Jackson et al v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. et al

Filing 23

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER granting 8 MOTION to Dismiss; dismissing case without prejudice; denying as moot 20 MOTION for Summary Judgment; directing clerk to close this case. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 5/28/2015. (c/m 5/29/2015 aos, Deputy Clerk) Modified on 5/29/2015 (aos, Deputy Clerk).

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
GWENDOLYN LAVERNE
JACKSON, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,

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Defendants.
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Case No.: PWG-14-3180

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs claim that Defendants wrongfully repossessed or attempted to repossess their
2013 Jaguar (the “Jaguar”) and violated a Security Agreement, thereby incurring liability to
Plaintiffs in excess of $6 billion under various common law and statutory causes of action.
Because Plaintiffs provide few additional factual allegations and consequently do not give
Defendants adequate notice of the claims against them, I will grant Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, ECF No. 8, and deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20, as moot
in light of this ruling. 1
I.

BACKGROUND

In a Verified Complaint filed against J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; Chase Auto
Finance; Greenwood Recovery, Inc.; and L&K Recovery, Inc. in the Circuit Court for Prince
George’s County, 2 Plaintiffs Gwendolyn Laverne Jackson and Ainsworth Charles Jackson claim

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The parties fully briefed both motions. See ECF Nos. 8-1, 15, 18, 21, 22. A hearing is not
necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6.
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Defendants removed to this Court. ECF No. 2.

that “Defendants have committed a ‘fraud’ against them by ‘repossessing’ their 2013 Jaguar,”
when “the debt has been discharged in its entirety,” and that Defendants are “in ‘default’ and are
debtors to plaintiffs, owing plaintiffs Six Hundred Billion Dollars ($600,000,000,000.00) per
plaintiff(s) ‘Security Agreement.’” 3 Compl. 1–2, ECF No. 2. They do not attach a contract
transferring title to the Jaguar to them or any financing agreement pertaining to the vehicle. They
do attach a “Security Agreement” between
GWENDOLYN LAVERNE JACKSON® “DEBTOR,” (All Debtors hereinafter
referred to, specifically, as one “DEBTOR” and collectively, as “Parties”), also
known by any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling of said name
except “Gwendolyn Laverne Jackson©, Employer Identification Number [], and
Social Security Account Number [], and the living, breathing, flesh-and-blood
man, Gwendolyn Laverne Jackson of the Jackson Family, the Secured
Party/Creditor . . . .
Security Agr. 1, Compl. Ex. 2, ECF No. 2-13.

According to Plaintiffs, they “may have

additional claims for relief under ‘State Civil RICO.’” Id. at 11. They seek damages of $6
billion, additional compensatory damages of $399,551, and punitive damages of $1 million, as
well as a declaratory judgment that “Defendants violated the Uniform Commercial Code; . . .
committed a ‘fraud’ against plaintiff(s); . . . entered into an unlawful and void contract;” and
“violated plaintiffs’[] constitutional rights.” Id. at 12.
They also allege that Defendants “are attempting to deprive plaintiffs of their assets and
property without ‘due process of law’ under the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that “Plaintiffs
have a claim in ‘Recoupment’ under Maryland UCC § 3-306 to the proceeds.” Id. at 2 (emphasis
added). Plaintiffs seek a “Preliminary Injunction and a Temporary Restraining Order” to enjoin
Defendants, “their agents, officers and employees from attempting to ‘repossess’ the 2013
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For the purposes of resolving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, I accept the facts alleged in
Plaintiffs’ Complaint as true, see Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011), to the extent
that they are not contradicted by the exhibits to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, see Veney v. Wyche, 293
F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Jaguar” and from making “any further attempts to collect on this debt which has been
discharged.” Id. (emphasis added). These claims and relief sought are in conflict with Plaintiffs’
earlier allegations that Defendants repossessed the vehicle and that this is an action in replevin
and detinue. See id. at 1.
In the remaining ten pages of the Complaint, Plaintiffs cite legal authority without
applying it to the facts of the case. Based on these citation, Defendants charitably conclude that
Plaintiffs also allege violations of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, et seq.;
the Community Reinvestment Act, 12 C.F.R. 25.11, et seq.; and the National Banking Act, 12
U.S.C. §§ 21 et seq.
II.

DISCUSSION

I am mindful that Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se and their Complaint is to be construed
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). However, liberal construction does
not absolve Plaintiffs from pleading a plausible claim. See Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128
(D. Md. 1981) (citing Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1977)). As stated by the
Fourth Circuit,
It is neither unfair nor unreasonable to require a pleader to put his complaint in an
intelligible, coherent, and manageable form, and his failure to do so may warrant
dismissal. Corcoran v. Yorty, 347 F.2d 222, 223 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
966 (1965); Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D. Md. 1981). District courts
are not required to be mind readers, or to conjure questions not squarely presented
to them. Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986).
Harris v. Angliker, 955 F.2d 41, 1992 WL 21375, at *1 (4th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ Complaint should be dismissed because it “consists of
vague and conclusory allegations that do not place Defendants on adequate notice of the
substance of the dispute, the allegations made against them, or the relief sought for the alleged

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wrongdoing,” and consequently “fails to meet the pleading requirements set forth in Federal
Rules 8(a), 9, and 12(b)(6).” Defs.’ Mem. 1. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), this Court may dismiss a claim or complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. Tucker v. Specialized Loan Servicing, LLC, ---- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2015 WL
452285, at *8 (D. Md. Feb. 3, 2015). In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court bears in
mind the requirements of Rule 8, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Specifically, a complaint must contain “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and
must state “a plausible claim for relief,” as “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. See
Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012)
(discussing standard from Iqbal and Twombly).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
As best I can discern, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants are liable for two wrongs: (1)
either repossessing or attempting to repossess Plaintiffs’ Jaguar, and (2) failing to pay Plaintiffs
under the terms of the Security Agreement that Plaintiffs attach as Exhibit 2 to their Complaint.
With regard to repossession of the Jaguar, it is not clear who owned the vehicle, what the terms
of the loan for its purchase were, whether Plaintiffs complied with those terms, which
Defendants repossessed or attempted to repossess the vehicle, which Defendants allegedly
violated which laws in repossessing or attempting the repossess the vehicle, how those
Defendants allegedly violated the identified laws in repossessing or attempting to repossess the
vehicle, or whether any Defendants succeeded in repossessing the vehicle. Consequently, I

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cannot reasonably infer that any “defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 663. Indeed, Plaintiffs do not provide even “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of [any]
cause of action,” nor any even “mere conclusory statements” in support. See id. at 678–79.
As for the Security Agreement, none of the Defendants is a party to it. See Security Agr.
1, 17–18 (listing parties); see also Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l, Ltd., ---- F.3d ----, 2015
WL 1137142, at *7 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that the court may consider “the ‘documents attached
or incorporated into the complaint’” in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion (quoting E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011)); Fayetteville Investors
v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that if the allegations
in the complaint conflict with an attached written instrument, “the exhibit prevails”). Therefore,
Defendants cannot be liable under it. See Horlick v. Capital Women’s Care, LLC, 896 F. Supp.
2d 378, 395 (D. Md. 2011) (“Under Maryland law, ‘a person cannot be held liable under a
contract to which he was not a party.’” (quoting Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes
Greenspring Valley, Inc., 728 A.2d 783, 794 (1999)). 4
ORDER
Accordingly, it is, this 28th day of May, 2015, hereby ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 8, IS GRANTED;
2. This case IS DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; 5

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It appears that Maryland law governs the Security Agreement. See Security Agr. 16 (referring
to a court’s determinations of the Security Agreement “in accordance with the course of the
common law arising under the Constitution of the Maryland Republic, as amended by the
qualified Electors of said Maryland Republic and the laws of the de jure Maryland”).
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This Court has the discretion to dismiss with prejudice, but generally dismissal should be
without prejudice unless the plaintiff has the opportunity to amend. Adams v. Sw. Va. Reg’l Jail
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3. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 20, IS DENIED AS MOOT;
4. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE THIS CASE; and
5. The Clerk SHALL MAIL a copy of this Order to Plaintiffs.
/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge
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Auth., 524 F. App’x 899, 900, 2013 WL 1943798, at *1 (4th Cir. 2013); Weigel v. Maryland, 950
F. Supp. 2d 811, 825–26 (D. Md. 2013).
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