Pawlak v. United States Department of Education

Filing 18

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER DENYING 15 and 17 motions for re-hearing (c/m to Appellant 5/14/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/14/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
IN RE: ELIZABETH JULIA PAWLAK
:
_________________________________
:
ELIZABETH JULIA PAWLAK
Appellant

:

v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2839

:
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION
Appellee

:
:

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

bankruptcy appeal is a motion for rehearing filed by Appellant
Elizabeth J. Pawlak (“Ms. Pawlak” or “Appellant”).
15).1

(ECF No.

The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
8012; Local Rule 105.6.

See Fed.R.Bankr.P.

For the reasons that follow, the motion

will be denied.
I.

Background
The facts underlying this bankruptcy appeal were discussed

in a prior memorandum opinion and need not be repeated.
re

Pawlak,

1

520

B.R.

177

(D.Md.

2014).

On

May

22,

See In
2014,

Two days after filing a motion for rehearing, Ms. Pawlak
filed a supplement to her motion. (ECF No. 17). The supplement
contains two exhibits which are irrelevant to the instant
motion.

Appellant filed in bankruptcy court a request for certification
for direct interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit regarding the May 12, 2014 order
issued

by

granting

United

States

Appellee’s

documents.

Bankruptcy

second

motion

Judge
to

Wendelin

compel

I.

production

Lipp
of

Specifically, Ms. Pawlak sought to appeal directly

to the Fourth Circuit a bankruptcy court order requiring her to
answer

in

full

all

of

production of documents.

the

interrogatories

(See ECF No. 1-2).

and

requests

for

On June 26, 2014,

Judge Lipp issued an order denying Ms. Pawlak’s motion.

Ms.

Pawlak then filed a motion for reconsideration, (ECF No. 1-7),
which Judge Lipp again denied.

(ECF No. 1-10).

Subsequently,

Ms. Pawlak filed an appeal in this court concerning the order
denying the interlocutory appeal to the Fourth Circuit.
On

April

1,

2015,

the

undersigned

opinion and order dismissing her appeal.

issued

a

memorandum

(ECF Nos. 13 & 14).

Appellant filed a motion for rehearing on April 15, 2015, which
she supplemented two days later.
opposed the motion.
II.

(ECF Nos. 15 & 17).

DOE

(ECF No. 16).

Standard of Review
The United States District Court for the District of South

Carolina identified the appropriate standard in considering a
motion for rehearing in Baurnhaft v. McGuffin, C/A No. 4:06-CV3617-RBH, 2007 WL 3119611, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007):
2

Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8015 provides that “a motion
for rehearing may be filed within 1[4] days
after entry of the judgment of the district
court . . .”
“The purpose of Rule 8015 is
to provide recourse to a party . . . after a
district court . . . has overlooked or
misapprehended some point of law or fact.”
10 Collier on Bankr.P. 8015.01 (15th ed.rev.
2004).
Although Rule 8015 does not specify
the standard for ruling on a petition for
rehearing, it appears that most courts have
looked by analogy to Fed.R.App.P. 40. . . .
Appellate Rule 40 provides that petitions
for rehearing must include points which the
court
allegedly
overlooked
or
misapprehended.
Petitions for rehearing
should not simply reargue the plaintiff’s
case or assert new grounds. See Sierra Club
v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1100-01 (10th Cir.
1988).
At base, motions for rehearing are “designed to ensure that the
appellate court properly considered all relevant information in
rendering its decision.”

In re Zegeye, Civ. No. DKC 04-1387,

2005 WL 544763, at *1 (D.Md. Mar. 4, 2005).
III. Analysis
Appellant believes that the court misunderstood the issues
on appeal, which she insists required the court to resolve the
following
court

“purely

may

interlocutory
appropriate

legal

“deny

mandatory

appeal”
test

issues”:

to

to
be

(1)

whether

certification

the

Fourth

used

by

the

the
for

Circuit;

and

bankruptcy

bankruptcy
a

direct
(2)

court

the
in

determining the existence of “any of the circumstances specified

3

in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) of 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A).”
(ECF No. 17, at 3).
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions, she has not identified
any

point

of

misapprehended.

law

or

fact

that

the

court

overlooked

or

At bottom, Ms. Pawlak appeals an order from

Judge Lipp denying her request for an interlocutory appeal to
the

Fourth

Circuit.

As

explained

in

the

April

1,

2015

memorandum opinion, Appellant provides no authority to suggest
that orders of the Bankruptcy Court denying a motion to file an
interlocutory appeal to the Fourth Circuit (and a motion for
reconsideration of that denial) are even reviewable on appeal to
the district court.

In any event, the determination of whether

to issue a certificate of interlocutory appeal is vested within
the discretion of the bankruptcy court, applying the standard in
Section

158(d)(2)(A).2

Moreover,

as

explained

in

the

prior

opinion, reversal of Judge Lipp’s decision to decline to issue
an interlocutory appeal certificate would not necessarily result
in the questions receiving appellate review because the Fourth

2

The Supreme Court of the United States recently recognized
Section 158(d)(2) as an appropriate mechanism that “allows a
broader range of interlocutory decisions to make their way to
the courts of appeals.”
See Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 135
S.Ct. 1686, 1696 (2015).
The Court acknowledged that “[w]hile
discretionary review mechanisms such as these do not provide
relief in every case, they serve as useful safety valves for
promptly correcting serious errors and addressing important
legal questions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This
is not one of those cases, however.
4

Circuit could still decline to hear the appeal.

Even assuming

this court could review on appeal the June 26, 2014 order issued
by Judge Lipp, Appellant has not satisfied the requirements of
28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) for the reasons explained in the April 1,
2015

opinion.

Appellant’s

disagreement

with

the

court’s

application of the relevant standard does not provide a basis
for rehearing.
Based on the foregoing, it is this 14th day of May, 2015, by
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland,
ORDERED that:
1.
rehearing

The
(ECF

motions

of

Appellant

Nos.

15

&

17)

BE,

clerk

is

directed

Elizabeth

and

the

same

Pawlak

for

hereby

ARE,

DENIED; and
2.
foregoing

The

Memorandum

Opinion

and

to

transmit

this

Order

copies
to

of

the

counsel

for

Appellee and directly to Appellant Elizabeth J. Pawlak.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

5