Levy v. Wexford Medical Health Care Provider et al

Filing 72

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 3/7/2016. (kw2s, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 3.7.16)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MS. SHAWNTE ANNE LEVY, a/k/a EL
SOUDANI EL WAHHABI, #416-369
Plaintiff,
v.
WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES, INC.,
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES,
GREGG L. HERSHBERGER,
COMMISSIONER; and
FRANK B. BISHOP, WARDEN,

Civil Action No. TDC-14-3678

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shawnte Anne Levy (“Levy”), also known as El Soudani El Wahhabi, has been
diagnosed with several psychiatric disorders and is currently incarcerated at North Branch
Correctional Institution (“NBCI”) in Cumberland, Maryland. Levy has been diagnosed with
Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”), or gender dysphoria, a condition under which a person feels
strongly that he or she is not the gender of his or her physical appearance. She 1 has filed a
Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Wexford Health Sources, Inc. (“Wexford”), the health
care provider under contract to provide certain medical services to Maryland state prisoners; the
Maryland Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (“DPSCS”); former Division
of Correction (“DOC”) Commissioner Gregg L. Hershberger; 2 and NBCI Warden Frank Bishop.

1

Because Levy identifies as female, the Court will use the feminine pronoun to refer to her.

2

Wayne Webb has replaced Hershberger as the Acting Commissioner.

Levy seeks injunctive relief in the form of estrogen medication and transgender psychotherapy
based on her allegations that Defendants have violated her rights under the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of
Rights by denying her requests for such treatment. 3

Levy also asserts that this denial of

treatment has violated her rights under the Fairness for All Marylanders Act, Md. Code Ann.,
State Gov’t, § 20-304 (2015). 4 She further alleges a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
based on NBCI’s failure to formally list her name in prison records as “Shawnte Anne Levy,”
despite the fact that she has had her name legally changed, and seeks injunctive relief to require
NBCI to update her commitment record to reflect that name change.
Pending before the Court are: Wexford’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative,
Motion for Summary Judgment; a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary
Judgment filed by DPSCS, Hershberger, and Bishop (collectively, the “Correctional
Defendants”); Levy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; Levy’s Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction; the Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Strike
Levy’s Supplemental Complaint; and Wexford’s Supplemental and Amended Motions for
Summary Judgment. No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motions. See D. Md. Local R.
105.6. For the reasons that follow, Wexford’s Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment are
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; the Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
3

The Maryland Declaration of Rights is in pari materia with the United States Constitution and
its Amendments. See Evans v. State, 914 A.2d 25, 67 (2006) (stating that the parallel provisions
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights should not be “read more broadly (or narrowly)” than the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution). Levy’s Maryland Declaration of
Rights claims thus essentially fold into her federal constitutional claims. For ease of reference,
the Court discusses those claims only in the constitutional context.

4

This Act prohibits discrimination in places of “public accommodation.” Md. Code. Ann.,
State Gov’t § 20-304. Because a prison is not a place of public accommodation, this cause of
action fails and is therefore dismissed.
2

or for Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART; Levy’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED; Levy’s Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or
for a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED; and the Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Strike is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
I.

Gender Identification Disorder
The parties do not explain the circumstances that led to Levy’s confinement at NBCI.

What is known is that Levy, then known as El Wahhabi, was committed to Clifton T. Perkins
Hospital Center (“CTPHC”) 5 for psychiatric treatment, but was transferred to DPSCS after she
murdered a fellow patient. Levy was transferred to NBCI on September 16, 2013. Within a
week of that transfer, Levy wrote the first of several letters to NCBI Psychology Department
Director Bruce Liller, asking for GID and transgender health care and amenities.
While at NBCI, Levy has received medical care from Wexford and mental health care
from DPSCS staff and employees of MHM Services, Inc. (“MHM”), the entity under contract
with the DPSCS to provide mental health services. Levy repeatedly told prison mental health
personnel that she had been diagnosed with GID, and she repeatedly requested GID treatment.
As part of her efforts, on March 24, 2014, Levy filed a request for an administrative remedy
(“ARP”) in which she expressly directed NBCI officials to her medical records from CTPHC,
which she stated would document her GID diagnosis dating back to 1984.
5

Despite this

CTPHC is a psychiatric hospital administered by Maryland’s Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene. It receives patients requiring psychiatric evaluation who have been accused of
felonies and have raised the Not Criminally Responsible (“NCR”) defense and/or whose
competency to stand trial is in question. CTPHC also provides treatment to offenders who have
been adjudicated NCR and/or incompetent to stand trial and accepts by transfer inmates from
other correctional facilities who meet the criteria for involuntary commitment. CTPHC further
accepts patients from other state regional psychiatric hospitals whose behavior is violent and
aggressive. See http://dhmh.maryland.gov/perkins/SitePages/Home.aspx.
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information, it does not appear that Defendants ever sought or obtained those records until after
Levy filed suit. Instead, prison mental health personnel repeatedly characterized Levy’s claim
that she suffered from GID as self-diagnosed, even as they noted her depression and attempts at
self-mutilation.
Because the prison mental health staff believed that Levy did not have a GID diagnosis,
they repeatedly informed her that, under prison policy, she was not entitled to the transgender
treatment that she was seeking. That policy is a part of a February 22, 2012 DPSCS Office of
Clinical Services/Inmate Health Services Medical Evaluations Manual, in effect at the time Levy
entered NBCI, which states that DPSCS will provide transgender treatment only to inmates who
have a transgender diagnosis prior to entering the prison, or prior enrollment in a certified
Transgender Program.

Wexford, as the primary medical contractor to DPSCS prisons, is

contractually obligated to follow this policy.
Levy’s March 24, 2014 ARP regarding the prison’s failure to provide her GID treatment
was denied the next day after the prison determined that it was “frivolous” and “without merit”
because Levy was “indeed a male inmate.” Compl. Ex. 1 at 2, ECF No. 1-1. 6 The denial
admonished Levy that “inmates may not seek remedy through a complaint which is not serious
or practical in content or form.” Id. That dismissal was signed by a member of prison staff on
behalf of Warden Bishop. Levy appealed that denial to the Inmate Grievance Office (“IGO”).
On December 8, 2014, the IGO instructed Levy to provide the medical records referenced in the
ARP within 30 days. When Levy failed to obtain the records from CTPHC and submit them, the
IGO administratively closed her appeal.

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This opinion references the pagination designated by the Court’s electronic docketing system.
4

Levy filed her Complaint in this Court on November 20, 2014, seeking an injunction
requiring that she be provided with estrogen medication and GID psychotherapy. On May 29,
2015, James K. Holwager, Director of Mental Health for DPSCS, submitted a Declaration stating
that he recently received copies of Levy’s mental health records from CTPHC, including
summaries of her mental health care and diagnosis. After reviewing the medical records,
Holwager concluded that Levy is suffering from multiple simultaneous conditions, including
GID. Holwager noted that Levy currently is housed in the Special Needs Unit for management
of the mentally ill and that she receives care for her psychiatric diagnoses through MHM and
mental health care from staff of the psychology department at NBCI. Based on Levy’s prior
diagnosis, Holwager recommended that Levy be considered a candidate for treatment with
hormones, and if such treatment is approved, that she be allowed to wear female undergarments.
On June 11, 2015, Levy filed an Amended Complaint in which she reiterated that she is seeking
an injunction requiring that she receive estrogen medication and GID psychotherapy.
In July 2015, Levy was evaluated for possible hormone therapy treatment and was
referred to a University of Maryland endocrinologist. Levy was also authorized to wear a sports
bra. On August 24, 2015, Levy was examined by an endocrinologist at University of Maryland
Medical Center. In October 2015, she had blood work to determine whether she could proceed
with hormone therapy.

On December 10, 2015, she had another appointment with the

endocrinologist, at which a follow-up appointment was scheduled for January 28, 2016.
On January 27, 2016, however, Levy submitted a verified “Supplement Complaint”
asserting that Defendants have violated their policy on transgender treatment, that the hormone
treatment has not proceeded, that she continues to suffer mental anguish and depression, and that

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she considers self-mutilation. On February 10, 2016, the Correctional Defendants filed a Motion
to Strike Levy’s Supplemental Complaint, asserting that it was procedurally improper.
Also on January 27, 2016, Levy filed a Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction seeking an order mandating that the treatment commence. The next day,
on January 28, 2016, Levy was seen by the endocrinologist and received a hormone treatment
plan consisting of two different medications, spironolactone and estradiol. On February 24,
2016, Levy reported that on February 13, 2016, she received her first supply of spironolactone,
but that on February 17, 2016, a correctional officer ordered her to surrender the spironolactone.
She also reported that she had not yet received the estradiol, which comes in patch form.
II.

Name Change
On March 26, 2014, Levy, then legally known as El Soudani El Wahhabi, filed an action

in the Circuit Court for Allegany County seeking a name change. See In the Matter of: El
Soudani El Wahhabi, Case No. 01C14040428 (Cir. Ct. Allegany Cty.), available at:
http://casesearch.courts.state.md.us/casesearch/inquiryDetail.jis. On January 5, 2015, the Circuit
Court granted the name change and sent notice to Levy and to NBCI. Id.
DPSCS has a formal procedure for changing an inmate’s name on commitment records.
The policy requires that the inmate seek and obtain an amended commitment order from the
sentencing judge. That policy dictates that absent an amended commitment order, the prison
may list an inmate’s new legal name only as an alias. In accordance with this policy, because
Levy has not obtained an order from her sentencing judge, NBCI officials have not changed her
commitment record name.
On June 11, 2015, in Levy’s Amended Complaint, she added a claim seeking an
injunction requiring that her commitment record be changed to reflect her new name. On July

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30, 2015, NBCI reported that, in accordance with its policy, it had added the name “Shawnte
Anne Levy” as an alias on the Offender Case Manager System and NBCI’s Inmate Data
Manager program and had issued her a new identification card with that name listed on the back
as an alias.
DISCUSSION
I.

Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment
In their Motion, the Correctional Defendants argue that DPSCS is entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity and is not a proper party to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that Defendants
Hershberger and Bishop are not personally liable for Levy’s health care, and that Levy has failed
fully to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42
U.S.C. §§ 1997e (2012). The Correctional Defendants also argue that they are entitled to
summary judgment based on the record evidence, and that the controversy has been rendered
moot because Levy is now being treated for GID.
In its Motion, Wexford seeks dismissal or summary judgment on the basis that Levy has
failed to state a claim under any of the federal or state legal theories she asserts. Wexford also
argues that it should be dismissed as a defendant because, as a private corporation carrying out a
governmental function such as the delivery of medical care in a prison setting, it may be sued
under § 1983 only if the alleged constitutional deprivation results from a policy, custom or
practice of the entity. See Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978).
In Levy’s June 11, 2015 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, filed after DPSCS
medical personnel acknowledged that she had been diagnosed with GID before she came to
NBCI, Levy seeks summary judgment granting her requested relief of hormone therapy and GID

7

psychotherapy. In her Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction,
filed on January 27, 2016, she argues that such an order should be entered immediately because
of the psychological harm she is enduring without such treatment.
A.

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

DPSCS seeks dismissal based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. Whether Eleventh
Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional matter is a question that the Supreme Court has not
resolved. Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 391 (1998); Calderon v.
Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 745 n.2 (1998) (“While the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdictional in the
sense that it is a limitation on the federal court’s judicial power, and therefore can be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, we have recognized that it is not coextensive with the limitations
on judicial power in Article III.”). Because this argument may implicate jurisdiction, the Court
addresses it first.
Under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies,
and its departments have sovereign immunity from suit in federal court. See Pennhurst State
Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1985). This bar “exists whether the relief
sought is legal or equitable.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276 (1986) (citing Pennhurst,
465 at 100-101). Although the Eleventh Amendment “permits suits for prospective injunctive
relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law,” Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins, 540
U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908)), this rule does not
extend to state agencies as parties. Because Maryland has not waived sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment for itself or its agencies and departments, the Eleventh Amendment
bars all claims in this case against the DPSCS. The Court dismisses DPSCS as a defendant.

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B.

Name Change

Levy seeks injunctive relief requiring that NBCI change her name in its commitment
records from El Soudani El Wahhabi to Shawnte Anne Levy. Levy secured a formal name
change from the Circuit Court for Allegany County, and NBCI now lists Levy’s new name as an
alias, but it has not changed her official name in her commitment record. The Correctional
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim because NBCI’s
handling of Levy’s name change conforms with a neutral prison policy regarding name changes
that mandates that an inmate’s name may not officially be changed absent an order from the
inmate’s sentencing judge.
1.

Legal Standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), the Court grants summary judgment if the
moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In assessing the Motion, the Court views the facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in its favor.
Anderson v. Liberty lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 1986). The Court may rely only on facts
supported in the record, not simply assertions in the pleadings. Felty v. Grave Humphreys Co.,
818 F.2d 1126, 1128 (4th Cir. 1987). The nonmoving party has the burden to show a genuine
dispute on a material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986). “A material fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 183 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248) (internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute of material fact is only

9

“genuine” if sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party exists for the trier of fact to return
a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.
2.

Equal Protection Claim

Levy has not identified a constitutional basis underlying her name change claim, but
because the name change issue is intertwined with Levy’s GID, the Court presumes that Levy is
alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution based on sex
or sexual identification. An inmate can establish an equal protection claim if it can be shown
that (1) the inmate is being intentionally or purposefully discriminated against on the basis of
membership in a protected class; and (2) the discrimination is not justified by legitimate
penological interests. See Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F.3d 648, 657 (4th Cir. 2001).
The Correctional Defendants have established that Levy’s name change is recognized as
an alias on NBCI internal data systems and that she has been provided a new identification card
listing “Levy” on the back as an alias. Prison policy, however, does not permit an inmate’s
official name to be changed unless the sentencing judge “issue[s] an amended commitment
[order] showing the new name.” Correctional Defs.’ Resp. Pl.’s Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 3 at
10, Division of Correction Manual: DOC.100.0002 § 25(A) (Inmate Name Changes), ECF No.
46-3. To date, it appears that Levy has not submitted her court-approved name change to her
sentencing judge and requested such a change. Thus, NCBI’s failure to change Levy’s name is
not based on Levy’s membership in a protected class, but based on the application and
enforcement of a neutral policy.

A process is in place for Levy to obtain the recognition she

requests, and Levy is free to avail herself of that process. Nothing more is constitutionally
required. The Correctional Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim.

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C.

Hormone Therapy and GID Psychotherapy

Defendants argue that Levy’s Complaint must be dismissed or summary judgment
entered in their favor because Levy’s claims relating to GID are now moot. Article III of the
Constitution limits the judicial power to “actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477 (1990) (citations omitted). A case becomes moot
when the issues presented are “no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in
the outcome.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (quoting County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979)).
Defendants acknowledge that because Levy was diagnosed with GID before being
incarcerated at NBCI, she is entitled under the prison’s policy to treatment for that condition, and
they assert that they are taking steps to provide such treatment. It is undisputed that Levy is
receiving psychotherapy for GID and that she is permitted to wear female undergarments. It is
also undisputed that Levy was approved for hormone treatment and received a treatment plan on
January 28, 2016. Defendants thus argue that because Levy is now receiving the injunctive relief
she sought, there is no active controversy for this Court to adjudicate.
Levy, however, tells a slightly different story. She asserts that she continues to encounter
difficulties in receiving hormone replacement therapy. Pursuant to the hormone treatment plan
approved on January 28, 2016, Levy was issued pills for one form of medication, spironolactone,
on February 13, 2016. According to Levy, those pills were then seized from her by correctional
officials on February 17, 2016. The basis for that seizure is unclear. It is also unclear whether
she has received the second medication, estradiol, which comes in the form of a patch. If true,
these allegations indicate that the requested relief of hormone therapy has not been fulfilled.
Given that Levy’s allegations of continued delays in providing her treatment follow what appears

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to have been a substantial delay by the prison medical staff in seeking and obtaining Levy’s
medical records from CTPHC, the Court cannot safely conclude that the treatment program has
been fully and permanently implemented. The Court therefore concludes that there remains an
active controversy such that this case is not moot.
However, in recognition of the fact that Levy’s hormone therapy may be fully
implemented in the near future, the Court will provide Defendants the opportunity to render this
claim moot before ruling on the merits of the unresolved issues in the pending Motions.
Accordingly, except with respect to issues otherwise resolved, the Court will deny without
prejudice Wexford’s Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, the Correctional
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and Levy’s Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment
To facilitate resolution of these matters, the Court orders Defendants to submit reports at
60-day intervals after the date of this Order informing the Court of the status of Levy’s hormone
treatment program. Levy may respond with a written submission within 14 days of the filing of
each of Defendants’ status reports. After 180 days, if appropriate, Defendants may file a Motion
to Dismiss on the grounds that the case is moot. In the alternative, after 180 days, Defendants
may renew their Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment as to the issues unresolved by
this Opinion. After 180 days, Levy may re-file her Motion for Partial Summary Judgment if the
requested relief has not been provided. In the event that such motions are re-filed, the parties
may incorporate by reference arguments made in their original briefs.
II.

Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
Levy filed her Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction on

January 27, 2016. On January 28, 2016, medical personnel approved Levy’s hormone treatment

12

program. Levy received her first medication on February 13, 2016. As discussed above, it is
unclear whether the remaining medication has been received. Because all parties have received
notice of the Motion and have had an opportunity to respond, the Court construes the Motion as
one for a preliminary injunction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a).
To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the plaintiff is likely
to succeed on the merits, (2) the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor, and (4) an injunction is
in the public interest. Winter v. Natural Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); see
Dewhurst v. Century Aluminum Co., 649 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2011). Because a preliminary
injunction is “an extraordinary remedy . . . [it] may only be awarded upon a clear showing that
the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. The plaintiff must satisfy all four
of these requirements. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d
342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009).
As to the likelihood of success on the merits, there is some indication that Levy could
prevail on the merits of her claim for injunctive relief in the form of hormone therapy. Under the
Eighth Amendment, a prisoner is entitled to psychological or psychiatric treatment if a
“[p]hysician or other health care provider, exercising ordinary skill and care at the time of the
observation, concludes with reasonable certainty (1) that the prisoner’s symptoms evidence a
serious disease or injury; (2) that such disease or injury is curable or may be substantially
alleviated; and (3) that the potential for harm to the prisoner by reason of delay or the denial of
care would be substantial.” Bowring v. Goodwin, 551 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1977). Defendants
have acknowledged that Levy has been diagnosed with GID; Levy’s condition is treatable with
hormone therapy; and there is some indication that denial of such care could lead to further

13

mental deterioration and self-mutilation. Although there remain unanswered questions, such as
the full factual basis for the delay of one to two years before NBCI sought Levy’s medical
records from CTPHC, Levy has made a substantial argument that she has a likelihood of success
on the merits.
The Court, however, need not decide whether Levy has satisfied that prong because
Levy’s Motion falters on the issue of irreparable harm. Levy’s hormone treatment plan was
approved one day after the Motion was filed, and her first prescription was filled on February 13,
2016, so steps have been taken toward implementing the treatment plan. The Court therefore
finds that because NBCI has started the process of providing Levy with the relief that she seeks,
she cannot establish that there is a likelihood that, in the absence of a preliminary injunction, she
will suffer irreparable harm. The Motion is therefore denied.
III.

The Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Strike
The Correctional Defendants ask the Court to strike Levy’s Supplemental Complaint

because it was filed without permission of the Court. Levy filed that Supplemental Complaint
after filing her original Complaint and an Amended Complaint. The Correctional Defendants are
correct that Levy’s Supplemental Complaint is technically improper because a party may amend
its pleading without leave of the Court only within 21 days after serving it or within 21 days of
service of a motion under Rule 12(b). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). Both of those deadlines had
passed by the time Levy filed her Supplemental Complaint.
However, the Court notes that the Supplemental Complaint does not add new causes of
action but instead simply asserts additional relevant facts relating to more recent events.
Because the Court does not find that the Supplemental Complaint prejudices Defendants, and
because Levy is proceeding pro se, the Court denies the Motion to Strike and accepts the

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Supplemental Complaint. Levy’s current complaint consists of the collective allegations in the
original Complaint, the First Amended Complaint, and the Supplemental Complaint. The Court
cautions Levy that any additional amended complaints filed without a motion for leave to amend
will not be accepted.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as
to DPSCS, which is dismissed as a defendant. The Motion is granted as to the Fairness for All
Marylanders Act claim and the claim seeking a change to Levy’s name in her commitment
record. The Motion is denied without prejudice as to all other issues.
Wexford’s Motions to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment are GRANTED IN PART and
DENIED IN PART. The Motions are granted as to the Fairness for All Marylanders Act claim
and denied without prejudice as to all other issues.
Levy’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is DENIED without prejudice. Levy’s
Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction is DENIED. The
Correctional Defendants’ Motion to Strike is DENIED.

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Defendants shall SUBMIT, under seal, status reports at 60-day intervals, beginning 60
days after the date of the accompanying Order, regarding the treatment of Levy’s GID. After
180 days, Defendants may file a Motion to Dismiss based on mootness or renew their Motions to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, and Levy may renew her Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.
A separate Order shall issue.

Date: March 7, 2016

__________/s/______________
THEODORE D. CHUANG
United States District Judge

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