Jones v. Prince George's County Public Schools et al

Filing 76

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/1/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
RACQUEL JONES
on behalf of her minor
children a/k/a S.K.1, S.K.2,
B.K. and D.K., as custodial
parent and legal guardian

:
:
:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-3245

v.
:
PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case are
the following motions: a motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendant Imagine Schools Nonprofit, Inc. (“Imagine Schools”)1
(ECF No. 33); a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants
the Board of Education of Prince George’s County (the “School
Board”) and Danielle Ellis (neé Goddard) (ECF No. 34); and three
motions to seal (ECF Nos. 32; 48; 68).

The relevant issues have

been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the

motions for summary judgment will be granted.

The motions to

seal will be denied without prejudice.

1

Imagine Schools, Inc. is also named as a defendant in the
caption. Imagine Schools, Inc. was merged into Imagine Schools
Nonprofit, Inc. in August 2015. (ECF No. 33-2 ¶ 4).

I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

Unless
undisputed

otherwise
and

noted,

construed

in

the

facts

outlined

the

light

most

here

favorable

are
to

Plaintiff Racquel Jones (“Plaintiff”), who brings this action on
behalf of her minor children.
permanent
children

address
at

for

Imagine

nearly

Lincoln

Plaintiff, who has been without a
two

years,

Public

enrolled

Charter

School

her

four

(“Imagine

Lincoln”) in Temple Hills, Maryland, a charter school operated
by Defendant Imagine Schools.

(ECF No. 33-2 ¶¶ 3-6).

Imagine

Lincoln had a uniform policy for its students, which, as of the
2012-2013

school

year,

requires

that

girls

in

sixth

through

eighth grade and all boys wear the following:
White short or long sleeve oxford [shirt]
with [school] logo to be worn with Khaki
pants, shorts or red/white/blue necktie and
red cardigan, pullover or vest with school
logo.
Dress/casual shoes must also be worn
at all times (no athletic shoes worn unless
at physical education).
(ECF No. 33-11, at 3).

The uniform policy mandates that girls

in kindergarten through fifth grade wear:
White short or long sleeve oxford [shirt]
with [school] logo to be worn with Khaki
pants, shorts (no skirts or skorts), white
short or long peter pan blouse worn only
with
red/white/blue
plaid
jumper,
red/white/blue
cross
bow
tie
and
navy
tights.
Dress/casual shoes must also be
worn at all times (no athletic shoes unless
at physical education).
2

(Id.).

Pursuant to the uniform policy, “[a]ny student who is

partially out of uniform will receive a uniform demerit.

Any

student that is missing a major component of the school uniform
will

not

(Id.).
face

be

admitted

and/or

allowed

to

remain

in

school.”

If a student receives a uniform demerit, he or she “will

consequences

issued.”

for

that

particular

day

the

demerit

was

(Id.).

Imagine Lincoln changed its uniform policy prior to the
2012-2013 school year, requiring students to wear some different
components than were previously required.
43).

(ECF No. 33-1 ¶¶ 42-

Imagine Lincoln informed parents about the uniform policy

change on July 16, 2012.

(ECF No. 33-12).

Plaintiff received

notice of the uniform change because she used her sister’s home
address to receive school mailings.
Prior

to

year,

Plaintiff

purchased the required khaki pants for her children.

She also

purchased

the

start

white

of

shirts,

the

(See ECF No. 36, at 17-18).

but

2012-2013

she

was

school

unable

required white shirts with the school logo.

to

afford

the

(Id. at 22).

The

children’s father purchased shoes for the children.
24).
at

(Id. at

Ms. Ellis, Imagine Lincoln’s principal, offered Plaintiff

least

$100.00

in

vouchers

to

purchasing the children’s uniforms.

3

help

defray

the

cost

of

(ECF Nos. 35, at 15-17; 36,

at 30).2

Plaintiff avers that Ms. Ellis told her that if she

could not afford the uniforms she should consider placing her
children in a different school.
During
Plaintiff’s

the

2012-2013

children

(ECF No. 60-1, at 9-10).

and

received

the

2013-2014

several

uniform

arriving at school without a complete uniform.
¶¶ 68-79; 59, at 4).

school

years,

demerits

for

(ECF Nos. 33-1

Plaintiff contends that, in punishment for

the repeated uniform violations, the children were placed in a
kindergarten or first grade classroom for one week each school
year

despite

the

fact

grades at the time.
4).

that

the

children

were

all

in

higher

(See ECF Nos. 37, at 13; 38, at 6; 59, at

While in the lower-grade classrooms, the children were

unable to complete regular school work.

(ECF No. 2 ¶ 31).

Plaintiff asserts that her children were “ridiculed, bullied,
and

harassed

by

their

classmates

for

not

having

on

uniforms and for being placed in lower grade classrooms.”

school
(Id.

¶ 30).

According to an affidavit of Janna Parker, a former

teacher

at

Imagine

Lincoln,

Ms.

Ellis

“frequently

called

Plaintiff derogatory names and informed other Imagine Lincoln
staff members that she wanted her children out of the school.”
(ECF No. 67-1 ¶ 10).
2

The parties dispute the exact amount offered Plaintiff,
and it is not clear if Plaintiff accepted all, a portion, or
none of the money offered. This dispute, however, is immaterial
and does not undermine Defendants’ entitlement to summary
judgment.
4

B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County on September 10,
2014.

(ECF No. 2).

Defendants Imagine Schools, the School

Board, and Ms. Ellis (collectively, the “Defendants”) removed
the action to this court.
the

following

counts:

(ECF No. 1).
a

violation

The complaint asserts

of

Plaintiff

and

her

children’s substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all defendants
(Count I); a violation of the Equal Protection Clause brought
under § 1983 against all defendants (Count II); and a state-law
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Ms. Ellis (Count III).

Defendants answered the complaint (ECF

No. 9), and the parties participated in discovery.
On February 11, 2015, the parties filed a joint motion for
a

protective

material

in

identifiable

order
order

regarding
to

information

School Board employees.

confidentiality

prevent
of

the

release

Plaintiff’s

(ECF No. 12).

minor

of
of

discovery
personally

children

and

The following day, the

court issued a paperless order granting the parties’ motion for
a protective order.

(ECF No. 13).

On October 5, Imagine Schools filed its pending motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 33), as did the School Board and Ms.
Ellis (ECF No. 34).

Plaintiff responded to both motions (ECF
5

Nos. 50; 59), and Defendants replied (ECF Nos. 71; 74).

The

parties have also filed three pending motions to seal.

(ECF

Nos. 32; 48; 68).
II.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 56(a) when there is no genuine dispute as to any
material

fact,

and

the

moving

party

is

plainly

judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

entitled

In

to

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), the Supreme Court
of the United States explained that, in considering a motion for
summary judgment, the “judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the

evidence

determine

and

whether

determine

the

there

a

is

truth

genuine

of

the

issue

matter

for

but

trial.”

to
A

dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such

that

nonmoving

a

reasonable

party.”

jury

Id.

at

could

248.

return
Thus,

a

“the

verdict
judge

for

the

must

ask

himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors
one

side

return

a

or

the

verdict

presented.”

other
for

but
the

whether
[nonmoving

a

fair-minded
party]

on

jury

the

could

evidence

Id. at 252.

In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
6

(quoting

United

States

v.

Diebold,

Inc.,

369

U.S.

654,

655

(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005).
evidence

in

support

The mere existence of a “scintilla” of
of

the

nonmoving

party’s

case

is

not

sufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment.

See

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
A “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact
through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.”

Shin v.

Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
Indeed,

this

court

has

an

affirmative

obligation

to

prevent

factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial.
See

Drewitt

v.

Pratt,

999

F.2d

774,

(4th

778–79

Cir.

1993)

(quoting Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th
Cir. 1987)).
III. Analysis
A.

Section 1983 Claims

The

briefs

supporting

Defendants’

ground than Plaintiff’s complaint.

motions

cover

a

wider

As Plaintiff’s responses to

the motions elucidate, Counts I and II of the complaint assert
two

clear

substantive

and
due

distinct
process

§

1983

claims.

violation

Count

occurred

when

children were placed in lower-grade classrooms.
37-38; 59, at 2-3).
Protection

Clause,

I

asserts

a

Plaintiff’s

(ECF Nos. 2 ¶¶

Count II asserts a violation of the Equal
alleging

that
7

Plaintiff’s

children

were

singled out for more extreme punishment than other students who
violated the uniform policy.

(ECF Nos. 2 ¶ 47; 59, at 3).

Because Plaintiff has failed to put forth evidence establishing
a

substantive

due

process

or

equal

protection

violation

in

general, it is not necessary to address several of Defendants’
arguments.3
1.

Substantive Due Process (Count I)

The complaint asserts a substantive due process violation
on behalf of Plaintiff’s children in that Defendants deprived
the children of their right to a “continuous and uninterrupted”
education.

(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 37, 40).

Plaintiff now concedes that

there is no constitutionally-protected right to a continuous and
uninterrupted education, see Stewart v. Morgan State Univ., 46
F.Supp.3d 590, 602 n.9 (D.Md. 2014) (citing San Antonio Ind.
Sch.

Dist.

v.

Rodriquez,

411

U.S.

1

(1973)),

but

instead

contends that the substantive due process claims in Count I “are
derived from the liberty interest she has in her children’s
education
harassment,

and

that

bullying,

Imagine
and

Lincoln’s

acquiescence

intimidation

of

her

in

the

children

constituted a violation of their substantive due process . . .
rights under the U.S. Constitution.”
3

(ECF No. 59, at 8-9).

For example, the parties devote significant attention to
the implications of Imagine Lincoln’s status as a charter school
for the viability of Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims.
It is not
necessary to decide this question here, and the court declines
to do so.
8

Plaintiff asserts a substantive due process claim on her own
behalf

based

on

a

deprivation

of

her

liberty

interest

in

directing her children’s education for the first time in her
responses to Defendants’ motions.

Plaintiff may not use her

responses to amend her complaint and assert what amounts to a
new claim.

See Barclay White Skanska, Inc. v. Battelle Mem’l

Inst., 262 F.App’x 556, 563 (4th Cir. 2008).

The complaint did

not put Defendants on fair notice that Plaintiff was attempting
to

assert

a

substantive

due

process

deprivation of her own liberty interest.

claim

based

on

the

In addition, although

parents have a right “to direct their children’s education,” see
Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174,
177 (4th Cir. 1996), Plaintiff has put forth no evidence showing
that Defendants’ actions prevented her from doing so.
Plaintiff also argues, again for the first time in her
responses, that Defendants violated her children’s substantive
due process rights when they “intentionally bullied and harassed
them in violation of Maryland Education Code § 7-424.1.”
No. 59, at 14).

(ECF

A § 1983 claim, however, is only “a method for

vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of
the

United

States

Constitution

and

federal

statutes

that

it

describes,” and Plaintiff may not base her § 1983 claim on a
violation of state law.

Clear Sky Car Wash, LLC v. City of

Chesapeake, Va., 910 F.Supp.2d 861, 889 (E.D.Va. 2012) (emphasis
9

added)

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted)

(quoting

Baker

v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, “[c]onstitutional
liability is reserved for those rare situations in which the
behavior of school officials is not merely disproportionate, but
‘so

disproportionate’

conscience.’”

as

to

be

‘literally

shocking

to

the

Savoy v. Charles Cty. Pub. Schs., 798 F.Supp.2d

732, 738 (D.Md. 2011) (quoting Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 613
(4th Cir. 1980)).

Even if Plaintiff could articulate a protected

interest, Defendants’ actions do not satisfy the high threshold
of egregiousness necessary to sustain a substantive due process
claim.

See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8

(1998).

No doubt, placing impressionable and vulnerable school-

age children in a significantly lower-grade classroom for a week
may have exposed Plaintiff’s children to unnecessary negative
attention from other students.

As evidenced by decisions in

other courts, however, such actions are not so outrageous as to
“shock the conscience.”

For example, in Hicks v. Halifax Cty.

Bd. of Educ., 93 F.Supp.2d 649 (E.D.N.C. 1999), a third-grade
student was placed on “long-term suspension” because he failed
to comply with the school’s uniform policy.

In Hicks, the court

held that although the school’s decision to suspend the child
“may be a decision disturbingly inconsistent with the most basic
goals of the public school system, the court cannot conclude
10

that such a decision ‘shocks the conscience.’”

Id. at 665.

Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that a teacher repeatedly
calling a student “retarded,” “stupid,” and “dumb” in front of
classmates

was

“singularly

unprofessional”

but

was

not

“sufficiently shocking to the conscience to state a substantive
due process claim.”

Costello v. Mitchell Pub. Sch. Dist. 79,

266 F.3d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Doe v. Gooden, 214
F.3d 952 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that “extensive” verbal abuse
and

insults

did

not

give

rise

to

a

substantive

due

process

claim); Abeyta By and Through Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep.
Sch.

Dist.,

(“strongly

No.

19,

condemning”

77
a

F.3d

1253,

teacher

(10th

1258

who

called

a

Cir.

1996)

student

a

“prostitute” and noting that doing so was “a complete abuse of
his authority,” but holding that such actions did not give rise
to a substantive due process claim).

Plaintiff has simply not

shown that Defendants’ actions rise to the level of sufficient
severity

to

support

a

substantive

due

process

claim.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment will be
granted as to Count I.
2.

Equal Protection (Count II)

Plaintiff
children

asserts

violated

the

that
Equal

Defendants’
Protection

treatment

Clause

because

of

her

“other

students whose school clothes did not conform to the school
uniform policy” were treated less harshly.
11

(ECF No. 2 ¶ 47).

Although unclear in the complaint, Plaintiff asserts an equal
protection claim under a “class-of-one” theory, rather than a
theory that Defendants discriminated against a certain class of
students.

(ECF No. 59, at 20).

theory,

a

party

treated

differently

must

show

from

that

others

To succeed on a class-of-one
“it

had

similarly

been

intentionally

situated

and

that

there was no rational basis to support the different treatment.”
Sunrise Corp. of Myrtle Beach v. City of Myrtle Beach, 420 F.3d
322, 328 (4th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted).

With respect to

class-of-one claims, the Supreme Court has noted:
There are some forms of state action,
however, which by their nature involve
discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast
array
of
subjective,
individualized
assessments.
In such cases, the rule that
people should be “treated alike, under like
circumstances
and
conditions”
is
not
violated
when
one
person
is
treated
differently from others, because treating
like individuals differently is an accepted
consequence of the discretion granted.
In
such situations, allowing a challenge based
on
the
arbitrary
singling
out
of
a
particular person would undermine the very
discretion that such state officials are
entrusted to exercise.
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agr., 553 U.S. 591, 603 (2008).
Thus, Engquist limits a plaintiff’s ability to bring an equal
protection claim under a class-of-one theory.
State

Bd.

of

Educ.,

--F.Supp.3d--,

12

2016

WL

See Dyer v. Md.
2939740,

at

*13

(D.Md.

May

20,

2016)

(noting

that

Engquist

has

“curtailed”

class-of-one equal protection claims).
Defendants argue that the school officials were exercising
their

discretion

uniform policy.

in

reprimanding

students

who

violated

the

As the undersigned noted in a prior case, “[a]

number of district court decisions have applied the reasoning
used in Engquist to preclude ‘class of one’ equal protection
claims in the public education context.”

Uzoukwu v. Prince

George’s Cmty. College Bd. of Trustees, No. DKC-12-3228, 2013 WL
4442289, at *9 (D.Md. Aug. 15, 2013) (citing cases).4

This has

included cases where the plaintiff asserts a class-of-one equal
protection theory based on perceived disparities in punishment
for violations of school policies.

See, e.g., Smith v. Seligman

Unified Sch. Dist., 664 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1078-79 (D.Ariz. 2009);
DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 658 F.Supp.2d 461,
494 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

The reasoning in Smith is persuasive:

The court believes that the type of
decisionmaking that Plaintiffs complain of
are precisely those type of actions not
subject to the class of one theory of equal
protection.
Like any system of punishment,
there will be a wide variety of results, all
4

The Fourth Circuit recently had an opportunity to discuss
Engquist’s impact on cases arising in the public education
setting, but it declined to do so.
See Kerr v. Marshall Univ.
Bd. of Governors, --F.3d--, 2016 WL 2995806, at *14 (4th Cir. May
24, 2016) (“We therefore need not decide whether a ‘class of
one’ equal protection theory is possible in the public education
setting and hold that the district court did not err in
dismissing this claim.”).
13

of
which
depend
upon
the
individual
circumstances of each situation.
To say
that a principal must uniformly apply the
same level of punishment to all violators of
a particular policy is to rob him or her of
the important discretion that is inherent in
the position of principal.
Moreover, a
particular form of punishment may not be as
effective for one student as it might for
another.
To subject a school district to
equal protection claims each time a new or
different punishment is administered by its
principals
would
have
the
effect
of
handicapping school officials in meting out
the type of punishment that the individual
student is most likely to respond. Such an
end is not the gravamen the Equal Protection
Clause is intended to eliminate.
Moreover, this Court is guided by the
same “common-sense realization” that guided
the Supreme Court in Engquist; namely, that
school districts could hardly function if
every
disciplinary
decision
became
a
constitutional matter.
If a student need
not claim discrimination on the basis of
membership in a protected class, but rather
only that he or she was treated worse than
other
students
similarly
situated,
any
disciplinary
action
taken
by
a
school
district can suddenly become the basis for a
federal constitutional claim.
It is not
difficult
to
imagine
an
allegation
of
differential
treatment
in
nearly
every
disciplinary decision in the public school
context.
Smith, 664 F.Supp.2d at 1078.

Accordingly, because Plaintiff

asserts only a class-of-one equal protection claim, Defendants’
motion for summary judgment will be granted as to Count II.

14

B.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count
III)
In

Count

III,

Plaintiff

asserts

a

claim

of

intentional

infliction of emotional distress against Ms. Ellis.
succeed

on

an

intentional

infliction

of

In order to

emotional

distress

claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant’s conduct
was intentional or reckless; (2) that the conduct was extreme
and

outrageous;

(3)

that

the

wrongful

conduct

is

causally

connected to the plaintiff’s emotional distress; and (4) that
the plaintiff suffered severe emotional distress.
121 F.Supp.3d at 503 (citation omitted).

See Hodge,

In Maryland, the tort

of intentional infliction of emotional distress is “to be used
sparingly and only for opprobrious behavior that includes truly
outrageous conduct.”
Cir.

2009)

omitted)

(Shedd,

(quoting

Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 231 (4th
J.,

concurring)

Bagwell

v.

(internal

Peninsula

Reg’l

quotation
Med.

marks

Ctr.,

106

Md.App. 470, 515 (1995)); see Williams v. Wicomico Cty. Bd. of
Educ.,

836

[intentional

F.Supp.2d
infliction

387,
of

399

(D.Md.

emotional

2011)

distress]

(“To

wit,

claims

may

succeed only when the defendant’s conduct was so outrageous that
it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, and is regarded
as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

15

Here, Plaintiff has put forth evidence that Ms. Ellis spoke
negatively

about

Plaintiff

derogatory

names

and

and

informed

“frequently
other

called

Imagine

Plaintiff

Lincoln

members that she wanted her children out of the school.”
No.

67-1

¶

10).

Plaintiff

asserts

that

this

staff
(ECF

conduct,

in

addition to placing the children in lower-grade classrooms, “was
tantamount to directly bullying the children for no other reason
other than to penalize them for their mother’s inability to
purchase appropriate uniforms on their behalf.”
24).

(ECF No. 50, at

Again, speaking negatively about Plaintiff and placing her

children in lower-grade classrooms may have been unprofessional,
counterproductive, and hurtful to Plaintiff and her children.
This conduct, however, falls far short of what is required to
succeed

on

an

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

distress

claim.

Accordingly, Ms. Ellis’s motion for summary judgment

will be granted as to Count III.
IV.

Motions to Seal
Pursuant to the court’s protective order, the parties have

filed three motions to seal.

(ECF Nos. 32; 48; 68).

At issue

in any request to seal are the principles of common-law access
and the more rigorous First Amendment analysis that applies to
judicial records.

The Fourth Circuit has reminded us that:

It is well settled that the public and
press have a qualified right of access to
judicial documents and records filed in
16

civil
and
criminal
proceedings.
See
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 580 n.17 (1980); Nixon v. Warner
Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597
(1978); Media Gen. Operations, Inc. v.
Buchanan, 417 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005).
The right of public access springs from the
First Amendment and the common-law tradition
that court proceedings are presumptively
open to public scrutiny. Va. Dep’t of State
Police v. Wash. Post, 386 F.3d 567, 575 (4th
Cir. 2004).
“The distinction between the
rights of access afforded by the common law
and the First Amendment is significant,
because the common law does not afford as
much substantive protection to the interests
of the press and the public as does the
First Amendment.”
In re United States for
an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
2703[(D)], 707 F.3d 283, 290 (4th Cir. 2013)
(quoting Va. Dep’t of State Police, 386 F.3d
at 575) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The common-law presumptive right of access
extends
to
all
judicial
documents
and
records, and the presumption can be rebutted
only
by
showing
that
“countervailing
interests
heavily
outweigh
the
public
interests in access.”
Rushford v. New
Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th
Cir.
1988).
By
contrast,
the
First
Amendment secures a right of access “only to
particular judicial records and documents,”
Stone v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 855
F.2d 178, 180 (4th Cir. 1988), and, when it
applies, access may be restricted only if
closure is “necessitated by a compelling
government interest” and the denial of
access is “narrowly tailored to serve that
interest.”
In re Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d
383, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Press–
Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501,
510
(1984)
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted)).
Doe

v.

Pub.

Citizen,

749

F.3d

246,

265-66

(4th

Cir.

2014).

“[D]ocuments filed with the court are ‘judicial records’ if they
17

play

a

role

in

the

substantive rights.”

adjudicative

process,

or

adjudicate

In re U.S. for an Order, 707 F.3d at 290.

The First Amendment test for access to judicial records extends
to “‘dispositive’ civil motions, such as a motion for summary
judgment that is successful either in full or part.”
Ins.

Co.

v.

Warns,

No.

CCB–11–1846,

2012

WL

Allstate

681792,

at

*17

(D.Md. Feb. 29, 2012); see Rushford, 846 F.2d at 252-53.
In addition, a motion to seal must comply with Local Rule
105.11, which provides that:
Any motion seeking the sealing of
pleadings, motions, exhibits or other papers
to be filed in the Court record shall
include (a) proposed reasons supported by
specific factual representations to justify
the sealing and (b) an explanation why
alternatives to sealing would not provide
sufficient protections.
The Court will not
rule upon the motion until at least 14 days
after it is entered on the public docket to
permit
the
filing
of
objections
by
interested parties.
Materials that are the
subject
of
the
motion
shall
remain
temporarily sealed pending a ruling by the
Court.
If the motion is denied, the party
making
the
filing
will
be
given
an
opportunity to withdraw the materials.
This Local Rule endeavors to protect the common-law right
to inspect and copy judicial records and documents, Nixon v.
Warner

Commc’ns,

recognizing

that

Inc.,

435

competing

public’s right of access.

U.S.

589,

interests

597

sometimes

(1978),
outweigh

while
the

In re Knight Publ’g Co., 743 F.2d

231, 235 (4th Cir. 1984).
18

Here, it is clear that the materials the parties request be
sealed contain some information designated as “confidential” in
the protective order, including the identities of Plaintiff’s
minor children.

The parties have not, however, explained why

redacting such information would not be an effective alternative
to the sealing of several documents.

Particularly in light of

the First Amendment interests that attach to judicial records,
more limited redactions are preferable to widespread sealing.
Accordingly,
prejudice.

the

motions

to

seal

will

be

denied

without

The parties will be given thirty (30) days to file

jointly a motion with proposed redactions, until which time the
materials currently under seal will remain under seal.
V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motions for summary judgment

filed by Defendants will be granted.
be denied without prejudice.

The motions to seal will

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

19