Gray v. Sarles et al

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 2/9/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 2/9/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JIM GRAY
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2939

:
UNIDENTIFIED METRO TRANSIT
POLICE OFFICERS 1, 2, 3

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is a motion to
dismiss filed by Defendants Ronald A. Pavlik, Jr., Kevin P.
Gaddis, Adam Fields, Emily Woodward Deutsch, and A. Thompson
(collectively, the “Defendants”).

(ECF No. 33).

The issues

have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being
deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons,

the motion to dismiss will be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background1

Defendants

are

employees

in

various

positions

Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”).
operates

a

police

unit

called

Department (“Transit Police”).

the

Metro

Transit

in

the
WMATA

Police

Defendant Pavlik is the Chief of

the Transit Police, and Defendant Gaddis is the Deputy Chief.
(ECF No. 25, at 1).
1

Defendant Thompson is a police officer for

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the second amended complaint (ECF No. 25) and construed
in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

the Transit Police.

(Id.).

Defendants Deutsch and Fields are

an attorney and a paralegal, respectively, in WMATA’s Office of
General Counsel.

(ECF No. 36, at 5).2

Plaintiff alleges that, on two separate occasions, he was
unlawfully pulled over by Transit Police officers and issued
traffic citations.

(ECF No. 25, at 2).

First, Plaintiff was

stopped by three Transit Police officers, including Defendant
Thompson, on July 22, 2011 (the “2011 Stop”).

(Id.).

Second,

he was stopped by several unidentified officers on July 30, 2013
(the “2013 Stop”).

(Id.).

Plaintiff contends that the Transit

Police officers who pulled him over were acting outside the
geographic and legal scope of their authority.
B.

(Id. at 3-4).

Procedural Background

On September 17, 2014, Plaintiff filed suit in this court
against the General Manager of WMATA, Richard Sarles, and three
unnamed officers from the 2013 Stop, alleging violations of 18
U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 14141, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

(ECF No. 1, at 1).3

Plaintiff alleged that the 2013

Stop occurred outside Transit Police jurisdiction and that the
citations he was issued during the stop were false charges.

2

Although Defendant Fields’ job title is not identified in
the second amended complaint, it is undisputed.
3

Plaintiff cites to 18 U.S.C. § 14141, which does not
exist. Construing his pro se complaint liberally, his claim is
interpreted as being brought under 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
2

(Id. at 3).
and

he

Plaintiff appears to have contested the citations,

attached

a

trial

summary

from

the

District

Court

of

Maryland for Prince George’s County showing that the citations
(ECF No. 1-1, at 1).4

were dismissed.

Although he made no

allegations related to the 2011 Stop in his initial complaint,
he also attached a similar trial summary issued by the same
court for the 2011 Stop.

(Id. at 2).

On November 3, Defendant

Sarles filed a motion to dismiss the case against him.
6).

(ECF No.

The court found that Defendant Sarles had been sued in his

official capacity and that, in that capacity, he was immune from
suits for torts committed by Transit Police officers performing
governmental functions.

(ECF No. 9, at 4).

Because Plaintiff

had failed to name or serve any of the other defendants, the
court also ordered Plaintiff to show cause why the case against
the three unnamed officers should not also be dismissed.

(Id.

at 8).
Plaintiff

responded,

describing

issues

he

was

having

identifying the unnamed officers (ECF No. 11), and the court
granted him sixty days to identify the defendants by name, amend
his complaint, and provide addresses for the service of process
on these officers.

(ECF No. 12, at 3).

4

Over the next several

A court may, without converting a motion to dismiss into a
motion for summary judgment, properly “consider documents
attached to the complaint.”
Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem’l Hosp.,
th
572 F.3d 176, 180 (4 Cir. 2009); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
3

months, Plaintiff filed multiple motions for discovery, which
were denied because there were no defendants in the case to
serve

with

discovery

requests,

and

multiple

extension of time, which the court granted.
14; 16; 18; 20; 21).

motions

for

(See ECF Nos. 13;

Plaintiff eventually filed an amended

complaint naming Defendants Pavlik, Gaddis, and Fields, but the
court ordered that no summons should be issued on the amended
complaint.

(ECF No. 21, at 2).

Because there were no factual

allegations pertaining to these three defendants in the body of
the

complaint,

it

appeared

that

Plaintiff

was

suing

these

Defendants in their official capacities and that the amended
complaint

“suffer[ed]

from

the

same

complaint against Mr. Sarles.”

(Id.).

defects

as

his

initial

Plaintiff was granted

another extension of time to identify defendants, describe what
each allegedly did wrong, and file a second amended complaint.
(Id.).

Plaintiff

then

moved

for

injunctive

relief,

seeking

records related to the 2013 Stop from WMATA under the Freedom of
Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
denied

that

motion,

explaining

(ECF No. 22).

that

WMATA

was

not

The court
a

named

defendant in this case and that Plaintiff must name WMATA as a
defendant and serve it with process if he sought to allege his
substantive claims against it or to challenge its response to
his records requests.

(ECF No. 24, at 3).

Plaintiff then

instituted a new civil action against WMATA for their alleged
4

violations of public records laws.

(See ECF No. 30).

That

case has been dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

See Gray v. WMATA, No. DKC-16-1792, 2017 WL 511910,

at *3 (D.Md. Feb. 8, 2017).
On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint,
naming Defendants Pavlik, Gaddis, Fields, Deutsch, and Thompson.
(ECF No. 25).
was

For the first time, he alleged that the 2011 Stop

unlawful,

and

that

Defendant

Thompson

was

of

the

(Id. at 2).

officers who pulled him over in the 2011 Stop.

one

The

second amended complaint failed to identify any of the three
officers involved in the 2013 Stop.
Counsel

for

WMATA

accepted

(Id.).
service

on

behalf

of

all

Defendants on June 8 (ECF No. 31, at 2), and Defendants filed
the

instant

motion

to

dismiss

on

August

Plaintiff responded, and Defendants replied.
II.

3

(ECF

No.

33).

(ECF Nos. 36; 37).

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

Presley v. City of

Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A complaint

need only satisfy the standard of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), which
requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the

pleader

requires

a

is

entitled

‘showing,’

entitlement to relief.”

to

rather

relief.”
than

a

“Rule
blanket

8(a)(2)

still

assertion,

of

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
5

544, 555 n.3 (2007).

That showing must consist of more than “a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” or
“naked

assertion[s]

devoid

of

further

factual

enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true, Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,
268 (1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

See

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cnty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events, United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
604

F.2d

844,

847

(4th

Cir.

1979);

see

also

Francis

v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Generally,

pro

se

pleadings

are

liberally

construed

and

held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by
lawyers.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting

Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

Liberal construction means that the

court will read the pleadings to state a valid claim to the
6

extent that it is possible to do so from the facts available; it
does not mean that the court should rewrite the complaint to
include claims never presented.
1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999).

Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d

That is, even when pro se litigants

are involved, the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege
facts that support a viable claim.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); Forquer v. Schlee, No.
RDB–12–969,

2012

WL

6087491,

at

*3

(D.Md.

Dec.

4,

2012)

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“[E]ven a pro
se complaint must be dismissed if it does not allege a plausible
claim for relief.”).
III. Analysis
A.
Claims Against Defendants Pavlik, Gaddis, Fields, and
Deustch
Defendants contend that Defendants Pavlik, Gaddis, Deutsch,
and Fields are immune from suit because they are named in their
official

capacities.

In

the

complaint,

Plaintiff

does

allege any specific acts by any of these four Defendants.

not

Thus,

the court must assume that he seeks to hold them liable in their
official capacities.5

5

In his opposition, Plaintiff argues that he intended to
hold these Defendants liable under a theory of supervisory
liability.
(ECF No. 36, at 2).
“[I]t is axiomatic that the
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a
motion to dismiss.”
Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 770
F.Supp. 1053, 1068 (D.Md. 1991) (quoting Car Carriers, Inc. v.
Ford Motor Co., 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984)); see Zachair Ltd.
7

As

discussed

in

detail

in

this

court’s

earlier

opinion

dismissing the complaint as to Defendant Sarles, WMATA officials
are immune from suit for law enforcement actions like those
underlying
compact

this

that

case.

(ECF

formed

WMATA

No.

9,

at

extends

4).

the

The

interstate

immunity

of

the

signatories to WMATA and its officials “for any tort occurring
in the performance of a governmental function.”
Transp.

§

10-204,

Art

XVI,

§

80

(2016).

See Md. Code,
“It

is

firmly

established [that] . . . the operation of a police force is a
governmental function, and that acts or omissions in connection
therewith ordinarily to do not give rise to liability.”
v. WMATA, 667 F.2d 435, 436 (4th Cir. 1981).

Martin

Even accepting

Plaintiff’s allegations that the stops and citations in question
were unfounded, traffic stops and citations are a means of law
v. Driggs, 965 F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D.Md. 1997) (stating that
the plaintiff “is bound by the allegations contained in its
complaint and cannot, through the use of motion briefs, amend
the complaint”), aff’d, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998). Moreover,
the second amended complaint completely lacks any specific facts
supporting a theory of supervisory liability.
Supervisory
liability requires that a supervisor had “actual or constructive
knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed
a pervasive and unreasonable risk of constitutional injury to
citizens like the plaintiff” and that the supervisor responded
with “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the
alleged
offensive
practices,”
such
that
“there
was
an
affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and
the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.”
Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The allegations in Plaintiff’s
opposition relate solely to knowledge of the allegedly unlawful
stops after the 2013 Stop occurred (see ECF No. 36, at 3, 5, 6),
which categorically cannot demonstrate a causal link.
8

enforcement,

and,

therefore,

these

characterized as police action.”

Id.

actions

are

“correctly

These Defendants are thus

immune from suit in their official capacities, and the motion to
dismiss the claims against them will be granted.
B.

Plaintiff’s Causes of Action

Plaintiff alleges violations of several statutes for which
no private cause of action exists.
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242.
criminal

statutes,

however,

First, he claims violations

(ECF No. 25, at 2).
and

it

is

“beyond

These are
the

court’s

purview in this civil matter to provide relief under criminal
statutes.”

Grant v. Prince George’s Cty., No. DKC-15-2433, 2016

WL 3541239, at *5 (D.Md. June 29, 2016); see also Agnew v. City
of Compton, 239 F.2d 226, 230 (9th Cir. 1956); Watson v. Devlin,
167 F.Supp. 638, 640 (E.D.Mich. 1958).6
to

42

U.S.C.

§

14141,

which

Second, Plaintiff cites

prohibits

law

enforcement

from

“engaging in a pattern or practice . . . that deprives persons
of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution
14141(a).

or

laws

Authority

of
to

the

United

file

suit

States.”
under

this

42

U.S.C.

statute

§
is

expressly granted to the Attorney General of the United States,
6

In his opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff also
references other violations of criminal law, including perjury
and obstruction of justice. (ECF No. 36, at 10). To the degree
that the facts in the second amended complaint properly allege
these violations, they, too, are beyond the court’s purview
here.
9

see § 14141(b), and it does not provide a private right of
action.

Johnson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. PJM-14-4008, 2016

WL 4593467, at *7 (D.Md. Sept. 2, 2016); Metcalf v. Call, No.
2:14-cv-00010-MR-DLH, 2014 WL 12497025, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 31,
2014),

aff’d,

584

F.App’x

(4th

56

Cir.

2014)

(per

curiam)

(unpublished opinion).
Plaintiff’s complaint also appears to allege violations of
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by way of malicious prosecution, false arrest,
and fabrication of evidence.

(ECF No. 25, at 2).

Plaintiff

seems to be arguing that the citations issued to him at the
traffic stops constituted fabricated evidence against him.
1983

claim

based

on

fabrication

of

evidence

is

A §

insufficient

unless a plaintiff pleads “adequate facts to establish that [a]
loss

of

liberty

incarceration

–

–

i.e.,

resulted

his

from

conviction

the

fabrication.”

Ojanit, 759 F.3d 343, 354 (4th Cir. 2014).
that

the

citations

“exposed

[him]

and

to

subsequent
Massey

v.

Although he argues
further

charges

and

incarceration” (ECF No. 25, at 4), he states that all charges
against him were dropped in a decision by Judge Powell of the
District Court of Maryland (id. at 3).

Because Plaintiff does

not allege that a loss of liberty resulted from these citations,
his fabrication of evidence claim will be dismissed.
Under § 1983, Plaintiff’s allegations of false arrest and
malicious

prosecution

amount

to
10

claims

that

he

was

seized

without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
See

Rogers

(“[F]alse

v.

Pendleton,

arrest

and

249

false

F.3d

279,

294

imprisonment

(4th

claims

Cir.
.

.

2001)
.

are

essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation
of the Fourth Amendment.”); Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257,
261-62 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]here is no such thing as a ‘§ 1983
malicious

prosecution’

claim.

What

we

termed

a

‘malicious

prosecution claim . . . is simply a claim founded on a Fourth
Amendment seizure that incorporates elements of the analogous
common law tort of malicious prosecution.”); Gregg v. Richmond,
No. DKC-2001-1212, 2004 WL 257080, at *2 (D.Md. Feb. 11, 2004)
(“The

court

will

treat

§

1983

as

the

basis

for

Plaintiff’s

Fourth Amendment violation claim, arising out of his alleged
false arrest, false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.”).
Construing the second amended complaint liberally, Plaintiff may
have pleaded cognizable injuries under § 1983 based on malicious
prosecution and false arrest by Defendant Thompson.
C.

Section 1983 Claims Against Defendant Thompson

Defendants

contend

Thompson are time-barred.

that

any

claims

against

(ECF No. 33, at 8-9).

Defendant

The statute of

limitations is an affirmative defense that a party typically
must raise in a pleading under Rule 8(c) and is not usually an
appropriate

ground

for

dismissal.

See

Eniola

v.

Leasecomm

Corp., 214 F.Supp.2d 520, 525 (D.Md. 2002); Gray v. Metts, 203
11

F.Supp.2d 426, 428 (D.Md. 2002).

Dismissal is proper, however,

“when the face of the complaint clearly reveals the existence of
a meritorious affirmative defense.”

Brooks v. City of Winston–

Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181 (4th Cir. 1996); see 5B Charles A. Wright
& Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357, at 714
(3d ed. 2004) (“A complaint showing that the governing statute
of limitations has run on the Plaintiff’s claim for relief is
the

most

common

situation

in

which

the

affirmative

defense

appears on the face of the pleading and provides a basis for a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).”).
When enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress determined that
gaps in federal civil rights acts should be filled by state law,
as long as that law is not inconsistent with federal law.
Burnett

v.

Grattan,

468

U.S.

42,

47–48

(1984).

Because

See
no

federal statute of limitations governs, federal courts routinely
measure the timeliness of federal civil rights suits by state
law.

See id. at 49; Chardon v. Fumero Soto, 462 U.S. 650, 655–

56 (1983); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454,
464

(1975).

Maryland’s

general

three-year

statute

of

limitations for civil actions is most applicable to Plaintiff’s
remaining claims.

See Md. Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5–101.

Federal law, however, governs the question of when a cause
of action accrues under § 1983.
384, 387 (2007).

See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S.

Under the general rubric, the running of the
12

statute of limitations begins when a plaintiff knows or has
reason to know of his injury.

Id.

A claim of unlawful seizure

accrues on the date of the alleged incident.

See Gray v. State

of Maryland, 228 F.Supp.2d 628, 635 (D.Md. 2002).

A claim for

false arrest accrues on the date of initial appearance before a
neutral magistrate.

See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 387.

For claims

based on malicious prosecution, the limitations period starts to
run

when

the

prosecution

is

terminated.

See

Fields

v.

Montgomery Cty., No. DKC-13-3477, 2014 WL 4231164, at *3 (D.Md.
Aug. 26, 2014) (citing Brooks, 85 F.3d at 181-83).
Here,

the

alleged

incident

occurred on July 22, 2011.

involving

Defendant

(ECF No. 25, at 1).

Thompson

The latest

possible date that his claims could have accrued is the date of
the termination of his prosecution, which was October 27, 2011.
(ECF No. 1-1, at 2).

Plaintiff thus had until, at the latest,

October

file

27,

2014,

to

a

claim

based

on

the

2011

Stop.

Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this court on September
17, 2014 (ECF No. 1).

As discussed above, however, although

Plaintiff attached a record from the hearing for the 2011 Stop
to the initial complaint, he did not allege any claim related to
that stop or name Defendant Thompson as a defendant until he
filed the second amended complaint on May 9, 2016.
25).

(ECF No.

An amended pleading may relate back to the date of the

original pleading if “the amendment asserts a claim or defense
13

that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
out – or attempted to be set out - in the original pleading.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(B).

Because the 2011 Stop was an entirely

distinct occurrence from the 2013 Stop and Plaintiff made no
factual allegations related to it in his original complaint,
relation back is not appropriate here.7
Plaintiff

argues

in

his

opposition

that

tolling

of

the

statute of limitations should be applied here because “[m]ost
statutes of limitations will run only while the alleged criminal
remains visible and in the state where the crime occurred.”
(ECF No. 36, at 9).

As noted above, rules governing criminal

proceedings do not apply in this civil case.
“[e]quitable
deception,

tolling

conceals

applies
a

cause

where
of

a

In civil cases,

defendant,

action.”

Lekas

Airlines, Inc., 282 F.3d 296, 301 (4th Cir. 2002).
not

alleged

any

facts

indicating

that

concealed the cause of action from him.

7

by

active

v.

United

Plaintiff has

Defendant

Thompson

His claim is therefore

Even if attaching the court record to his original
complaint were construed as alleging a claim based on the 2011
Stop, Rule 15(c)(1)(C) bars relation back for amendments to the
named parties against whom a claim is asserted unless that party
“knew or should have known that the action would be brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).
Nothing in the
original or first amended complaint indicated that Plaintiff
intended to bring suit against anyone involved in the 2011 Stop,
and Plaintiff has not made any allegations that suggest
Defendant Thompson knew or should have known that an action
would be brought against him.
14

barred as to the 2011 Stop under the statute of limitations.
Because Plaintiff’s asserted claims against Defendant Thompson
come exclusively from the 2011 Stop, all claims against him will
be dismissed.
D.

Unidentified Transit Police Officers 1, 2, and 3

Finally,

the

three

unidentified

Transit

Police

officers

named in the original complaint will be dismissed from the case.
“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 21.

Moreover, “[a]

pleading that has been amended under Rule 15(a) supersedes the
pleading it modifies . . . .
interposed,

the

original

function in the case.”

Once an amended pleading is

pleading

no

longer

performs

any

Wright & Miller, supra, § 1476; see also

Wall v. Fruehauf Trailer Servs., Inc., 123 F.App’x 572, 576 n.4
(4th Cir. 2005) (“When the Second Amended Complaint was filed, it
had the effect of superseding the earlier complaint . . . which
no longer performs any function in the case.”); Young v. City of
Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general
rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and
renders it of no legal effect.”).

Although each of Plaintiff’s

complaints

to

alleged

facts

related

the

three

officers,

he

removed them as named defendants in both his first and second
amended complaints.

(ECF Nos. 17; 25).

It is thus no longer

clear that Plaintiff seeks to hold these officers individually
15

responsible for the stop.

Throughout this case, Plaintiff has

sought both money damages and an injunction preventing all WMATA
officers from issuing citations outside of their jurisdiction, a
demand

that

indicates

an

interest

in

suing

WMATA

or

its

policymakers, rather than the specific officers who pulled him
over.
of

(See ECF Nos. 1; 17; 25).

Defendant

Sarles

and

Despite the court’s dismissal

direction

to

identify

the

unnamed

officers, Plaintiff has instead continued to add Defendants who
work in executive and administrative positions at WMATA.

The

court has repeatedly explained the deficiencies related to the
unnamed officers, ordered Plaintiff to identify and serve these
defendants, and granted him extensions of time in which to do
so.

(See ECF Nos. 9; 12; 16; 21; 24).

Plaintiff’s

pro

se

status,

his

failure

Even in light of
to

identify

these

officers and his omission of them from his amended complaints
make dismissing them appropriate here.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendants Ronald A. Pavlik, Jr., Kevin P. Gaddis, Adam Fields,
Emily Woodward Deutsch, and A. Thompson will be granted.
separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
16

A