Winkler v. Helsel

Filing 6

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 11/8/2017. (c/m 11/9/2017 tds, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

CHARLES T. WINKLER,

*

Petitioner

*

v.

*

DAVID HELSEL,

*

Respondent

*

Civil Action No. PWG-I5-889

***
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The District

Court of Maryland

for Harford

County

found Charles

T. Winkler

incompetent to stand trial and also found that he posed a danger to himself or the person or
property of another, and it committed him to the Department of Mental Health and Mental
Hygiene. Commitment Order, ECF No. 5-4. Winkler challenges that commitment in his Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

S 2254.

Pet., ECF No.1.

Respondent

David Helsel argues that the Petition should be dismissed because Winkler was lawfully
confined and in any event, he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Resp. 1, ECF NO.5.
Respondent also contends that, alternatively, it should be dismissed as moot because Petitioner
has been released. Id. After reviewing these papers, I find no need for an evidentiary hearing.
See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also
28 U.S.C.

S 2254(e)(2).

collateral

consequences

Because Winkler was released and never found guilty, there were no
to his confinement.

Therefore,

the Petition

is DENIED

and

DISMISSED.
Winkler was charged with unauthorized removal of property in the District Court of
Maryland for Harford County on January 5, 2015. Printed State Ct. Docket, ECF No.5-I;

see

also

Online

State

http://casesearch.courts.state.md.
&loc=34&detaiILoc=DSCR.

Ct.

Docket,

us/ casesearch/inquiry Detail.j is?caseld=3 R000995 71

The court ordered a pretrial competency evaluation, Commitment

for Examination Order, ECF No. 5-2, and Kimberly A. Witczak, Psy. D., evaluated him and
reported that, in her opinion, he did "not have a factual and rational understanding of the nature
and object of the proceedings against him and a sufficient present ability to consult with his
lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding," and "because of a mental disorder,
[he] would be a danger to self and/or the person and property of others." Pre-Trial Eval. 5, 6,
ECF No. 5-3. On January 15, 2015, the court found Winkler incompetent to stand trial and
dangerous because of his mental disorder and committed him to the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene (the "Department"), ordering that he be transported to Spring Grove Hospital.
Commitment Order.

The Commitment Order also scheduled a status conference for July 15,

2015, and set the annual review required under Maryland law for January 18,2016. /d.
On April 7, 2015, Winkler filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals, which referred the petition to the District Court for Harford County's
Administrative Judge. Pet., ECF No. 5_5;1Referral Order, ECF No. 5-7. When Winkler filed his
Petition in this Court in March 2015, his state court petition had not been resolved, and neither
party has provided an updated status of that petition.
At a May 18, 2015 status hearing, the District Court of Maryland for Harford County
found that Winkler was competent to stand trial and ordered him released from commitment at
Spring Grove.

Release from Commitment Order, ECF No. 5-8. He was committed again on

1The exhibit is mostly illegible due to poor scanning of the document.
2

July 11, 2016, and then released again on August 9, 2016, at which time his criminal case was
placed on the stet docket Online State Ct. Docket.
Discussion
This Court "shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."

28 U.S.C.

S

2254(a)

(emphasis added). But, "[a] habeas corpus petition is moot when it no longer presents a case or
controversy under Article III,

S 2,

of the Constitution." Aragon v. Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691

(10th Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). "This case-or-controversy
requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and appellate ....
The parties must continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the lawsuit." Lewis v.
Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,477-78

(1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.

95, 101 (1983)).
Thus, federal habeas relief is unavailable where a petitioner "suffers no present restraint
from a conviction." See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989).

Release from state custody

does not always moot a claim for habeas relief, as the collateral consequences of a criminal
conviction-such

as the loss of the right to vote or to serve as a juror-may

create "a substantial

stake in the judgment of conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence."

Carafas v.

LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237 (1968) (quoting Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222
(1946)). If there are no collateral consequences upon release, however, then the petition is moot.
See Broughton v. North Carolina, 717 F.2d 147, 149 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that petitioner's
misdemeanor contempt conviction did not carry any collateral consequences as petitioner would
not be prevented from voting, serving on a jury, obtaining a law license, becoming a labor union

3

official, or qualifying for elective office, and would not be exposed to enhanced sentencing
should he commit a later crime; thus, petitioner's release from confinement mooted the claim).
In Jackson v. Director of Patuxent Institution, 360 F. Supp. 138, 138-39 (D. Md. 1973),
the court considered whether collateral legal consequences existed after a petitioner, who had
been adjudicated a "defective delinquent" and confined at Patuxent Institution, was released
from the institution after a finding by medical staff that he had been rehabilitated. The court
found that there were no collateral consequences flowing from petitioner's civil commitment and
his release mooted his habeas claim. Id. at 139. The Court held:
Unlike a criminal conviction, it cannot be presumed that there exist collateral
legal consequences flowing from such a determination [of being a "defective
delinquent"]. It is merely a decision in the rehabilitation process regarding the
proper method of rehabilitation, which, due to its seriousness, is clothed with a
large measure of due process rights. It is not a finding of guilt. No expre~s
collateral legal consequences attach to the determination. There are certainly
direct consequences, for example, the indefinite sentence. However, once the
sentence terminates, no other effects of a legal nature appear to continue to be felt
by the individual beyond those that arise as a consequence of the underlying
conviction. Since none is presumed to exist, absent a showing of the existence of
collateral legal consequences, the release from Patuxent Institution of a petitioner
will render moot an attack on the constitutionality of the defective delinquency
determination.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Here, Winkler, a former patient in a state mental institution who has not been convicted
of a crime, does not suffer any collateral consequences now that he has been released from his
commitment. His release based upon a finding of competency renders his Petition moot. See id.
Additionally, the injury for which Winkler sought a remedy, i.e., his confinement, cannot be
"redressed by a favorable judicial decision," as he already has been released. See Spencer, 523
U.S. at 7 ("[T]hroughout the litigation, the plaintiff 'must have suffered, or be threatened with,

4

an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.'''

(quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477)). Accordingly, the Petition shall be dismissed.

When a district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on procedural

grounds, a

certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both "(1) 'that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of
a constitutional right' and (2) 'that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.''' Rouse v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)).

Winkler has not met this standard.

By

separate Order which follows, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus shall be dismissed and a
Certificate of Appealability denied.

~

Date

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