Hodge et al v. College of Southern Maryland (CSM) et al
Filing
38
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiffs 8/3/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/3/2015. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
HAROLD HAMILTON HODGE, JR.,
et al.
:
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 14-2829
:
COLLEGE OF SOUTHERN MARYLAND,
et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for review in this civil rights
case are several motions to dismiss filed by Defendants College
of
Southern
Maryland
and
its
affiliated
Defendants,
Calvert
County Local Government, Charles County Local Government, and
the State of Maryland.
(ECF Nos. 15, 21, and 26).
The relevant
issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing
being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following
reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants will be
granted.
I.
Background
Plaintiffs Harold Hodge and Chante’ Hodge, proceeding pro
se, filed this action on September 5, 2014 against thirteen
Defendants:
College of Southern Maryland (“CSM”); Dr. Bradley
M. Gottfried, President of CSM; Sue Subocz, Vice President of
Academic
Affairs
in
CSM’s
Math
Department;
Loretta
McGrath;
Richard
B.
Fleming;
Schatz;
Ricardo
Jeffrey
“Doe”;
Potter;
Charlie
Richard
“Doe”;
Welsh;
Calvert
Matthew
County
Local
Government; Charles County Local Government; and the State of
Maryland.
(ECF No. 1).
Along with their complaint Plaintiffs
filed motions to proceed in forma pauperis, which were granted.
(ECF Nos. 2, 5, and 6).
rights
violations
and
The complaint asserts multiple civil
other
claims
relating
to
events
that
occurred between 2009 and 2013 while Plaintiffs were enrolled as
students
at
CSM.
Plaintiffs
seek
$500,000
in
compensatory
damages from each individual Defendant, and $3,500,000,000 in
exemplary damages for the injuries they purportedly suffered as
a result of incidents described below.
The
crux
of
Plaintiffs’
(ECF No. ¶ 128).
complaint
is
that
Mr.
Hodge
received a final grade of “D” when he had purportedly earned a
“C” in the entry-level math class that he was enrolled in during
the spring 2013 semester at CSM.
Mr. Hodge appealed his final
grade seeking to have it changed to a “C” but Plaintiffs allege
that the Vice President of CSM’s Math Department, Sue Subocz,
refused
to
change
his
grade,
stating
that
Mr.
Hodge
had
miscalculated his math grade and that his final grade of “D” was
correct.
(ECF No. 1, at 6-7).
Thereafter, Mr. Hodge submitted
multiple written complaints to various CSM administrators and
the
President
of
CSM,
Bradley
grade be changed to a “C.”
Gottfried,
demanding
that
his
These individuals allegedly did not
2
respond except for Ms. Subocz, who rejected his complaint that
his math grade was incorrect.
its
administrators
“racially
Plaintiffs assert that CSM and
discriminat[ed]
depriv[ed]” him of his final math score.
Hodge’s
written
complaints
received
and
maliciously
(Id. ¶ 38).
no
response,
When Mr.
Plaintiffs
allegedly filed official “intent to sue” notices with Defendants
on September 19, 2013.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 36).
Plaintiffs allege
that because Mr. Hodge received a “D” in the math course, he was
unable to transfer to a four-year University as he had planned,
and Mrs. Hodge was required to delay her transfer to a four-year
university as well because she refused to transfer without her
husband.
Plaintiffs
allege
that
“in
great
humiliation”
Mr.
Hodge enrolled in an entry-level math course at Prince George’s
Community College (“PGCC”) in January 2014 even though he had
already
passed
the
math
course
at
CSM.
Plaintiffs
further
allege that this math class was harder than the course at CSM
and required Mr. Hodge to drive an hour to get to PGCC.
Mr.
Hodge allegedly passed the course at PGCC with a “C” grade,
which enabled him to transfer to a four-year university with
Mrs. Hodge.
University
Plaintiffs assert that they began attending the
of
the
District
of
Columbia
(“UDC”)
starting
in
August 2014 to work towards earning Bachelor of the Arts and
Juris Doctor degrees.
(Id. ¶ 47).
3
The
complaint
references
a
number
of
other
unrelated
incidents that occurred between 2009 and 2013 while Plaintiffs
were enrolled as students at CSM.
These other incidents also
serve as a basis for the claims Plaintiffs assert.
relevant
sampling
of
the
incidents
will
be
Only a
discussed
here.
Plaintiffs allege that in October 2009, CSM’s librarian, Jeffrey
Potter,
“maliciously”
threw
away
Mr.
Hodge’s
math
homework
completion certification that was sitting on the library printer
even though he knew that it belonged to Mr. Hodge.
¶¶ 52-56).
(ECF No. 1
Mrs. Hodge, while attending a CSM sponsored field
trip to the “Black Wax Museum” in Baltimore in October 2009, was
“intentionally left in Baltimore” and the bus driver had to turn
the bus around to go get her.
(Id. ¶¶ 68-70).
Mr. Hodge
asserts that in January 2010 he checked his grades online and
noticed that CSM had added to his grade report two classes from
1986 that Plaintiff never took, which caused his grade point
average (“GPA”) to drop from 3.5 to 1.7.
Plaintiffs assert that
CSM “falsely added and intentionally meant to damage” Mr. Hodge
by adding these classes.
incidents
assert
and
that
others
CSM
was
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 63).
referenced
“a
hostile
in
the
and
Based on the these
complaint,
racially
Plaintiffs
discriminatory
environment for both [of them,] but they endured the environment
because they had a right to be at (CSM) which was receiving
Federal and state funds” for education.
4
(Id. ¶ 73).
The complaint also cites several incidents in which CSM
professors limited the Hodges’ self-expression in the classroom.
For
example,
Plaintiffs
allege
that
in
November
2010
CSM
Professor Richard Welsh refused to let Mrs. Hodge express her
opinions in class, and when Mr. Hodge mentioned that an African
American woman was one of the first female pilots, Professor
Welsh accused Mr. Hodge of lying.
Plaintiffs assert that:
“It
was clearly understood that defendant Wel[s]h had a problem of
her being an African American plane flyer.
Moreover, at the end
of the semester the defendant Welsh sent the plaintiffs an email
and said:
‘I hope that you and she find appropriate forum[s]
for you to present your personal opinions.’
(emphasis in original).
2013
they
Plaintiffs
took
a
assert
class
that
(Id. ¶¶ 66-67)
Plaintiffs also assert that in October
with
CSM
Professor
Professor
Schatz
Matthew
“maliciously
Schatz.1
skipped
over the Civil Rights section of the text book and would not
even attempt to teach on it” even though it was in the syllabus.
(Id. ¶ 78).
Plaintiffs also assert that at some point during a
class discussion on welfare policy, Professor Schatz indicated
that he “wanted to keep race out of the matter[.]”
(Id. ¶ 78).
They further allege that Professor Schatz “would allow ‘white’
1
The complaint identifies this professor as Matthew “Doe”
but CSM Defendants provide that this professor’s last name is
Schatz.
5
students to express any view point they wanted, but he told the
Plaintiff Mrs. Hodge she could not and indirectly [told] [] Mr.
Hodge [the same thing.]
It got so bad in the class [that] the
‘white’ students were even trying to stop the plaintiff Mrs.
Hodge from stressing her view point[.]”
assert
that
“this
discriminatorily
instructor.”
atmosphere
created
was
by
the
(Id. ¶ 78).
maliciously
(CSM)
Plaintiffs
and
racially
Welfare
Policy
(Id. ¶ 78).
Plaintiffs’
complaint
asserts
action arising from these events:
ten
purported
causes
of
(1) violation of Plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process;
(2)
violation
of
the
Equal
Opportunity
Act
of
1995;
(3)
42
U.S.C. § 1983; (4) race discrimination; (5) loss of consortium;
(6)
intentional
defamation-libel;
infliction
(8)
false
of
light
emotional
invasion
distress;
of
privacy;
(7)
(9)
violation of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974; and (10) pain and suffering.
In three separate motions, Defendants moved to dismiss the
complaint on various grounds pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
(ECF Nos. 15, 21, and 26).
Plaintiffs
filed an opposition (ECF No. 34), and Defendant CSM replied (ECF
No. 36).
6
II.
Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) (6) is
to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Presley v. City of
Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).
A complaint
need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a), which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).
“Rule 8(a)(2)
still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of
entitlement to relief.”
544, 555 n.3 (2007).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
That showing must consist of more than “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or
“naked
assertion[s]
devoid
of
further
factual
enhancement.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations
omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light
most
favorable
to
the
plaintiff.
See
Harrison
v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).
In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal
allegations
not
need
be
accepted.
Revene
Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).
v.
Charles
Cnty.
Legal conclusions
couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
7
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events.
United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979).
Finally,
pleadings
drafted
that
“to
by
lack
while
courts
less
stringent
lawyers,”
a
they
cognizable
generally
standards
may
legal
should
than
nonetheless
theory
or
hold
formal
dismiss
that
fail
sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.
pro
se
pleadings
complaints
to
allege
Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Turner v. Kight, 192 F.Supp.2d
391, 398 (D.Md. 2002), aff’d, 121 F.App’x. 9 (4th Cir. 2005)
(unpublished).
III. Analysis
Plaintiffs are no strangers to this court.
They have filed
numerous civil lawsuits over the years in the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, including:
Hodge
v. Stephens, No. 12-cv-01988-AW, 2013 WL 398870 (D.Md. Jan. 31,
2013); Hodge v. Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs, No. RWT-10-2396, 2010 WL
4068793 (D.Md. Oct. 15, 2010); Hodge v. Calvert Cnty, No. PJM
09-2252, 2009 WL 2884928 (D.Md. Sept. 4, 2009); Hodge v. St.
Mary’s Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. PJM 08-2522, 2009 WL 8708855
(D.Md. June 22, 2009); and Hodge v. Taylor Gas Co., No. DKC-05319, 2005 WL 5501493 (D.Md. June 21, 2005).
In the current suit, although Plaintiffs’ complaint almost
exclusively discusses their grievances with CSM, they have also
8
named several local county governments and the state of Maryland
as Defendants.
All Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
proceeding
Because Plaintiffs are
in forma pauperis, the court is also required to
dismiss their case if it “fails to state a claim on which relief
may be granted.”
A.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs
pertaining
to
Maryland
state
Calvert
local
Plaintiffs
only
one
County,
allegation
Maryland
in
and
governments
(the
that
assert
Defendants
County
their
complaint
Charles
“County
County,
Defendants”).
violated
Plaintiff
Harold Hodge’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by “turning a blind
eye
to
Mr.
incorrectly
Hodge’s
reported
complaints”
math
class
regarding
grade.
his
(ECF
No.
allegedly
1
¶
88).
Plaintiffs assert a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the County
Defendants based on this single allegation.
(Id. ¶ 97).
The
County Defendants move to dismiss the complaint arguing that the
it does not state any viable claims against them because it does
not
contain
any
factual
allegations
showing
that
the
County
Defendants “played any role in any of the events [] or that any
of the named individual Defendants currently are or were at the
time [of the events in question] local government employees.”
(ECF
No.
15-1,
at
2).
In
addition,
the
County
Defendants
contend that the complaint fails to state a proper § 1983 claim
9
based
on
the
standard
for
municipal
liability
set
forth
in
Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658 (1978).
Under the Monell standard, “a municipality can be found
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where the municipality itself
causes the constitutional violation at issue.”
City of Canton,
Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) (emphasis in original).
Municipalities
are
not
liable
under
respondeat
superior
principles for the constitutional violations of their employees
simply because of the employment relationship.
at 692-94.
Monell, 436 U.S.
“Liability arises only where the constitutionally
offensive acts of city employees are taken in furtherance of
some municipal ‘policy or custom.’”
Milligan v. City of Newport
News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th Cir. 1984), citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694.
Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that an unconstitutional
policy
or
Plaintiffs’
custom
of
purported
the
County
injuries.
Defendants
Indeed,
the
resulted
only
in
allegation
pertaining to the County Defendants is the vague statement that
the County Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ rights by “turning a
blind
eye”
Plaintiffs’
to
Mr.
vague
Hodge’s
complaints
allegation
is
over
his
insufficient
math
to
grade.
state
a
plausible 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim based on municipal liability, a
10
violation
of
Plaintiffs’
Fourteenth
Amendment
rights,
or
any
claim for that matter, against the County Defendants.
B.
State of Maryland’s Motion to Dismiss
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ only allegation regarding the State
of
Maryland
Fourteenth
is
that
Amendment
it
violated
rights
by
Plaintiff
“turning
a
Harold
blind
eye
Hodge’s
to
Mr.
Hodge’s complaints” regarding his allegedly incorrectly reported
math grade.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 88).
Plaintiffs assert a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim against the State of Maryland based on this single
allegation.
(Id. ¶ 97).
The State of Maryland moves to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim against it because
none of Plaintiffs allegations “relate to the activities of the
State of Maryland, nor any of its employees.”
3).
(ECF No. 26-1, at
In addition, the State argues that Plaintiffs’ claims are
barred
due
to
the
sovereign immunity.
State’s
Eleventh
Amendment
immunity
and
(ECF No. 26).
As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Lee-Thomas v. Prince George’s County Public
Schools, 666 F.3d 224, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2012):
Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, “[t]he
Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State.”
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
The Supreme Court “has drawn on principles
of
sovereign
immunity
to
construe
the
Amendment to establish that an unconsenting
11
State is immune from suits brought in
federal courts by her own citizens as well
as by citizens of another State.”
Port
Auth. Trans–Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S.
299, 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868, 109 L.Ed.2d 264
(1990) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The States’ immunity also extends to “state
agents
and
state
instrumentalities.”
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519
U.S. 425, 429, 117 S.Ct. 900, 137 L.Ed.2d 55
(1997). “The Eleventh Amendment bar to suit
is not absolute,” however. Feeney, 495 U.S.
at 304, 110 S.Ct. 1868.
There are three
exceptions to that constitutional bar.
First, “Congress may abrogate the States’
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both
unequivocally intends to do so and acts
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional
authority.”
Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363, 121
S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001) (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). .
. . Second, “the Eleventh Amendment permits
suits for prospective injunctive relief
against state officials acting in violation
of federal law.”
Frew ex rel. Frew v.
Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437, 124 S.Ct. 899,
157 L.Ed.2d 855 (2004). . . .
Third, “[a]
State remains free to waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in a federal
court.”
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 618, 122 S.Ct.
1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002).
Congress did not abrogate States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity
for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.
See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of
State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1989) (finding that a state is
not a person within the meaning of § 1983 and that Eleventh
Amendment bars § 1983 suits unless the state has waived its
immunity).
The second exception is inapplicable here because
12
Plaintiffs are not seeking any prospective injunctive relief,
but instead only damages.
Finally, the State of Maryland has
not
Amendment
waived
Accordingly,
its
Eleventh
the
Eleventh
immunity
Amendment
in
bars
this
case.
Plaintiffs
from
bringing this suit against the State of Maryland.
C.
College of Southern Maryland’s Motion to Dismiss
Most of the allegations in the complaint involve actions
taken
by
CSM’s
administrators,
faculty,
and
other
personnel.
Plaintiffs assert numerous federal and state claims against the
various CSM Defendants.2
CSM Defendants have moved to dismiss
Plaintiffs’ claims on various grounds.
1.
No Private Causes of Action
CSM Defendants first argue that Plaintiffs’ claims under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment,
the
Family
Educational
Rights
and
Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”), the Equal Opportunity Act of
1995, and Plaintiffs’ claim for “pain and suffering” should be
dismissed because the underlying amendment, statute, or state
tort law does not provide a private right of action for these
claims.
(ECF No. 21-1, at 18-19).
The complaint asserts a direct right of action under the
Fourteenth
Amendment
against
all
2
Defendants
for
allegedly
CSM Defendants include:
CSM, Dr. Bradley M. Gottfried,
Sue Subocz, Loretta McGrath, Richard Fleming, Jeffrey Potter,
Richard Welsh, Matthew Schatz, Ricardo “Doe,” and Charlie “Doe.”
13
violating Plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights.
The
only
relief
sought
by
Plaintiffs
compensatory and punitive damages.
in
the
complaint
is
Plaintiffs’ direct right of
action under the Fourteenth Amendment will be dismissed because
the
Fourteenth
private
Amendment
right
of
does
action
not
provide
Plaintiffs
to
seek
damages
against
with
state
a
or
municipal officials; rather, it provides a right of action for
those
seeking
F.Supp.2d
injunctive
587,
591
relief.
(D.Md.
1999)
See
(“The
Farmer
v.
Fourth
Ramsay,
Circuit
41
has
explicitly rejected the argument that an implied cause of action
for
damages
exists
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.”)
Cale v. Covington, 586 F.2d 311 (4th Cir. 1978)).
seek
monetary
damages
for
violations
of
(citing
Plaintiffs may
their
Fourteenth
Amendment rights through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which they have pled
as their third cause of action.
Plaintiffs also seek relief under FERPA, alleging that CSM
Defendants violated this Act because they failed to correct Mr.
Hodge’s inaccurate math grade.
FERPA also does not provide a
private right of action; rather, it “provides for an aggregate
action only:
the withdrawal of public institution funding for
the impermissible release of student records.”
Henry’s Wrecker
Service Co. of Fairfax Cnty., Inc. v. Prince George’s Cnty., 214
F.Supp.2d 541, 545 (D.Md. 2002).
14
In
addition,
Plaintiffs
Opportunity Act of 1995.
seek
relief
under
the
Equal
CSM Defendants note that although this
bill was introduced on July 27, 1995 in the 104th Congress, it
was never enacted.
Accordingly, it cannot provide a basis for
the relief Plaintiffs seek.
Finally, the complaint asserts a cause of action for “pain
and suffering.”
included
this
It appears from the complaint that Plaintiffs
“cause
of
action”
merely
to
describe
their
purported injuries and the damages they are seeking.
To the
extent they are trying to state a separate claim, no such cause
of
action
exists.
compensatory
damages
“Pain
that
and
suffering”
plaintiffs
may
is
a
recover
type
for
of
certain
tort claims, but is not an individual cause of action.
See
Joseph H. King, Jr., Pain and Suffering, Noneconomic Damages,
and the Goals of Tort Law, 57 SMU L. Rev. 163 (2004).
Following
Plaintiffs’
dismissal
remaining
of
federal
the
claims
aforementioned
are
violations
claims,
of
their
Fourteenth Amendment rights brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and
“race
discrimination.”
Plaintiffs
do
not
specify
under
which statute they are bringing their race discrimination claim,
but given the facts in the complaint, it will be construed as
stating violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
15
2.
Statutes of Limitations
CSM Defendants contend that many of Plaintiffs’ claims are
time-barred
by
the
applicable
statutes
of
limitations.
CSM
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ federal claims are subject to
either
a
three
Plaintiffs’
or
state
four-year
law
limitations
claims
are
period,
subject
to
a
and
that
three-year
limitations period, aside from the defamation claim, which has a
one-year statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that
should
only
be
employed
to
dismiss
claims
pursuant
to
Rule
12(b)(6) when it is clear from the face of the complaint that
the claims are time-barred.
Green v. Pro Football, Inc., 31
F.Supp.3d 714, 721-22 (D.Md. 2014).
Although 42 U.S.C. § 1983
does not contain a statute of limitations, courts borrow the
statute
of
limitations
from
Maryland
personal-injury
which have a three-year statute of limitations period.
suits,
Owens v.
Baltimore City State’s Attorneys’ Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th
Cir.
2014).
Similarly,
Title
VI
does
not
have
its
own
limitations period and courts therefore borrow Maryland’s threeyear limitations period.
Jersey Heights Neighborhood Ass'n v.
Glendening, 174 F.3d 180, 187 (4th Cir. 1999).
Section 1981
claims have a four-year statute of limitations period if they
arise
under
Donnelley
&
the
1991
Sons,
Amendment
Co.,
541
U.S.
16
to
the
369,
Act.
Jones
382-84
(2004).
v.
R.R.
Here,
Plaintiffs’
allegations
—
that
they
were
subject
to
race
discrimination by CSM administrators, faculty, and personnel —
arise under the 1991 Amendment to the Act, as this conduct would
not have been actionable under the pre-1991 version of § 1981
which covered “only conduct at the initial formation of the
contract and conduct which impairs the right to enforce contract
obligations through legal process.”
See Howard v. Feliciano,
No. 05-1928 (RLA), 2008 WL 3471295, *5-6 (D.P.R. Aug. 8, 2008)
(finding that plaintiffs allegations that their “minor child was
subjected to harassment by his math teacher because of his race
to the point where he was given a ‘C’ grade when he deserved an
‘A’ grade” arose under the 1991 Amendment to § 1981).
Finally,
Plaintiffs’ state law claims are subject to Maryland’s threeyear statute of limitations period for civil actions, Md. Code
Ann.,
Cts.
defamation
&
Jud.
claim
Proc.
which
is
§
5-101,
subject
to
accept
a
for
Plaintiffs’
one-year
limitations
period, Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-105.
Given these
limitations periods and the dates of the incidents as provided
in the complaint, any events that occurred prior to September 5,
2011 that underlie Plaintiffs’ § 1983, Title VI, and state law
claims are time-barred, and any events that occurred prior to
September 5, 2010 that underlie Plaintiffs’ § 1981 claim are
time-barred.
Specifically, the face of the complaint reveals
that the following incidents cited in support of Plaintiffs’
17
claims
are
time-barred:
CSM’s
librarian
throwing
away
Mr.
Hodge’s printouts in October 2009; Mrs. Hodge being left behind
on a CSM-sponsored field trip in October 2009; and the addition
of two classes from 1986 to Mr. Hodge’s grade report in January
2010.
By the same logic, the other incidents referenced in the
complaint, which are not specifically referenced in the facts
section above, are also time-barred and cannot serve as a viable
basis for Plaintiffs’ claims.
3.
Local Government Tort Claims Act
CSM Defendants also contend that any claims arising from
incidents that occurred after September 19, 2013 — the date on
which Plaintiffs purportedly sent CSM Defendants a notice of
intent to sue letter — should be dismissed because Plaintiffs
failed
to
comply
with
the
Local
Government
Tort
Claims
Act
(“LGTCA”), which required Plaintiffs to provide notice to CSM
within 180 days of these additional claims.3
(ECF No. 21-1, at
23).
to
Specifically,
incident
that
CSM
occurred
in
Defendants
October
point
2013
in
the
purported
Professor
Matthew
Schatz’s class and CSM’s transmission of Mr. Hodge’s transcript
3
CSM Defendants note that although CSM is a State agency,
it is also defined as a “local government” under the LGTCA.
(ECF No. 21-1, at 22).
Under the Maryland Code, Courts and
Judicial Proceedings § 5-301(d)(9), Local government is defined
to include “a community college or board of trustees of a
community college established or operating under Title 16 of the
Education Article[.]”
18
to PGCC and UDC,4 and contend that Plaintiffs have not alleged
that they sent a notice of a claim to CSM for any actions that
took place after September 19, 2013.
(Id.).
Under the LGTCA, “an action for unliquidated damages may
not
be
brought
against
a
local
government
or
its
employees
unless the notice of the claim required by this section is given
within 180 days after the injury.”
§ 5–304(b).
Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc.
The notice itself “shall be in writing and shall
state the time, place, and cause of the injury.”
Md. Code, Cts.
&
district
Jud.
Proc.
recognized
§
that
5-304(b)(2).
under
the
Courts
LGTCA,
in
this
“notice
is
a
have
condition
precedent to the right to maintain an action for damages, and
compliance with the notice provision should be alleged in the
complaint as a substantive element of the cause of action.”
See,
e.g.,
Renn
v.
Bd.
of
Comm'rs
of
Charles
Cnty.,
352
F.Supp.2d 599, 603 (D.Md. 2005).
4
The complaint does not allege a date on which this event
occurred, but Plaintiffs’ defamation and invasion of privacy
claims are premised on UDC and PGCC viewing Mr. Hodge’s
purportedly incorrect grade on transcripts that were received
from CSM. Mr. Hodge did not start attending PGCC until January
2014 and UDC until August 2014, accordingly, it is possible that
the transmission of his transcript occurred after September 19,
2013.
Even if Plaintiffs’ complied with the LGTCA as to these
claims, as will be seen, Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state
plausible defamation or false light invasion of privacy claims.
19
Here, although Plaintiffs allege that they sent intent to
sue
notices
all
Defendants
does
complaint
to
not
allege
on
September
that
they
19,
2013,
the
complied
with
the
requirements of the LGTCA for any events following September 19,
2013.
(See
ECF No. 1 ¶ 36).
As Plaintiffs’ September 19
notification could not possibly have given CSM notice of their
purported injuries arising from future events, Plaintiffs have
failed plausibly to allege compliance with the LGTCA for any
claims arising from events that occurred following September 19,
2013,
which
includes
Plaintiffs’
allegations
regarding
any
incidents that occurred in October 2013 in Professor Matthew
Schatz’s
classroom
and
the
transmissions
of
Mr.
Hodge’s
transcript to UDC and PGCC if it occurred after September 19,
2013.
4.
Failure to State Plausible Claims
After dismissing the causes of action for which no private
right of action exists and excluding claims that are clearly
time-barred or for which Plaintiffs failed to comply with the
requirements of the LGTCA, only several claims remain.
claims are based on the following incidents:
refusal
policy
to
let
class
purportedly
in
Plaintiffs
November
incorrect
express
2010;
math
themselves
Mr.
grade
Hodge’s
in
May
These
Professor Welsh’s
in
his
receipt
2013
welfare
of
and
the
his
dissatisfaction with the CSM’s grade appeal process; and UDC and
20
PGCC
viewing
Mr.
Hodge’s
purportedly
incorrectly
grade
on
a
transcript received from CSM.
a.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claim Premised on Violations of
Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment Rights
The complaint asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiffs’
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 97).
Although a
claimant may use § 1983 as a vehicle for asserting violations of
rights secured by the Constitution or other federal laws, it
does not provide its own substantive protections.
See Chapman
v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979) (“[O]ne
cannot go into court and ‘claim a violation of § 1983’ – for §
1983 by itself does not protect anyone against anything.”).
The
complaint also asserts that CSM Defendants violated Plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment rights, a violation which Plaintiffs may
bring pursuant to § 1983.
Section
individual
1983
“who,
authorizes
under
a
suit
color
of
for
any
damages
statute,
against
any
ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution.”
claim
under
Section
1983,
a
plaintiff
In order to state a
must
allege:
(1)
a
deprivation of a constitutional right or some right secured by
the laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was
21
caused by a state actor.
West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988).
Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Hodge was deprived of:
“life,
liberty, and [the same] equal protection as ‘white’ students []
at the college when he was deprived of his proper final letter
grade
in
complaint
his
math
also
course.”
asserts
(ECF
that
No.
Mr.
1
¶¶
Hodge
87,
was
97).
The
deprived
of
“privileges and rights to an equal education as white students.”
(Id.
at
99).
The
complaint
names
official and unofficial capacities.
CSM
Defendants
in
their
(Id. ¶¶ 1-2).
CSM Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth
Amendment claims brought pursuant to § 1983, arguing that CSM is
a state agency and its employees and administrators are state
actors subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity for Plaintiffs’ §
1983
claims
addition,
against
CSM
them
Defendants
in
their
contend
official
that
they
capacities.
In
are
to
entitled
qualified immunity for Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claims
against them in their individual capacities because Plaintiffs’
have
not
alleged
facts
showing
that
individual
Defendants
violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.
(ECF No. 21-1, at 27).
CSM
Defendants further contend that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not
state
a
plausible
violation
of
Mr.
Hodge’s
procedural
due
process rights, as Mr. Hodge did not have a property interest in
22
earning a particular grade and therefore could not have been
deprived of due process with respect to that alleged property
interest,
nor
a
plausible
violation
of
his
substantive
due
process rights because Plaintiffs have not alleged facts showing
that CSM’s actions concerning Mr. Hodge’s grade and the appeals
process departed so far from academic norms as to be arbitrary
and
capricious.
Defendants
further
argue
that
Plaintiffs’
allegations fail to state a plausible claim for violation of the
Equal Protection Clause because Plaintiffs have not alleged any
facts showing that similarly situated people were treated more
favorably than Mr. Hodge or that CSM Defendants actions were in
any way motivated by race.
In discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity in Gray v. Laws,
51 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 1995), the Fourth Circuit commented
that:
[Eleventh Amendment] immunity extends . . .
to state agencies and other government
entities properly characterized as “arm[s]
of the State.”
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97
S.Ct. 568, 572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977); see
also Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, ––––,
113 S.Ct. 684, 688, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993)
(“[A] State and its ‘arms’ are, in effect,
immune from suit in federal court.”).
Like
the state itself, state officers acting in
their official capacity are also entitled to
Eleventh Amendment protection, because “a
suit against a state official in his or her
official capacity is not a suit against the
official but rather is a suit against the
23
official’s office,” and “[a]s such, it is no
different from a suit against the State
itself.”
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304,
2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (citations
omitted).
As recently noted by Judge Hollander in Jenkins v. Kurtinitis,
No.
ELH-14-01346,
2015
WL
1285355,
at
*8-9
(D.Md.
Mar.
20,
2015), Maryland community colleges are treated as arms of the
state.
Id. (citing Adams v. Montgomery Coll., No. DKC-09-02278,
2010 WL 2813346, at *4 (D.Md. July 15, 2010); Williams v. Board
of Trustees of Frederick Community College, CCB-03-02123, 2004
WL 45517, at *4 (D.Md. Jan. 8, 2004)).
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’
§ 1983 claims against CSM and CSM Defendants in their official
capacities seeking monetary damages, are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Qualified
immunity
is
an
affirmative
defense
to
Section
1983 claims and “protects government officials ‘from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which
a reasonable person would have known.’”
Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982)).
Two inquiries must be satisfied to determine
whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity:
(1)
whether, after viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
the party asserting the injury, there was a deprivation of a
24
constitutional right; and, if so, (2) whether the right was
clearly established at the time of the deprivation such that a
reasonable
official
unlawful.
See
would
Saucier
understand
v.
Katz,
533
that
their
U.S.
194,
conduct
201
was
(2001),
overruled in part on other grounds in Pearson, 555 U .S. at 236.
Courts
are
deciding
“permitted
which
of
the
to
exercise
two
prongs
their
of
the
sound
discretion
qualified
in
immunity
analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances
in the particular case at hand.”
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
The
burden is on the Plaintiff to prove that the alleged conduct
violated the law, while Defendant must prove that the right was
not clearly established.
(4th Cir. 2007).
Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377–78
Finally, the court should make a ruling on the
qualified immunity issue “early in the proceedings so that the
costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is
dispositive.”
Here,
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200.
taking
the
allegations
in
the
complaint
as
true,
Plaintiffs have failed to establish a plausible violation of Mr.
Hodge’s rights to due process and equal protection.
As noted by
the Fourth Circuit in Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of
Mrytle Beach, 420 F.3d 322, 328 (4th Cir. 2005):
To establish a violation of procedural due
process, plaintiffs must show that (1) they
had property or a property interest (2) of
which
the
defendant
deprived
them
(3)
without due process of law.
Sylvia Dev.
25
Corp. v. Calvert County, Md., 48 F.3d 810,
826 (4th Cir. 1995).
To establish a
violation
of
substantive
due
process,
plaintiffs must “demonstrate (1) that they
had property or a property interest; (2)
that the state deprived them of this
property or property interest; and (3) that
the state’s action falls so far beyond the
outer limits of legitimate governmental
authority that no process could cure the
deficiency.”
Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at
827 (citing Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120,
122 (4th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs have not established that Mr. Hodge had a protected
property or liberty interest in receiving a “C” in his math
course.
Moreover,
Plaintiffs’
conclusory
assertion
that
Mr.
Hodge was deprived of life, liberty, and an equal education to
that of his white peers is unsupported by any facts.
The
Equal
Protection
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amendment
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
amend. XIV, § 1.
all
persons
U.S. Const.
This clause “‘is essentially a direction that
similarly
situated
should
be
treated
alike.’”
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 542 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,
439
(1985)).
“[T]o
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss
an
equal
protection claim, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
demonstrate
others
who
plausibly
were
that
similarly
he
was
treated
situated
and
differently
that
treatment was the result of discriminatory animus.”
26
the
from
unequal
Equality in
Athletics v. Dep't of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 108 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing
Morrison
v.
Garraghty,
239
F.3d
648,
(4th
654
Cir.
2001)).
Other than Plaintiffs’ conclusory assertion that Mr. Hodge
did not receive an equal education to that of his white peers,
the complaint does not contain facts to support that Mr. Hodge’s
similarly
situated
peers
were
treated
more
favorably
grading process or in the grading appeal process.
in
the
Plaintiffs’
conclusory assertions are insufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss because they do not show a plausible violation of Mr.
Hodge’s rights to due process or equal protection.
b.
Race Discrimination Under Title VI and 42 U.S.C. §
1981
The
complaint
based
on
the
asserts
allegations
a
claim
that
for
Mr.
“race
Hodge’s
discrimination”
math
professor
racially discriminated against him by depriving him of the “C”
grade he had purportedly earned in his math class.
allege
that
“‘white’
students
at
the
College
Plaintiffs
of
Southern
Maryland were not deprived of their final math letter grades as
the plaintiff Mr. Hodge was whom is an African American.”
No.
1
¶
103).
Plaintiffs
also
assert
that
Professor
(ECF
Welsh
discriminated against them by depriving them of the right to
express their opinions in class regarding why African Americans
“lived in certain conditions and why they committed crimes,” and
27
by mocking Mr. Hodge and accusing him of lying when he made
statements about a famous African American pilot.
08).
The
complaint
also
financial assistance.
asserts
that
(Id. ¶ 73).
CSM
(Id. ¶¶ 107-
receives
federal
Defendants move to dismiss
these claims arguing that Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts
indicating
Hodge’s
that
appeal
racial
of
his
bias
grade,
motivated
or
CSM’s
motivated
denial
Professor
of
Mr.
Welsh’s
decision in how to conduct his class.
Under
Title
VI,
no
person
shall
“be
excluded
from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance” because of the person’s race, color, or
national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
To state a claim under
Title VI, a plaintiff must allege facts that show the defendant
intentionally discriminated against him on the basis of race,
color, or national origin, and that defendant receives federal
financial assistance.
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280,
121
L.Ed.2d
S.Ct.
provides,
1511,
in
149
pertinent
part,
517
that
(2001).
“[a]ll
42
U.S.C.
persons
§
within
1981
the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as
is enjoyed by white citizens [.]”
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
The
statute broadly defines the term “make and enforce contracts” as
“the
making,
performance,
modification,
28
and
termination
of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms,
and conditions of the contractual relationship.”
1981(b).
To
establish
“purposeful,
affect
least
at
1981(b).”
state
a
one
claim
under
racially
of
the
§
1981,
a
42 U.S.C. §
plaintiff
must
actions
that
discriminatory
contractual
aspects
listed
in
§
Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 165 F.3d 1015, 1018
(4th Cir. 1999).
Thus, both Title VI and § 1981 require that
plaintiffs plausibly allege intentional discrimination.
Plaintiffs’
because
race
Plaintiffs’
discrimination
complaint
claim
provides
will
only
be
dismissed
conclusory
assertions devoid of factual support that Mr. Hodge’s math grade
and CSM’s denial of his grade appeal were motivated by racial
discrimination.
Although Plaintiff believes based on his own
calculation that he should have received a “C” grade in his math
class, even if this assertion is true, his allegations do not
provide a plausible inference that his math professor and CSM’s
administrators refused to correct his grade because of racial
animosity.
Moreover,
Plaintiffs’
allegations
do
not
support
that Professor Welsh refused to let them express their views in
his class because of their race.
Plaintiffs’ allegation that
Professor Welsh sent them an email at the end of the semester
stating: “I hope that you and she find [an] appropriate forum
for you to present your personal opinions” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 67),
coupled
with
their
allegations
29
that
Professor
Schatz
and
Plaintiffs’ fellow students sought to prevent Plaintiffs from
expressing
their
viewpoints
in
another
class
(Id.
¶
78),
provides an inference not of racial discrimination, but that
Plaintiffs’
expression
of
their
viewpoints
timed or disruptive to the class.
factual
allegations
as
true
and
was
either
poorly
Taking all of Plaintiffs’
excluding
their
speculative
assertions that these actions were taken because of their race,
the
allegations
do
not
provide
a
plausible
inference
that
Plaintiffs were discriminated against by CSM Defendants on the
basis of race.
c.
Loss of Consortium
Plaintiffs’
loss
of
consortium
claim
is
based
on
their
allegations that Mr. Hodge was deprived of time with his family
as a result of having to travel to PGCC to take a math class he
had already passed at CSM.
Plaintiffs
attend
the
allege
that
they
same
college
for
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 112).
were
a
deprived
period
of
of
six
In addition,
being
able
months.
to
CSM
Defendants have moved to dismiss this claim arguing that the
complaint fails to allege the loss of a benefit of the marital
relationship or an underlying injury to either spouse.
“A claim for loss of consortium arises from the loss of
society, affection, assistance, and conjugal fellowship suffered
by the marital unit as a result of the physical injury to one
spouse through the tortious conduct of a third party.”
30
Oaks v.
Connors, 339 Md. 24, 33-34 (1995).
of
consortium
dismissed
is
because
deficient
the
is
Plaintiffs’ claim for loss
many
complaint
respects,
does
not
but
allege
a
will
be
physical
injury to either spouse.
d.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants intentionally inflicted
emotional
distress
on
them
by
“depriving
them
of
their
education,” depriving Mr. Hodge of his proper math grade, and
“not allowing them to express themselves in the classrooms while
attending CSM.”
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 113-15).
CSM Defendants contend
that Plaintiffs’ have not alleged any requisite “extreme and
outrageous” conduct by them in order to establish a plausible
claim.
As
noted
by
Judge
Titus
in
Vance
v.
CHF
Int’l.,
F.Supp.2d 669, 682 (D.Md. 2012):
In order to succeed on an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim,
Plaintiffs must demonstrate (a) intentional
or reckless conduct that is (b) outrageous
and extreme (c) causally connected to (d)
extreme emotional distress.
See Caldor,
Inc. v. Bowden, 330 Md. 632, 641–42, 625
A.2d 959 (1993). Maryland courts “have made
it clear that liability for the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress
should be imposed sparingly, and its balm
reserved for those wounds that are truly
severe and incapable of healing themselves.”
Id.
at
642,
625
A.2d
959
(quotation
omitted).
“In order to satisfy the element
of extreme and outrageous conduct, the
conduct ‘must be so extreme in degree as to
31
914
go beyond all possible bounds of decency,
and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable
in
a
civilized
society.’”
Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 164 Md.App.
497, 525, 883 A.2d 1008 (2005) (quoting
Batson v. Shiflett, 325 Md. 684, 733, 602
A.2d 1191 (1992)).
The emotional distress
“must be so severe that ‘no reasonable man
could be expected to endure it.’” Id.
(quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 571,
380 A.2d 611 (1977)).
“One must be unable
to function; one must be unable to tend to
necessary
matters.”
Id.
(quotation
omitted).
The conduct of the CSM Defendants as alleged in the complaint is
far
from
extreme
and
outrageous.
Even
if
CSM
Defendants
intentionally gave Mr. Hodge a lower grade than he had earned,
or
intentionally
themselves
fully
restricted
in
bounds of decency.”
the
Plaintiffs’
classroom
it
ability
would
not
to
express
exceed
“all
Moreover, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts
showing that the emotional distress they suffered as a result of
this conduct rendered them dysfunctional.
e.
Defamation and False Light Invasion of Privacy5
Plaintiffs assert a “defamation-libel” claim based on their
allegation that the CSM Defendants wrote Mr. Hodge’s “false”
math grade on his transcript, which was in turn seen by UDC and
5
Plaintiffs advance both defamation and false light
invasion of privacy claims. Plaintiffs’ false light claim need
not be assessed separate and apart from their defamation claim
because “[a]n allegation of false light must meet the same legal
standards as an allegation of defamation[,]” and Plaintiffs’
allegations of defamation fail to state a claim. Piscatelli v.
Van Smith, 424 Md. 294, 306 (2012).
32
PGCC and which purportedly reflected poorly on his character.
(ECF No. 1 ¶ 117).
several
grounds,
CSM Defendants move to dismiss this claim on
the
first
being
that
Plaintiffs’
conclusory
allegations fail to state a plausible defamation claim.
Libel is a branch of the tort of defamation, which covers
acts of written defamation.
Russell v. Railey, No. DKC 08-2468,
2012 WL 1190972, at *3 (D.Md. April 9, 2012).
To state a claim
for defamation in Maryland, a plaintiff must plead the following
four
elements:
“(1)
that
the
defendant
made
a
defamatory
statement to a third person, (2) that the statement was false,
(3)
that
the
defendant
was
legally
at
fault
in
making
the
statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.”
Offen
v.
Brenner,
402
Md.
191,
198
(2007).
“A
defamatory
statement is one which tends to expose a person to public scorn,
hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the
community from having a good opinion of, or associating with,
that person.”
Offen, 402 Md. at 198–99 (internal quotations
omitted).
Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a plausible claim for
defamation.
First, Plaintiffs fail plausibly to allege how the
receipt of a grade on a transcript can be defamatory, as it is
unlikely that any grade would engender hate or ridicule from the
community
especially
when
the
only
persons
alleged
viewed the grade are administrators at UDC and PGCC.
33
to
have
Second,
although Mr. Hodge believes he earned a “C” in his math class,
CSM writing on his transcript that he received a “D” in the
course would not be “false,” as that is the grade Mr. Hodge
acknowledges
semester.
from
UDC
that
he
actually
received
at
the
end
of
the
Third, Plaintiffs identify no injury that resulted
and
PGCC
viewing
Mr.
Hodge’s
“D”
grade;
indeed,
Plaintiffs’ allegations show that Mr. Hodge was accepted as a
student
at
PGCC
and
later
at
UDC
despite
these
schools’
officials viewing his purportedly “false” grade.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions to dismiss filed by
County Defendants, the State of Maryland, and CSM Defendants
will be granted.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
34
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