Onley v. Wexford Health Sources Inc.

Filing 38

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 5/2/2016. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 5/3/16)

FilED

U.S. DISTRICT COURT
IN THF: UNITF:D STATF:S DISTRICT COUIPJSTRICT OF MARYLAND
FOR THF: DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division

lOlb HAY - 2 P ]: 55

*
TIRAY ONLF:Y, #"12-568,

*
Plaintiff,

*
v.

Case No.: G.III-15-595

*
WEXFORD

HF:AL TH SOURCF:S, INC.,

et al.,
Defendants.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

MEMORANDUM

*

*

*

*

*

*

OPINION

Tiray Onley liled a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.c.

* 1983. seeking unspecilied

money damages against Wexford Health Sources. Inc. ("Wexford"). two of its employees.
"Nurse Katrina" and "Nurse Manager .len:' and four Marvland Division of Correction (DOC)
~
.
employees. Sergeant Valentine Ning. Officer Robert Duvall. Major Rosalind Sample. and
Captain Yvonne Green (collectively. the "Correctional Defendants").

I

Onley. a selt~represented

prisoner. alleged that while he was housed at Central Maryland Correctional Facility ("CMCF").
prison health care providers failed to provide appropriate follow up treatment and relerral to a
specialist to treat a serious shoulder injury belore clearing him to resume a work detail. Onley
also alleged that Correctional Delendants sent him out on a work detail without medical
clearance. resulting in additional injury to his right shoulder. ECF No.

I

J

at 32

The Clerk shall amend the docket to rellect the Correctional Defendants f"lInames.

Pin cites to documents tiled on the Coun"s electronic filing system (CMIECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system.
2

Wexford. a corporate

entity not amenable

*

to suit under

1983. was dismissed

14. 2015. ECF Nos. 36 & 37. The t\\'o nurses allegedly

Court on December

Wexford, "Nurse Katrina"

and "Nurse Manager .len." are not properly

employed

by this
by

identified and thus have

not been served with notice of this action: they. too. are entitled to dismissal

without prejudice at

this juncture.
Pending

is a Motion to Dismiss or. in the Alternative.

behalf of the Correctional
in part, as a response

Defendants.

in opposition

resolve the issues presently
reasons, the Correctional

for Summary

ECl' No. 32. and Olney's

Judgment

Ii led on

pleading that will be construcd.

to that motion. ECF No. 34. No hearing is necessary

to

pending. See Local Rule 105. (D. Md. 2014). For the f(lllowing

Defendants'

Motion. construcd

as a motion for sunllnary judgment.

will be granted.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants'

the alternative.
consider
dismiss."

motion is stvled as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or. in

for summary judgment

matters outside the pleadings

Bosiger

I'.

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. Ordinarily.

or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to

U.S'.A inrays. 510 l' .3d 442. 450 (4th Cir. 2(07). II' the court does so. "the

motion must be treated as one for summary judgment
given a reasonable

opportunity

under Rule 56." and "[aJlI parties must be

to present all the material that is pertincnt

Civ. P. 12(d). When the movant expressly
summary judgment

a cOUl1 "is not to

captions

its motion "in the alternative"

and submits matters outside the pleadings

however, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion
court "does not have an obligation

2

Fed. R.

as one !()r

for the court's consideration.
under Rule 12( d) may occur: the

to notify parties of the obvious."

Airports Auth.. 149 F.3d 253. 26\ (4th Cir. 1998).

to thc motion."

Laughlin \'. Melro. Wash.

A district judge has "complete discretion to determine whether or not to aecept the
submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule
12(b)(6) motion and rely on it. thereby converting the motion. or to rcject it or simply not
consider it." 5C Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller. Fl'dl'l'lIlPl'lIc/icl'

allllProcedllrl'

* 1366.

at 159 (3d cd. 2004. 20 II Supp.). This discretion "should be exercised with great caution and
attention to the parties' procedural rights."' /d. at 149. In general. courts are guided by whether
consideration of extraneous material "is likely to lilcilitate the disposition of the action."' and
"whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure" is necessary. /d.
at 165. 167.
Ordinarily. summary judgment is inappropriate "where thc parties ha\'e not had an
opportunity for reasonable discovery."' £.1. dllPol1/. SlIpl'll. 637 F.3d at 448-49. Ilowevcr. "the
party opposing summary judgment 'cannot complain that summary judgment was grantcd
without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds
that more time was needed for discovery .... Harrods Ltd

I'.

Six/)' /n/I'I'/II'/ DOll/ain Nall/I's.

F3d 214. 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting El'ans 1'. Techs. Applications

302

& S('I'I'. Co .. 80 F.3d 954.

961 (4th Cir. 1(96». To adequately raise the issue that discovery is nccded. the nOl1-l110\'ant
typically must file an aftidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(1).
explaining why. "for specified reasons. it cannot present facts essential to justifY its opposition."'
without needed discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d): see lIarrods.

302 F.3d at 244-45 (discussing

aftidavit requirement of former Rule 56(1). Notably. "'Rule 56(d) aftidavits cannot simply
demand discoverv~for the sake of discoverv-' .... Hall/ilIon

I'.

Jla\,or & CiI\' COllncil of Ball ..
...

807 F.

Supp. 2d 331. 342 (D. Md. 2011) (quoting YOllng \'. UPS. No. DKC-08-2586. 2011 WL 665321.

3

at *20, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14266. at *62 (D. Md. Feb. 14.20 II)). "Rather. to justify a denial
of summary judgment on the grounds that additional discovery is necessary. thc facts identified
in a Rule 56 anidavit must be 'essential to [thel opposition .... Scolll'. NUI'ell Fin. Sen's .. LLe.
789 F. Supp. 2d 637. 641 (D. Md. 2011) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). A non-moving
party's Rule 56(d) request for additional discovery is properly denied "where the additional
evidence sought f(Jr discovery would not have by itself created a genuinc issue of material I~lct
sufficient to defeat summary judgment'" Slm~ v. Bd (Jj'Trs .. Crm'en CIIII)'. Co/I.. 55 F.3d 9.B.
954 (4th Cir. 1995); see a/so Alllirlllokri

I'.

Ahml1alll. 437 F. Supp. 2d 414. 420 (D. tvld. 2006).

ajJ"d. 266 Fed. Appx. 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
If a non-moving party believes that fUl1herdiscovery is necessary before consideration of
summary judgment. the party that fails to tile a Rulc 56(d) aflidavit docs so at his peril. because
'''the failure to file an affidavit ... is itself sufficient grounds to reject a claim that the
opportunity f(Jr discovery was inadequate .... HarrodI'. 302 F.3d at 244 (citations omittcd). But
the non-moving party's failure to tile a Rulc 56(d) affidavit cannot obligate a court to issue a
summary judgment ruling that is obviously prematurc. According to the Fourth Circuit. failure to
tile an affidavit may be excused "if the nonmoving party has adequately informcd the district
court that the motion is premature and that more discovery is necessary" and the "nonmoving
party's objections before the district court served as the functional equivalent of an anidavit'" Jd.
at 244-45 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Onley. who has received copies of the exhibits that accompany the dispositive
motion, has not requested additional material nccded to defend Defendants' motion. nor has he
filed an affidavit under Rule 56(d). suggesting that additional discovery is nceded. Thus. the

4

Court is satisfied that it is appropriate to address Defendants' motion as one for summary
judgment.
Summary judgment is governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). which provides. in relevant part:
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law:' The Supreme
Court has clarilied that Rule 56(a)"s standard does not mean that any factual dispute will deleat
the motion. Rather. "the requirement is that thcrc be no genuine issuc of II/aleriall~let:' Anderson
v. Liherly Lobby. Inc., 477 U. S. 242. 247-48. 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986) (emphasis in original).
"The party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment 'may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings.' but rather must 'set forth spceific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial. ... Bouchal \'. Ballill/ore Rm'em Foolhall Club. Inc .. 346
F.3d 514, 525 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c». The court
should "view the cvidence in the light most tilVorable to ... the nonmovant. and draw all
inferences in her favor without wcighing the evidencc or assessing the witnesses' crcdibility:'
Dennis

I'.

Columbia Collelon Med. elr .. Inc.. 290 F.3d 639. 644-45 (4th Cir. 2002). Because

Onley is self-represented. his submissions are liberally construed. See Erickson

I'.

rardus. 551

U.S. 89. 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197 (2007). But the Court must also abide by its "'affirmative obligation
... to preventlactually

unsupported claims and de lenses from proceeding to trial. ... Bouc!wl.

346 F.3d at 526 (citations and intcrnal quotation marks omitted).
II.

DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Allegations
Onley alleges that around August 20. 2014. hc injured his shoulder while lilting weights

and was sent to a Carroll County hospital cmergency room ("ER"). ECF No.

5

J

at 3: Eel' 34 at 1-

2. The ER staff treated his injury and released him with instructions that he should sec an
orthopedic specialist in two weeks. ECr No. I at 3: ECr No. 34 at 2. Onley was taken to Jessup
Regional Hospital and cleared to return to CMCr. ECI' No. I at 3: ECr No. 34 at 2. Onley states
that the CMCF medical provider "did not tollow the instructions of the ER doctor" but instead
allowed Defendant Ning to return him to a road crew. where he sustained further damage to his
right shoulder. ECr NO.1 at 3.
Onley was housed at CMCr Ii'om January 13.2014 until his transfer to Maryland
Correctional Training Center ("MCTe')

on November 21. 2014. ECl' No. 32-8 at 1. He tiled

this Complaint on March 2. 2015. On March 9. 2015. the Court ordered Onley to supplement his
Complaint to name the medical and correctional personnel alleged to have caused his injury.
ECF NO.3. Onley complied. Ecr NO.5. but also tiled correspondence alleging that he was
suffering retaliation at the hands ofMCTC medical and correctional staff because he had filed
the instant lawsuit and continued to tight for better care lor his shoulder condition:' ECl' NO.4:
see also ECF No. 34 at I. 6-13. While his allegations concerning treatment at DOC facilities
other than CMCl' fall outside the purview of his initial Complaint and are not at issue here. his
allegation that he was improperly transferred from CMCl' before medical treatment of his
shoulder was resolved. see Ecr No. 34 at 5.14. must be addressed in the context of this lawsuit.
B. Defendants' Responses
Defendants Duvall. Sample and Green contend that none of Onley' s allegations are
directed specifically at them. In support of this argument. Duvall has submitted a declaration
under oath indicating that alier Onley injured his shoulder liliing weights. a "medical hold" was
placed on his assignment to a work crew. ECl' No. 32-3 at ~ 5. Duvall further avers he was olT

Medical records reveal that Onley. now in his early 40s. has a history of chronic recurrent anterior shoulder
dislocations. ECF No. 32-7 nt 46. 150.238.
3

6

duty on the day that Onley reinjured his shoulder. and had no involvement with Onley's
assignment to a road crew or in choosing the work that Onley pcrlormcd. Ill. at ~ 6. Duvall also
states that he was told that Onley requestcd to return to the road crew alier his injury. Id. at
Green was a shift commander at the time ofOnley's

~18.

injury. Eel' No. 32-5 at ~ 4. In her

declaration. Green indicates she played no rolc in dctcrmining whcther a prisoner was medically
fit to serve on a road crew. Id. at ~ 7. Grecn was prescnt when Onley returned from the work
crew with a dislocated shouldcr. and was informed that his shoulder was reinjured during the
crew's return trip in the van when Onley turned around in his seat to speak to a fellow prisoner.
Ill. at ~ 8.
At the time of Onley's injury, Sal11plewas second-in-command at CMCI'. but had no
immediate interaction with details of the road crcw or thc assignments of prisoners to the work
details. ECl' No. 32-6 at

'14.

Sample was unaware that Onley expressed a desire to return to a

work crew alier his initial injury or that the medical hold was removed. permitting his rcturn. Ill.
atp.
Ning, however, is specifically mentioncd in Onley's pleadings. as shc is the detail
supervisor lor CMCl' road crews. Ning notes in her declaration that she works thc II p.l11.to 7
a.m. shill. and work crews leave in the morning prior to the end of her shili and rcturn following
her shift, aller 2 p.l11.ECl' No. 32-4 at ~~ 4-5. She indicatcs that Onlcy had received a "mcdical
hold" several days prior to the alleged work crew injury alier he injured his shoulder liliing
weights, and that he asked medical staff to rel110vethe hold in order to be assigned to anothcr
road crew. ld. at

'1'17-8.

Ning was not on duty at the time the mcdical hold was rel11oved. Id. at

10.

7

~i

The medical records submitted in support of the Correctional Defendants' Motion reveal
the following pertinent information. On August 21. 2014. Onley was examined by medical
personnel alier he dislocated both shoulders while liliing weights. ECF No. 32-7 at 265-66.4
Records reflect that he had sutIered recurrent bouts of shoulder dislocation It))'roughly 10 years.
Id at 218. Onley was seen by medical stan' daily fl'om August 22 through August 26. 2014.
when he was discharged from the intimlary. Id. at 246-64. An August 25. 2014 medical
assessment report states that Onley was "advieed [sic J to immobilize [sic J shoulder. no sports or
stren[uous] activity:'ld.

at 252. lie was also recommended It)r bottom bunk status. !d at 248.

No mention ofOnley's

work assignment or work restriction is contained in the medical records.

During an August 28. 2014 follow-up examination. Onley was told to It)lIow up in two weeks to
obtain an orthopedic evaluation. Id. at 243-45.
Neither the record nor the parties indicate when Onley returned to work alier his release
from the infirmary. On September 11. 2014. Onley returned to the infirmary alier he dislocated
his right shoulder while trying to turn around or open a window on the work detail van. Id. at
242.
Onley was transferredli'OIll CMCF following a November 3. 20 J 4 adjustment conviction
for violation of institutional rules. ECF No. 32-14 at 1.
C. Analysis
Onley correctly states that his e1aim against the Correctional Defendants arises under the
Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain" by virtue of its guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. see Gregg \'. Georgia. 428
U.S. 153, 173.96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976). and "[sjcrutiny under the Eighth Amendment is not limited

The voluminous medical record. ECF No. 32-7. has been filed separately as a lengthy exhibit. It is not
electronically filed as part orthe case record.

4

8

to those punishments authorized by statute and imposed by a criminal judgment:'

De LOlita

l'.

Angelone, 330 F. 3d 630. 633 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilsoll \'. Seiter. 501 U.S. 294. 297, II I S.
Ct. 2321 (1991)),
In order to state an Eighth Amendment claim I"ordenial 01" medical care. a prisoner must
demonstrate that the actions ol"the defendants-or

their I"ailureto act-amounted

to deliberate

indilTerence to a serious medical need, See Estelle ,'. Gamhle. 429 U.S. 97, 106.97 S. Ct. 285
(1976), Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that. objeeti\'ely, the
prisoner was sul1ering Irom a serious medical need and that. subjectively. the prison staff were
aware of the need for medical attention but tailed to either provide it or ensure the needed care
was available, Farmer

l'.

IJrellllall. 511 U.S. 825. 837.128 S, Ct. 1970 (1994),

Prisoners may also state an Eighth Amendment claim as to the conditions under which
they are confined, Under the Eighth Amendment. conditions which "deprive inmates ol"the
minimal civilized measure of lite's necessities" may amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
Rhoden'.

Chapmall. 452 U, S, 337, 347. 101 S. Ct. 2392 (1981), In order to establish the

imposition of cruel and unusual punishment based on the conditions of conlinement. a prisoner
must prove two elements-that

..the deprivation of[a] basic human need was ohjectil'ely

suftieiently serious:' and that "suhjectil'ely the orticials acted with a sufticiently culpable state of
mind:' Shakka

l',

Smith. 71 F,3d 162. 166 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original) (citation

omitted), "These requirements spring trom the text of the amendment itself: absent intentionality.
a condition imposed on an inmate cannot properly be called 'punishment.'

and absent severity.

such punishment cannot be called 'cruel and unusual,''' Iko ". Shre\'e, 535 F.3d 225. 238 (4th
Cir. 2008) (citing IVilsoll. 501 U.S. at 298-300),

9

The objective prong of an Eighth Amendment claim requires proof of a serious or
significant physical or mental injury reslIllingji'ollllhe

challengeti contiilions. see Slrickla \'.

Walers, 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added): see also Otiolll \'. SOli/h Carolina
Depl. ojCorreclions,

349 F. 3d 765. 770 (4th Cir. 2003). or. in the context of interference with

medical care, evidence that a known excessive risk of harm to the prisoner's health or safety was
disregarded. Wilson. 50 I U.S. at 298. In other words ... the test is whether the guards know the
plaintifT inmate faces a serious danger to his safety and they could avert the danger easily yet
they fail to do so:' Brown\'. NC Depl. of Carl's.. 612 F.3d 720. 723 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Case v. AllilOll', 301 F.3d 605. 607 (7th Cir. 2002)). Conduct is not actionable under the Eighth
Amendment unless it transgresses bright lines of clearly-established pre-existing law. See
Maciariello \'. SU/1/ner.973 F. 2d 295. 298 (4th Cir. 1992).
Onley states that Ning received verbal clearance from "Nurse Katrina" indicating Onley
could return to the road crew. and that Duvall supervised the crew5 ECF NO.5 at 1. While his
medical records indicate that his condition was chronic and Onley ultimately would require
surgery, nothing suggests that the nursing stall' or any of the Correctional Defendants knew or
should have known that a return to the road crew was in and of itself injurious to his health. The
medical record does not imply that Onley's September II. 2014 shoulder dislocation was in any
way attributable to his work assignment. but rather that it occurred as a result of a mundane
movement turning to open a window while in a vehicle alier the day's aetivit.ies had ended.
Onley has therefore not satisfied his burden of proof as to the first element based on the facts of
this case.

5

Nothing suggeststhat Onley was forced or threatened to return to the work crew: instead. it is appears that Onley

wanted to return to work as soon as possible.
10

His proof of the second element also fails. To establish a sufficiently culpable slate of
mind on the part of Defendants. thcre must be evidence that a known excessive risk of harm to
the prisoner's health or safety was disregarded. SI!I! Wilson. 501 U. S. at 298. In other words.
Defendants must know the prisoner faces serious danger to his safety and then lail to protect the
prisoner from that danger. SI!I! BrOlI'l1. 612 F.3d at 723: Casl!. 301 F.3d at 607.
Defendants' actions do not subject them to liability unless. "in light of preexisting law the
unlawfulness of the actions is apparent:' Iko \'. Shrl!l'l!. 535 F. 3d 225. 238 (4th Cir. 2008) (citing
Anderson

v. Creighton.

483 U.S. 635. 640.107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987)). "We do not require of such

officials the legal knowledge culled by the collective hindsight of skilled lawyers and learned
judges. but instead only the legal knowledge of an objectively reasonable official in similar
circumstances at the time of the challenged conduct:' Johnson \'. COl/dill. 475 F. 3d 645. 650
(4th Cir. 2007). The record is devoid of any hint that Delcndants pushed Onley to return to duty
against medical advice. Further. the injury he sustained on September I I. 2014 did not occur
while Onley was completing his job assignment." but rather while he was in a van returning to
the facility alier completion of his job assignment. No bright linc was crossed in assigning Onley
to a work crew following his August 2014 shoulder injury.
Even if the named Defcndants had an obligation to inquire further as to whether Onley
was fit for duty, whieh is not the case here. the situation as described by Onley was not so severe
that Delendants could be charged with "fair warning that their conduct was unconstitutional:'
Ridpath
Bl!1'erafli

v. Bd. oj'Go1'l!l'I1ors Marshal!
1'.

Smilh.

Un"' .. 447 F. 3d 2929. 313 (4th Cir. 2006):

.II!I!

also

120 F.3d 500. 504 (4th Cir. 1997).

Onley describes his job assignl11~nt as "using a weed eaters" to cut weeds and grass along the highway. ECF 34 at
3.

6

I1

With respect to Onley's retaliation claim. to make out a prima facie case that his transfer
from CMCF occurred in retaliation for his insistence that he be provided surgery lor his shoulder
condition, Onley bears the burden of showing that retaliation for the exercise of protected
conduct was the "substantial" or "motivating" lilctor behind Defendants' conduct. M/. Hea//hy
CUy Sch. Dis/. Bd. l!fEeluc.

I'.

Day/e. 429 U.S. 274. 287. 97 S, Ct. 568 (1977), In the prison

context, Onley must establish that the prison authorities' retaliatory action did not advance
legitimate goals of the correctional institution or was not narrowly tailored to achie\'e such goals.
See Rizzo v. DCnI'SOIl,778 F,2d 527. 532 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1985). The prcscrvation of internal order
and discipline constitutes a legitimate goal of the correctional institution. Id. at 532,
Retaliation claims are treated with skepticism in the prison context. because "Ie]very act
of discipline by prison officials is by delinition 'retaliatory' in the sensc that it responds dircctly
to prisoner misconduct. .,. Cachrall

I'.

Morris. 73 F,3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Adams v. Rice, 40 F,3d 72. 74 (4th Cir. 1994)), Further. in order to prevail on a claim of
retaliation, Onley "must allege either that the retaliatory act was taken in responsc to the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right or that the act itsel f violated such a right." Aelallls. 40 F.3d at
75.
It is unclear how much of a showing of adversity must be made in order to survive a
motion for summary judgment on a retaliation claim in this context. COlllpare Bur/all

I'.

LivingS/Oil. 791 F.2d 97. 100-0 I (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that "complaint that a prison guard,
without provocation, and lor the apparcnt purpose of retaliating against the prisoner's exercise of
his rights in petitioning a federal court fClrredress. terrorized him with threats of death" sufficient
to state claim"). II'Uh Gillv. Moolley. 824 F.2d 192. 194 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting F1aher/y

1'.

Coughlin, 713 F,2d 10. 13 (2d Cir. 1983) ("'A complaint which alleges retaliation in wholly

12

conc1usory terms may safely be dismissed on the pleading alone .... ): Pierce
932,945 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (conc1usory allegations ofrewliation

I'.

King. 91 R F. Supp.

insufficient to state claim).

Nevcrtheless. the Fourth Circuit has explaincd:
Retaliation. though it is not expressly referred to in thc Constitution. is
nonethcless actionable bccause rctaliatory actions may tend to chill
individuals' exercise of constitutional rights. Where there is no
impairment of the plaintiffs rights. thcrc is no nccd li)r the protection
provided by a cause of action for retaliation. Thus. a showing of
adversity is essential to any retaliation claim.
ACLU o/Md., Inc. \', Wicomico

COll11lY,

Md.. 999 F.2d

no. 7R5 (4th Cir.

1993) (citing I'en:\' \'.

Sindermwm, 408 U.S. 593. 597. 92 S. Ct. 2694 (1972».
When compared to the uncontroverted evidence submitted by Defendants. Onlcy's
transfer appears to have occurred due to an independent. legitimate cause. namely a violation of
institutional rules. His transfer from CMCF does not implicate a constitutional right. Thus. Onley
has tailed to cstablish a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights based on the actions ofthc
named Correctional Defendants,

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons. Defendants' summary judgment motion is granted and this

action is dismissed. A separate Order ti)llows.

Dated: May

M~

1/.2016

GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judgc

13