Ross et al v. Broxton et al
Filing
22
MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiffs 8/27/15 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/27/2015. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DANIEL HUBERT ROSS, et al.
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 14-2967
:
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner, Social
Security Administration1
:
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This
case
DiGirolamo
was
for
referred
pretrial
to
management
recommendation for disposition.
2015,
Judge
DiGirolamo
Magistrate
filed
and
Judge
a
(ECF No. 16).
a
Report
and
Thomas
report
and
On July 29,
Recommendation,
recommending that Carolyn W. Colvin be substituted as Defendant,
and that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted.
(ECF No.
20).
objection
On
August
14,
accompanied by exhibits.
2015,
Plaintiffs
filed
an
(ECF No. 21).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, a district judge may designate
a
magistrate
judge
to
conduct
hearings
and
report
proposed
findings of fact and recommendations for action on a dispositive
motion.
1
Thereafter,
After initially naming R. Jeffries-Broxton, the Social
Security Administration, and Carolyn W. Colvin as Defendants,
Plaintiffs have agreed that Ms. Colvin, in her official
capacity, is the proper Defendant. (ECF Nos. 20, at 1; 14, at
3).
A party who is aggrieved by a magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation as to a
dispositive
motion
must
file
“specific
written objections to the proposed findings
and recommendations” within fourteen days.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The district judge
must then “determine de novo any part of the
magistrate judge’s disposition that has been
properly
objected
to.”
Fed.R.Civ.P.
72(b)(3). But, the Court “need only conduct
a de novo review of those portions of the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
to which objection is made.”
Chavis v.
Smith, 834 F.Supp. 153, 154 (D.Md.1993). As
to those portions of the report for which
there is no objection, the district court
“must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no
clear error on the face of the record in
order
to
accept
the
recommendation.’”
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.,
416 F.3d 310, 315–16 (4th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee
note), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1091, 126
S.Ct. 1033, 163 L.Ed.2d 855 (2006).
Baltimore Line Handling Co. v. Brophy, 771 F.Supp.2d 531, 534-35
(D.Md. 2011).
Magistrate Judge DiGirolamo recommends that the complaint
be
dismissed
under
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
12(b)(1)
because it is barred by the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g),
and
administrative
because
Plaintiffs
remedies.
Judge
have
not
DiGirolamo
exhausted
also
noted
their
that
Plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional claims are not sufficient to
bypass the exhaustion requirement because they are not colorable
and are not collateral to the merits of a claim for benefits.
See Varandani v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 307, 310 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
2
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330-31 (1976)).
Plaintiffs’
objection does not challenge the fact that they did not exhaust
their administrative remedies or that a potential substantive
claim for benefits is not presently actionable.
2).
Instead, Plaintiffs reassert their constitutional claims.
(Id.).
over
(ECF No. 21, at
This court does not have subject matter jurisdiction
Plaintiffs’
constitutional
collateral and colorable.
claims
unless
they
are
As Judge DiGirolamo noted:
“A claim is colorable if it is not ‘wholly
insubstantial, immaterial, or frivolous.’”
Cassim v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir.
1987 (quoting Boettcher v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 759 F.2d 719, 722 (9th Cir.
1985)).
In other words, a constitutional
claim should be dismissed if it clearly
appears to be immaterial and made solely for
the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or is
wholly insubstantial or frivolous.
Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (1946); Holloway
v. Schweiker, 724 F.2d 1102, 1105 (4th Cir.
1984).
(ECF No. 20, at 10).
Plaintiffs’ argue that the Social Security Administration’s
(“SSA”)
“procedures
used
to
determine
the
amount
of
money
[Plaintiffs] can earn” in wages while receiving Social Security
benefits
are
unconstitutional.
(ECF
No.
1,
at
2).
First,
Plaintiffs allege that “the government’s restriction of [their]
liberty
violates
interests
the
to
earn
Thirteenth
a
livelihood
Amendment.
to
make
(Id.).
ends
meet”
Plaintiffs’
Thirteenth Amendment argument appears to be based on the belief
3
that the SSA’s reduction in benefits due to wages earned is a
“badge[]
of
interest
in
slavery”
[their]
(ECF No. 4, at 3).
that
restricts
right-to-work
and
Plaintiffs’
continued
“liberty
employment.”
Plaintiffs’ assertion that the SSA infringed
on their ability to work and earn a living is simply not correct
because
there
were
no
Plaintiffs could work.
absolute
restrictions
on
the
amount
Rather, the SSA, pursuant to statute and
regulation, reduced the monthly benefits Plaintiffs received to
offset
unreported
wages
earned.
Plaintiffs,
despite
their
policy disagreement, have made no colorable claim that the SSA’s
conduct,
or
the
applicable
incident
or
badge
of
statutes
slavery
that
and
regulations,
violates
the
is
an
Thirteenth
Amendment.
Plaintiffs then argue that this reduction in benefits is a
violation of their constitutionally protected “life, liberty,
[and] property” interests.
(ECF No. 4, at 3).
The reduction in
Plaintiffs’ benefits is not, however, a constitutional violation
because “a noncontractual claim to receive funds from the public
treasury [such as Social Security] enjoys no constitutionally
protected
(1975);
status.”
see
also
Weinberger
Flemming
v.
v.
Salfi,
Nestor,
363
422
U.S.
U.S.
749,
603,
772
616-17
(1960); Davis v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 799, 800 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
Flemming, 363 at 611).
As such, “Congress has reserved the
right to modify the scheme of benefits,” and “[s]uspension of
4
benefits is unconstitutional ‘only if the statute manifests a
patently arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational
justification’ and not rationally related to legitimate goals.”
Davis, 825 F.2d at 800 (citing Flemming, 363 U.S. at 611).
Much
like in Salfi, “[t]he Constitution does not preclude” a rule
reducing benefits based on wages earned.
785.
Such
a
rule
is
not
“patently
See Salfi, 422 U.S. at
arbitrary”
or
“utterly
lacking in rational justification,” and Plaintiffs’ arguments
challenging its constitutionality are not colorable.
Rather,
Plaintiffs’ claim should be styled as one challenging the SSA’s
determination as to their individual benefits.
If Plaintiffs
feel their benefits were improperly reduced, they must follow
the SSA’s appeal process outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.900, but
they have not stated a colorable constitutional claim that would
give this court subject matter jurisdiction prior to exhaustion
of administrative remedies.2
review
of
the
record,
the
For the foregoing reasons, after a
court
will
overrule
Plaintiffs’
objections and adopt the Report and Recommendation, by separate
order.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
2
Plaintiffs allege that they attempted to appeal
various
SSA
determinations,
but
the
record,
including
Plaintiffs’ exhibits, indicate that, if Plaintiffs did attempt
to appeal any of the determinations, they did not follow proper
procedures.
5
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