Mengle v. Shady Grove Adventist Hospital

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paula Xinis on 4/17/2017. (aos, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
*
SAKINA MENGLE,
*
Plaintiff,
*
v.

Civil Action No. PX 15-610
*

SHADY GROVE ADVENTIST HOSPITAL,
*
Defendant.
******
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending in this employment discrimination case is Defendant’s motion for partial
summary judgment (ECF No. 48). The issues are fully briefed and the Court now rules pursuant
to Local Rule 105.6 because no hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s
motion is denied.
I.

BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2000, Sakina Mengle, an African-American woman, was hired by Shady

Grove Adventist Hospital (hereinafter “Shady Grove” or “the Hospital”) to work in the
Hospital’s Radiology Department. She was primarily employed as a front desk receptionist in the
Department’s diagnostic x-ray cost center and was responsible for greeting patients and checking
them in. She also worked in the Radiology Department’s “film library,” filling in when the fulltime film librarian, Jennifer Springer, took her half-hour lunch break. At the time she was
terminated, Mengle held the position of Customer Service Representative II (“CSR II”) earning
$19.79 per hour and was qualified to work in multiple positions within the Department. See, e.g.,
ECF No. 53-2 at 31. Mengle was supervised by Radiology Manager Alicia Lentini, who in turn

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was supervised by Michael Calhoun, the Director of the Radiology Department. Calhoun
reported to Eunmee Shim, the Hospital’s Chief Operating Officer.
In 2013, Shady Grove was experiencing financial challenges that necessitated reductions
in staffing. ECF No. 48-1 at 5. The Hospital engaged a consulting company, Kaufman Hall, to
review its operations. As part of its review, Kaufman Hall determined that staffing should be
reduced Hospital-wide. With respect to the Radiology Department’s diagnostic x-ray cost center,
Kaufman Hall concluded that staffing should be reduced by 4.87 full-time employee (FTE)
equivalents,1 resulting in a staffing goal of 32 FTEs for the cost center.
In the summer of 2013, Shady Grove’s COO, Eunmee Shim, began discussions with
Michael Calhoun on how Calhoun could meet this goal. Shim explained to Calhoun that based
on her observations, the front desk appeared to be overstaffed. She also suggested that the need
for a stand-alone film library had diminished with the increased digitalization of radiological
records. See Shim Dep., ECF No. 54-1 at 11–12. Shim ultimately suggested to Calhoun that the
film library function could be moved to the front desk, resulting in a merger of the film library’s
and front desk’s staff. Id. at 12.
After closing the film library and merging the library tasks with those of the front desk,
Calhoun concluded that one full-time front desk receptionist in the Diagnostic X-ray cost center,
equal to one FTE, should be eliminated to meet the reduction goal of 4.87 FTEs. See Calhoun
Dep., ECF No. 53-3 at 18–19. The remaining 3.87 FTEs would be eliminated through attrition,
reducing the hours of some of the employees in the cost center, and not filling already-vacant
positions. Calhoun Dep., ECF No. 53-3 at 15.
Mengle and two other full-time Customer Service Representatives—Nellie Abarca and
Jennifer Springer—worked in the Diagnostic X-ray cost center. Jennifer Springer is an African1

In other words, a full-time employee is equal to 1.0 FTE while a part-time employee equals less than 1.0 FTE.

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American woman and like Mengle, is also a long-term, full-time employee classified as a CSR
II. Prior to the merger of the film library and the front desk, Springer had never worked at the
front desk. Nellie Abarca is a Hispanic woman and although she is also a customer service
representative like Mengle and Springer, she was classified as a CSR I, earning $1.87 per hour
less than Mengle and Springer.
Five other “on call” or “LPN” employees also provided front desk coverage—Mary
Hennigan, Moneeb Al Angurli, Jeanne Kohn, Elaina Previte, and Lisa Aguilleria. Mary
Hennigan, a white woman who worked at the front desk on a part-time basis, was a CSR II like
Mengle and Springer. Moneeb Al Angurli, a white man, worked part-time at the front desk and
in the film library as a CSR II. Jeanne Kohn, a white woman, also worked at the front desk in
2013 on an “on call” part-time basis. Elaina Previt, a white woman, carried the same
responsibilities as Mengle. Previte’s position was eliminated upon her resignation and as part of
the Kaufman Hall recommended cutbacks. Lisa Aguilleria, an African-American woman, served
as a Reception Coordinator and provided front desk coverage on the weekends. ECF No. 53-1 at
3.2
Calhoun concluded that the easiest and most efficient way to terminate one FTE was to
fire one of the full-time employees. To be sure, he could have met his goal by eliminating several
of the part-time positions, but he determined that such a move would cause gaps in front desk
coverage and that firing several employees would be more difficult than firing one full-time
employee. See Calhoun Dep., ECF No. 53-3 at 31. As explained above, Mengle, Springer, and
Abarca were the diagnostic x-ray cost center’s only full-time employees. Abarca was removed
from consideration because she was classified as a CSR I and thus earned less money than

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While Ms. Aguilleria is mentioned in Ms. Lentini’s declaration, she is not mentioned in by Mengle in her response
in opposition to Shady Grove’s partial motion for summary judgment.

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Springer and Mengle. Id. at 32. Calhoun was therefore left to decide whether Mengle or Springer
would be terminated.
Shady Grove’s policy on reductions in force provides that the “primary factor for
selecting employees within the affected job classification will be the employees’ actual job
performance.” See Reduction in Workforce Policy, ECF No. 54-3. If performance is deemed
equal, the employees’ qualifications are to be examined. Id. Length of service is relevant only
where both performance and qualifications stand in equipoise. Id. The policy further states that:
Employee performance shall be determined by examining the employee’s
disciplinary actions, commendations and performance. Where performance
appraisals are available, should an initial interview of the latest yearly
performance appraisal establish that an employee who has been subjected to only
a single appraisal is deemed more qualified, than an employee who has been
employed within the department for three (3) or more years, then the last three (3)
annual appraisal scores of the more senior employee shall be averaged and then
compared to the employee with the higher review score from the latest appraisal.
Id.
Alicia Lentini, the Hospital’s Radiology Manager and Calhoun’s direct subordinate,
compared Mengle’s and Springer’s performance evaluations for the calendar year 2011, the last
year both employees received performance evaluations.3 Both Mengle and Springer earned an
“overall rating” of “successfully meets” expectations, which was recorded in the section entitled
“Summary Performance.” See ECF No. 53-1, Attachments B and C. However, the evaluations
also contained numerous subcategories. In two of these subcategories, Mengle had received a
lower score than Springer. Thus, based on her comparison of the evaluations, Lentini concluded
that Springer had the superior evaluation and reported to Calhoun accordingly. Neither Lentini
nor Calhoun considered Mengle’s several commendations when deciding which employee to

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Lentini testified that she could not use Mengle’s or Springer’s performance evaluations for the 2012 calendar year
because she had not completed them at the time the Hospital was deciding who to terminate. ECF No. 48-1 at 8.

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terminate. In 2010, Mengle received the Star Award for her outstanding service to a patient in
need.4 See Mengle Dep., ECF No. 57-1 at 32–34; ECF No. 50-3. She also received several
awards by her co-workers and an award for punctuality. ECF No. 50-3. According to Mengle,
Springer had never received a commendation for her work performance.
Mengle believes that Shady Grove’s failure to consider her many commendations in the
termination decision was in violation of the Hospital’s reduction in force policy, which explains
that “[e]mployee performance shall be determined by examining the employee’s disciplinary
actions, commendations and work performance.” See Reduction in Workforce Policy, ECF No.
54-3 (emphasis added). She also believes that had Calhoun properly followed the Hospital’s
policy, he would have considered all of the front desk employees when deciding who to
terminate. Instead, he focused his decision on the two African-American CSR II employees who
worked in the cost center. Pl.’s Response in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 50 at 9.
Contemporaneously, and on July 31, 2013, Mengle sent an email to Lentini reporting that
she had been subjected to a racist joke by a co-worker, Wilton Hacket. ECF No. 48-1 at 9. After
consulting with the Mary Cloutier, the Hospital’s Human Resources Business Partner, Lentini
and Calhoun presented Hacket with a final written warning. Lentini Decl., ECF No. 53-1 at 5.
Several days later, Calhoun and Lentini met with the Senior Human Resources Business
Partner, Eric Brown, to review Mengle’s performance evaluations. Brown agreed that the lower
scores Mengle received in a few of the subcategories distinguished her evaluation from
Springer’s, and concluded that Shady Grove should eliminate Mengle’s position even in the face
of her recent complaint against Hacket. Mengle was informed of the termination decision on
August 8, 2013 and her employment was terminated effective September 6, 2013.

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The parties dispute whether this award was given to one employee on a yearly basis or whether the award was
analogous to an “employee of the month” award.

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Mengle believes that the decision to terminate her was racially motivated and/or in
retaliation for her filing a complaint regarding the incident with Hacket. She argues that the
Kaufman Hall-driven staff cuts were used as a pretext for firing her. As evidence of the
Hospital’s racial animus, she alleges that on a few occasions Calhoun treated her with “open
hostility” because of her race. Mengle Dep., ECF No. 57-1 at 22–23, 28–30; ECF No. 57-3 at
12–13. Additionally, Calhoun was once accused of racial or gender discrimination in anonymous
letters from employees to the hospital, the seriousness of which caused hospital officials to meet
with Calhoun in or around 2011. ECF No. 50-4 at 12–13; ECF No. 53-2 at 18.
On March 3, 2015, Mengle filed her first complaint against Shady Grove in this Court
alleging racial and national origin discrimination as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. and the Montgomery County Human
Rights Law, Montgomery Cnty. Code § 27-19. ECF No. 1. On October 30, 2015, she filed an
amended complaint against Shady Grove for race discrimination and retaliation in violation of
Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. ECF No. 25. On September 26, 2016, Shady Grove filed a
motion partial for summary judgment as to Mengle’s Title VII and § 1981 claims for racial
discrimination. ECF No. 48. For the following reasons, Shady Grove’s motion is denied.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, permits a party to move for summary

judgment or partial summary judgment by identifying “each claim or defense [ ] on which
summary judgment is sought.” Here, Shady Grove seeks summary judgment on Count One (race
discrimination in violation pursuant to Title VII) and Count Two (race discrimination pursuant to
§ 1981) of Mengle’s amended complaint. See ECF No. 48 at 1. A court may enter summary
judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled

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to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). However, summary judgment
is inappropriate if any material fact at issue “may reasonably be resolved in favor of either
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986); JKC Holding Co. LLC v.
Washington Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir. 2001).
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club,
Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “A mere scintilla
of proof . . . will not suffice to prevent summary judgment.” Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 314
(4th Cir. 2003). “If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary
judgment may be granted.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted). At the same
time, the court must construe the facts presented in the light most favorable to the party opposing
the motion. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
III.

ANALYSIS
Under Title VII it is “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . race.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e–2(a)(1).
Like Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 prohibits “discrimination in employment on the basis of race.”
Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 551–52 (4th Cir. 2006). A plaintiff
may survive summary judgment by establishing her Title VII or § 1981 discrimination claim
either through direct and indirect evidence of discriminatory animus, or through the burdenshifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Diamond v.

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Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005). The Fourth Circuit has also
referred to these two “avenues of proof” as the “mixed-motive” framework and the “pretext”
framework, respectively. But see Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318 n.4 (“In the event that a plaintiff has
direct evidence of discrimination or simply prefers to proceed without the benefit of the burdenshifting framework, she is under no obligation to make out a prima facie case.”). Under either
avenue of proof, the focus is on whether a reasonable juror could conclude that illegal
discrimination was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Sawicki v. Morgan State
Univ., No. WMN-03-1600, 2005 WL 5351448, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 2, 2005).
In this case, Mengle has not identified any direct evidence of discriminatory intent, and
thus the McDonnell Douglas scheme of proof applies. See Lightner v. City of Wilmington, 545
F.3d 260, 263 n.* (4th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas framework applies to
discrimination claims under . . . § 1981.”); Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766, 786 (4th Cir.
2004) (stating that “the McDonnell Douglas framework, developed for Title VII, has been used
to evaluate race discrimination claims under the three statutes,” i.e., Title VII, § 1981, and §
1983). McDonnell Douglas dictates a three-step analysis: (1) the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case of employment discrimination or retaliation; (2) the burden of production then
shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory or non-retaliatory reason for the adverse
action; (3) the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the stated reason for the adverse employment action is a pretext and that the true
reason is discriminatory or retaliatory. Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d
208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal citations omitted).

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A. Prima Facie Case
In a discriminatory discharge case involving a reduction in force, the plaintiff establishes
a prima facie case by showing (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she suffered
from an adverse employment action; (3) that she was performing at a level that met her
employer’s legitimate expectations; and (4) that her duties were absorbed by employees not in
the protected class or that the employer did not treat her protected characteristics neutrally when
deciding to terminate her. See Guessous, 828 F.3d at 219 (4th Cir. 2016) (explaining that the
typical prima facie case for employment discrimination must be altered in a reduction-in-force
case to account for the particular factual circumstances); see also Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928
F.2d 1413, 1417 (4th Cir. 1991). Here, because some of Mengle’s duties were absorbed by nonblack employees, Shady Grove assumes, for the purpose of this motion, that Mengle has
established a prima facie case of discrimination. See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 48-1 at 12.
B.

Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Reason
Because Mengle has established her prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas framework

shifts the burden to Shady Grove to produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse employment action. “The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually
motivated by the proffered reasons.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254
(1981). Instead, the defendant only needs to produce admissible evidence that raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff. Id.
At the summary judgment stage and construing all facts most favorably to the Plaintiff,
Shady Grove has demonstrated a legitimate business reason for terminating Mengle. Plaintiff
does not dispute that Shady Grove’s financial challenges led to the Hospital hiring Kaufman Hall
to determine how to reduce costs most effectively. Further, it is undisputed that Kaufman Hall

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conducted a study and recommended staffing reductions throughout the hospital system,
including Shady Grove. Particularly, the Kaufman Hall study recommended that Calhoun reduce
staffing in the diagnostic x-ray cost center by 4.87 FTEs to 32 FTEs. See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.,
ECF No. 48-1 at 14; Cost Reduction Plan Summary, ECF No. 54-2. Calhoun maintained
discretion in determining how to implement the reduction of 4.87 full-time positions and
ultimately believed the best course of action was to do so through attrition, by reducing
employee hours, and by eliminating one full-time CSR II position. See Def.’s Mot. Summ. J.,
ECF No. 48-1 at 14; Calhoun Dep., ECF No. 53-3 at 18–19. He focused his decision on the CSR
II employees because they earned a higher hourly wage than the CSR I employees. Therefore,
firing a CSR II employee would reduce the Hospital’s budget by a greater amount.
At the time the decision was made, Mengle and Springer were the only full-time CSR II
employees in the diagnostic x-ray cost center. Lentini Declaration at ¶ 10, ECF No. 53-1 at 4.
Once the decision was made to cut either Mengle or Springer, Lentini compared these
employees’ performance evaluations from 2011; the most recent calendar year that performance
evaluations were completed for both employees. While the performance evaluations indicated
that both employees successfully met their duties, there were several subcategories where
Springer outperformed Mengle. Lentini concluded that Springer had the superior evaluation and
reported this finding to Calhoun. Consequently, Calhoun decided to terminate Mengle. ECF No.
48-1 at 9. As such, Defendant has established a legitimate business reason for terminating
Mengle.
C.

Pretext
After the defendant employer has proffered a legitimate reason for its termination

decision, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that a genuine dispute of

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material fact on the question of pretext exists sufficient to make the employer’s proffered
justification a triable issue. To prove pretext, the Plaintiff may “offer evidence that the facts
supporting the defendant’s articulated reasons are untrue,” or that the “defendant’s proffered
reason, although factually supported, was not the actual reason for its decision . . . .” Gbenoba v.
Montgomery Cnty. Dep’t. of Health and Human Servs., 209 F. Supp. 2d 572, 577 (D. Md. 2002)
(citations omitted). See also Gessous, 838 F.3d at 217–18 (4th Cir. 2016) (citing King v.
Rumsfeld, 328 F.3d 145, 154 (4th Cir. 2003) (explaining that to survive summary judgment on
pretext, plaintiff “must cast sufficient doubt upon the genuineness of Defendant’s explanation to
warrant a jury’s consideration of possible alternative and discriminatory motivations for the
firing.”)
Here, Mengle has generated a genuine question as to whether Shady Grove’s nondiscriminatory reason for firing her was false. Shady Grove put forward a single ground for
terminating Mengle: the best way to accomplish the goals of the Kaufman Hall study was to
terminate one full-time employee to arrive at the targeted 32 full time employees. The Cost
Reduction Plan Summary Calhoun prepared for Kaufman Hall, however, reflects that
terminating Mengle resulted in a final staffing plan of 29.44 FTEs, or 2.56 employee positions
under the targeted staff reduction number of 32. See ECF No. 54-2. Put simply, Calhoun would
have met the reduction target without terminating a single employee. Thus the Kaufman study
could not be the reason for firing Mengle.
Calhoun was confronted with this discrepancy at his deposition:
Q. And am I right that by the end of the reduction in force, your final staffing plan
was for 29.44 FTE’s?
A. I’d have to confirm that. That’s certainly what’s stated here.
Q. Is there any reason to think that you go that wrong?
A. At this point, I’d say no.
Q. So the FTE variance to target, what do you understand that to mean?
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A. I’m assuming it’s the variance between the final and the target.
Q. So the 32 minus the 29.44?
A. Right
Q. How many FTE’s did Sakina Mengle’s job take?
A. One.
Q. So am I right that you could have met your target for the reduction in force
without terminating Sakina Mengle?
A. Yes.
Calhoun Dep., ECF No. 53-3 at 27. Certainly this, in combination with claims of Calhoun’s
discriminatory treatment of Mengle and others, is enough to cast his proffered legitimate
business explanation in serious doubt.
In its reply brief, Shady Grove characterizes Mengle’s argument that Calhoun reduced
the cost center’s staff to well below the 32 FTE target as “flatly wrong.” ECF No. 51 at 2. It
notes that later in Calhoun’s deposition, he testified that he believed he only made reductions
sufficient to meet his goal of 32 FTEs. See Calhoun Dep., ECF No. 53-4 at 30. Calhoun also
stated that, to answer this question, he would have to research why the document at issue referred
to a staffing plan of 29.44 FTEs. Id. Finally, “[t]o eliminate any further uncertainty concerning
the issue,” Shady Grove attached a declaration from Calhoun to its reply brief in which he
confirms that, based on his further review of this issue, staffing was reduced to 32 FTEs. See
ECF No. 51-1. Calhoun explains that the reference to 29.44 FTEs on the document at issue was
an error resulting from his failure to include non-productive time (e.g. vacation and other nonworking time) in his staffing plan when he completed the Kaufman Hall spreadsheet. Id. With
the added non-productive time, Calhoun reduced the cost center’s staff to a number just shy of
32 FTEs. Shady Grove, however, waited until its reply brief purportedly to correct the record
and provides nothing other than Calhoun’s after-the-fact declaration. Mengle, by contrast, has
pointed to evidence in Shady Grove’s exhibits supporting her interpretation. This is precisely the

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kind of factual tit-for-tat that a fact finder must resolve. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Thus, summary judgment is inappropriate here.
Notably, Plaintiff does not survive summary judgment simply because she has
established sufficient evidence on her prima facie case and as to pretext. See Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (“[i]t is not enough . . . to disbelieve the
employer; the factfinder must [also] believe the plaintiff’s explanation of intentional
discrimination.”) (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter of
law “if the plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s reason was
untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination
had occurred.” Id. However, proof that the proffered reasons were false may serve as
circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination. Id. The probative value of falsity varies
depending on whether there are alternative non-discriminatory (but non-proffered) explanations
and the strength of the evidence establishing falsity. Id. at 148; see also Figueroa v. Geithner,
711 F. Supp. 2d 562, 574 (D. Md. 2010). “Factors to consider in determining whether intentional
discrimination could be found relying heavily on falsity and the prima facie case ‘include the
strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s
explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case . . . .’” Figueroa,
711 F. Supp. 2d at 574 (quoting Reeves, 530 U.S. at 148–49).
Here, the alleged falsity of Shady Grove’s proffered reason for firing Mengle is
particularly probative because Shady Grove offered no other non-discriminatory reason for
Mengle’s termination. It is undisputed that Mengle’s performance was never an issue and, but for
the Kaufman Hall study, Shady Grove does not give any other reason to reduce its staff or

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terminate Mengle. Therefore, when confronted with evidence that the Kaufman Hall study did
not compel Mengle’s termination, the jury may conclude that discrimination is the most likely
alternative explanation for her firing. See Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, 147 (“[O]nce the employer’s
justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well be the most likely alternative
explanation, especially since the employer is in the best position to put forth the actual reason for
its decision.”).
This is especially so when considering the additional evidence that, perhaps by itself
would not be sufficient, but when coupled with the Shady Grove’s failure to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for firing Mengle, could sustain a finding of discrimination. That Shady
Grove narrowed its termination decision to two African-American employees—Springer and
Mengle—matters less if no legitimate business reason existed to terminate either employee in the
first place. Additionally, Mengle has produced some evidence that, despite her exemplary work
performance, she was treated adversely when compared to her non-black colleagues. Mengle
testified that Calhoun treated her with open hostility: he screamed at her, criticized her for no
apparent reason, insulted her in front of others, and often simply ignored her when she would ask
a question. See Mengle Dep., ECF No. 57-1 at 22–23, 28–30. Mengle further observed that
Calhoun did not treat the white and Hispanic employees in the Radiology Department in a
similarly hostile fashion. Moreover, Calhoun was the subject of at least one complaint accusing
him of discrimination. See Calhoun Dep., ECF No. 53-2 at 17–18. Based on this evidence in
combination with no legitimate reason for firing her, a genuine issue of disputed material fact
requires that Mengle’s discrimination claims survive summary judgment.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
In sum, when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Mengle, she has

generated sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Further, a genuine
factual dispute exists as to whether Shady Grove’s proffered reason for termination was
pretextual. Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is therefore denied. A separate order will
follow.

4/17/2017
Date

/S/
Paula Xinis
United States District Judge

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