Christopher Beam et al v. Dillon's Bus Service, Inc. et al

Filing 22

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 7/1/2015. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
CHRISTOPHER BEAM, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 14-3838

:
DILLON’S BUS SERVICE,
INC, et al.

:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this wage and
hour law case is Plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for approval of
the parties’ Settlement Agreements, which resolve the claims of
Plaintiffs Christopher Beam, George Thomas, and Marquese Ford
(“Plaintiffs”), for unpaid overtime wages under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201, et seq.

(ECF No. 20).1

The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now rules, no
hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

Because the

proposed Settlement Agreements represent a fair and reasonable
resolution of a bona fide FLSA dispute, they will be approved.
I.

Background
Plaintiff Beam alleges that he was employed as a dispatcher

for Defendants Dillon’s Bus Service, Inc. and Coach USA, Inc.
(“Defendants”) from November 2012 until October 2014; Plaintiff
1

Also pending is a motion to dismiss or in the alternative
for summary judgment filed by Defendant Coach USA, Inc.
(ECF
No. 14).
This motion will be denied as moot, as Plaintiffs’
motion to approve the parties’ settlement will be granted.

Thomas

alleges

that

he

was

employed

as

a

dispatcher

for

Defendants from October 2012 until October 2014; and Plaintiff
Ford alleges that she was employed as a scheduler for Defendants
from March 2008 until July 2014.

Plaintiffs assert that they

consistently worked over 40 hours per week for Defendants, and
that

this

overtime

was

recorded

when

they

“clocked

“clocked out” on Defendants’ time card machine.

in”

and

According to

Plaintiffs, Defendants knew exactly how many hours they were
working each week because all hours worked were reflected in
their paystubs.
multiple
wages,

Despite the fact that Plaintiffs complained on

occasions

to

Plaintiffs

complaints

and

management

allege

continued

that

denying

about

their

Defendants
Plaintiffs

unpaid

overtime

ignored
their

their

rightfully

earned time and half wages for the hours they worked in excess
of 40 per week as required by the FLSA and Maryland Wage and
Hour Law (“MWHL”).

Defendants terminated Plaintiff Ford in July

2014 and Plaintiffs Beam and Thomas on October 31, 2014.
Plaintiffs

Beam

December 11, 2014.

and

Thomas

(ECF No. 1).

filed

the

instant

action

on

On January 23, 2015, Defendant

Dillon’s Bus Service, Inc. (“Dillon’s”) answered the complaint
(ECF No. 9), and Defendant Coach USA, Inc. (“Coach USA”) moved
to dismiss (ECF No. 10).

Plaintiffs then filed a first amended

complaint, in which Plaintiff Ford joined as a Plaintiff.
2

(ECF

No. 12).
violated

The first amended complaint alleges that Defendants
the

FLSA,

MWHL,

and

the

Maryland

Wage

Payment

and

Collection Law (“MWPCL”) by failing to pay Plaintiffs overtime
wages for the hours they worked per week in excess of forty.

On

February 23, 2015, Dillon’s answered the complaint and Coach USA
again moved to dismiss the complaint or in the alternative for
summary judgment.

(ECF Nos. 14 and 15).

On May 19, 2015, the parties participated in mediation with
retired United States District Court Judge Legg, and on June 23,
2015 the parties executed Settlement Agreements.
1).

(ECF No. 20-

On June 25, 2015, Plaintiffs filed under seal an unopposed

motion to approve the parties’ Settlement Agreements, along with
copies

of

outlining

the
the

proposed
reasons

Settlement
why

the

Agreements,

court

a

should

memorandum

approve

the

settlement, a proposed order, and Plaintiffs’ counsel’s billing
records pertaining to this suit.
and 20-4).

(ECF Nos. 20-1, 20-2, 20-3,

On June 26, the parties filed a joint stipulation to

unseal the motion to approve the settlement.
This

motion

will

be

unsealed.2

request that the court:
Defendant
2

Coach

USA’s

In

this

(ECF No. 26).

motion,

Plaintiffs

(1) approve the settlement, (2) hold
pending

motion

to

dismiss

in

abeyance

The parties’ Settlement Agreements recognize that certain
information will be filed publicly in the process of seeking
court approval. They nevertheless agreed to keep non disclosed
information confidential.
3

pending its decision on the unopposed motion to approve the
settlement, and (3) if the motion to approve the settlement is
granted, deny as moot Coach USA’s motion to dismiss.
The

Settlement

Agreement

pertaining

to

Christopher

Beam

states that, upon court approval, Defendants will pay Plaintiff
Beam $16,627, on condition that they receive a completed W-9 Tax
Form for Mr. Beam.

(ECF No. 20-1, at 4).

The agreement also

states that Plaintiffs’ counsel, The O’Neal Firm, LLP, will be
paid $14,500 for “attorneys’ fees, costs, and other expenses
incurred by and on behalf of Mr. Beam[.]”

(Id.)

The Settlement

Agreement pertaining to George Thomas states that, upon court
approval,

Defendants

will

pay

Plaintiff

Thomas

$22,764,

on

condition that they receive a completed W-9 Tax Form for Mr.
Thomas.

(ECF No. 20-1, at 15).

The agreement also states that

Plaintiffs’ counsel will be paid $14,500 for “attorneys’ fees,
costs,

and

Thomas[.]”

other

expenses

(Id.).

The

incurred
Settlement

by

and

on

Agreement

behalf

of

pertaining

Mr.
to

Marquese Ford states that, upon court approval, Defendants will
pay Plaintiff Ford $22,764, on condition that they receive a
completed W-9 Tax Form for Ms. Ford.

(ECF No. 20-1, at 26).

The agreement also states that Plaintiffs’ counsel will be paid
$14,500 for “attorneys’ fees, costs, and other expenses incurred
by

and

on

behalf

of

Ms.

Ford[.]”
4

(Id.).

The

Settlement

Agreements

also

specify

in

paragraph

12

that

Plaintiffs

are

responsible for any tax consequences or liabilities arising from
the payments made by Defendants under the agreements.
The

Settlement

Agreements

provide

that,

in

exchange

for

their various settlement amounts, Plaintiffs agree to a general
release of all claims against Defendants and upon court approval
of the Settlement Agreements, dismissal of this lawsuit with
prejudice.
contain
paragraph

(Id. ¶¶ 4-7, 24-25).

inter

alia

8

a

and

a

partial

The Settlement Agreements also
confidentiality

non-disparagement

clause

in

provision
paragraph

in
10,

pursuant to which each party agrees not to criticize the other
party in order to protect the parties’ interests in maintaining
their

reputations.

(Id.

at

6-8,

17-19,

28-29).

Moreover,

paragraph 7 requires Plaintiffs to agree that:
the
consideration
set
forth
in
[the
agreements] is being exchanged to resolve
all claims, known and unknown, by the
Parties, for [Plaintiffs] confidentiality,
and payment of [Plaintiffs] attorneys’ fees,
costs, and expenses.
The Parties warrant
that the consideration that [Plaintiffs are]
receiving represents full satisfaction of
all claims against [Defendants].
II.

Analysis
Because Congress enacted the FLSA to protect workers from

the poor wages and long hours that can result from significant
inequalities

in

bargaining

power
5

between

employers

and

employees, the statute’s provisions are mandatory and, except in
two

narrow

circumstances,

are

generally

not

subject

to

bargaining, waiver, or modification by contract or settlement.
See Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O’Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945).
Under the first exception, the Secretary of Labor may supervise
the payment of back wages to employees, who waive their rights
to seek liquidated damages upon accepting the full amount of the
wages

owed.

See

29

U.S.C.

§ 216(c).

Under

the

second

exception, a district court can approve a settlement between an
employer and an employee who has brought a private action for
unpaid

wages

pursuant

to

Section

216(b),

provided

that

the

settlement reflects a “reasonable compromise of disputed issues”
rather than “a mere waiver of statutory rights brought about by
an employer’s overreaching.”

Lynn’s Food Stores, Inc. v. United

States, 679 F.2d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982).
Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has not directly addressed the factors to be considered
in deciding motions for approval of such settlements, district
courts in this circuit typically employ the considerations set
forth by the Eleventh Circuit in Lynn’s Food Stores.
Hoffman

v.

First

Student,

Inc.,

No.

See, e.g.,

WDQ-06-1882,

2010

WL

1176641, at *2 (D.Md. Mar. 23, 2010); Lopez v. NTI, LLC, 748
F.Supp.2d

471,

478

(D.Md.

2010).
6

Pursuant

to

Lynn’s

Food

Stores, an FLSA settlement generally should be approved if it
reflects

“a

fair

and

reasonable

dispute over FLSA provisions.”

resolution

of

a

bona

fide

Lynn’s Food, 679 F.2d at 1355.

Thus, as a first step, the bona fides of the parties’ dispute
must be examined to determine if there are FLSA issues that are
“actually in dispute.”

Lane v. Ko-Me, LLC, No. DKC-10-2261,

2011 WL 3880427, at *2 (D.Md. Aug. 31, 2011) (citing Dees v.
Hydradry, Inc., 706 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1241-42 (M.D.Fla. 2010)).
Then, as a second step, the terms of the proposed settlement
agreement

must

be

assessed

for

fairness

and

reasonableness,

which requires weighing a number of factors, including:

“(1)

the extent of discovery that has taken place; (2) the stage of
the proceedings, including the complexity, expense and likely
duration

of

the

litigation;

(3)

the

absence

of

fraud

or

collusion in the settlement; (4) the experience of counsel who
have represented the plaintiffs; (5) the opinions of [] counsel
. . .; and (6) the probability of plaintiffs’ success on the
merits

and

the

amount

potential recovery.”

of

the

settlement

in

relation

to

the

Lomascolo v. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Inc.,

No. 08–cv–1310, 2009 WL 3094955, at *10 (E.D.Va. Sept. 28, 2009)
(collective action); Duprey v. Scotts Co. LLC, 30 F.Supp.3d 404,
409 (D.Md. 2014) (applying the same factors to a settlement that
involved only individual claims).
7

Finally, if attorneys’ fees

are included in the settlement agreement, the court must assess
the reasonableness of the attorneys’ fees.
A.

Id. at 408.

Bona Fide Dispute

“In deciding whether a bona fide dispute exists as to a
defendant’s
pleadings

liability

in

the

under

case,

the

along

FLSA,

with

courts

the

examine

the

representations

and

recitals in the proposed settlement agreement.”

Amaya v. Young

& Chang, Inc., No. PWG-14-749, 2014 WL 3671569, at *2 (D.Md.
July

22,

2014).

Plaintiffs

are

Here,

the

entitled

crux

to

Defendants, or were exempt.

of

recover

the

dispute

overtime

is

whether

wages

from

Under the FLSA, “no employer shall

employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than
forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his
employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not
less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is
employed.”

29 U.S.C. § 207.

If an employer violates Section

207, he is liable for unpaid overtime and an equal amount of
liquidated damages.
the

duties

they

29 U.S.C. § 216.
performed

were

Plaintiffs allege that

non-exempt

from

overtime

compensation, and therefore, that they are owed overtime wage
payments for all hours they worked in excess of 40.

Plaintiffs

also have documentation of the overtime hours that they worked.
Defendants deny liability, contending that Plaintiffs were not
8

owed overtime compensation because their duties as dispatchers
(Plaintiffs Beam and Thomas) and as a scheduler (Plaintiff Ford)
qualify them for the Administrative Employee Exemption and/or
the Motor Carrier Exemption of the FLSA.

In addition, although

Plaintiffs have alleged that Dillon’s was their employer and
that Coach USA was a joint employer, Defendant Coach USA, denies
that it was Plaintiffs’ employer and any associated liability
for wage payments.
defenses

to

Because Defendants have asserted several

liability

and

provided

factual

bases

for

these

defenses, a bona fide dispute exists as to Defendants’ liability
under the FLSA.
B.

Fairness & Reasonableness

Upon review of the parties’ filings and after considering
the

relevant

Settlement

factors

Agreements

enumerated
appear

by

to

the

be

a

Lomascolo
fair

and

court,

the

reasonable

compromise of the parties’ bona fide dispute.
The

parties

agreed

to

settle

at

an

early

stage

of

the

proceedings, while Defendant Coach USA’s motion to dismiss is
still

pending

and

formal

discovery

has

yet

to

occur.

The

parties believe that this case “involves serious questions of
fact and law which make the outcome of continued litigation
uncertain.
anticipate

If this settlement is not approved, the parties
litigation

[will]

conclude
9

in

2017,

resulting

in

significantly increased legal fees and costs for all parties.”
(ECF No. 20-2, at 4).

Plaintiffs assert, however, that “the

parties had full access to virtually all of Plaintiffs’ pay
records that reflected the overtime hours worked.

Also, the

parties exchanged documents and information that challenge their
respective positions.”

(ECF No. 20-2, at 4).

Because both

parties had access to Plaintiffs’ payroll records and exchanged
additional

documents,

the

parties

have

had

sufficient

opportunity to “obtain and review evidence, to evaluate their
claims and defenses[,] and to engage in informed arms-length
settlement negotiations with the understanding that it would be
a difficult and costly undertaking to proceed to the trial of
this case.”

Lomascolo, 2009 WL 3094955, at *11.

Additionally,
Settlement

there

Agreements

–

is
which

no

evidence

are

the

that

product

the
of

proposed
months

of

ongoing negotiations and a twelve-hour mediation session during
which both parties were represented by counsel – is the product
of fraud or collusion.

Plaintiffs’ counsel, Alan Mitchell and

Arda O’Neal, are members of an employment law firm, The O’Neal
Firm, LLP.

Mr. Mitchell is a fifth year attorney and Ms. O’Neal

has

practicing

been

employment

law

for

nineteen

years.

Plaintiffs’ counsel appear to be well-versed in employment law
and capable of representing Plaintiffs’ interests.
10

Although the

parties

have

not

engaged

in

formal

discovery,

they

have

exchanged information, which has purported “revealed material
disputes of fact and law[,]” which permitted Plaintiffs’ counsel
to reassess Plaintiffs’ position and revalue the case.

(ECF No.

20-2, at 5).
As to the relationship between the amount of the settlement
and Plaintiffs’ potential recovery, the Settlement Agreements
require
according

Defendant
to

to

their

pay

Plaintiffs

individual

on

overtime

a

pro

hours

liquidated damages in the following amounts:

rata
worked

basis
and

Plaintiff Beam

$16,627 (back pay = $8,314; liquidated damages = $8,313), which
is 63% of the back pay he would have recovered if he prevailed
at trial under his view of the facts; Plaintiff Thomas $22,764
(back pay = $11,382; liquidated damages = $11,382), which is 59%
of the back pay he would have recovered if he prevailed at trial
under his view of the facts; Plaintiff Ford $22,764 (back pay =
$11,382; liquidated damages = $11,382), which is 74% of the back
pay she would have recovered if she prevailed at trial under her
view

of

the

facts.

As

Plaintiffs’

counsel

notes,

however,

“success on the merits is uncertain due to the serious questions
of fact and law[.]”

(ECF No. 20-2, at 5).

Plaintiffs alleged

that pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 207, Defendants were required to
pay them “not less than one and one half times their regular
11

rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40 in a workweek,
unless

the

employees

(emphasis added).
employees

but

are

otherwise

exempt.”

(Id.

at

6)

Plaintiffs contend that they are non-exempt

Defendants

Plaintiffs

are

exempt

Exemption3

and/or

the

dispute
under

Motor

this

the

Carrier

issue,

arguing

Administrative
Exemption4

of

that

Employee
the

FLSA.

Defendant Coach USA also disputes that it owes Plaintiffs any
compensation,

arguing

that

there

was

never

an

employment

relationship between itself and Plaintiffs and therefore that it
3

The FLSA “White Collar” Exemption excludes from overtime
coverage “any employee employed in a bona fide executive,
administrative, or professional capacity . . . as such terms are
defined and delimited . . . by regulations of the Secretary [of
Labor].” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). The regulations promulgated by
the Secretary define an administrative employee as someone:
whose “primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual
work directly related to the management or general business
operations of the employer or the employer's customers,” whose
“primary
duty
includes
the
exercise
of
discretion
and
independent judgment with respect to matters of significance,”
and who is paid on a salary basis at a rate of not less than
$455 per week.
29 C.F.R. § 541.200; Torres v. Gristedes
Operating Corp., 628 F.Supp.2d 447, 455 (2008) (noting that this
exemption is called the “white collar” exemption).
4

The FLSA “Motor Carrier” Exemption excludes from overtime
coverage “any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of
Transportation has power to establish qualifications and maximum
hours of service pursuant to the provisions of” the Motor
Carrier Act.
29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1).
“The Secretary of
Transportation has authority under the MCA ‘to regulate the
maximum hours of service of employees who are employed (1) by a
common carrier by motor vehicle; (2) engaged in interstate
commerce; and (3) whose activities directly affect the safety of
operations of such motor vehicles.’” Walters v. Am. Coach Lines
of Miami, Inc., 575 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2009)
(citations omitted).
12

could not be liable under the FLSA for overtime violations.
Although Plaintiffs could potentially recover greater sums at
trial if they are able to prove they are non-exempt and that
Defendant

Coach

USA

was

their

employer,

they

also

risk

recovering less than the settlement amounts or nothing at all if
Defendants

succeed

in

proving

they

are

exempt

employees.

Moreover, although the Settlement Agreements contain a general
release of claims not specified in the complaint,5 this provision
does not render the agreements unreasonable as Plaintiffs appear
to be adequately compensated for the release, seeing as the
factual

disputes

in

this

case

make

it

uncertain

whether

Plaintiffs would ultimately recover overtime wages should this
case proceed to trial.

See Duprey, 30 F.Supp.3d at 410 (“[I]f

the employee is compensated reasonably for the release executed,
the settlement can be accepted, and [the court] is not required
to evaluate the reasonableness of the settlement as to non-FLSA
claims.”).
In

light

of

the

risks

and

costs

to

both

parties

in

proceeding with this lawsuit, the settlement amounts appear to

5

The release provision does not include any potential
workers
compensation
or
unemployment
benefit
claims
by
Plaintiffs, nor does it release any rights or claims arising
after the effective date of the Settlement Agreements. (ECF No.
20-1 ¶ 4).
13

be a reasonable compromise over issues that are actually in
dispute.
C.

Attorneys’ Fees & Costs

Next,

the

Settlement

Agreements’

provisions

regarding

attorneys’ fees must be assessed for reasonableness.

A number

of recent cases decided by the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, relying upon Lynn’s Food Stores,
have

described

“‘both

that

the

court’s

counsel

is

interest

taints

conflict

of

recovers

under

a

task

in

compensated

settlement

the

this

regard

adequately

amount

agreement.’”

the

as
and

wronged
Dees

v.

assuring
that

no

employee
Hydradry,

Inc., 706 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1243 (M.D.Fla. 2010) (quoting Silva v.
Miller, 307 Fed.Appx. 349, 351 (11th Cir. 2009)).

Thus, if the

motion demonstrates that the proposed fee award was “agreed upon
separately

and

without

regard

to

the

amount

paid

to

the

plaintiff, then, unless . . . there is reason to believe that
the plaintiff’s recovery was adversely affected by the amount of
fees paid to his attorney, the Court will approve the settlement
without separately considering the reasonableness of the fee to
be paid to plaintiff’s counsel.”

Bonetti v. Embarq Mgmt. Co.,

715 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1228 (M.D.Fla. 2009).

These cases appear to

suggest, in other words, that so long as the amount paid to the

14

plaintiffs’

counsel

does

not

affect

the

amount

paid

to

the

plaintiffs themselves, the fee award need not be reasonable.
Section
addition

to

216(b)
any

expressly
judgment

provides,

awarded

to

however,
the

that

plaintiff

“in
or

plaintiffs,” the court must “allow a reasonable attorney’s fee
to be paid by the defendant, and costs of the action.”
U.S.C. § 216(b).

29

Thus, where judgment is entered in favor of

the plaintiffs on their FLSA claims, an award of “reasonable”
attorneys’ fees is mandatory.

Of course, in the context of a

settlement, judgment is not entered in favor of either party —
in fact, the defendants typically deny that any FLSA violation
has occurred, as do the Defendants in this case.
little

sense

to

require

the

amount

of

fees

It would make
awarded

to

be

reasonable where the plaintiffs prevail on the merits, but to
abandon that requirement altogether where the parties agree to
settle the case.

Moreover, from a practical standpoint, any

time that plaintiffs would receive less than the full value of
their claims in a settlement, there is a strong likelihood that
the amount paid to the plaintiffs would be adversely affected by
an exorbitant award of attorneys’ fees.

See Cisek v. Nat’l

Surface Cleaning, Inc., 954 F.Supp. 110, 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(plaintiffs’ counsel “should have perceived that every dollar

15

the defendants agreed to pay [the attorneys] was a dollar that
defendants would not pay to the plaintiffs”).
Accordingly, the reasonableness of the fee award proposed
in an FLSA settlement must be independently assessed, regardless
of whether there is any suggestion that a “conflict of interest
taints

the

settlement

amount

the

agreement.”

wronged
Dees,

employee
706

recovers

F.Supp.2d

at

under

1243.

a
As

explained by Judge Grimm in Duprey, 30 F.Supp.3d at 412:
Traditionally, “[i]n calculating an award of
attorney’s fees, the Court must determine
the
lodestar
amount,
defined
as
a
‘reasonable hourly rate multiplied by hours
reasonably expended.’” Lopez v. XTEL Const.
Grp., LLC, 838 F.Supp.2d 346, 348 (D.Md.
2012) (citing Grissom v. The Mills Corp.,
549 F.3d 313, 320–21 (4th Cir. 2008); Plyler
v. Evatt, 902 F.2d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 1990)).
An hourly rate is reasonable if it is “in
line with those prevailing in the community
for
similar
services
by
lawyers
of
reasonably comparable skill, experience, and
reputation.” Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886,
890 n.11, 104 S.Ct. 1541, 79 L.Ed.2d 891
(1984); see Thompson v. HUD, No. MJG–95–309,
2002 WL 31777631, at *6 n.18 (D.Md. Nov. 21,
2002) (same).
In Appendix B to its Local
Rules (D.Md. Jul. 2011), this Court has
established rates that are presumptively
reasonable for lodestar calculations.
See,
e.g., Poole ex rel. Elliott v. Textron,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 509 (D.Md. 2000).
As noted, the Settlement Agreements provide that Defendants
will pay Plaintiffs’ counsel a total of $43,500 in “attorneys’
fees, costs, and other expenses incurred by and on behalf of”
16

Plaintiffs.

(ECF No. 20-1 ¶ 3).

Plaintiffs assert that this

amount is reasonable because it represents less than one third
of

Plaintiffs’

$156,310.35,

and

actual

attorneys’

because

of

the

fees,

which

“uncertainty

amounted
of

to

protracted

litigation, the serious questions of fact and law involved and
Defendants’ defenses.”

(ECF No. 20-2, at 7).

In reviewing the billing records submitted by Plaintiffs’
counsel, it appears that the paralegal, Mr. Maloney, spent very
little time on this case, and that the two attorneys performed
almost all of the services contained in their billing records.
The billing rates for Mr. Mitchell and Ms. O’Neal of $300 per
hour

and

of

paralegal

Michael

Maloney

of

$150

per

hour

are

within the presumptively reasonable rates set forth in Appendix
B.6

The attorneys and paralegal collectively billed 533.75 hours

on this case, which amounted to $156,310.35 in total legal fees.
Plaintiffs’ counsel attached an exhibit detailing:
which

each

service

was

performed;

the

the date on

attorney/paralegal

who

performed the service; a short description of the service; the
number of hours spent performing the service; the rate at which

6

Mr. Mitchell has been practicing for five years and Ms.
O’Neal has been practicing for nineteen years.
Appendix B to
the Local Rules (2014 ed.) states that a reasonable hourly rate
for attorneys admitted to the bar for five to eight years is
$165-300, for lawyers admitted to the bar for fifteen to
nineteen years is $275-425, and for paralegals and law clerks is
$95-150.
17

the

client

service.
counsel

was

billed;

and

the

(ECF No. 20-3).
also

provides

a

total

amount

billed

for

the

In their memorandum, Plaintiffs’

summary

of

the

services

they

have

performed in representing Plaintiffs in this case:
(1)
meeting
with
Plaintiffs
and
communicating with Plaintiffs by telephone
numerous times; (2) investigating potential
claims in this case; (3) performing detailed
damage
calculations;
(4)
reviewing
Plaintiffs’ paycheck stubs; (5) drafting all
necessary
pleadings
and
motions;
(6)
participating
in
continuous
negotiations
with Defendants[;] (7) preparing Plaintiffs
for mediation; and (8) attending the May 19,
2015 mediation session.
(ECF

No.

20-2).

Plaintiffs’

counsel

has

performed

numerous

services since October 2014 in preparing this case, including
factual development of multiple Plaintiffs’ claims and damages,
drafting

pleadings

and

motions,

ongoing

negotiations

with

Defendants, and attending a twelve-hour mediation that resulted
in a successful settlement and a considerable recovery for their
clients.

Taking into consideration that Plaintiffs’ counsel has

agreed to reduce their fees to $43,500, which when divided by
the attorneys’ hourly rates amounts to about 145 hours of time
spent on this case, the billed hours are reasonable.
In

light

of

the

facts

of

this

case

and

the

numerous

disputes described above, this compromised provision requiring

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Defendants to pay Plaintiffs’ counsel $43,500 in attorneys’ fees
and costs is reasonable and will be approved.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to approve
the parties’ Settlement Agreements will be granted.

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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