Olhausen Billiard Manufacturing, Inc. v. Averitt Express, Inc.

Filing 15

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 10 Motion for More Definite Statement. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 10/16/14. (am2s, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
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OLHAUSEN BILLIARD
MANUFACTURING, INC.

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Plaintiff,

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v.

Case No.: GJH-14-03085
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AVERITT EXPRESS, INC.
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
On or about August 11, 2014, Plaintiff Olhausen Billiard Manufacturing, Inc.
(“Plaintiff”) filed a Complaint against Averitt Express, Inc. (“Defendant”) in the District Court
for Montgomery County. See ECF No. 2. Defendant removed the case to this Court on
September 30, 2014. See ECF No. 1. On October 7, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion for a More
Definite Statement. See ECF No. 10. Because the Court finds the Complaint to be vague and
ambiguous, at best, Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement is GRANTED.
The standard for requiring a more definite statement is set forth in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e),
which states that a more definite statement is justified where “a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to
frame a responsive pleading.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Rule 12(e) is to be read in conjunction
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires that an affirmative pleading consist of a
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. Upon review of the Complaint, it is clear that Plaintiff has failed to comply with
these rules.

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The Complaint, which purports to state contract and tort claims against the Defendant,
arises out of the Defendant’s alleged mishandling of goods shipped by Plaintiff and handled by
Defendant. See ECF No. 2. Aside from that fact, however, additional factual allegations are
sparse. Indeed, the only substantive allegations in the Complaint provide that:
Plaintiff hired Defendant to perform shipping and delivery services
and during performance of said services the Defendant recklessly
and carelessly destroyed the property of the Plaintiff and despite
repeated demands the Defendant has failed to compensate Plaintiff.
Additionally when Plaintiff contested the freight bill, Defendant
did file a frivolous case against Plaintiff causing Plaintiff to incur
unnecessary fees and expenses
ECF No. 2. These allegations, however, are vague and ambiguous insofar as they fail to specify,
among other things: (1) when the alleged transport occurred; (2) where the alleged transport
originated and/or terminated; (3) the nature and/or value of the goods shipped; (4) the nature
and/or extent of the damage to the goods; and (5) any of the terms of the contract allegedly
breached. Accordingly, the Court finds that the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint are so vague
and ambiguous that Defendant cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e).
Rather than request leave to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff opposes Defendant’s
Motion for a More Definite Statement by claiming that the federal pleading standard does not
apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint because it was originally filed in Maryland state court and was
subsequently removed to Maryland federal district court. See ECF No. 13. Plaintiff is incorrect.
Removal of an action from state to federal court does not somehow absolve a plaintiff of its
responsibility under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to satisfy the familiar federal pleading
requirements refined by the Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). See Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c) (the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure “apply to a civil action after it is removed from a state court”); see also Spaulding v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 714 F.3d 769, 775, 781 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b)’s
heightened pleading standards to fraud claim, and MCPA claims that sounded in fraud, after
removal); Rankin v. Mattamy Homes Corp., No. 10-117, 2010 WL 3394036, at *3 (M.D. N.C.
Aug. 26, 2010) (“Plaintiff also argues that because she first brought this case in state court, and it
was removed to federal court, she should somehow be excused from federal pleading standards. I
do not agree. Plaintiff is not absolved of the pleading requirements under the federal rules and
Twombly and Iqbal simply because the action was first filed in state court.”); Shaffer v. City of S.
Charleston, No. 13-12450, 2014 WL 1159572, at *3 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 21, 2014) (“A district
court applies the federal pleading standard to all removed claims, including claims brought under
state law.”).
Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Complaint does not satisfy the federal
pleading standard and is so vague and ambiguous that Defendant cannot reasonably prepare a
response to it, the Court will grant Defendant’s Motion for a More Definite Statement. Pursuant
to Rule 12(e), Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to cure the defects in the Complaint. See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that this Court has the authority to strike the
Complaint if the Court’s order to provide a more definite statement is not obeyed. Id. Further,
should Plaintiff fail to cure the defects in their Complaint, it may be subject to dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows the Court to dismiss a complaint that
does not contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Dated: October 16, 2014

/S/
George Jarrod Hazel
United States District Judge

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