Miller-Jones v. Prince George's Community College
Filing
30
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 8/4/2016. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
MARIETTA MILLER-JONES
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 14-3517
:
PRINCE GEORGE'S COMMUNITY
COLLEGE
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
this
employment discrimination case is a motion for summary judgment
filed
by
Defendant
(“Defendant”).
Prince
George’s
(ECF No. 23).
Community
College
Also pending is a motion for
leave to file a surreply filed by Plaintiff Marietta MillerJones.
(ECF No. 28).
The relevant issues have been briefed,
and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, both motions will
be granted.
I.
Background
A.
Factual Background
Unless
otherwise
noted,
construed
facts
outlined
the
light
most
here
and
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff, an African-American woman, began working
program
(“HSI”)
assistant
within
to
In May 2010, she was promoted to a
position
the
favorable
are
undisputed
for Defendant in 2001.
in
the
at
Workforce
the
Human
Services
Development
and
Institute
Continuing
Education Department (“WDCE”).
(ECF No. 26, at 9).
According
to the job description, the program assistant position “assists
the
coordinator
in
managing
the
programs
and
assumes
responsibilities of the coordinator in his/her absence.”
No. 23-14, at 2).
the
(ECF
In November 2010, Plaintiff’s position was
reclassified as an office associate, but the duties remained
largely the same.
duties
are
to
(ECF Nos. 23-1, at 11; 23-15 (noting the
“[a]ssist
with
overall
program
functions
and
supervisory tasks” and to “[p]rovide direction and leadership in
absence of program director.”)).
During her time as a program
assistant and office associate, Plaintiff’s supervisor, Ashante
Abubakar, was pulled away for other tasks, leaving Plaintiff to
assume many of his responsibilities.
On
January
20,
2011,
(See ECF No. 23-4, at 14).
Defendant
posted
a
vacancy
announcement for the HSI program director position, which was
open
to
internal
(ECF No. 26-11).1
candidates
only
(the
“first
recruitment”).
Plaintiff applied for the vacancy and was
selected for an interview along with three other candidates.
(ECF
Nos.
23-1,
at
13-14;
26,
at
10-11).
Following
the
interviews, the screening committee recommended two applicants
1
The parties appear to agree that any claim that may have
arisen from the first recruitment is time-barred because
Plaintiff did not file an administrative complaint within 300
days. (ECF Nos. 23-1, at 13 n.5; 26, at 28 n.4); see Williams
v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 428-29 (4th Cir. 2004).
The
details surrounding the first recruitment, however, are relevant
background.
2
for hire: Plaintiff and Nancy Park, a Caucasian woman.
Nos. 23-1, at 14; 26, at 11).
(ECF
Plaintiff was re-interviewed and
was recommended for the position.
Plaintiff received multiple
congratulatory wishes despite the fact that the position was not
yet
officially
Ultimately,
offered
Plaintiff
to
her.
was
not
(See
offered
ECF
the
No.
26,
job.
at
12).
Defendant’s
chief of staff and affirmative action officer, Alonia Sharps, an
African-American woman, and Defendant’s interim vice president,
Joseph Martinelli, a Caucasian man, determined that the first
recruitment
was
flawed
and
that
Plaintiff
did
desired supervisory experience for the position.
1, at 15; 26, at 13).2
she
was
not
selected
not
have
the
(ECF Nos. 23-
Mr. Martinelli informed Plaintiff that
because
he
“wanted
a
wider
pool
of
applicants and [he] would prefer to readvertise” the position.
(ECF No. 26-4, at 19).
Plaintiff was formally informed that she
was
the
not
selected
for
position
readvertised on March 28, 2011.
and
that
it
was
being
(ECF No. 23-23, at 2).
Defendant posted the HSI program director vacancy again in
April 2011 (the “second recruitment”).
Plaintiff
did
not
apply
for
this
(ECF No. 23-1, at 17).
vacancy
because
recently promoted to a program coordinator position.
2
The
Martinelli
that both
immaterial
she
was
Interviews
parties dispute the exact roles of Ms. Sharps and Mr.
in the recruitment process.
The record indicates
were involved in the process, and such a dispute is
for the relevant questions at hand.
3
were conducted for the second recruitment in December 2011, but
no applicant was selected.
(Id.).
On January 27, 2012, Defendant advertised the HSI program
director position for a third time (the “third recruitment”).
(ECF
No.
23-27).
Plaintiff
was
once
again
selected
for
an
interview along with three other applicants, and the selection
committee recommended Plaintiff for the position in June 2012.
(ECF Nos. 23-1, at 17; 26, at 14).
At some point in 2012, the
new WDCE dean, Dr. Yvette Snowden, an African-American woman,
decided
to
expand
HSI
into
the
and
thus
reclassify
Institute
(“HHSI”),
position.
(ECF No. 23-1, at 18).
and
Dr.
Snowden
discussed
the
Health
and
the
Human
Services
program
director
Mr. Martinelli stated that he
reclassification,
in
part
to
“attract additional expertise to work on both [health and human
services] areas.”
(ECF No. 26-4, at 32).
According to Dr.
Snowden, the desire to create HHSI was due to the “expansion of
the
healthcare
industry,”
the
expected
opening
of
a
large
medical facility in the area, and the needs of the department.
(ECF No. 23-5, at 17).
On July 30, Dr. Snowden informed human
resources that she wished to “re-advertise[] the position of
Program Director Human Services Institute in order to update the
position description based on changing requirements within our
division.”
(ECF No. 23-5, at 43).
On August 15, Plaintiff was
informed that “the Division has decided not to fill the position
4
at this time,” and she received formal notification on September
4.
(ECF Nos. 23-32; 23-33).
On
September
creating
the
position.
various
cuts.
job
12,
Dr.
posting
Snowden
for
the
(ECF No. 23-5, at 51).
other
announcements,
was
initiated
new
HHSI
the
process
program
of
director
The HHSI position, along with
never
posted
due
(ECF Nos. 23-1, at 20; 23-5, at 57-58).
to
budget
Since 2012,
neither the HSI nor the HHSI program director position has been
advertised, and no one has been hired for either position.
No.
23-1,
at
20).
The
parties
dispute
whether
the
(ECF
program
director position has been eliminated or merely remains vacant.
(Compare ECF Nos. 23-10 ¶ 10, and 23-45, with ECF No. 28-3).3
Plaintiff remains employed by Defendant.
B.
Procedural History
On
April
5,
2013,
Plaintiff
filed
a
charge
of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”).
(ECF No. 23-16).
The EEOC issued a right-to-sue
3
Plaintiff seeks leave to file a surreply, which contains a
copy of a recent organizational chart showing the HSI program
director position as “vacant.”
(ECF No. 28).
Local Rule
105.2(a) states that, “[u]nless otherwise ordered by the Court,
surreply memoranda are not permitted to be filed.”
Surreplies
are generally disfavored.
Chambers v. King Buick GMC, LLC, 43
F.Supp.3d 575, 624 (D.Md. 2014) (citing Chubb & Son v. C.C.
Complete Servs., LLC, 919 F.Supp.2d 666, 679 (D.Md. 2013)).
Plaintiff avers that she received the organizational chart in a
meeting in February 2016, after she filed her response.
(ECF
No. 28-2 ¶ 3).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file a surreply will be granted, and the court will consider the
organizational chart to the extent that it is relevant.
5
letter on July 8, 2014, which Plaintiff received August 14.
(ECF No. 23-50).
On November 7, Plaintiff filed a complaint to
commence the action in this court.
(ECF No. 1).
The one-count
complaint alleges that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff
on the basis of race in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.
when it failed to promote her to the program director position.
Following
discovery,
Defendant
filed
summary judgment on December 31, 2015.
the
pending
motion
(ECF No. 23).
for
Plaintiff
responded (ECF No. 26), and Defendant replied (ECF No. 27).
On
March 18, 2016, Plaintiff filed the pending motion for leave to
file a surreply (ECF No. 28), and Defendant responded (ECF NO.
29).
II.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 56(a) when there is no genuine dispute as to any
material
fact,
and
the
moving
party
is
plainly
judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
In
entitled
to
Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986), the Supreme Court
of the United States explained that, in considering a motion for
summary judgment, the “judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the
evidence
determine
and
whether
determine
the
there
a
is
truth
genuine
of
the
issue
matter
for
but
trial.”
to
A
dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
6
such
that
nonmoving
a
reasonable
party.”
jury
Id.
at
could
248.
return
Thus,
a
verdict
“the
for
must
judge
the
ask
himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors
one
side
return
or
a
the
other
verdict
presented.”
but
for
the
whether
a
[nonmoving
fair-minded
party]
on
jury
the
could
evidence
Id. at 252.
In undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion.”
Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)
(quoting
United
States
v.
Diebold,
Inc.,
369
U.S.
654,
655
(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005).
evidence
in
support
The mere existence of a “scintilla” of
of
the
nonmoving
party’s
case
is
not
sufficient to preclude an order granting summary judgment.
See
Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
A “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material fact
through mere speculation or compilation of inferences.”
Shin v.
Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation omitted).
Indeed,
this
court
has
an
affirmative
obligation
to
prevent
factually unsupported claims and defenses from going to trial.
See
Drewitt
v.
Pratt,
999
F.2d
774,
778–79
(4th
Cir.
1993)
(quoting Felty v. Graves–Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th
Cir. 1987)).
7
III. Analysis
Title VII prohibits discrimination based on an employee’s
personal characteristics such as “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Univ. of Texas Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013).
To survive a
motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must provide evidence
of
intentional
proof:
(1)
employer’s
discrimination
direct
evidence
adverse
through
that
employment
one
of
two
discrimination
decision;
or
(2)
avenues
motivated
the
of
the
McDonnell
Douglas “pretext framework” that requires a plaintiff to show
that “the employer’s proffered permissible reason for taking an
adverse
employment
discrimination.”
action
is
actually
a
pretext
for
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc.,
354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Texas Dep’t of Comm.
Affairs
v.
Burdine,
Douglas
Corp.
v.
450
Green,
U.S.
411
248,
U.S.
252-53
792,
(1981);
807
McDonnell
(1973)).
Here,
Plaintiff must rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework because
she offers no direct evidence of discrimination.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, once the plaintiff
meets her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for
discrimination, “the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
employment action.”
Id.
reason
for
the
adverse
Once the employer meets this burden of
production, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by
8
a
preponderance
reasons
‘were
of
not
the
evidence
true
Id.
discrimination.’”
its
(quoting
that
reasons,
the
but
Reeves
employer’s
were
v.
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000)).
a
stated
pretext
Sanderson
for
Plumbing
“The final pretext
inquiry merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court
that
[the
plaintiff]
has
been
the
victim
of
intentional
discrimination, which at all times remains with the plaintiff.”
Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294
(4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A.
Prima Facie Case
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in a nonselection
member
case,
of
a
a
plaintiff
protected
must
class;
prove
(2)
she
that:
(1)
suffered
she
an
was
a
adverse
employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position for
which she applied; and (4) she was rejected from the position
under
circumstances
discrimination.
giving
rise
to
an
inference
of
unlawful
See Westmoreland v. Prince George’s Cty., Md.,
876 F.Supp.2d 594, 604 (D.Md. 2012) (citing Hill, 354 F.3d at
285).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima
facie case because no one outside of Plaintiff’s protected class
was hired for the program director position.
25-26).
(ECF No. 23-1, at
Defendant’s argument overstates relevant case law.
The
“general rule” within the United States Court of Appeals for the
9
Fourth Circuit is that a plaintiff must show that the position
was
filled
by
a
similarly
qualified
applicant
outside
the
protected class to satisfy the fourth element of a prima facie
See Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 485-87 (4th Cir.
case.
2005); see also Westmoreland, 876 F.Supp.2d at 606.
There are,
however, exceptions to this rule, including cases where: “(1) an
age
discrimination
plaintiff
is
replaced
by
a
much
younger
person within the same class, (2) a significant lapse of time
occurs between the adverse employment action and the decision to
hire another person, and (3) the employer’s hiring of another
person within the protected class is calculated to disguise the
act of discrimination.”
Miles, 429 F.3d at 486 (citing Brown v.
McLean,
905
159
plaintiff
F.3d
may
898,
satisfy
the
(4th
fourth
Cir.
1998)).
prong
by
Moreover,
showing
position in question remained open and was unfilled.
that
a
the
See, e.g.,
id., at 485 (citing Hill, 354 F.3d at 285); Westmoreland, 876
F.Supp.2d at 606.
Accordingly, Plaintiff is not required to
show that the position was filled by someone outside of her
protected class.
Possibly recognizing the contours of the fourth element,
Defendant also asserts that Plaintiff’s prima facie case must
fail because the vacancy announcement was cancelled and the HSI
program director position was eliminated.
26; 27, at 9).
(ECF Nos. 23-1, at
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
10
Plaintiff,
eliminated.
however,
it
is
not
clear
that
the
position
was
Although Dr. Snowden attempted to rework the HSI
program director position into a combined HSSI position, the
HSSI position was never created.
Moreover, there is conflicting
evidence as to whether Defendant actually eliminated the HSI
program director position or merely considers it to be “vacant.”
(See ECF No. 28-3).
The third recruitment effort may have been
cancelled, but a reasonable juror “could still conclude that
‘the position remained open.’”
Westmoreland, 876 F.Supp.2d at
607 (quoting Hill, 354 F.3d at 285).
Defendant’s reliance on
Agelli v. Sebelius, No. DKC-13-497, 2014 WL 347630 (D.Md. Jan.
30, 2014) is unpersuasive.
In Agelli, the defendant National
Institutes of Health cancelled a vacancy announcement because
the program lost its full-time equivalent position; the position
itself was undisputedly eliminated.
Id. at *1.
The vacancy was
cancelled before any applicant was interviewed or before the
applicant pool was narrowed in any way.
Id.
The court held
that in such a situation, “when a government agency cancels a
vacancy announcement and no one outside the protected class is
hired to fill the position, the plaintiff cannot establish her
prima facie case because she cannot satisfy the fourth prong of
the analysis.”
marks
omitted).
Id.
at *5 (citations and internal quotation
Here,
on
the
other
hand,
the
timing
of
Defendant’s decision regarding HSSI, Defendant’s handling of the
11
first recruitment, and the dispute regarding the status of the
HSI program director position support Plaintiff’s establishment
of a prima facie case.
B.
Defendant’s Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was not selected for the
HSI
program
director
position
because
Dr.
Snowden
and
Mr.
Martinelli sought to alter the position to include additional
responsibilities and require familiarity of additional subject
matter.
(See
ECF
No.
23-5,
at
45).
Dr.
Snowden
and
Mr.
Martinelli aver that expanding HSI into HSSI made sense in light
of
the
growing
additional
expertise
services] areas.”
45).
healthcare
to
field
work
in
and
both
in
[the
order
to
health
“attract
and
human
(ECF No. 23-6, at 25; see ECF No. 23-5, at
As the Fourth Circuit has noted, “[d]uty-bound though we
are to examine employment decisions for unlawful discrimination,
we are not cloaked with the authority to strip employers of
their basic business responsibilities.”
Hux v. City of Newport
News, Va., 451 F.3d 311, 315 (4th Cir. 2006).
Thus, when an
employer puts forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for an
action, a court may not “decide whether the reason was wise,
fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the
reason.”
2000).
Hawkins v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 279 (4th Cir.
Accordingly, Defendant has met its burden of production
12
of
articulating
a
legitimate,
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
Plaintiff’s non-selection.
C.
Pretext
Plaintiff attempts to show that Defendant’s reason for her
non-selection
is
pretext
for
discrimination.
To
establish
pretext, a plaintiff “has to prove ‘both that the reason was
false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’”
Adams v.
Trustees of the Univ. of N.C.-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th
Cir.
2011)
(emphases
in
original)
(quoting
Jiminez
v.
Mary
Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995)); see Reeves,
530 U.S. at 143, 147.
“Plaintiff may prove that the defendant’s
proffered reasons are unworthy of credence ‘by showing that they
had no basis in fact, they did not in fact motivate the [nonselection] or, if they were factors in the decision, they were
jointly insufficient to motivate the [non-selection].’”
Agelli,
2014 WL 347630 at *8 (quoting Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d
843, 848 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s reason is pretextual
for
the
following
reasons:
Defendant
cancelled
the
third
recruitment because Plaintiff was selected; Mr. Martinelli, not
Dr. Snowden, made the decision to cancel the third recruitment;
and Defendant had no prior plan to expand HSI into HSSI and did
not actually follow through with the expansion.
13
(ECF No. 26, at
40-50).4
In
addition
to
countering
Plaintiff’s
arguments,
Defendant also notes that a survey of its promotion practices
shows a lack of discriminatory animus.
Plaintiff’s
assertions
that
pretextual are unpersuasive.
Defendant’s
decision
was
Every employee stated that the
third recruitment was cancelled because of the desire to expand
HSI into HSSI and modify the position description due to the
changing
healthcare
department.
4, at 32).
environment
and
evolving
needs
of
the
(See, e.g., ECF Nos. 23-5, at 17; 23-9, at 12; 26Furthermore, Dr. Snowden had just been named dean of
WDCE and wanted to modify the department’s structure.
In her
deposition, Dr. Snowden avers that she continues unsuccessfully
to request funding for HSSI, showing that her desire to expand
the department was, and continues to be, legitimate.
23-5, at 55-56).
(ECF No.
In addition, the fact that Mr. Martinelli was
involved in the decision to cancel the third recruitment is of
little relevance.
Plaintiff appears to be attempting to pin the
decision on Mr. Martinelli because he is outside of Plaintiff’s
protected
class.
The
record
indicates,
however,
that
Mr.
Martinelli and Dr. Snowden, who is African-American, both played
a role in the decisionmaking process.
4
Perhaps more importantly,
Much of Plaintiff’s response is devoted to the first
recruitment.
While such a discussion provides context, the
first recruitment itself is time-barred, as discussed above.
14
Mr. Martinelli approved Plaintiff for another promotion in 2011.
In a similar situation, the Fourth Circuit explained:
[T]he employee was hired and fired by the
same person within a relatively short time
span . . . this fact creates a strong
inference that the employer’s stated reason
for acting against the employee is not
pretextual.
. . . In short, employers who
knowingly hire workers within a protected
group seldom will be credible targets for
charges of pretextual firing.
Jiminez,
57
F.3d
at
378
(omissions
in
original)
(internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796,
798 (4th Cir. 1991)).
Defendant also notes that several African-
American employees were promoted within WDCE to positions at the
same level or higher than the one sought by Plaintiff.
(ECF No.
23-1, at 23).5
Plaintiff
“cannot
rely
on
[her]
‘own
assertions
of
discrimination[, which] in and of themselves are insufficient to
counter
substantial
evidence
of
legitimate
reasons for an adverse employment action.’”
nondiscriminatory
Adams, 640 F.3d at
560 (alteration in original) (quoting Williams v. Cerberonics,
5
Plaintiff’s attempt to show that Caucasian comparators
were promoted when she was not is unavailing.
The Caucasian
employees were not similarly situated because they were promoted
to different jobs than the one sought by Plaintiff.
See
Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 27273 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a plaintiff failed to show
pretext by pointing to purported comparators because “the job
requirements and responsibilities for the white employees [were]
different” than those for the plaintiff). Plaintiff’s argument
also ignores the many African-American employees who were
promoted to similar positions within WDCE.
15
Inc.,
871
F.2d
452,
456
(4th
Cir.
1989)).
Unlike
in
Westmoreland, 876 F.Supp.2d at 608-10, Plaintiff has put forth
no evidence showing that Defendant’s reason was false or was
actually pretext for discrimination.
See Agelli, 2014 WL 347630
at *8 (holding that the plaintiff failed to show pretext because
“the record contradicts Plaintiff’s broad assertions, which fail
to
show
that
Defendant’s
nondiscriminatory
reasons
pretextual”).
short,
In
for
[proffered]
its
Plaintiff
hiring
has
failed
legitimate
decisions
to
show
are
that
Defendant was motivated by any unlawful discriminatory animus
whatsoever.
Accordingly,
Defendant
is
entitled
to
summary
judgment.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
file a suprreply and Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
will both be granted.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
16
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