Mason v. Colvin

Filing 22

ORDER denying 19 Ms. Mason's Motion for Summary Judgment; granting 21 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; and affirming the Commissioner's judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 1/19/2016. (bmhs, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

January 19, 2016
LETTER TO COUNSEL
RE:

Janice Mae Mason v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-3362

Dear Counsel:
On October 28, 2014, Plaintiff Janice Mae Mason petitioned this Court to review the
Social Security Administration’s final decision to deny her claims for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income. (ECF No. 1). I have considered the parties’ crossmotions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 19, 21). I find that no hearing is necessary. See
Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is
supported by substantial evidence and if the Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 405(g); 1383(c)(3); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that
standard, I will deny Ms. Mason’s motion, grant the Commissioner’s motion, and affirm the
Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains
my rationale.
Ms. Mason filed claims for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security
Income, alleging a disability onset date of August 5, 2009.1 (Tr. 183-91). Her claims were
denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 123-30; 135-44). A hearing was held on July 16,
2013, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 33-55). Following the hearing, the
ALJ determined that Ms. Mason was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act
during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 13-32). The Appeals Council denied Ms. Mason’s request
for review, (Tr. 1-4), so the ALJ’s decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the
Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Mason suffered from the severe impairments of osteoarthritis,
obesity, hypothyroidism, status post ORIF left ankle fracture in 2006, right tennis elbow, right
ulnar neuropathy, bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome, scoliosis, asthma, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease, lower extremity peripheral neuropathy, major depressive disorder, bipolar
disorder, and a generalized anxiety disorder. (Tr. 19). Despite these impairments, the ALJ
determined that Ms. Mason retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to:

1

Although her attorney later sought to amend her onset date to coincide with her date last insured, the
ALJ denied the amendment. (Tr. 16).

Janice Mae Mason v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3362
January 19, 2016
Page 2
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: the
claimant is allowed a sit/stand option at will; no more than frequent reaching, handling,
fingering, or feeling with the dominant right upper extremity; no more than occasional
exposure to humidity, wetness, and respiratory irritants; work is simple, routine, and
repetitive tasks; no more than frequent interaction with coworkers, supervisors, or the
public; the claimant can occasionally make simple decisions; she is able to deal with
simple routine changes in the work setting; she is able to perform work that does not
require the satisfaction of a production pace; and she is able to perform low stress work,
defined as few changes in the workplace.
(Tr. 22). After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ determined that
Ms. Mason could perform work existing in significant numbers in the national economy and that,
therefore, she was not disabled. (Tr. 26-27).
Ms. Mason raises four arguments on appeal: (1) that the ALJ erroneously assessed her
RFC under the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015); (2)
that the ALJ failed to consider the GAF scores assigned by her treating physician, Dr. Ally; (3)
that the ALJ improperly considered her alleged work activity; and (4) that the ALJ provided an
inadequate explanation for his assessment of her mental RFC. Each of Ms. Mason’s arguments
lacks merit and is addressed below.
First, Ms. Mason argues that the ALJ’s RFC assessment did not adequately account for
the finding at step three that she has a moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and
pace, pursuant to the holding in Mascio, 780 F.3d 632. In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit determined
remand was warranted for several reasons, including a discrepancy between the ALJ’s finding at
step three concerning the claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace, and his
RFC assessment. 780 F.3d at 638. Although a similar discrepancy appears to exist in this case, it
is critically distinguishable in several respects, and Mascio does not require remand.
To understand why this case is distinguishable from Mascio, some background is
necessary. At step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determines whether a claimant's
impairments meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. Listings 12.00 et. seq., pertain to mental impairments. Id. at § 12.00.
Each listing therein consists of: (1) a brief statement describing its subject disorder; (2)
“paragraph A criteria,” which consists of a set of medical findings; and (3) “paragraph B
criteria,” which consists of a set of impairment-related functional limitations. Id. § 12.00(A). If
both the paragraph A criteria and the paragraph B criteria are satisfied, the ALJ will determine
that the claimant meets the listed impairment. Id.
Paragraph B consists of four broad functional areas: (1) activities of daily living; (2)
social functioning; (3) concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) episodes of decompensation.
The ALJ employs the “special technique” to rate a claimant’s degree of limitation in each area,
based on the extent to which the claimant’s impairment “interferes with [the claimant’s] ability
to function independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. §§

Janice Mae Mason v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3362
January 19, 2016
Page 3
404.1520a(c)(2), 416.920a(c)(2). The ALJ uses a five-point scale to rate a claimant’s degree of
limitation in the first three areas: none, mild, moderate, marked, or extreme. Id. §§
404.1520a(c)(4), 416.920a(c)(4). In order to satisfy paragraph B, a claimant must exhibit either
“marked” limitations in two of the first three areas, or “marked” limitation in one of the first
three areas with repeated episodes of decompensation. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P,
App. 1 § 12.02. Marked limitations “may arise when several activities or functions are impaired,
or even when only one is impaired, as long as the degree of limitation is such as to interfere
seriously with your ability to function.” Id. § 12.00(C).
The functional area of “concentration, persistence, or pace refers to the ability to sustain
focused attention and concentration sufficiently long to permit the timely and appropriate
completion of tasks commonly found in work settings.” Id. § 12.00(C)(3). Social Security
regulations do not define marked limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace “by a specific
number of tasks that [a claimant is] unable to complete.” Id. The regulations, however, offer little
guidance on the meaning of “moderate” limitations in the area of concentration, persistence, or
pace.
The RFC assessment is distinct, but not wholly independent, from the ALJ’s application
of the special technique at step three. In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit voiced its agreement with
other circuits “that an ALJ does not account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration,
persistence, and pace by restricting the hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled
work.” 780 F.3d at 638 (joining the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit explained that “the ability to perform
simple tasks differs from the ability to stay on task. Only the latter limitation would account for a
claimant’s limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace.” Id. In so holding, however, the
Fourth Circuit noted the possibility that an ALJ could offer an explanation regarding why a
claimant’s moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, or pace, at step three did not
translate into a limitation in the claimant’s RFC assessment, such that the apparent discrepancy
would not constitute reversible error.
In this case, at step three, the ALJ found that Ms. Mason has “no more than moderate”
limitation in her ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. Even assuming that that
finding is equivalent to a finding of “moderate” limitations, in his RFC assessment, the ALJ
included a restriction to address those limitations, specifically limiting Ms. Mason to “work that
does not require the satisfaction of a production pace.” (Tr. 22). While a limitation to unskilled
work alone is insufficient under Mascio, here the ALJ included another limitation that clearly
accounts for Ms. Mason’s “no more than moderate” limitation in concentration, persistence, or
pace. Accordingly, I find no error warranting remand under Mascio.
Ms. Mason’s argument regarding her GAF scores is likewise unpersuasive. She correctly
notes that the ALJ did not mention one GAF score of 50 in August, 2011. Pl. Mot. at 7; (Tr.
501-03). However, the ALJ did discuss other moderate GAF scores assigned in 2010 and 2011,
and provided a full analysis of the findings from Ms. Mason’s mental health treatment notes and
the opinion issued by her treating psychiatrist. (Tr. 24-25). While nothing prohibits an ALJ

Janice Mae Mason v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3362
January 19, 2016
Page 4
from considering GAF scores as one component of a full analysis of the evidence of record, it is
well established that GAF scores are not determinative of disability. See, e.g., Davis v. Astrue,
Case No. JKS-09-2545, 2010 WL 5237850, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2010); Kozel v. Astrue, No.
JKS-10-2180, 2012 WL 2951554, at *10 (D. Md. July 18, 2012). Therefore, although the ALJ
failed to mention an isolated GAF score of 50, his thorough summary of the other medical
evidence in the record renders that error harmless, since he provided substantial evidence
supporting his assessment of Ms. Mason’s mental RFC.
Next, Ms. Mason contends that the ALJ should not have relied upon her alleged work
activity in assessing her RFC. Pl. Mot. 7-8. It is true that Ms. Mason testified at her hearing that
she had not engaged in any work, (Tr. 39), but her testimony is belied by the medical evidence
from multiple physicians consistently reporting that she was continuing to work as a house
cleaner during the relevant time period, at least on a part-time basis. See (Tr. 321, 323, 324, 326,
331, 333). Ms. Mason correctly notes that the medical records after January, 2012, do not
contain any indications that she was continuing to clean houses. However, the ALJ provided
substantial evidence to support his reliance on the discrepancy to undermine Ms. Mason’s
credibility about not only the extent of her activities, but also the severity of her symptoms
during the entire relevant period. Moreover, the ALJ did not rely exclusively on her work
activity, but also on her activities of daily living, medical records, and other evidence. (Tr. 2023).
Finally, Ms. Mason argues that the ALJ provided inadequate support for the mental
health limitations in the RFC assessment. Pl. Mot. 8. In fact, however, the ALJ provided the
evidence cited above, provided an explanation for his finding that her mental limitations were
actually greater than suggested by the non-examining State agency consultants, and provided a
summary explanation of his conclusion that various limitations adequately addressed “pain and
mental health symptoms, as well as possible medication side effects.” (Tr. 26). Accordingly, I
find no error in the ALJ’s explanation of his conclusions.
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Mason’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
19) is DENIED and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 21) is GRANTED.
The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge