conciliate and a
Notice of Right to Sue, with a finding of "reasonable cause."

Id. ~ 46, 47.
DISCUSSION
I.

Legal Standard

To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must allege enough
facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 696 (2009). The Court
must examine the complaint as a whole, consider the factual allegations in the complaint as true,
and construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. ofComm 'rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th
Cir.2005).
II.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Defendants move to dismiss the lIED claim for failure to state a claim. To establish an
lIED claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate that (I) the conduct was "intentional or reckless"; (2)
the conduct was "extreme and outrageous"; (3) there is a "causal connection between the
wrongful conduct and the emotional distress"; and (4) the emotional distress was severe.

3

ManUmi v. Mass Transit Admin., 758 A.2d 95. 113 (Md. 2000) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). The elements must be pled with specificity. Id (citations omitted).
Here. Defendants challenge the lIED claim on two grounds. First, they contend that the
conduct alleged does not satisfy the "extreme and outrageous" prong; second, they assert that
Castro has not alleged the severity of the emotional distress with the required specificity. The
Court disagrees as to both arguments.
For purposes of stating an lIED claim, "extreme and outrageous" conduct consists of
actions "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency. and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilize
community." Harris v. Janes, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts ~ 46 cmt. d (1965» (internal quotation marks omitted).

Although "mere insults,

indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities" would not suffice. the
extreme and outrageous character of conduct may arise from the defendant's "abuse of a
position, or relation with another person, which gives him actual or apparent authority over him,
or power to affect his interests," such as an employer acting against an employee. ld. at 616.
Thus, "where the defendant is in a peculiar position to harass the plaintiff, and cause emotional
distress," the conduct "will be carefully scrutinized by the courts." See id. at 615-16 (citing
A/earn v. Anbro Eng'g, Inc., 468 P.2d 216 (Cal. 1970), in which the court found an liED claim

arising from a black employee whose supervisor, without cause or provocation, humiliated him
and insulted his race).
Here, Castro has alleged a pattern in which a supervisor used his authority to abuse
disadvantaged employees emotionally, including putting their health and safety in danger, in a
purposeful. systematic effort to make them feel helpless and inferior, all while knowing that

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because they did not speak English well, they had few employment options.

Not only did

Goldschmidt subject Castro and others to repeated verbal, profane abuse, often based on their
national origin, he also deliberately placed them at significant risk of injury by forcing Castro
and other Hispanic employees to work in extreme heat, on slippery scaffolding and equipment
during heavy rains, or without protective
Goldschmidt

gloves and masks while removing

insulation.

purposefully forbade Castro and other Hispanics from speaking in Spanish, a

language they were more comfortable with, making it difficult for them to communicate among
themselves or with others. At the motion to dismiss stage, these allegations successfully plead a
plausible claim.
Castro also sufficiently alleges severe emotional distress. The complaint must "state with
reasonable certainty the nature, intensity or duration of the alleged emotional injury." Manikhi,
758 A.2d at 115. Although there is no bright-line rule for emotional distress, the emotional
injury "need not produce total emotional or physical disablement."

Figueiredo-Torres

v. Nickel,

584 A.2d 69, 76 (Md. I 991)(quoting B.N. v. KK, 538 A.2d 1175, 1181-82 (Md. 1988». Tn the
extent that psychological or medical treatment is sought, the plaintiff should allege the nature of
the treatment and its duration. See ManUchi, 758 A.2d at 115. Not only does Castro allege that
he experienced low self.esteem so severe that he began to withdraw from his family, friends, and
other social settings, he also asserts that the abuse he suffered has caused high blood pressure,
psoriasis, recurring nightmares, and

the inability to sleep through the night.

He has been

diagnosed with anxiety, severe depression, and post-traumatic stress disorder and continues to
seek treatment for those conditions.
severe emotional distress.

These allegations, collectively, state a plausible claim of

See Figueiredo-Torres,

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584 A.2d at 76 (finding that allegations that

the plaintiff suffered hypertension, loss of visual acuity, and depression and anxiety resulting in
hospitalization were sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment).2
III.

Motion to Strike
Defendants move to strike Paragraphs 46 and 47 of the Amended Complaint. Defs.' Mot.

Strike

3-5, ECF NO.6. "The court may strike from a pleading ... any redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous matter."

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(1). Rule 12(1) motions are generally

disfavored "because striking a portion of a pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often
sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic."

Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252

F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants argue that the EEOC findings are immaterial. inadmissible as evidence, and
prejudicial because Title VII discrimination claims in district court are heard de novo.
Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 844 (1976).

See

The Supreme Court of the United States,

however, has stated that prior administrative findings are admissible in a de novo trial under Title
V11. See id. at 863 n.39 ("Prior administrative findings made with respect to an employment
discrimination claim may, of course. be admitted as evidence at a federal-sector trial de novo.").
Cf Alexander v. Grander-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974) (holding that in a Title VII case, a
prior arbitrator's decision under a collective bargaining agreement "may be admitted as evidence
and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate").

The Fourth Circuit has also

recognized that administrative findings are admissible in de novo trials. See Laber v. Harvey,

2 Although Defendants correctly assert that individual supervisors are not liable for Title VII
violations, Lissau v. S. Food Serv., Inc., 159 F.3d 177, 180-81 (4th Cir. 1998), they cite no
authority for the proposition that an individual supervisor may not be held liable for common law
11ED, which has different elements from a Title VII discrimination claim. The Court will not
adopt such a rule. See Harris, 380 A.2d at 616 (referencing a successful lIED claim against an
employer for actions against an employee).
6

438 F.3d 404, 421 (4th Cir. 2006) ("[Ajdministrative

findings are merely evidence - that, like

any other evidence, can be accepted or rejected by the trier of fact.").

In light of this precedent, Defendants' reliance on Chancey v. North American Trade
Schools, No. WDQ-IO-0032, 2010 WL 4781306 (D. Md. Nov. 17,2010), is misplaced.

To the

extent that, as in Chancey, there is a concern that the EEOC findings would be unduly prejudicial
in a jury trial, Defendants will have the opportunity prior to trial to file a motion in /imine to
exclude such information from the trial. There is no need, at this early stage afthe case, to strike
the allegations based on this concern.

Because the allegations are not "redundant, immaterial,

impertinent, or scandalous," Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(t), the Motion to Strike is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Strike are DENIED.
separate Order follows.

Date: June 15,2015
THEODORE D. CI
United States Oistr

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