Quartey v. Clinton et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 3/3/2015. (c/m 3/4/15)(kw2s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

MARY AKU QUARTEY
Plaintiff,
v.

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BILL CLINTON
HARRY CLINTON

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Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. PJM-15-568

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MEMORANDUM OPINION
On February 27, 2014, Mary Aku Quartey (“Quartey”), a self-represented plaintiff who
resides at a shelter in the District of Columbia, filed this action against Bill and “Harry” Clinton.
She seemingly claims that she is a “world predictor,” inventor, and Presidential candidate and the
Clintons have claimed ownership of her total assets and properties including, but not limited to,
her body parts, personal documents, biological children, real property, and capital wealth in the
“trillions.” ECF No. 1. She further claims that President and First Lady Barack and Michelle
Obama instructed the Secret Service to use her medical reports to correct medical records in
prison clinics through the Northeastern, Mid-Atlantic and Southern United States. She asks that
Defendants be ordered to correct false information they filed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore
City. Id. After reviewing Quartey’s indigency Motion and Complaint, the Court will grant her
Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and summarily dismiss the Complaint.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent litigant may commence an action in federal court
without prepaying the filing fee. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute
allows a district court to dismiss the case before service of process upon a finding that the action
has no factual or legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Indeed, this Court must conduct
a preliminarily review of Complaint allegations before service of process and dismiss them if

satisfied that the Complaint has no factual or legal basis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that a district
court may dismiss the complaint of a pro se litigant under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 when the complaint
includes only a “fanciful factual allegation” and lacks “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”
Id. at 325; see Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32–33 (1992) ( “[A] court may dismiss a claim
as factually frivolous only if the facts alleged are ‘clearly baseless,’ a category encompassing
allegations that are ‘fanciful,’ ‘fantastic,’ and ‘delusional.’ As those words suggest, a finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict
them. An in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed, however, simply because the court
finds the plaintiff’s allegations unlikely.”) (citations to Neitzke omitted). Neitzke explained that
the statute “accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably
meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual
allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Id. at 327.
Indeed, § 1915 was amended after Neitzke and Denton, such that now the statute mandates that a
district court “shall dismiss” a case upon a finding that the Complaint “fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (B)(ii).
The complaints of self-represented litigants are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and a federal
district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a self-represented litigant
to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
(2007). When a federal court is evaluating a self-represented Complaint, the Plaintiff's
allegations are assumed to be true. Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corporation v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). Liberal construction does not mean that a court can
ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim cognizable in a federal
district court. See Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
Quartey, a frequent litigant in this court,1 has presented claims that are wholly incredible
and nonsensical. Even when giving a generous review to the self-presented Complaint, it is
appropriate to dismiss Quartey’s action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii) for the failure to state
a claim. A separate Order follows.

/s/
PETER J. MESSITTE
March 3, 2015

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Since December of 2009, Quartey has filed over thirty-one civil actions in this court.

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