Stancil v. USA - 2255

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING ( 24 in TDC 00-cr-0295) Motion to Vacate (2255) and DISMISSING AS MOOT ( 29 in TDC 00-cr-0295) Motion to Enter Default as to Daniel Charlie Stancil (1). Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 10/22/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 10/23/15)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DANIEL STANCIL,
Prisoner Identification No. 36241-037,
Petitioner,
Criminal Action No. TDC-00-0295
Civil Action No. TDC-15-0333

v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM

ORDER

On November 8, 1999, Daniel Stancil ("Stancil") pled guilty in the North Carolina
Superior Court to second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, first-degree
kidnapping,

and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping.

transcript), ECF No. 24-1.

Mot. Vacate Ex. 1 (plea

Based on the same events underlying those convictions, a federal

prosecution for Conspiracy to Commit Kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. ~ 1201(c), was
initiated on June 7, 2000. See ECF NO.1.

That same month, Stancil pled guilty to that charge.

See ECF NO.5. By ajudgment entered on May 29,2002 (Williams, J.), Stancil was sentenced to
360 months of imprisonment, to be followed by 60 months of supervised release, on the federal
crime. ECF No. 21. Stancil was represented by counsel throughout his federal prosecution.
On February 5, 2015, Stancil filed a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct a Sentence
under 28 U.S.C. ~ 2255 ("~ 2255") in which he asks this Court to vacate his federal sentence
because the charge and the evidence supporting it are "essentially the same" as the charge and
evidence underlying his state conviction. Mot. Vacate at 1, ECF No. 24. Stancil thus concludes
that his federal conviction violates the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

specifically

the Double Jeopardy

Clause.

On March

13, 2015, this Court ordered the

Government to respond to the Motion within 60 days. ECF No. 25. The Government failed to
respond by that deadline.

On June 3, 2015, the Court issued an Order instructing

the

Government to file its Response within seven days. ECF No. 27. The next day, June 4, 2015,
the Government filed its Response, in which it argues that Stancil's Motion must be denied
because it is time-barred.

ECF No. 28. On June 5, 2015, Stancil filed a Motion for Entry of

Default, based on the Government's

failure to file its Response by the Court's initial deadline.

ECF No. 29. On June 18,2015, Stancil filed his Reply to the Government's Response, which he
then amended on June 22, 2015. ECF Nos. 30 & 31.
The Government is correct that Stancil's Motion is time-barred.

9 2255

are subject to a one-year statute of limitations.

Motions for relief under

That one-year period begins to run from

the latest of:
(l) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created
by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented
from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by
the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases
on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
28 U.S.C.

9 2255(f)(1)-(4).

Turning to the first provision, Stancil was sentenced on the federal

case on May 29, 2002, and the judgment was docketed on May 31, 2002. Under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(l)(A),

Stancil had 10 days to file his Notice of Appeal on that

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judgment. I Stancil filed no Notice of Appeal, so that judgment became final on June 10, 2002.
See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522,532 (2003) (holding, in the context of a petition for writ

of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, that a judgment becomes final for purposes of
starting the ~ 2255 one-year limitation period when the time for seeking review of that judgment
expires). Thus, under this first provision, Stancil had until June 10, 2003 to file his ~ 2255
motion.
On the second provision, Stancil asserts in his Reply that from about late May 2002 to
May 13, 2003, he was housed in "various county jails and federal holdovers," some of which
have restrictive library policies. Reply at 2. He also stated that he served his state sentence at
Central Prison in Raleigh, North Carolina, and that the "North Carolina Department of
Corrections DOES NOT have an inmate law library." Id (emphasis in original). Even if the
Court were to assume that Stancil lacked access to a law library while in state custody, and that
such a lack of access constituted governmental action in violation of the Constitution that served
as an impediment to Stancil's filing a ~ 2255 motion, Stancil's submission indicates that he
completed his state sentence and was moved to federal custody at the Federal Correctional
Institution in Bennettsville, South Carolina on or before December 6, 2011. Mot. Ex. 1 at 6
(Detainer Letter). Thus, under the most favorable view for Stancil of the second provision, he
had until no later than December 6,2012 to file his ~ 2255 motion.
The third and fourth provisions are inapplicable to Stancil's case.

As to the third

provision, the right not to face multiple prosecutions for the same crime is a right that is
enshrined in the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. amend. V. It is therefore not a newly
articulated right that would otherwise toll the running of the statute of limitations. As to the
I In 2009, that period was extended to 14 days. See Fed. R. App. P. Advisory Committee Notes,
2009 Amendments.

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fourth provision, the facts underlying Stancil's double jeopardy claim were entirely known to
him at the time he pled guilty to the federal kidnapping charge. By that time, Stancil had already
been charged with, and pled guilty in state court to, second-degree murder, conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and conspiracy to commit first-degree kidnapping.
He thus had, at the time of his federal conviction in 2002, all the information needed to seek
relief on his current claim, so there is no basis to toll the statute of limitations period due to
newly discovered information.

Accordingly, even under the most generous application of the

terms of ~ 2255(f), the statute of limitations on Stancil's double jeopardy claim expired, at the
latest, on December 6, 2012, over two years before he filed his current Motion.
therefore denies Stancil's

untimely Motion without a hearing.

The Court

See 28 U.S.C. ~ 2255(b)

(requiring a district court to hold a hearing unless "the motion and the files and records of the
case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief').
The Court notes that even if it were to consider the merits of Stancil's claim, the Motion
still would not succeed.

Because the federal government and state governments are separate

sovereigns, "[ c]onviction and punishment in a state court under a state law for [a state crime] is
not a bar to prosecution in a court of the United States under the federal law for the same acts."
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 385 (1922).

Stancil's prosecution in federal court for

kidnapping therefore did not amount to double jeopardy.
Lastly, while it is true that the Government was tardy in filing its Response to Stancil's
Motion, Stancil's Motion for Entry of Default was docketed after the Government's
when the Government had already cured its error. That Motion is dismissed as moot.

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Response,

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that Stancil's Motion to Vacate, ECF No. 24, is
DENIED, and his Motion to Enter Default, ECF No. 29, is DISMISSED AS MOOT. The Clerk
is directed to close this case.

Date:

October 22,2015
THEODORE D. CH
United States District Ju ge

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