Coulibaly et al v. Chasanow et al

Filing 2

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Theodore D. Chuang on 2/27/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 2/27/15)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DR. TIEMOKO COULIBALY
and DR. FATOU GAYE-COULIBALY,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil Action No. TDC-15-0425

JUDGE DEBORAH CIIASANOW
and JUDGE CHARLES B. DA Y,
Defendants.

:l>lEMOIlANDU:I>l OPIII'ION
On February 11,2015,

self-represented PlaintiITs Dr. Tiemoko Coulibaly and Dr. Falau

Gayc-Coulibaly (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed a document entitled "Plaintiffs' Second Federal
Tort Claim Act (FTCA, Attached) Against Federal Judges Deborah Chasanow, Charles B. Day
and Other Witnesses:'

ECF NO.1.

A careful reading of the document indicates that Plaintiffs

may have intended the document not as a Complaint, but as a motion in their prior case,
Coulibaly v, .J.P. AJorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. closed Sept. 7, 2012).
See Compl. at 2, 5. However, that case was closed on September 7, 2012, and Plaintiffs appear
to be attempting to bring claims against the judges \vho presided over that action.

Therefore,

Plaintiffs' document has been filed as a new Complaint in the present case, and the Court will
construe the Complaint as bringing claims under the Federal Tort Claim Act C'FTCA,,).I
However, for the reasons stated below, the Complaint must be DISMISSED.

1 The document \vas not accompanied by the civil filing fee or a Motion to Proceed In Fonna
Pauperis. 110wever, because the Court is dismissing the Complaint, Plaintiffs shall not be
required to cure these delieiencies.

BACKGROUNIl
In order to analyze this self-represented
Plaintiffs' litigation history in this Court?

action, the Court conducts an overview of

On December 16, 2010, Plaintiffs, residents of Silver

Spring. l\1aryland, filed a complaint in this Court related to the purchase and financing of their
Silver Spring property against multiple defendants. See Comp!., Coulibaly v. J.P. ~\forgan Chase
Bank.

,vA .. No.

DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Dec. 16.2010). ECF No. I. On August 8, 2011, Judge

Deborah K. Chasanow issued a memorandum opinion and accompanying order that pennittcd
some claims to proceed against defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. ("Chase"),

but

dismissed the remaining defendants from the case and denied Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions and
motion to add additional defendants. See Coulibaly v.l? Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. DKC10-3517,2011

WL 3476994 (D. Md. Aug. 8, 2011).

In subsequent orders, Judge Chasanow

issued a discovery and motions schedule, denied Plaintiffs' motion for recusal, and denied their
motions for reconsideration.

See Orders, Coulibaly v. JP. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. DKC-

10-3517 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 201 I-Dec. 28, 2011), ECF Nos. 57, 59-60, 62, 64.
On March 29, 2012, Magistrate Judge Charles B. Day, to whom the case had been
referred for discovery, held a discovery hearing, during which he denied Plaintiffs' Motion for
Extension of Time to conduct additional discovery. See Status Conference I Motion Hearing re:
ECF No. 85, Coulibaly v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank,

,vA.,

No. DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Mar. 29,

2012), ECF No. 87. On September 7, 2012, Judge Chasanow issued a memorandum opinion and
accompanying order, which granted Chase's :V10tionfor Summary Judgment and closed the case.
See Coulibuly v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank.
Sept. 7, 2012).

,vA., No.

DKC-IO-3517, 2012 WL 3985285 (D. Md.

On May t, 2013, the United Slates Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit

affirmed the decisions.

See Coulibaly v. J P Morgan Chase Bank. N.A., 526 F. App'x 255 (4th

Federal Rule of Evidence 201 permits a court to take judicial notice, on its own and at any stage
of the proceeding, of a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it can be "accurately
and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R.
Evid.201(b)-(d).

2

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Cir. May 1,2013).

After the Fourth Circuit issued its opinion, Plaintiffs filed various additional

motions, including a motion to vacate, see Coulibaly v. J.P .. Morgan Chase Bank, NA., No.
DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2013), ECF No. 108, a motion to stay the linality of the
judgment, see Coulibaiy v. JP. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Oct. 17,
2013), ECF No. 111, and a motion to alter judgment, see COlilibaly v. J.P. A/organ Chase Bank,
N.A., N(). DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 2014), ECF Nn. 117, all of which Judge Chasanow
denied. Plaintiffs then appealed those orders as well. See Notice of Appeal, Coulibaly v. J.P.

Morgan Cha" Bank. NA., N(). DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Apr. 14,2014), ECF No. 119; Second
Notice of Appeal, COlilibaly v. J.P. A/organ Chase Bank, NA., No. DKC-1O-3517 (D. Md. June
23,2014), ECF No. 126.
On October 20, 2014, the Fourth Circuit affirmed those post.judgment opinions.

See

Coulibaiy v. J P Morgan Chase Bank, NA., 584 F. App'x 178 (4th Cir. Oct. 20, 2014). On
January 26, 2015, Plaintiffs then sought to transfer venue of the closed case to the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia based upon claims of alleged judicial retaliation.

Coulibaiy v. J P. Morgan Chase Bank, NA., No. DKC-IO-35 I 7 (D. Md. Jan. 26, 2015), ECF No.
132. The Motion to Transfer was denied on January 29, 2015. COlilibaly v. J.P. }.lorgan Chase

Bank. NA., No. DKC-IO-3517 (D. Md. Jan. 29, 2015), ECF No. 133.
On February 12, 2015, Plaintiffs submitted the present Complaint, in \vhich they appear
to take issue with the previous judicial decisions issued by Judge Chasanow and Magistrate
Judge Day (collectively, the '.judges" or "Defendants") in their previous case. Plaintiffs claim
that Defendants' determinations were entered in reprisal and constitute discriminatory, negligent,
and unconstitutional acts. Compl. at 1-3.
DlSCUSSIOl\'
A federal court must screen complaints from prisoners proceeding informa pauperis and
dismiss any complaint that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief

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from an immune defendant.

28 U.S.c.

S

1915(e)(2) (2012).

Here, because Plaintiffs are

proceeding pro sc and without having paid a civil filing fcc, the Court also conducts its o\',n
screening of this Complaint.
(extending 28 U.S.C.

9

Newsome v. EEOC, 301 F.3d 227, 3231-33 (5th Cir. 2002)

1915 screening to non-prisoner pro se litigants).

A sclf.represented

party's complaint must be construed liberally. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But
this docs not relieve a pro se plaintiff of "the burden of alleging suflicient facts on which a
recognized legal claim could be based." 11011 Bel/mon. 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
v.
lIere, Plaintiffs claim they arc entitled to $100,000,000.00

in damages on account of

alleged tortious conduct on the part of Judge Chasanow and Magistrate Judge Day. Compl. at 4.
5. The Court generously construes the document as an FTCA Complaint in which Plaintiffs are
challenging the District Court's decisions in their prior federal case. However, Defendants are
entitled to absolute immunity for their judicial acts.

It is firmly established that judges, in

exercising the authority vested in them, are absolutely immune from civil lawsuits for money
damages.

See Mireles v. Wueo. 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991) (per curiam) ("1\ long line of this

Court's precedents acknO\••..
ledges that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money
damages."); Ch" v, Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cic. 1985), This judicial immunity extends to
judicial action taken in error, done maliciously, or in excess of authority.
435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978).

Stump v. Sparkman,

This rule allows judges to perform their functions without

harassment or intimidation, and is a benefit to the public at large "whose interest it is that the
judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of
consequences."

Pierson v, Ray. 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967)(citation

omitted).

Because a judge is entitled to absolute immunity, a plaintiff alleging a claim for money
damages overcomes immunity only by a sho\.••.. that (1) the judge's actions were taken outside
ing
of her or his judicial capacity or (2) the judge acted in the complete absence of jurisdiction.

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See

King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 356.57 (4th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiffs' allegations are devoid of
any suggestion that the individual judges acted outside their duties as judicial officers or in the
complete absence of jurisdiction

when they presided over Plaintiffs'

prior federal action.

Plaintiffs' disagree with the content of Judge Chasanow and Judge Day's decisions, \\'hich were
made in their judicial capacity.

Plaintiffs' claim that the decisions were biased and retaliatory,

but do not include any allegations from \vhich it can be inferred that the judges acted in clear
absence of their jurisdiction,
Pier,mn Court recognized

Plaintiffs' lawsuit is therefore exactly the type of action that the
as necessitating the doctrine of judicial immunity.

Accordingly,

Plaintiffs' FTCA claims against Judge Chasanow and Magistrate Judge Day must be dismissed.
Furthermore, to the extent that Plaintiffs' Complaint implicates the United States as a
Defendant, it is immune, as well. The FTeA provides, in relevant part:
With respect to any claim under this chapter, the United States shall be entitled to
assert any defense based upon judicial or legislative immunity which otherwise
would have been available to the employee of the United States whose act or
omission gave rise to the claim ....
28 V.S.c.

S 2674

(2012). Thus, where a federal judicial omcer's actions form the basis for the

FTCA claim, the United States may assert judicial immunity if the individual judicial officer
would be immune from suit.

See Tinsley v. Widener, 150 F. Supp. 2d 7, 12 (D.D.C. 2001)

(explaining that the United States possesses whatever immunity is available to the judicial officer
whose act is the basis of the suit). As discussed above, the Complaint leaves no doubt that the
individual judges are entitled to judicial immunity.

Thus, the United States is immune as well.

See id.; see also BliSh v. Blake, No. JFM-I1-1410.

2011 WL 2311835, at '2 (D. Md. June 9,

201 I) (explaining that even if the United States had been a properly named defendant in the
complaint, it would be immune from suit because plaintiffs

FTCA claims \\iere against several

federal district judges who were entitled to absolute judicial immunity).

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Accordingly, because

judicial immunity precludes Plaintiffs' claims for recovery, sua ,\ponle dismissal of the
Complaint is appropriate.

CO:'olCLUSIO!'I'
For the foregoing reasons, the Complaint is DISMISSED. A separate Order follows.

Date: February 27, 2015

THEODORE D.
United States Distn

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