Helms v. Colvin

Filing 25

ORDER Granting 23 Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; Affirming the Commissioner's judgment. Signed by Magistrate Judge Stephanie A Gallagher on 1/19/2016. (c/m 1/19/2016 nd2s, Deputy Clerk)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
CHAMBERS OF
STEPHANIE A. GALLAGHER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

101 WEST LOMBARD STREET
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
[phone]
Fax [phone]

January 19, 2016
Tashea Britt Helms
6006 Reed Street
Cheverly, MD 20785
Benjamin Prevas, Esq.
Social Security Administration
Altmeyer Building
6401 Security Boulevard, Room 617
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
RE:

Tashea Britt Helms v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration;
Civil No. SAG-14-3687

Dear Ms. Helms and Counsel:
On November 24, 2014, Plaintiff Tashea Britt Helms, who proceeds pro se since the
withdrawal of her attorney, petitioned this Court to review the Social Security Administration’s
final decision to deny her claim for Disability Insurance Benefits. (ECF No. 1). I have
considered the Commissioner’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 23). Ms. Helms has
not filed a response.1 I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). This
Court must uphold the decision of the Agency if it is supported by substantial evidence and if the
Agency employed proper legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585,
589 (4th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, I will grant the Commissioner’s motion and affirm the
Commissioner’s judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This letter explains
my rationale.
Ms. Helms filed a claim for Disability Insurance Benefits on May 21, 2009, alleging
disability beginning February 16, 2009. (Tr. 179-82). Because her date last insured was March
31, 2009, she needed to establish disability within that six week period to be entitled to benefits.
(Tr. 24). Her claim was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 118-21, 123-24). A
hearing was held on February 7, 2011, before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (Tr. 5582). Following the hearing, the ALJ determined that Ms. Helms was not disabled within the
meaning of the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Tr. 96-114). However, the
1

On December 23, 2015, a Rule 12/56 letter was sent to Ms. Helms advising her of her right to file a
response to the Commissioner’s motion within seventeen (17) days from the date of the letter. (ECF No.
24). No response was received.

Tashea Britt Helms v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3687
January 19, 2016
Page 2
Appeals Council determined that the hearing recording did not capture the testimony of the
vocational expert (“VE”), and remanded the case for additional VE testimony. (Tr. 116-17).
The ALJ held a second hearing on September 12, 2012, at which Ms. Helms failed to appear, but
a VE provided additional testimony. (Tr. 46-54). The ALJ again issued an order denying
benefits. (Tr. 18-40). This time, the Appeals Council denied Ms. Helms’s request for review,
(Tr. 1-4), so the ALJ’s 2013 decision constitutes the final, reviewable decision of the Agency.
The ALJ found that Ms. Helms suffered from the severe impairments of lower extremity
disorder, status post left ankle fracture, and depressive disorder. (Tr. 24). Despite these
impairments, the ALJ determined that Ms. Helms retained the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to:
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b). The claimant can also
perform sedentary work. The claimant cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds,
be exposed to hazardous heights or hazardous moving machinery, or be exposed
to extreme temperature changes as a precautionary measure. The claimant retains
the ability to occasionally climb stairs and ramps, balance, stoop, and crouch, but
does not retain the ability to perform work involving kneeling or crawling. The
claimant must avoid exposure to more than occasional vibration or occasional
humidity or wetness. The claimant must have no frequent exposure to dust,
fumes, chemicals, or poor ventilation. The claimant is precluded from work
requiring the use of push/pull controls with the legs and must not lift or carry
above shoulder height. The claimant experiences occasional pain and occasional
fatigue that cause occasional limitations as to the ability to perform activities
within a schedule, maintain regular attendance for reliability purposes, and being
punctual within customary tolerances and as to completing a normal workday and
workweek without an unreasonable length and number of rest periods. The
claimant cannot tolerate prolonged walking or standing but can stand or walk for
four hours in an eight hour day or sit for six hours in an eight hour day. The
claimant requires the option to alternate between sitting and standing such that not
more than one half hour is required to either sit or stand at any one time. The
claimant must avoid direct immediate contact with the general public but is not
precluded from all public contact. The claimant has occasional interruptions as to
accepting instructions, responding appropriately to supervisors, or getting along
with coworkers or peers.
(Tr. 26) (footnotes omitted). After considering the testimony of a VE, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Helms was not disabled. (Tr. 34-36).
I have carefully reviewed the ALJ’s opinion and the entire record. See Elam v. Barnhart,
386 F. Supp. 2d 746, 753 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (mapping an analytical framework for judicial review
of a pro se action challenging an adverse administrative decision, including: (1) examining
whether the Commissioner’s decision generally comports with regulations, (2) reviewing the
ALJ’s critical findings for compliance with the law, and (3) determining from the evidentiary

Tashea Britt Helms v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3687
January 19, 2016
Page 3
record whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings). For the reasons described
below, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
The ALJ proceeded in accordance with applicable law at all five steps of the sequential
evaluation. The ALJ ruled in Ms. Helms’s favor at step one and determined that she did not
engage in substantial gainful activity during the period between her alleged onset date and her
date last insured. (Tr. 24); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At step two, the ALJ considered
the severity of each of the impairments that Ms. Helms claimed prevented her from working.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). As noted above, the ALJ concluded that several of Ms.
Helms’s alleged impairments were severe, and thus proceeded to the other steps. (Tr. 24).
At step three, the ALJ determined that Ms. Helms’s impairments did not meet the specific
requirements of, or medically equal the criteria of, any listings. (Tr. 24-26). The ALJ
considered the specific requirements of Listing 1.02, which pertains to major dysfunction of a
joint, and Listing 12.04, which governs depressive disorder. Id. The ALJ provided adequate
explanation of his evaluation of the listings, by citing to the record evidence and comparing that
evidence to the specific listing criteria. Id. I have carefully reviewed the record, and I agree that
no listings are met.
In considering Ms. Helms’s RFC, the ALJ summarized her subjective complaints from
her testimony and her written function reports. (Tr. 27-28). However, the ALJ determined that
Ms. Helms’s subjective complaints were not entirely credible. Id. In support of that assessment,
the ALJ cited to Ms. Helms’s generally independent activities of daily living, which include
child care and transportation, household chores, shopping, and dancing. Id. The ALJ noted that
Ms. Helms had sought and received unemployment compensation during the time frame at issue,
thus representing that she was able and willing to work, and that records in May, 2010 indicate
that she was actively seeking employment despite her assertions of disabling impairments. (Tr.
29). The ALJ further noted that Ms. Helms had declined surgical intervention to relieve her
pain, and had not consistently complied with her medication regimen. (Tr. 29). Finally, the ALJ
further reviewed and cited medical evidence, much of which reflected improvement with
compliance with the prescribed medications. (Tr. 30-32). The ALJ thus provided a thorough
credibility analysis, explaining his reasons for discounting each of Ms. Helms’s complaints.
The ALJ also considered all of the opinion evidence in the record, providing substantial
evidence in support of the weight he accorded each opinion. The ALJ assigned “great weight” to
the opinion of Ms. Helms’s treating physician, Dr. Thomas, that her disability for her ankle
injury would be a temporary condition. (Tr. 33). The ALJ also assigned “significant weight” to
the opinions of the non-examining State agency consultants, who concurred with the notion that
the condition would be temporary. (Tr. 33-34). The ALJ disagreed with the opinion rendered by
another treating doctor, Dr. Siekanowicz, in which he suggested that Ms. Helms “remained
disabled.” (Tr. 33). The ALJ noted that not only was the determination of disability reserved to
the Commissioner, but the opinion is contradicted by Ms. Helms’s activities of daily living and
examination notes. Id.

Tashea Britt Helms v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3687
January 19, 2016
Page 4
Ultimately, my review of the ALJ’s decision is confined to whether substantial evidence,
in the record as it was reviewed by the ALJ, supports the decision and whether correct legal
standards were applied. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390, 404 (1971). Even if there is
other evidence that may support Ms. Helms’s position, I am not permitted to reweigh the
evidence or to substitute my own judgment for that of the ALJ. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453,
1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In considering the entire record, I find the ALJ’s RFC determination was
supported by substantial evidence.
I have also reviewed the RFC assessment under the dictates of Mascio v. Colvin, 780
F.3d 632 (4th Cir. 2015). In Mascio, the Fourth Circuit determined that remand was appropriate
for three distinct reasons, one of which is relevant to the analysis of this case. Specifically, the
Fourth Circuit remanded Mascio because the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE – and the
corresponding RFC assessment – did not include any mental limitations other than unskilled
work, despite the fact that, at step three of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ determined that the
claimant had moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace. Id. at 63738. The Fourth Circuit specifically held that it “agree[s] with other circuits that an ALJ does not
account for a claimant’s limitations in concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting the
hypothetical question to simple, routine tasks or unskilled work.” Id. at 638 (quoting Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
This case is distinguishable from Mascio because the ALJ imposed a limitation to address
the moderate limitation found. The ALJ specified that the moderate difficulties arose because
Ms. Helms’s “pain was so severe that she could not concentrate or remember things.” (Tr. 25).
The ALJ specifically acknowledged, in the RFC assessment, that Ms. Helms’s pain would cause
occasional limitations in her ability to maintain attendance and complete a normal workday. (Tr.
26). However, the ALJ was clear in his questioning of the VE that by “occasional,” he still
found that Ms. Helms could persist more than 80% of the time. (Tr. 50). Because the ALJ
explained the reason for his finding of a moderate limitation and imposed a corresponding
restriction in the RFC assessment, there is no Mascio violation.
Next, at step four, the ALJ determined that, pursuant to her RFC assessment, Ms. Helms
was unable to perform her past relevant work as a fast food worker, customer service
representative, and medical assistant. (Tr. 34). Accordingly, the ALJ proceeded to step five,
where he considered the impact of Ms. Helms’s age and level of education on her ability to
adjust to new work. (Tr. 34-36). After considering and summarizing the testimony of the VE,
the ALJ found that both light and sedentary jobs existed in significant numbers in the national
economy that a person with Ms. Helms’s RFC could perform. (Tr. 35). I find that the ALJ’s
determination was supported by substantial evidence.
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No.
23) is GRANTED. The Commissioner’s judgment is AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.

Tashea Britt Helms v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration
Civil No. SAG-14-3687
January 19, 2016
Page 5
Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as an opinion and docketed
as an order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/
Stephanie A. Gallagher
United States Magistrate Judge