Rubin v. Norwich Commercial Group, Inc.

Filing 26

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 4/21/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
SANDRA R. RUBIN
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-3246

:
NORWICH COMMERCIAL GROUP, INC.
d/b/a Norcom Mortgage

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

negligence and fraud case is a motion for summary judgment filed
by

Defendant

Norwich

“Defendant”).
briefed,

and

necessary.

(ECF
the
Local

Commercial
No.

court
Rule

21).
now

Group,
The

rules,

105.6.

Inc.

issues
no

For

(“Norcom”

have

hearing

the

been

being

following

or

fully
deemed

reasons,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

Unless
undisputed

otherwise
and

noted,

construed

in

the

facts

outlined

the

light

most

Plaintiff Sandra Rubin (“Plaintiff”).

here

favorable

are
to

In July 2013, Plaintiff

submitted an online inquiry regarding the possibility of taking
out a reverse mortgage on her condominium in Silver Spring,
Maryland.
responses
business.

(ECF No. 23-3 ¶ 1).
from

multiple

lenders

(ECF No. 21-3, at 6).

In July, Plaintiff received
attempting

to

secure

her

One such lender was Mr.

Rayburn George, Jr., who, according to Plaintiff, represented
that he worked for Norcom.

(Id.).

Shortly thereafter, Mr.

George met Plaintiff at her apartment to discuss her financial
situation.
reverse

He

told

mortgage,

Plaintiff

but

that

suggested

she

that

finances by purchasing an annuity.

could
she

not

obtain

restructure

a

her

Mr. George explained to

Plaintiff that such an annuity would be “virtually risk free”
and

would

expenses.

allow

her

to

receive

monthly

checks

to

cover

her

(ECF No. 23-3 ¶ 3).

On Mr. George’s recommendation, Plaintiff liquidated her
stocks and wrote multiple checks to MFG, Inc., which Mr. George
told

Plaintiff

“was

an

acronym

Matrix Financial Group, Inc.”

for

Norcom’s

(Id. ¶ 4).

clearing

house,

Plaintiff wrote a

check to MFG for $36,000 on August 2, 2013, and for $99,000 on
August 5.

(Id.).

Plaintiff believed that Mr. George would

purchase an annuity with these funds to supplement her monthly
income.

Mr. George did not purchase an annuity for Plaintiff,

but sent Plaintiff some monthly payments from MFG to create the
appearance that an annuity existed.

In October, Plaintiff wrote

a $4,000 check to MFG to invest in the purported annuity.

(ECF

No. 21-3, at 10).
In

early

2014,

Mr.

George

contacted

refinancing her mortgage with Norcom.

Plaintiff

about

(ECF Nos. 21-3, at 11;

23-3 ¶ 6). Mr. George suggested that Plaintiff would receive
2

approximately $60,000 from refinancing, which she could put into
her annuity.

(ECF Nos. 21-3, at 11; 23-3 ¶ 6).

According to

Plaintiff, “in order to get [her] loan application approved, Mr.
George

forged

annuity.

a

set

of

documents”

(ECF No. 23-3 ¶ 8).

the documents.

regarding

the

nonexistent

Mr. George did not show Plaintiff

On February 21, 2014, Norcom approved Plaintiff

for refinancing and she received approximately $61,797.28.
Nos. 21-3, at 15; 23-3 ¶ 9).

(ECF

On February 26, at Mr. George’s

request, Plaintiff wrote a check to MFG for $59,000.

(ECF Nos.

21-3, at 15; 23-3 ¶ 12).
Plaintiff conducted no further business with Mr. George and
had difficulty reaching him to inquire about her investments and
the status of her money.
Plaintiff

paid

Mr.

(ECF No. 21-3, at 15).

George

and

MFG

receiving only $30,260.45 in return.1

In the end,

approximately

$198,000,

(See ECF No. 21-3, at 9).

Plaintiff contends that she “lost everything [she] had to Mr.
George” and “subsequently had to sell [her] condominium, move to
Florida where [she] live[s] in a trailer with [her] daughter”
living “month to month” on social security.

(ECF No. 23-3 ¶

15).
Despite Plaintiff’s initial belief that Mr. George worked
for Norcom when he first reached out to her in July 2013, the

1

Plaintiff no longer asserts Norcom is liable for this full
amount. The full amount is included here as factual background.
3

parties now agree that Mr. George began working for Norcom on
August 22, 2013.

(ECF Nos. 21-1, at 3; 23, at 3).

In late July

2013, Mr. George approached Norcom seeking to open a Norcom
branch in York, Pennsylvania.
starting

at

Norcom,

Mr.

(ECF No. 21-4 ¶ 6).

George

worked

for

other

lending companies out of the same office in York.
21-4 ¶ 7; 21-7, at 3; 21-10, at 3-4).

Before
financial

(See ECF Nos.

Mr. George’s duties as

branch manager of Norcom’s York office were to manage staff and
payroll, assist in problem solving, oversee marketing and daily
operations, and manage the loan files and pipeline of work for
the branch’s loan officers.
5;

21-11,

at

5).

Mr.

(See ECF Nos. 21-4 ¶ 41; 21-10, at
George

helped

loan

officers

with

individual cases, but he was not authorized to accept funds from
customers or potential customers on behalf of Norcom.
21-4 ¶¶ 24-26; 21-10, at 5).
April 4, 2014.

Mr. George resigned from Norcom on

(ECF No. 21-4 ¶ 20).

George committed suicide.

(ECF Nos.

On September 2, 2014, Mr.

(Id. ¶ 21).

A note addressed “to the

authorities,” which was signed by Mr. George stated that he
takes

“full

inappropriate
originations,
sales/claims.”

responsibility
or

illegal

for
with

insurance

any

and

regard

sales/claims,

(ECF No. 21-8).

4

all
to

acts
any

or

deemed
mortgage

investment

B.

Procedural History

Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint on
October

16,

2014.

(ECF

No.

1).

After

an

unsuccessful

settlement conference, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on
June 26, 2015 (ECF No. 22), which Defendant answered (ECF No.
24).

The

amended

complaint

asserts

two

counts

against

Defendant: negligence (Count I); and fraud under a respondeat
superior theory of liability for Mr. George’s actions (Count
II).

The amended complaint requests compensatory damages in the

amount of $200,000, but Plaintiff has since noted that she “is
not

pursuing

claims

from

Norcom

for

damages

sustained

Plaintiff prior” to when Mr. George joined Norcom.
23, at 1).

by

(See ECF No.

On October 23, Defendant filed the pending motion

for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 21).

Plaintiff responded (ECF

No. 23), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 25).
II.

Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure Rule 56(a) when there is no genuine dispute as to any
material

fact,

and

the

moving

party

is

plainly

judgment in its favor as a matter of law.

In

entitled

to

Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), the Supreme Court
of the United States explained that, in considering a motion for
summary judgment, the “judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the

evidence

and

determine

the
5

truth

of

the

matter

but

to

determine

whether

there

is

a

genuine

issue

for

trial.”

A

dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such

that

nonmoving

a

reasonable

party.”

jury

Id.

at

could

248.

return
Thus,

a

verdict

“the

for
must

judge

the
ask

himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors
one

side

return

or

a

the

other

verdict

presented.”

but

for

the

whether

a

[nonmoving

fair-minded
party]

on

jury

the

could

evidence

Id. at 252.

In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”

Matsushita Elec.

Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting

United

States

v.

Diebold,

Inc.,

369

U.S.

654,

655

(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005).
evidence

in

support

The mere existence of a “scintilla” of
of

the

nonmoving

party’s

case

is

not

sufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment.

See

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
A “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact
through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.”

Shin v.

Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
Indeed,

this

court

has

an

affirmative

obligation

to

prevent

factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial.
See

Drewitt

v.

Pratt,

999

F.2d
6

774,

778–79

(4th

Cir.

1993)

(quoting Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th
Cir. 1987)).
III. Analysis
A.

Direct Negligence and Negligent Supervision

In her response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment,
Plaintiff notes that she “is not pursuing claims based on a
theory of negligent hiring,” but rather is asserting claims of
direct negligence and negligent supervision.
1).

In

addressing

Plaintiff’s

direct

(ECF No. 23, at
negligence

claim,

Defendant argues that Plaintiff is attempting impermissibly to
amend her complaint through her response.
7).

(See ECF No. 25, at

The amended complaint, however, asserts a broad claim of

“negligence” against Defendant, and includes factual allegations
of direct negligence.
amended
identify

complaint
and

act

(ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 14-18).

alleges:
upon

“Norcom

[forged

Specifically, the

negligently

documents]

even

failed
though

to
the

falsified annuity paperwork was central to its confirmation of
[Plaintiff’s] ability to repay the Norcom loan;” and “Norcom
failed to make a single independent contact with [Plaintiff]
after it introduced Mr. George to her.”

(ECF No. 22 ¶¶ 15-16).

Therefore, the amended complaint contains sufficient allegations
to state a claim of direct negligence against Defendant.
Defendant next contends that, even if the amended complaint
states a claim of direct negligence, Plaintiff has not provided
7

any evidence that Norcom breached the applicable standard of
care.

(ECF No. 25, at 8-9).

Plaintiff argues that it is

“widely known” that “underwriters have two essential functions:
(a)

verifying

collateral;

and

repayments.”
“Norcom

that

the

(b)

borrower

verifying

income

(ECF No. 23, at 10).

had

to

be

aware

has

that

it

good
to

title

support

to
the

the
loan

She further asserts that
was

critical

confirm her sources of funds for repayment.”

to

prove

and

(Id.).

“In a negligence case, there are four elements that the
plaintiff must prove to prevail: ‘a duty owed to him [or her]
(or to a class of which he [or she] is a part), a breach of that
duty,

a

legally

cognizable

causal

relationship

between

breach of duty and the harm suffered, and damages.’”

the

Schultz v.

Bank of America, N.A., 413 Md. 15, 27-28 (2010) (quoting Jacques
v. First Nat’l Bank, 307 Md. 527, 531 (1986)).

“In a case of

alleged negligence by a professional, [such as a loan officer or
banker,]

the

presumption

plaintiff

that

due

bears
skill

the

and

burden

care

of

were

overcoming

used,”

often

the
by

presenting expert testimony “to establish the requisite standard
of care owed by the professional.”

Id. at 28-29 (citations and

internal quotation marks omitted).

“If the plaintiff presents

no such evidence, the trial ‘court may rule, in its general
power to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence, that there
is not sufficient evidence to go to the [trier of fact].’”
8

Id.

at 29 (alteration in original) (quoting Rodriguez v. Clarke, 400
Md.

39,

71

(2007)).

In

Schultz,

the

Court

of

Appeals

of

Maryland noted that expert testimony may not be necessary when
“the alleged negligence, if proven, would be so obviously shown
that

the

trier

of

fact

could

recognize

it

without

expert

testimony,” such as in cases “where a dentist extracts the wrong
tooth, a doctor amputates the wrong arm or leaves a sponge in a
patient’s body, or an attorney fails to inform his client that
he has terminated his representation.”

Id.

The Schultz court held that, in a situation regarding a
bank’s duty to a customer, the plaintiff was required to present
expert testimony in order to establish the requisite standard of
care.

Id. at 34-35; see also Willes v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

No. CCB-12-137, 2015 WL 1237193, at *3 (D.Md. Mar. 16, 2015)
(granting

the

defendant’s

motion

for

summary

judgment

in

a

subprime mortgage case because the plaintiff did not put forth
expert testimony).

Here, Plaintiff has not put forth expert

testimony or any evidence whatsoever regarding the standard of
care, if any, that Norcom owed her.

Conclusory assertions in

her response, which are unsupported by any legal authority, are
not

sufficient

at

the

summary

judgment

stage.

Accordingly,

Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s direct
negligence claim in Count I.

9

As

for

Plaintiff’s

negligent

supervision

claim,

her

response does not address the arguments in Defendant’s motion,
and she has failed to put forth evidence sufficient to survive
summary judgment.
In order to prove a cause of action for
either negligent hiring, supervision or
retention, the [p]laintiff must establish
that her injury was caused by the tortious
conduct of [the employee], that the employer
knew or should have known by the exercise of
diligence and reasonable care that the
[employee] was capable of inflicting harm of
some type, that the employer failed to use
proper care in selecting, supervising or
retaining
that
employee,
and
that
the
employer’s breach of its duty was the
proximate
cause
of
the
[p]laintiff’s
injuries.
Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F.Supp.
720, 751 (D.Md. 1996) (citing Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 165
(1978)).

Plaintiff

has

put

forth

no

evidence

showing

that

anyone at Norcom knew or should have known about Mr. George’s
conduct.

Plaintiff does not challenge the veracity of the sworn

statements made by current and former Norcom employees averring
that no other Norcom employee knew about Mr. George’s schemes.
(ECF

Nos.

21-4

¶¶

21-23;

21-7,

at

6-7;

21-10,

at

5-6).

Plaintiff admitted in her own deposition that she was not aware
of

any

evidence

George’s actions.
has

not

shown

that

other

Norcom

employees

(ECF No. 21-3, at 16).
that

Norcom

failed

10

to

knew

about

Mr.

Moreover, Plaintiff
use

proper

care

in

supervising Mr. George.

Philip F. DeFronzo, Norcom’s president,

outlined in his affidavit the steps Norcom took to supervise Mr.
George

and

the

York

managers

visiting

“review

of

office,

the

the

office

which
in

facility,

included:

October

personnel,

2013

three
to

senior

conduct

signage,

a

lobbying

disclosures and training”; a visit by Norcom’s general counsel
and chief compliance officer in November 2013 “for additional
review and training related to legal and regulatory compliance”;
and

periodic

quality

2013 and 2014.
dispute

these

control

measures

and

(ECF No. 21-4 ¶¶ 14-19).
facts

and

does

not

show

reviews

throughout

Plaintiff does not
how

such

actions

constituted a failure to exercise proper care in supervising Mr.
George.

Accordingly, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment

on Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim in Count I.
B.

Respondeat Superior Liability for Mr. George’s Fraud

“Litigants may invoke the doctrine of respondeat superior
as

a

means

vicariously

of

holding

liable

for

an

employer,

the

tortious

corporate
conduct

of

or
an

otherwise,
employee,

where it has been shown that the employee was acting within the
scope of the employment relationship at the time.”
Corp. v. Taha, 378 Md. 461, 480-81 (2003).

So. Mgmt.

“To be within the

scope of the employment the conduct must be of the kind the
[employee] is employed to perform and must occur during a period
not

unreasonably

disconnected

from
11

the

authorized

period

of

employment

in

a

locality

not

unreasonably

distant

from

the

authorized area, and actuated at least in part by a purpose to
serve the master.”

E. Coast Freight Lines v. Mayor of Balt.,

190 Md. 256, 285 (1948); see also Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md.
247,

255

(1991).

Courts

in

Maryland

generally

apply

the

following factors when considering if an employee committed acts
within the scope of employment:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly
done by such servants; (b) the time, place
and purpose of the act; (c) the previous
relations
between
the
master
and
the
servant; (d) the extent to which the
business
of
the
master
is
apportioned
between different servants; (e) whether the
act is outside the enterprise of the master
or, if within the enterprise, has not been
entrusted to any servant; (f) whether or not
the master has reason to expect that such an
act will be done; (g) the similarity in
quality
of
the
act
done
to
the
act
authorized;
(h)
whether
or
not
the
instrumentality by which the harm is done
has been furnished by the master to the
servant; (i) the extent of departure from
the
normal
method
of
accomplishing
an
authorized result[;] and (j) whether or not
the act is seriously criminal.
Sawyer,

322

Md.

at

256

(internal

quotation

marks

omitted)

(incorporating factors from First Restatement of Agency § 229).
Of particular relevance here, “[t]he general rule is that,
‘for an employee’s tortious acts to be considered within the
scope of employment, the acts must have been in furtherance of
the employer’s business and authorized by the employer.’”

12

Blue

Rider Fin., Inc. v. Harbor Bank Md., No. ELH-11-3101, 2013 WL
1196204, at *6 (D.Md. Mar. 22, 2013) (quoting Taha, 378 Md. at
481).

The Court of Appeals has noted that being “authorized by

the employer” does not require that “authority [be] expressly
conferred” by the employer.

See Sawyer, 322 Md. at 255-57.

However, “where an employee’s actions are personal, or where
they represent a departure from the purpose of furthering the
employer’s business, or where the employee is acting to protect
his own interests, even if during normal duty hours and at an
authorized

locality,

the

scope of his employment.”

employee’s

actions

are

outside

the

Id. at 256-57.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff has put forth “no evidence
showing

that

Mr.

George

was

acting

within

employment when he took the checks from her.”
17).

the

scope

of

his

(ECF No. 21-1, at

Defendant argues that “[t]he undisputed facts show that

Mr. George was not authorized by Norcom to accept money from
customers

or

investments.”

potential
(Id.).

customers
As

for

evidence,

annuities

Defendant

or

cites

other
to

Mr.

DeFronzo’s affidavit and the depositions of Mr. George’s former
colleagues.

(See ECF Nos. 21-4 ¶ 41; 21-10, at 5; 21-11, at 5).

Furthermore, Defendant argues that Mr. George was not acting
within the scope of employment because he carried out his scheme
“for his own personal benefit” and did not intend to benefit
Norcom.

(ECF No. 21-1, at 18).
13

Plaintiff counters that “[w]ithout question, Mr. George’s
solicitation

of

[Plaintiff]

to

refinance

her

Silver

Spring,

Maryland condominium through Norcom in 2014 was an authorized
act which furthered Norcom’s business.”
Plaintiff

asserts

that

“[a]ll

of

the

(ECF No. 23, at 7).
relevant

communications

took place during business hours, and Mr. George . . . engaged
the

services

of

multiple

individuals

at

Norcom

to

collect

documents, package the same, underwrite the loan, and to close
the

transaction,

benefit.”

which

(Id. at 9).

was

to

[Norcom’s]

direct

financial

Plaintiff contends that “[u]nder such

facts, and understanding that Mr. George was . . . ‘plainly
authorized’
Nortchom

to

solicit

refinance

customers

their

existing

like

[Plaintiff]

mortgages,

this

to
too

have
is

a

situation that exposed the employer on a respondeat superior
basis.”

(Id.).

The

parties

primarily

opinions in this district.

rely

on

two

recent

unreported

These two opinions are informative

and ultimately support granting summary judgment for Defendant.
Defendant cites to this court’s decision in Day v. DB Capital
Group, LLC, No. DKC-10-1658, 2011 WL 887554 (D.Md. Mar. 11,
2011).

In Day, the plaintiff brought claims against Wachovia

and Millennium Bank under a respondeat superior theory for an
alleged foreclosure rescue scam perpetuated by an employee at
each bank.

The plaintiff in Day alleged that the employees took
14

advantage of their positions at the banks to recruit potential
victims, used bank resources to “conduct the business” of the
fraudulent entity, and utilized the banks’ names to earn trust
from

potential

customers.

The

court

in

Day

granted

the

defendant’s motion to dismiss, stating:
Plaintiff
has
alleged
only
that
[the
employees] conducted acts relating to the DB
Capital foreclosure rescue scam from their
offices at Wachovia and Millennium Bank and
during business hours and that their actions
may have had the incidental effect of
obtaining a few extra customers for the
banks.
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts
to
indicate
that
[the
employees]
were
motivated by a desire to benefit their
employers.
Id. at *21.
Plaintiff cites to Blue Rider, 2013 WL 1196204, to support
her assertions that Mr. George was acting within the scope of
his employment.

In

Blue Rider, Judge Hollander applied the

aforementioned scope-of-employment factors and determined that
the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to survive a motion
to dismiss.

Specifically:

[The employee’s] alleged tortious conduct
was the facilitation of a loan transaction,
an act that certainly may have been within
the ordinary scope of responsibility of a
bank vice president. The acts apparently
were performed by [the employee] during
business hours at his office at Harbor Bank.
There is no indication that [the employee]
was a recent hire. Other employees of Harbor
Bank specifically stated to Blue Rider that
[the employee], and only [the employee], was
15

authorized to handle the transaction. The
financial transaction at issue came within
the enterprise of banking. Harbor Bank had
reason to believe that [the employee] was
engaged in the fraudulent scheme, because it
had been alerted to the scheme by Quick
Draw. [The employee’s] actions seemingly
were of a type he would have undertaken in
the course of his ordinary business, as
authorized
by
Harbor
Bank.
The
“instrumentality by which the harm was done”
was [the employee’s] title as vice president
of Harbor Bank, and Harbor Bank's offices
and communications infrastructure, all of
which were “furnished by [Harbor Bank] to
[Dunn].” [Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Nopenberger, 171 Md. 378, 391 (1937)].
Harbor Bank points to no apparent “departure
from the normal method of accomplishing an
authorized
result.”
Id.
The
only
Noppenberger factor that weighs in Harbor
Bank's favor is that Dunn's alleged actions
most likely were criminal. But, as the
Noppenberger Court observed, “an act may be
within the scope of employment, even though
forbidden or done in a forbidden manner, or
consciously criminal or tortious.” Id.
Blue Rider, 2013 WL 1196204, at *7.
Plaintiff’s
unpersuasive.

argument

and

reliance

on

Blue

Rider

is

The undisputed facts here are more analogous to

the facts alleged in Day than those in Blue Rider, and they show
that

Mr.

George

was

employment at Norcom.2

not

acting

within

the

scope

of

his

Notably, Judge Hollander distinguished

2

It is important to note the difference in procedural
posture between this case and the two cases the parties cite.
Both Day and Blue Rider were at the motion to dismiss stage, and
the courts accepted the plaintiffs’ well-plead allegations as
true.
Here, at the summary judgment stage, Plaintiff cannot
rely on allegations and assertions to survive Defendant’s
16

the

situation

in

Blue

Rider

with

that

in

Day

because

the

complaint in Blue Rider alleged that the bank was aware of the
employee’s fraudulent activity.
employee

in

Blue

Rider

was

Id. at *9.
fulfilling

In addition, the

his

job

duties

by

negotiating the fraudulent instruments, whereas the employees in
Day

were

“moonlighting”

regular job duties.

Id.

and

performing

tasks

outside

their

The undisputed facts here show that no

one else at Norcom was aware of Mr. George’s activity.
Nos. 21-4 ¶¶ 21-23; 21-7, at 6-7; 21-10, at 5-6).

(ECF

Moreover,

Plaintiff’s unsupported assertion that Mr. George was authorized
to solicit customers and accept payments is not sufficient to
overcome the undisputed evidence that such activities were not
among his official duties at Norcom.

Rather, the facts show

that Mr. George was moonlighting outside his official role to
conduct his fraudulent activities.

(ECF Nos. 21-4 ¶¶ 24-26; 21-

10, at 5).
Much like in Day, Mr. George’s efforts may have had “the
incidental effect” of providing a minimal amount of additional
business for Norcom, but there are no facts showing that Mr.
George was motivated by a desire to benefit Norcom.
2011

WL

887554,

at

*21.

The

Court

of

Special

See Day,
Appeals

of

motion.
Accordingly, the court will look at the undisputed
facts in the record, rather than allegations made by the
parties, to determine if Mr. George was acting within the scope
of his employment.
17

Maryland,

in

upholding

a

jury

verdict,

held

that

evidence

showing that an employee’s fraudulent scheme was motivated in
part by a desire to increase his standing within the company may
be

sufficient

superior.

to

establish

liability

through

respondeat

See Fidelity First Home Mortg. Co. v. Williams, 208

Md.App. 180, 206 (2012).

Here, there is no evidence showing Mr.

George was motivated by anything other a desire for personal
gain separate and apart from his role at Norcom.
that

Norcom

received

a

marginal

benefit

It is possible

from

Plaintiff’s

refinancing, but Mr. George was motivated by the prospect of
receiving $60,000 from Plaintiff for his personal use, not by a
desire

to

provide

professional status.

Norcom

with

business

or

bolster

his

Accordingly, Defendant may not be held

liable through a theory of respondeat superior, and its motion
for summary judgment will be granted on Count II.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed

by

Defendant

will

be

granted.

A

separate

order

follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

18

will