Best Security Training & Associates, LLC v. Paragon Systems, Inc.

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/13/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
BEST SECURITY TRAINING &
ASSOCIATES, LLC

:

v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-2985

:
PARAGON SYSTEMS, INC.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

defamation case are the following motions: (1) a motion for
summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Best Security Training &
Associates, LLC (“Best Security” or “Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 32);
(2)

a

cross-motion

for

summary

judgment

filed

by

Defendant

Paragon Systems, Inc. (“Paragon” or “Defendant”) (ECF No. 34);
and (3) a motion to seal partially an exhibit filed by Defendant
(ECF No. 36).

The relevant issues have been fully briefed, and

the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule 105.6.

Local

For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for

summary judgment will be denied.

Defendant’s cross-motion for

summary judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and
its motion to file a redacted exhibit will be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed.
Best

Security

provides

weapons

and

security

training

for

individuals
Service

seeking

positions

(“FPS”)

at

that

require

positions

federal
a

security

officer

Charles

Gaskins,

Best

worked

for

the

Security’s

and

Virginia,

license.

CMS

Federal

properties

Maryland,

Columbia

previously

with

(ECF
owner

Training

Protective

various
or

other

District

No.

32-1,

at

and

sole

member,

Academy

&

4).

Protective

Services, LLC (“CMS”), another security training company.
at 5; ECF No. 34-1, at 4).

of

(Id.

On April 1, 2013, Mr. Gaskins left

CMS to focus on building Best Security.

(ECF No. 34-8, at 3).

While at CMS, Mr. Gaskins provided training for individuals
who

were

Paragon.

seeking

employment

as

(ECF No. 32-1, at 5).

FPS

security

officers

Paragon contracts with FPS to

provide security officers for federal properties.
1, at 2).
Paragon

with

(ECF No. 34-

While still employed by CMS, Mr. Gaskins approached

about

providing

training

for

officers

who

would

be

working for Paragon pursuant to Paragon’s new contract with FPS
under

which

Paragon

was

to

provide

security

for

the

United

States Department of Homeland Security and the United States
Coast Guard’s new headquarters at St. Elizabeths in Washington,
D.C.

(ECF Nos. 34-1, at 5; 34-8, at 15).

training class was scheduled for May 2013.
5; 34-8, at 19).

Best Security’s first
(ECF Nos. 34-1, at

Nicholas Hill, a Paragon employee at the time,

was registered for the class but ultimately did not attend.

The

parties dispute why Mr. Hill did not attend the class: Plaintiff
2

contends

that

Mr.

Hill

refused

to

satisfy

the

class’s

requirements, and Defendant asserts that Mr. Hill did not attend
the

class

either

because

he

learned

that

Best

Security

was

unable to provide the FPS training he sought or due to confusion
over the schedule.
According

(ECF Nos. 32-1, at 5-6; 34-1, at 5, 9).

to

Plaintiff,

in

June

2013,

Yasimina

Jackson

completed a training class at Best Security and applied for a
security guard position with Paragon.

(ECF No. 32-1, at 6).

Plaintiff

Ms.

avers

that

Paragon

informed

Jackson

that

Best

Security “was not accredited to teach” an FPS security officer
training course.

(Id.).

Mr. Gaskins sent an e-mail to Richard

Waddell, a program manager at Paragon, asking why Ms. Jackson
was told Best Security was not accredited.

(ECF No. 34-13).

Mr. Waddell informed Mr. Gaskins that there was an issue with
Best

Security’s

“exhibits,”
sending

and

Security

[because

Paragon]

(Id.).1

According to Mr. Gaskins, Paragon continued to accept

Exhibits

he

when

accept

working

Paragon

Best

from

cannot

to

that

“refrain

signed

personnel

requested

[Best

at

for

employment

Security’s]

exhibits.”

CMS

but

did

not

accept

exhibits he signed on behalf of Best Security once he left CMS.
(ECF No. 34-8, at 26).

On June 27, 2013, Mr. Hill sent an e-

mail to eighty-six unidentified individuals:
1

“Exhibits” are forms documenting the completion of
training pursuant to FPS contracts.
(See ECF Nos. 34-1, at 2;
34-5, at 87; 34-16).
3

Good morning,
Unfortunately
due
to
our
training
department[’]s
investigation
into
the
accreditation of BEST SECURITY (Mr. Charles
Gaskins)[,]
they
have
found
that
this
Security company has not been accredited and
therefore we cannot use the exhibits.
I
apologize for this[;] I have just found out
from our training department.
If this
pertains to you please reply to this email.
Respectfully,
Hill, Nicholas
Paragon Systems
(ECF No. 32-4, at 2).

According to Plaintiff, three of the six

students enrolled in a training class withdrew and requested a
refund after receiving Mr. Hill’s e-mail.

(ECF No. 32-1, at 7).

Plaintiff also contends that it lost significant business in the
months following the e-mail.
B.
On
Circuit

(See id. at 9).

Procedural History
June
Court

25,
for

2014,

Plaintiff

Prince

filed

George’s

a

County

complaint
(ECF

No.

in

the

2),

and

Defendant timely removed the action to this court (ECF No. 1).
The complaint asserts two counts: defamation based on Mr. Hill’s
e-mail and “other verbal communications” (Count I); and wrongful
interference with a business relationship based on the alleged
defamatory statements (Count II).
On

February

24,

2015,

the

parties

participated

in

an

unsuccessful settlement conference with Magistrate Judge Charles

4

B. Day, and discovery closed on July 28.

On September 25,

Plaintiff filed the pending motion for summary judgment.
No. 32).

Defendant filed a combined cross-motion for summary

judgment and opposition to Plaintiff’s motion.
Plaintiff

(ECF

filed

a

combined

opposition

to

(ECF No. 34).

Defendant’s

cross-

motion and a reply in support of its motion (ECF No. 37), and
Defendant replied (ECF No. 38).
held

another

Magistrate

unsuccessful

Judge

Day.

Also

On November 18, the parties

settlement

conference

pending

a

partially an exhibit filed by Defendant.
II.

is

motion

before
to

seal

(ECF No. 36).

Standard of Review
A court may enter summary judgment only if there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a);

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Emmett v.
Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

Summary judgment is

inappropriate if any material factual issue “may reasonably be
resolved in favor of either party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v. Wash.
Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary
judgment ‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
[his]

pleadings,’

but

rather

must

‘set

forth

specific

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’”
5

facts

Bouchat v.

Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir.
2003) (quoting former Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)).
proof

.

.

.

will

not

suffice

to

“A mere scintilla of

prevent

summary

judgment.”

Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314 (4th Cir. 2003).

“If the

evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.”
249–50 (citations omitted).
construe

the

facts

that

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

At the same time, the court must
are

presented

in

favorable to the party opposing the motion.

the

light

most

Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
“When

cross-motions

for

summary

judgment

are

before

a

court, the court examines each motion separately, employing the
familiar standard under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.”

Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC, 630 F.3d

351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).

The court must deny both motions if

finds there is a genuine dispute of material fact, “[b]ut if
there is no genuine issue and one or the other party is entitled
to prevail as a matter of law, the court will render judgment.”
10A Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice & Procedure §
2720 (3d ed. 1998).

6

III. Analysis
A.

Defamation

In

Maryland,

plaintiff

must

to

succeed

prove

the

on

a

following

claim

of

elements:

defamation,
“(1)

that

a

the

defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person, (2)
that the statement was false, (3) that the defendant was legally
at fault in making the statement [(i.e., the defendant acted
with negligence or actual malice)], and (4) that the plaintiff
thereby suffered harm.”
(2007);

see

also

Offen v. Brenner, 402 Md. 191, 198

Trundle

v.

Homeside

Lending,

Inc.,

162

F.Supp.2d 396, 400 (D.Md. 2001) (citing Shapiro v. Massengill,
105

Md.App.

743,

772

(1995)).

Defendant

argues

that

it

is

entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff has not shown
that the alleged defamatory statements were false.

(ECF No. 34-

1, at 13-15).
In

Maryland,

demonstrate

that

the
an

plaintiff

allegedly

has

the

defamatory

burden

of

statement

proof
is

to

false.

Trundle, 162 F.Supp.2d at 400 (citing Batson v. Shiflett, 325
Md.

684,

726

(1992)).

Judge

Blake

recently

summarized

plaintiff’s burden:
A “false” statement is “one that is not
substantially correct.”
Piscatelli [v. Van
Smith, 424 Md. 294, 306 (2012)] (quotation
omitted).
“If the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of a
statement is substantially true, ‘minor
inaccuracies will not give rise to a
defamation claim.’”
AIDS Counseling and
7

a

Testing Cntrs. v. Group W Television, Inc.,
903 F.2d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Rees, 852 F.2d 595,
601 (D.C.Cir. 1988)).
Maryland extends
substantial constitutional protections to
private
defamation
defendants
and
“the
burden of proving falsity rests upon the
plaintiff.”
Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v.
Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 597 (1976).
Brown

v.

Ferguson

Enters.,

Inc.,

No.

CCB-12-1817,

6185310, at *2 (D.Md. Dec. 11, 2012).
statement

is

not

considered

false

2012

WL

“Put another way, a

unless

it

would

have

a

different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the
pleaded truth would have produced.”

Batson, 325 Md. at 726

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
According

to

Plaintiff,

Mr.

Hill’s

statements

that

Best

Security is not “accredited” are false because Best Security and
Mr. Gaskins had the requisite certifications and accreditations
to provide training, and there are no additional requirements to
perform FPS training.

In his sworn deposition, Mr. Gaskins

avers that Paragon accepted, and continued to accept, exhibits
that

he

signed

when

working

at

CMS

but

exhibits he signed while at Best Security.

refused

to

accept

(ECF No. 34-8, at

25-26).

According to Mr. Gaskins, nothing changed other than

that

began

he

instead

of

CMS.

signing
(Id.

exhibits
at

on

47-48).

behalf

of

Best

Furthermore,

Mr.

Security
Gaskins

asserts that he spoke with two FPS employees who informed him
that there were no additional requirements to become accredited
8

for FPS training.

(ECF No. 34-8, at 8-10).

Defendant counters

that the statements are true because neither Best Security nor
Mr. Gaskins were approved as trainers under Paragon’s statement
of work with FPS and “it is FPS policy not to accept Exhibits
from

third-party

contract.”

trainers

with

whom

it

does

not

have

a

(ECF No. 34-1, at 13-15).

Neither

party’s

contentions

are

supported

fully

by

the

record, which does not clearly establish what requirements, if
any,

exist

for

companies

training for FPS.

and

individuals

seeking

to

provide

Defendant’s argument that Best Security was

not approved as a training company under Paragon’s contract with
FPS is unpersuasive.

At best, such an argument indicates that

Paragon chose not to allow Best Security to provide training
under a statement of work for one particular contract, but it
does not show that Best Security was not “accredited” to provide
FPS training.
Similarly, Defendant’s argument regarding FPS’s acceptance
of third-party trainers is unclear and in dispute.
point

to

evidence

supporting

their

assertions

Security’s ability to provide FPS training.

Both parties

regarding

Best

Defendant cites to

an e-mail sent by an FPS employee in 2014, which states: “FPS
doesn’t do business with 3rd party vendors.

. . .

Without a

contract number, there is no way to verify the legitimacy of the

9

contract.”

(ECF No. 34-12, at 1).2

On the other hand, Mr.

Gaskins asserts in his deposition that it has always been his
practice, even when he was at CMS, to fill out the blanks for
“name of instructor” and “name of company” on the exhibits but
leave the signature line blank to be filled out by an employee
of the contractor.

(ECF No. 34-8, at 23; see also ECF No. 34-16

(example of an exhibit Mr. Gaskins completed for Ms. Jackson for
completing a Best Security training class)).

According to Mr.

Gaskins, Paragon previously accepted such exhibits.
34-8, at 25-26).

(ECF No.

Even if FPS does not accept exhibits signed by

companies without an FPS contract, it is unclear how this policy
would prevent FPS from accepting an exhibit signed by a Paragon
employee under Paragon’s contract with FPS certifying training
that was performed by Best Security.

Again, Paragon may have

decided not to utilize Best Security’s training services for
this particular contract, but this decision does not indicate
that Best Security was “unaccredited” to perform FPS training,
particularly

in

light

of

Mr.

Gaskins’s

sworn

assertions

regarding Paragon’s prior acceptance of exhibits he filled out
while at CMS.

2

It should be noted that the FPS official sent this e-mail
approximately one year after the relevant time period and in
response a question from Paragon regarding a different training
company.
10

In sum, significant gaps in the record and briefing exist
that preclude the award of summary judgment to either party.

At

minimum, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to what,
if

any,

process

Security

to

exists

become

contracts.

for

a

training

accredited

to

company

provide

such

training

as

Best

under

FPS

Defendant has articulated that Paragon chose not to

accept Best Security’s exhibits under its contract with FPS, but
this is not what Mr. Hill’s e-mail stated.
focused
that

on

Best

Best

[Paragon]

Security’s

Security
cannot

“has

use

qualifications,

not

the

Rather, the e-mail

been

clearly

accredited

exhibits.”

(ECF

No.

asserting

and

therefore

32-4,

at

2).

Neither the parties nor the record sheds much light on what any
such accreditation or approval process entails, and the parties
dispute whether Best Security was able to provide the training
at issue.

Accordingly, neither party is entitled to summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s defamation claim.
B.

Wrongful Interference with a Business Relationship

When no contract exists between the parties, the tort of
interference
plaintiff

with

show:

a

business

“‘(1)

relationship

intentional

and

requires

willful

that

acts;

a
(2)

calculated to cause damage to the plaintiffs in their lawful
business;
damage

(3)

and

resulting.’”

done

loss

.

with
.

the
.

unlawful

and

(4)

purpose

actual

to

damage

cause

such

and

loss

Mehul’s Inv. Corp. v. ABC Advisors, Inc., 130
11

F.Supp.2d 700, 710 (D.Md. 2001) (quoting Natural Design, Inc. v.
Rouse Co., 302 Md. 47, 70-71 (1984)).
the

tortfeasor

economic
Shield

‘maliciously

relationships.’”

of

Md.,

Inc.,

or

wrongfully

Martello

143

The tort “requires that

Md.App.

v.
462,

interfere

with

Blue

Cross

Blue

476

(quoting

and

Natural

Design, 302 Md. at 69).
In its cross-motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has
failed to show that Paragon acted with the requisite malice or
wrongfulness or that Best Security suffered any actual damage or
loss resulting from Mr. Hill’s statements.
20-22).

(ECF No. 34-1, at

Beyond a recitation of the tort’s elements, Plaintiff

neither discusses nor puts forth evidence supporting this claim
in any of its summary judgment papers, including its response to
Defendant’s motion.
complaint,
satisfy

Beyond a few conclusory allegations in its

Plaintiff

the

has

elements.

not

shown

Accordingly,

how

Defendant’s

Defendant’s

actions

motion

for

summary judgment will be granted as to Count II.
C.

Defendant’s Motion to Seal Partially an Exhibit

Defendant seeks to redact portions of Exhibit 2 to its
cross-motion for summary judgment, which is Paragon’s Training
Management Plan.
stipulated

(ECF No. 36-1).

protective

order

Defendant moves pursuant to a

regarding

confidentiality

discovery material, which the court approved.
25).

of

(ECF Nos. 24;

Defendant’s request implicates principles of common-law
12

access and a more rigorous First Amendment analysis that applies
to judicial records.

Before sealing any documents, the court

must provide the non-moving party with notice of the request to
seal and an opportunity to object.
F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).
satisfied

by

either

In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743

This notice requirement may be

notifying

the

persons

present

in

the

courtroom or by docketing the motion “reasonably in advance of
deciding the issue.”

Id. at 234.

Finally, the court should

consider less drastic alternatives to sealing, such as filing
redacted versions of the documents.
sealing

is

appropriate,

it

If the court decides that

should

also

provide

reasons,

supported by specific factual findings, for its decision to seal
and for rejecting alternatives.

Id. at 235; see Ashcraft v.

Conoco, Inc., 218 F.3d 288, 302 (4th Cir. 2000).
Although Defendant initially filed its entire cross-motion
for summary judgment under seal, the proposed redactions to the
Training Management Plan are limited and reasonable.
has

not

Accordingly,

opposed

Defendant’s

Defendant’s

will be granted.

motion

request
to

seal

for

partially

Plaintiff
redactions.
an

exhibit

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment

and all exhibits will be unsealed except for Exhibit 2, ECF No.
34-4, which shall remain under seal.
is available at ECF No. 36-1.

13

A redacted public version

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for summary

judgment will be denied.

Defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment will be granted in part and denied in part, and its
motion to seal partially an exhibit will be granted.

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

14