Gray v. Sarles et al

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 7/6/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/6/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
JIM GRAY
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2939

:
RICHARD SARLES, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is this civil
rights action is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Richard
Sarles.

(ECF No. 6).

The relevant issues have been briefed and

the court now rules pursuant to Local Rule 105.6, no hearing
being deemed necessary. For the following reasons, the motion
will be granted.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Jim Gray, proceeding pro se, filed this action on

September 17, 2014 against Defendants Richard Sarles, General
Manager

of

Washington

Metropolitan

Area

Transit

Authority

(“WMATA”), and three unidentified Metro Transit Police Officers.
(ECF No. 1).
to proceed

Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion
in forma pauperis, which was granted.

Plaintiff

seeks redress for what he believes were illegal actions taken on
July 30, 2013, when he was driving in Capitol Heights, Maryland,
and was pulled over by a WMATA police unit.

Plaintiff was

issued

citations

infraction.

for

unreasonable

speed

and

a

seatbelt

The charges were dismissed on April 22, 2014, in

the District Court of Maryland for Prince George’s County.

The

crux of Plaintiff’s complaint is that the WMATA police officers
who pulled him over violated his rights by issuing him citations
when he was purportedly on property that was outside of their
jurisdictional limits.

Plaintiff asserts several claims arising

from this incident, including violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18
U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
On

November

3,

2014,

Defendant

Sarles

moved

to

dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
No. 6).
II.

Plaintiff responded on November 18, 2014.

(ECF

(ECF No. 8).

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.
Charlottesville,

464

F.3d

480,

483

(4th

Presley v. City of
Cir.

2006).

A

plaintiff's complaint need only satisfy the standard of Rule
8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).

Fed.R.Civ.P.

“Rule 8(a)(2) still requires a ‘showing,’ rather than

a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.”
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3 (2007).

Bell Atl. Corp.

That showing must

consist of more than “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
2

a cause of action” or “naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal citations omitted).
At this stage, all well-pleaded allegations in a complaint
must be considered as true.
268 (1994).
in

the

light

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266,

Further, all factual allegations must be construed
most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999)

(internal

citations

omitted).

While

courts

generally

should hold pro se pleadings “to less stringent standards than
formal

pleadings

drafted

by

lawyers,”

they

may

nonetheless

dismiss complaints that lack a cognizable legal theory or that
fail to allege sufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Errivares v. Transp.
Sec. Admin., No. DKC 09-1138, 2010 WL 610774 (D.Md. Feb. 17,
2010).

Legal conclusions couched as factual allegations are

insufficient, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of
any reference to actual events.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

III. Analysis
A.

Defendant Sarles

Defendant Sarles asserts that he (and WMATA) are immune
from liability for the governmental activity of running a police
department, that he cannot be sued in his official capacity
3

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that there is no private right of
action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 221 and 241 and 42 U.S.C. § 14141.
The

undersigned

need

only

address

Defendant

Sarles’

first

argument.
Although Defendant Sarles is named in the caption of the
Complaint,

Plaintiff

does

not

allege

involved in the events of July 30.

that

he

was

personally

Presumably Plaintiff has

named him in his official capacity, which essentially seeks to
hold

his

agency,

WMATA,

responsible

unnamed transit police officers.

for

the

actions

of

the

Plaintiff’s claims will be

dismissed because Defendant Sarles, who has been sued in his
official capacity as General Manager of WMATA, is immune from
suit

for

torts

governmental

of

WMATA

functions.

Transit
WMATA

police

was

officers

formed

by

an

performing
interstate

compact (“the Compact”) enacted and consented to by Congress and
adopted by the state of Maryland, the District of Columbia, and
the Commonwealth of Virginia.
435, 436 (4th Cir. 1981).

See Martin v. WMATA, 667 F.2d

The Compact provides that WMATA is an

interstate agency and instrumentality of the signatories to the
Compact.

See Delon Hampton & Assocs., Ctd. v. WMATA, 943 F.2d

355, 359 (4th Cir. 1991).

As such, it enjoys the same rights and

privileges

including

as

a

state,

sovereign

immunity.

Id.

(citing Beatty v. WMATA, 860 F.2d 1117, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
4

As noted by Judge Titus in Hutcherson v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., No. CIV. 08-3044-RWT, 2009 WL 2168998, at *2-3
(D.Md. July 16, 2009):
Under the Compact, WMATA has the authority
to establish and maintain a transit police
force
in
connection
with
its
transit
operation.
[Md. Code Ann., Transp. § 10204], § 76.
As a governmental agency, WMATA enjoys
immunity from certain civil suits.
Id. §
80. Specifically, “[t]he Authority shall be
liable . . . for its torts and those of its
Directors, officers, employees and agents
committed in the conduct of any proprietary
function, in accordance with the law of the
applicable signatory (including rules on
conflict of laws), but shall not be liable
for any torts occurring in the performance
of a governmental function.”
Id. (emphasis
added).
Thus, for this Court to have
jurisdiction over Defendant, the actions
giving rise to the complaint must properly
be characterized as “proprietary” as opposed
to “governmental” functions.
Id.; Smith v.
Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 290 F.3d
201, 206 (4th Cir. 2002).
When addressing the WMATA Compact, the
Fourth Circuit looks to the District of
Columbia
Circuit
for
interpretive
aid,
striving to maintain consistency between the
only two federal circuits likely to preside
over WMATA Compact issues.
See Lizzi v.
th
Alexander, 255 F.3d 128, 134 (4 Cir. 2001).
Federal courts in both circuits interpreting
the WMATA Compact have adopted certain tests
to aid in their determination of which
functions are “governmental” and thus immune
from suit. Smith, 290 F.3d at 207; Burkhart
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d
1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
5

Activities
that
are
“quintessentially
governmental” fall within the scope of §
80’s grant of immunity. Dant v. District of
Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Such functions have been defined as those
activities exclusively within the purview of
the government by way of its legal and
authoritative nature.
See Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 59, 73 S.Ct.
956, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953) (“When an official
exerts governmental authority in a manner
which legally binds one or many, he is
acting in a way in which no private person
could.”); see also Smith, 290 F.3d 201 at
207 (holding that the WMATA Compact adopted
“the Dalehite conception” in its language)
(internal quotations omitted).
The oftcited prototypical governmental function as
pertains to WMATA is the act of maintaining
a police force.
See Martin v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 667 F.2d 435 (4th Cir.
1981) (“If the operation of a police force
is not a governmental function, then a
governmental
function
may
not
exist.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
. . . .
The Fourth Circuit has held that it “is
firmly established that . . . the operation
of
a
police
force
is
a
governmental
function.”
Martin, 667 F.2d at 435; see
also Morris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth.,
781 F.2d 218 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(holding
that
the
“principle
is
wellestablished that the operation of a police
force
is
a
governmental
rather
than
proprietary function”).
This operation
includes those activities undertaken by
transit
officers
“comparable
to
those
executed
by
their
counterparts
in
the
respective jurisdictions.”
Hall v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 468 A.2d 970, 973
(D.C. 1983) (holding WMATA immune from a
false arrest claim filed by a WMATA employee
6

accused of embezzling money from a farecard
machine).
In Hutcherson, Judge Titus went on to dismiss the plaintiff’s
claims,

which

arose

from

a

traffic

stop

during

which

WMATA

Transit Police stopped plaintiff and issued him a citation for
having illegal window tints, finding that the issuance of this
citation was “a garden variety police function” that constituted
a

government

function

under

entitled WMATA to immunity.

§

80

of

the

WMATA

compact

and

Hutcherson, 2009 WL 2168998, at *4.

Here, Plaintiff’s claims arise from what he alleges was an
unlawful traffic stop by WMATA Transit police officers where he
was issued citations purportedly outside of WMATA jurisdiction
for speeding and a seatbelt violation.

As in Hutcherson, these

activities by WMTATA police are governmental functions for which
WMATA is immune under § 80 of the Compact.
B.

Unidentified Metro Transit Police Officers 1, 2, and 3

Plaintiff
Transit

police

also

purports

Officers.

to

sue

When

three

his

unidentified

complaint

was

WMATA
filed,

Plaintiff was provided instructions for having the United States
Marshal effect service of process.

He was sent four service of

process forms and advised to return one for each Defendant.

It

appears that he supplied one completed form for Mr. Sarles, but
none for the other Defendants.

It has now been much longer than

the allotted 120 days within which the complaint should have
7

been

served

on

those

Defendants.

Fed.R.Civ.P.

4(m).

Accordingly, Plaintiff will be directed to show cause within
fourteen (14) days why the case should not be dismissed without
prejudice as to those three Defendants.
IV.

Conclusion
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

Defendant

Sarles’

motion

to

dismiss will be granted and Plaintiff will be directed to show
cause as to why the complaint should not be dismissed as to the
remaining unidentified Defendants.

A separate order follows.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

8