Coleman v. Calvert County et al

Filing 32

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 9/22/2016. (c/m to pla 9/22/16 rs) (rss, Deputy Clerk)

FILED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT E'<!1.s.~tS fRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT

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OF MARYLAND

ZOIb Sf P 2?

Southern Division
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CLERK'C; n,C",''"
/•.TG::~:~,:~~ !l-

WAYNE E. COLEMAN,

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Plaintiff,

OF~ARYLA'm
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Case No.: GJH-IS-920

v.

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CALVERT COUNTY, et aI.,

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Defendants.

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MEMORANDUM

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OPINION

Pro-Se Plaintiff Wayne E. Coleman's Amended Complaint alleges violations of his civil
rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 991983,1985,1986,

and 18 U.S.C. 9241, along with state law

claims for various torts against Calvert County, the Calvert County Sheriff Department, the State
of Maryland, Supervising Officer Phelps, Officer Gott, Officer Cress, and Sheriff Mike Evans,
ECF No. 16. Now pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the
Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 27. A hearing is unnecessary. Loc. R.
105.6 (D. Md. 2016). For the reasons stated below, the Court grants summary judgment to all
Defendants on all counts except for the unreasonable search and seizure claim in Count I with
respect to Gott, Phelps, and Evans in their individual capacities.

I. BACKGROUND!
On the morning of February 4,2014, Coleman was driving his pick-up truck home along
Route 260 after picking up his medication at a local pharmacy when Officer Gott pulled him
over for not having a rear license plate. ECF No. 16 ~ 6. Gott approached the driver's side door,
informed Coleman that he lacked a rear license plate, and asked for identification. /d. Coleman
handed Gott a "personal identification card,,2 and a "Public Servant's Questionnaire." /d. The
Questionnaire asserted the right of a "sovereign natural person" to collect information from a
"Public Servant" pursuant to 5 U.S.C.

S 552a(e)(3).

ECF No. 17-2. Upon receiving these papers,

Gott returned to his vehicle and requested a supervisor because Coleman was not providing his
license. ECF No. 27, Ex. A at 09:47:30.3
Supervising Officer Phelps then arrived on the scene. ECF No. 16 ~ 7. Both Phelps and
Gott approached the driver's side window of the truck, and Phelps asked Coleman to produce a
driver's license-telling

him he could go to jail for failing to produce a license during a traffic

stop. ECF No. 27, Ex. A at 09:51 :00. After Coleman's noncompliance, Phelps opened the truck
door, took Coleman's hand, and said, "climb on out, 1 don't want to drag you out of the vehicle."
/d. at 09:5 I: I 7; contra ECF No. 16 ~ 8 (alleging that Phelps said "[y]ou're under arrest" while
removing Coleman from the vehicle). At the same time, the two officers grabbed each of

I The parties in this case allege different versions of certain facts, but for the purposes of this motion, the facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to Coleman, the non-moving party. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317,
322-24 (1986). However, in addition to submitting declarations suggesting different versions of certain facts,
Defendants submitted video footage from a dashboard camera inside of Officer Gott's patrol car. See ECF No. 27,
Ex. A. The video spans twenty-seven minutes and captures the entirety of the traffic stop. Id. When the nonmovant's version of the facts are "so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed
him," the facts should be viewed in the light depicted by the recording. See SCali v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81
(2007). Consequently, certain competing versions of the facts will be construed in light of the video, and the
discrepancies with Plaintitrs version of the facts will be noted.

2

The nature afthe "personal identification card" is unclear. It was not, however, Coleman's driver's license, which

Officer Phelps later asked for. ECF No. 16 ~ 7.
3

The pin cites for the video refer to time stamps embedded on the bottom-right corner of the video.

2

Coleman's arms and moved him to the side of the truck. ECF No. 27, Ex. A at 09:51: 17; contra
ECF No. 16 ~ 8 (alleging that Phelps "aggressively grabbed Plaintiff by the hand (pressure
point), neck and shoulder area" and twisted his right arm while Gott twisted his left arm). The
officers forcefully placed Coleman's hands on the truck and frisked him after he reached for his
back pocket. ECF No. 27, Ex. A at 09:51 :26. The officers searched inside at least some of
Coleman's pockets during the frisk and seized a wallet. ECF No. 16'\9. Inside the wallet, the
officers found Coleman's Virginia driver's license. /d. Phelps escorted Coleman by his
shirtsleeve behind the truck and ordered him to sit on the roadside guardrail. ECF No. 27, Ex. A
at 09:52:40; contra ECF No. 16 ~ 8 (alleging that Phelps "forcibly carried" Coleman to the
guardrail). At this point, Officer Cress arrived on the scene. ECF No. 16 ~ 9.
The officers stood around Coleman on the guardrail. /d. ~ 10.4 Phelps and Gott took turns
searching the truck's interior. /d. ~ 9. 5 Phelps took the keys out ofthe truck and removed the
ignition key from the key ring because the ring held a little knife. /d. ~ II. The officers informed
Coleman that his truck would be impounded because it could not be legally operated without a
rear plate. /d. Phelps asked Coleman ifhe wanted anything from the truck before it was towed,
and Coleman mentioned only an unsealed, stamped letter which Phelps brought to him. /d. ~ 12.
The officers handed Coleman a ticket, told him to use his cell phone to call a friend who could
pick him up, placed the key ring containing the little knife thirty feet up the road from the truck,
and terminated the encounter. /d.

'I~ 13.
10,

The dashboard video plainly contradicts Plaintiffs allegation that the officers' hands were on their gun holsters
while standing near him. See ECF No. 27, Ex. A.

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, The video clarifies the chronology of the events following Coleman's placement on the guardrail. The officers did
open the truck's passenger side door but only after determining that the truck would be impounded and telling
Coleman to use his cell phone to have someone pick him up. See ECF No. 27, Ex. A at 09:55:33-n9:57:11. Prior to
the officers' impoundment decision, they had looked inside the truck only through the open driver's side door and
through the windshield. Id at 09:53:00.

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In the days following the encounter, Coleman talked to Sheriff Mike Evans over the
phone.ld. ~ 14. Coleman asked if the Sheriffs Department could return the medication left
inside his truck. ld. He also expressed his concern that the vehicle was illegally impounded, but
Evans did not remedy those concerns. ld. Coleman was charged criminally for driving an
uninsured vehicle, failing to attach registration plates, and operating an unregistered vehicle on
the highway. ld. ~ 15. The criminal proceedings were subsequently terminated in favor of
Coleman. ld.
Coleman raises the following claims against one or more Defendants pursuant to 42
U.S.C.9 1983: unreasonable search and seizure; deprivation ofliberty without due process;
deprivation of property without due process; excessive force; false arrest; a takings claim; and,
failure to implement appropriate police customs and practices. ECF No. I 6 ~~ 23--44. Coleman
also raises additional federal claims against the three officers present during the stop and Sheriff
Evans for conspiring against Coleman pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 9 1985(3), id. ~~ 45--47, against the
Sheriff Department for neglecting to prevent a conspiracy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 9 1986, id. ~~
48-53, and against the three officers and Evans for conspiring to deprive constitutional rights
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 924 I, id. ~~ 54-55. Coleman raises the following claims against one or
more Defendants pursuant to Maryland law: assault; battery; intentional infliction of emotional
distress; false arrest; malicious prosecution; abuse of process; false imprisonment; and, gross
negligence. ld. ~~ 56-96. Lastly, Coleman alleges a violation of Article 24 of Maryland's
Declaration ofRights.ld.

~~ 71-75.

Coleman seeks the following relief: a declaration that his rights were violated; an
injunction ordering Defendants to avoid Coleman on sight and forbidding them from detaining

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him; compensatory and punitive damages; statutory damages and reimbursement of funds paid or
lost; and court costs. Id. ~~ 97-102.
Coleman filed his Amended Complaint on June 12,2015. Defendants have filed a Motion
to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court sent Plaintiff a letter
dated June 1,2016 that notified him of Defendants' motion and provided him seventeen days to
file a response. ECF No. 28. Coleman replied with a letter dated June 21, 2016, ECF No. 29,
requesting clarification of his need to respond to a pending motion. The Court construed Mr.
Coleman's letter as a Motion for Extension of Time to Respond and granted Coleman thirty days
from June 24, 2016 to file a response. ECF No. 30. Coleman filed his response on July 29, 2016.
ECF No. 31.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
A.

Standard of Review
Defendants have styled their motion as a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative, a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. "A
motion styled in this manner implicates the court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." McCray v. Md. DOT, No. ELH-II-3732,

2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

8513, at *15 (D. Md. Jan. 16,2013); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ("If, on a motion under Rule
12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court,
the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56."). Pursuant to Rule
12(d), the Court has discretion to determine whether to accept evidence outside the pleadings,
and thus convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56 motion. Id. at *16. Typically, all parties
must then be given the opportunity to present all material pertinent to the motion, Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d), but when the moving party captions its motion "in the alternative" and presents evidence
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outside the pleadings for the Court's consideration, the parties are deemed to have notice that the
Court may treat the motion as one for summary judgment under the parameters of Rule 12(d).
McCray, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8513, at *17.
In the instant case, Defendants' motion relies heavily on video footage from a dashboard
camera in Gott's car. Coleman likewise references the video in his Amended Complaint and had
full opportunity to respond to this evidence. Thus, it appears that both parties agree the video is
helpful to the Court's resolution of this motion and neither side has requested additional
discovery in this regard. See McCray, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXlS 8513, at *16 ("In general, courts
are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material 'is likely to facilitate the disposition
of the action,' and 'whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment
procedure' is necessary.") (citation omitted). Accordingly, conversion of the motion to a motion
for summary judgment under Rule 56 is appropriate.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court, viewing the record as a whole
and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, determines that there exists no genuine
issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
Celotex Corp. v. Catrell, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986). Once a party has properly filed evidence supporting the motion for
summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings,
but must instead set forth specific facts illustrating genuine issues for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at
322-24.
The Court "must review the motion, even if unopposed, and determine from what it has
before it whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter oflaw." Custer
v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th Cir. 1993). If the non-movant's version of

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the facts are "so utterly discredited by the record," in this case the dashboard recording, "that no
reasonable jury could have believed him," the facts should be viewed in the light depicted by the
recording. See Scali v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (finding that the courts below
should not have relied on a "visible fiction" refuted by a videotape).
Finally, "a pro se complaint, 'however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.''' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,106 (1976)
(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
B.

42 V.S.c. ~ 1983 Claims (Counts I-V)6
Section 1983 provides a remedy against any person who, under color of state law,

deprives another ofrights protected by the United States Constitution. See 42 U.S.C.

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1983

(2012); Brown v. Bailey, No. RDB-11-01901, 2012 U.S. Dis!. LEX1S 81664, at *14 (D. Md.
June 13,2012) ("A civil rights action under Section 1983 allows 'a party who has been deprived
of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief. "') ( quoting City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999)). "To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: I) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated and 2)
the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law." Brown,
2012 U.S. Dis!. LEX1S 81664, at *15-16 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure (Count I)
Defendants seek summary judgment on Count I which alleges, inter alia, unreasonable
searches and seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments during the traffic stop. ECF
No. 16 ~ 26.

There is significant overlap within the five ~ 1983 counts. When appropriate, the Court will make note when a
summary judgment decision applies to multiple counts. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges multiple ~ 1983 causes of
action within Count I: unreasonable search and seizure; deprivation of liberty without due process; deprivation of
property without due process; excessive force; false arrest; and a takings claim. ECF No. 16 ~ 23.

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a. The Initial Traffic Stop
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Gott lacked a legally sufficient basis to conduct a warrantless
stop of Plaintiffs vehicle. Id A warrantless traffic stop requires, at minimum, a "reasonable
suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, of unlawful conduct." United Stales v. Hassan
EI,5 F.3d 726, 729 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I (1968)).
In Maryland, it is illegal to operate a vehicle "on any highway in [Maryland], unless there
is attached to the vehicle and displayed on it ... plates issued for the vehicle ... for the current
regulatory period .... " Md. Code Ann., Transp.

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13-411(d)(I) (West 2016). "[O]ne plate shall

be attached to the front and the other on the rear of the vehicle."

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13-411(a).ln his Amended

Complaint, Plaintiff concedes that he was driving along Route 260, a Maryland highway,
immediately prior to the traffic stop. ECF No. 16 ~ 6. Plaintiff also concedes that he was driving
his truck without plates. /d. Additionally, the dashboard video shows that the truck was missing a
rear license plate, and that the missing plate was visible from Gott's vantage point immediately
prior to the decision to stop. ECF No. 27, Ex. A. Thus, Gott had reasonable suspicion to stop
Coleman's vehicle for a violation of Maryland law because he observed first-hand the lack of a
rear license plate. See

u.s. v. Johnson,

734 F.3d 270, 275 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that officers

had reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop after observing a vehicle with illegal license plates
under Maryland law). The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants regarding the
alleged illegality of the initial stop in Count l.
b. The Removal of Coleman from His Vehicle
Plaintiff alleges the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable seizure by opening the driver's door and removing him from the truck. Id. ~ 26.
The Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" analysis requires balancing "the public interest and the
individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers."
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Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977) (quoting United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)); United States v. Sakyi, 160 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998). Applying
this balancing test to Terry traffic stops, the Supreme Court has found that, "once a motor vehicle
has been lawfully detained for a traffic violation, the police officers may order the driver to get
out of the vehicle without violating the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable
searches and seizures." Mimms, 434 U.S. at III n.6. The public interest in an officer's safety
outweighs the "mere inconvenience" to the driver from being forced to exit the vehicle. See id. at
Ill. "A brief but complete restriction ofliberty is valid under Terry." United States v. Moore,
817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th
Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, the officers had the authority to exert some physical force to effectuate
the order for Coleman to step out of his vehicle.?
Coleman's truck was lawfully stopped for a traffic violation. Pursuant to Mimms, the
officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches and
seizures by ordering Coleman from the truck then physically removing him upon
noncompliance. The reasonableness of the officers' actions stands as a lawful continuation of the
initial Terry stop. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendants regarding the
Count 1allegation of unreasonable seizure when Coleman was removed from the vehicle.
c. The Frisk of Coleman and Wallet Search
Plaintiff alleges the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an
illegal search by performing a patdown search of his person shortly after he exited the truck. See
ECF No. 16 ~ 26. "To justify a patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop ... the

The degree of physical force the officers used against Coleman to effectuate the order to exit the vehicle will be
analyzed further in the discussion of the excessive force claim.

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police must harbor reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and
dangerous." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009).
Coleman alleges that Gott and Phelps carried him to the side of the truck then began
"tearing through every pocket of shirt, coat and pants after forcibly placing his hands upon his
truck." ECF No. 16 ~ 9. The dashboard video, however, provides crucial context absent from
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint for the officers' decision to commence the body patdown.
Immediately prior to the frisk and while standing by the side of the truck, Coleman reached with
his right hand into his right back pocket. ECF No. 18, Ex. A. at 09:51 :26.
Observing Coleman reaching toward his back pocket, like observing a bulge in a jacket,
provided Gott and Phelps a reasonable suspicion that Coleman was armed and dangerous and
reaching for a weapon, which was sufficient to justifY a patdown. See Mimms 434 U.S. at 112
(finding frisk of driver previously ordered out of his vehicle to be lawful because the police's
observation of an unidentified bulge in the driver's jacket provided a reasonable suspicion that he
was armed and dangerous).
But there remains an issue of whether the officers exceeded the permissible scope of the
frisk. The patdown must be limited to outer clothing. United States v. Raymond, 152 F.3d 309,
312 (4th Cir. 1998). If an officer feels an object during the patdown, he may lawfully seize it
only if "the contour or mass of the object makes its identity [as a weapon or contraband]
immediately apparent." See id. at 312 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)).
"Once an officer has determined that the object is not a weapon, however, and if its shape or size
does not indicate its contraband nature, the search must stop." Raymond, 152 F.3d at 312 (citing
Dickerson, 152 F.3d at 378).

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Coleman alleges that Gott and Phelps were "tearing through every pocket of shirt, coat
and pants" rather than limiting their frisk to a patdown of outer clothing. ECF No. 16 '\l9. At
some point during the frisk, the officers reached into Coleman's pocket, seized his wallet, and
searched inside it.ld. The dashboard video corroborates Coleman's base allegation that the frisk
exceeded an outer clothing patdown. The video leaves unclear the point during the frisk when the
officers seized Coleman's wallet. ECF No. 18, Ex. A at 09:51:27-52:29.

At 09:51:33, Gott

clearly reaches into Coleman's jacket pocket.ld. at 09:52:21. Gott also removes Coleman's
baseball cap from his head. ld.
Defendants' motion is silent regarding whether the officers reasonably thought any item
felt on Coleman's person during the patdown was "immediately apparent" as a weapon or
contraband. Defendants do not provide a sufficient reason why the patdown justified the seizure
and search of Coleman's wallet, the search inside other pockets, or the search under the baseball
cap.B Consequently, the Court denies summary judgment to Gott, Phelps, and Evans in their
individual capacities regarding the Count I allegation of an unreasonable search due to the scope
of the frisk.9
Defendants' defense of qualified immunity fails. To overcome the defense of qualified
immunity, Plaintiff must show that the official violated "'clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.''' Conn v. Gabbert, 526
U.S. 286, 290 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Phelps and Gott

Defendants cite to United States v. Bethel, 52 Fed. Appx. 609 (4th Cir. 2002) for the proposition that the officers
had probable cause to arrest (and search) the plaintiff based on his failure to provide satisfactory identification. ECF
No. 27-1 at 22. But, here, Plaintiff alleges that he handed Defendants a "personal identification card." ECF No. 16 ~
6. Without knowing the contents of the card, the Court cannot, at this juncture, say as a matter of law that lack of
identification justified a search that went beyond the limitations of a Terry frisk for weapons. Additionally, there is
no indication that he was placed under arrest and searched incident to that arrest.
9 Summary judgment is granted to Officer Cress, who did not participate in the frisk. Summary judgment is also
granted to the remaining defendants who are not "persons" as required by ~ 1983.

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II

allegedly violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free from searches that go
beyond outer clothing patdowns during a Terry frisk absent additional justification by seizing
Coleman's wallet and searching it.
d. The Inventory Search of Coleman's Truck
Plaintiff alleges the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an
unreasonable search by searching his vehicle without a warrant. See ECF No. 16 ~~ 9, 26.
Defendants argue that the officers conducted a lawful inventory search of Coleman's truck, and
that such inventory searches are exempt from the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.
ECF No. 27 at 27. "For an inventory search to be valid, the vehicle searched should first be in the
valid custody oflaw enforcement officers conducting the inventory." United States v. Brown,
787 F.2d 929, 931-32 (4th Cir. 1986). "[TJhe police may inventory the vehicle, if such
inventories are routine and conducted pursuant to standard police procedures, so long as the
purpose of the inventory is to secure the car or its contents and not to gather incriminating
evidence against the owner." /d. at 932.
Here, the officers took valid custody of Coleman's truck. Coleman was operating his
truck without registration plates, which is illegal under Maryland law. Md. Code Ann., Transp.

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13-41 I (d)(1). Additionally, Coleman told the officers that his vehicle was not registered, ECF
No. 27, Ex. A at 09:52:13, which meant that it could not be legally driven on Maryland
highways. Md. Code Ann., Transp.

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13-401 (b)(I). For these reasons, the vehicle was properly

impounded.
Based on the video, the officers did not take any actions that could be construed as a
search of the vehicle until after the decision to impound the vehicle had been made, ECF No. 27,
Ex. A., and the inventory search was performed pursuant to standard police procedures as
documented in the Vehicle Report filled out by Phelps. ECF No. 27-3. The Court therefore
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grants summary judgment to Defendants regarding the allegations in Count I of an illegal
inventory search.
2. Deprivation

of Liberty Without Due Process of Law (Count I)

Defendants seek summary judgment on the allegation in Count I that Coleman was
deprived ofliberty without due process oflaw, ECF No. 16 ~ 24, and argue, correctly, that
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not allege any facts which would create a cognizable claim
against Defendants for deprivation ofliberty without due process. See id.
"A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation."
Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). "In assessing whether a detention is
too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop," courts consider "whether the police
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant." United States v. Sharpe,
470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); see also Peters v. City ofMt. Ranier, GJH-14-00955, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39290, at *15 (D. Md. March 24, 2016) ("A Terry stop must last no longer than
necessary to verify or dispel the officer's suspicion.") (internal citations omitted).
The video recording captures the entire twenty-seven minute traffic stop. ECF No. 18,
Ex. A. Over the course ofthe stop, the officers appear to be diligently investigating the traffic
violation-determining

Coleman's identity, impounding his vehicle, and issuing the proper

traffic citations. ld. Plaintiff has not presented any facts which would dispute the lawful duration
of the traffic stop. Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants regarding
alleged deprivation ofliberty without due process oflaw contained in Count I.
3. Deprivation

of Property Without Due Process of Law (Counts I, V)

Defendants seek summary judgment on allegations in Counts I and V that the officers
deprived Plaintiff of his property without due process in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
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Amendments when they impounded Plaintiffs truck. ECF No. 16 ~~ 24, 42. In order to succeed
on the claim, Plaintiff must show that he had a property interest, that the state deprived him of
that interest, and that the procedures employed were constitutionally inadequate. Iota Xi Chapter
a/Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Patterson, 566 F.3d 138, 145 (4th Cir. 2009).
This Court has found that the procedures employed during impoundment are
constitutionally adequate if the dispossessed party "had notice and a fair opportunity to be heard
throughout [the] process." Richter v. Maryland, 590 F. Supp. 2d 730, 737 (D. Md. 2008). In
Richter, the plaintiff had ample notice and opportunity to be heard when, after locating his towed
vehicle, he was advised of the process by which he could retrieve it. See id. at 737.
Plaintiff concedes that Officer Phelps informed him that the vehicle was being
impounded because it could not legally be driven without registration tags. ECF No. 16 ~ 11. He
additionally concedes that Officer Gott gave him a ticket. Id. ~ 10. Additionally, Phelps received
a Vehicle Report before the traffic stop concl uded, which provided the location where the
vehicle would be taken and that the vehicle "Needs to be Registered" before it could be released.
ECF No. 27-3. Thus, Plaintiff had the same "ample notice and opportunity" afforded to the
dispossessed party in Richter. Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants
IO

regarding the alleged deprivation of property without due process alleged in Counts I and V.
4. Excessive Force (Counts I, III)

Defendants seek summary judgment on allegations in Counts I and 1II that the officers
used excessive force in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments during the traffic
stop of Coleman. ECF No. 16 ~~ 24, 35. "The Fourth Amendment bars police officers from using
excessive force to effectuate a seizure." Yates v. Terry, 817 F.3d 877, 884 (4th Cir. 2016). Courts

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For the same reasons, Plaintiffs' Count I allegations that Plaintiffs' vehicle was taken without compensation is

also dismissed.

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evaluate excessive force claims under an objective reasonableness standard-balancing

"the

nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
countervailing governmental interests at stake." Id. at 884-85 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396 (1989». This balancing test requires evaluating "the proportionality ofthe force in
light of all the circumstances." Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95,101 (4th Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff refers to the dashboard video to support his allegation that Officers Gott and
Phelps used excessive force when removing him from the truck. ECF No. 16 ~ 8. Plaintiff alleges
that Phelps, after opening the driver's side door, "aggressively grabbed Plaintiff by the hand
(pressure point), neck and shoulder area" and twisted his right arm while Gott twisted his left
arm. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the officers went on to forcibly place his hands upon the truck. Id. ~
9. After the frisk, Coleman alleges that Phelps carried him by force to the railing along the road.
Id. After forcing Coleman to sit on the guardrail, the three officers allegedly stood around him
with their hands on the holsters of their guns. Id. ~ 10.
But the dashboard video plainly contradicts Plaintiffs portrayal of the officers' use of
force during the traffic stop. Immediately prior to removing Coleman from the truck, Phelps
asked for his license, told him he could go to jail for not producing it, and expressed his
preference to not have to drag him out of the vehicle. ECF No. 18, Ex. A at 09:51 :00. After
Coleman's continued failure to produce a license, Phelps and Gott each grabbed one of his arms
and carried him to the side of the truck. Id. at 09:51: 17. The recording does not support the
allegations of arm-twisting or extra physical contact by Phelps to Coleman's neck and shoulder
areas.Id. Given Coleman's failures to produce his license, the officers' lawful order for Coleman
to step out of the vehicle, and Coleman's continued noncompliance with that order, the officers'
actions were reasonable and proportionate to the circumstances.

15

The officers forcefully placed Coleman's hands on the truck only after he had reached for
his back pocket. The video depicts Phelps barely holding onto Coleman's sleeve to escort him to
the guardrail rather than carrying him by force. ECF No. 18, Ex. A at 09:52:40. Finally, the
video fails to depict Gott, Phelps, or Cress at any time with their hands on the holsters of their
weapons in a way that would reasonably signal a threat of violence against Coleman. See ECF
No. 18, Ex. A. At no point in the video did any of the officers have a hand on the handle of a
gun. Jd. If any of the officers touched their holsters while surrounding Coleman, such contact
could only be construed as incidental. Jd. Thus, at no point can the force used by the officers be
deemed excessive.
Consequently, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants regarding the alleged
uses of excessive force enumerated in Counts I and 111.
5. False Arrest (Counts I, IV)
Defendants seek summary judgment on allegations in Counts I and IV that Plaintiff was
the subject ofa false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 16 ~~ 24, 39. For a
cognizable false arrest claim, Plaintiff must show he was the subject of a warrantless arrest that
was not supported by probable cause. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th
Cir. 1996). For the reason stated above, the officers executed a lawful investigative stop, not an
arrest, and summary judgment is therefore granted to Defendants regarding the false arrest
claims enumerated in Counts 1and IV.
6. Failure to Implement

Proper Policies, Customs, and Practices (Counts II, III)

Sheriff Evans, the State of Maryland, and Calvert County seek summary judgment on
Counts 11and Ill, which allege that those parties "adopted and implemented careless and reckless
policies, customs or practices" that led to violations of Plaintiffs constitutional rights. ECF No.
16

'I~ 35. Of the rights Plaintiff
30,

alleges were violated, given the Court's rulings above, only
16

the allegation involving the scope of the patdown remains, thus any claims related to the customs
or practices of various municipal employers or supervisors as to any other alleged violations
must be dismissed. See Shields v. Prince George's Cry, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118924, at *12 (noting
that a claim against a municipal employer based on custom or practice proceeds only if plaintiff
establishes a violation of rights by one of the active employees). Plaintiffs custom and practice
claim against the Sheriff, the State of Maryland and Calvert County related to the scope of the
patdown also fails because the Plaintiff does not allege with specificity the nature of the custom
or practice or inadequate training that caused the alleged violation. Id. at *22 ("section 1983
plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on a municipality must ... adequately plead and prove the
existence of an official policy or custom that is fairly attributable to the municipality and that
proximately caused the deprivation of their rights.") (quoting Jordan by Jordan v. Jackson, 15
F.3d 333, 338 (4th Cir. 1994)). Thus, summary judgment is granted in favor of Defendants on
Counts II and 1II of the Amended Complaint.
C.

42 V.S.c. ~ 1985(3)-Conspiracy

Claim (Count VI)

Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans seek summary judgment on Count VI which alleges that
those parties conspired to deprive Coleman of his rights in violation of 42 U.S.c.
No. 16 ~ 46. To establish a conspiracy claim under

S

S

1985(3). ECF

1985(3), Plaintiff must show:

(I) a conspiracy of two or more persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific
class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to (3) deprive the plaintiff of the
equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all, (4) and which results in injury
to the plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants
in connection with the conspiracy.
Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995). A claimant must additionally show a
'''meeting ofthe minds' by defendants to violate the claimant's constitutional rights." Id. at
1377. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint provides no factual basis for finding any Defendants to be

17

motivated by a "specific class-based invidiously discriminatory animus." Consequently, this
Court grants summary judgment to Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans on Count VI.
42 V.S.c. ~ 1986-Neglect

D.

to Prevent Conspiracy

Claim (Count Vll)

The Sheriffs Department seeks summary judgment on Count VII which alleges that it
neglected to prevent as 1985 conspiracy in violation of 42 U.S.C.

S

1986. ECF No. 16 "ij52.

S

1986 states:
Every person who, having knowledge that any of the wrongs conspired to be
done, and mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and
having power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same,
neglects or refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to
the party injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages caused by such
wrongful act, which such person by reasonable diligence could have prevented ..

42 U.S.C.

S

S

1986 (2012). Because Plaintiff has pleaded no factual basis to meet the elements of a

1985 conspiracy, this Court grants summary judgment to the Sheriffs Department on Count

VII.

E.

18 V.S.c. ~ 241-Conspiracy

Claim (Count VllI)

Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans seek summary judgment on Count VIII which alleges that
those parties conspired to deprive Coleman of his rights in violation of 18 U.S.C.
16 "ij55. But 18 U.S.c.

S 241

S 241.

ECF No.

is a criminal statute and does not provide for civil enforcement.

Consequently, this Court grants summary judgment to Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans on Count

VIII.
F.

State Intentional

and Constitutional

Tort Claims (Counts IX-XVll)

18

Defendants seek summary judgment on Counts IX through XVII, which allege that
Coleman was a victim of various state law intentional and constitutional torts. II ECF No. 16 ~~
56-96.
1. Sovereign Immunity
The State of Maryland and the Calvert County Sheriff Department, along with Gott,
Phelps, Cress, and Evans in their official capacities12 seek summary judgment on all counts on
the basis of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. ECF No. 27 at 16--17. Under the
Eleventh Amendment, an individual citizen cannot directly sue a state absent a waiver by the
State or congressional abrogation. Kimel v. Fla. Bd of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000); see U.S.
Const. amend. XI. This immunity extends to "state agencies and state officers acting in their
official capacity." Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff bears the
burden of showing an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity. Williams v. United States, 50
F.3d 299,304 (4th Cir. 1995).
a. The State of Maryland
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint does not discuss whether the General Assembly of
Maryland has waived sovereign immunity for any of the aforementioned state law actions
against the State in federal court. See ECF No. 16.13 Plaintiff has therefore failed his burden of
establishing a waiver of sovereign immunity for any of his state law actions against the State.

11

Specifically: assault; battery; intentional infliction of emotional distress; false arrest; malicious prosecution; abuse

of process; false imprisonment; gross negligence; and a violation of Article 24 of Maryland's Declaration of Rights.
ECF No. 16 ~~ 56-96.
12 This Court grants dismissal to Calvert County on all counts naming it as a Defendant in Plaintiff's
Amended
Complaint. To this date, the Court's online docket confirms that Calvert County was never served with a copy of the

Summons.
13 Further research by this Court indicates that Maryland has not consented to tort suits brought against it in federal
court. Davenport v. Maryland, 38 F. Supp. 3d 679, 691 (D. Md. 2014)(citing Wellerv. Dep't of Soc. Servs.for City
of Bolt., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th Cir. 1990)).

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Consequently, this Court grants summary judgment to Maryland on the basis of sovereign
immunity with respect to Plaintiffs state claims.
b. Calvert County Sheriff Department

In Maryland, county sheriffs offices are state agencies. See, e.g., Lee v. Queen Anne's
Cnty. Office of the Sheriff, No. RDB-I3-672, 2014 WL 476233, at *6 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2014).
Consequently, this Court grants summary judgment to the Calvert County Sheriff Department on
the basis of sovereign immunity with respect to Plaintiffs state law claims. See Cromer, 88 F.3d
at 1332.
c. Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans in their official capacities
In Maryland, "county sheriffs and their deputies are state officials when acting in their
official law enforcement capacities." Lee, 2014 WL 476233, at *6. "Suits against state officials
in their official capacity ... should be treated as suits against the State." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S.
21,25 (1991). Because Maryland has sovereign immunity, Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans are
afforded the same immunity as state officials acting in their official capacities. See Cromer, 88
F.3d at 1332. Consequently, this Court grants summary judgment to Gott, Phelps, Cress, and
14

Evans in their official capacities with respect to Plaintiffs state law claims.
2. Maryland

Tort Claims Act Immunity

Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans in their individual capacities seek summary judgment on
all state law intentional and constitutional torts on the basis of immunity through the Maryland
Tort Claims Act ("MTCA"). ECF No. 27 at 38. State officials are "immune from suit in courts of
the State and from liability in tort for a tortious act or omission that is within the scope of the
14 The preceding analysis of sovereign immunity applies equally to all Defendants named in the federal ~ 1983
claims besides Goll, Phelps, Cress, and Evans in their individual capacities. Congress has not abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity through ~ 1983. Dyer v. Mary/and State Bd. of Educ., No. JKB-15-3699, 2016 WL 2939740,
at *6 (D. Md. May 20, 2016). Consequently, in addition to the reasons previously stated, summary judgment is
granted to all Defendants besides Goll, Phelps, Cress, and Evans in their individual capacities with respect to the ~
1983 claims.

20

public duties of the State personnel and is made without malice or gross negligence .... " See
Md. Code Ann., State Gov't
Proceedings

S 5-522

S 12-105

(West 2016) (citing Md. Code Ann., Courts and Judicial

(West 2016)).

Plaintiff's state law claims implicate Got!, Phelps, Cress, or Evans only for actions taken
within the scope oftheir public duties. See ECF No. 16. The state law claims encompass actions
taken by Defendants during the course of the traffic stop and the process of releasing Coleman's
impounded truck. Id. The officers on the scene and Sheriff Evans were clearly acting within the
scope of their public duties at these times.
Got!, Phelps, Cress, and Evans would not be afforded MTCA immunity if their tortious
conduct was made with malice or gross negligence. See Md. Code Ann., State Gov't

S

12-105.

Malice "has been characterized as the performance of an act without legal justification or excuse,
but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and
willfully injure the plaintiff." Biktasheva v. Red Square Sports, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 289, 296
(D. Md. 2005) (quoting K & K Mgmt., Inc. v. Lee, 557 A.2d 965, 984 (Md. 1989)). Plaintiff has
alleged no facts to establish that Got!, Phelps, Cress, or Evans acted "with an evil or rancorous
motive influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure the plaintiff."
See ECF No. 16.
To establish gross negligence, a plaintiff must "allege a duty of care, a breach of that
duty, and damages as a proximate cause ofthe breach." Swedish Civil Aviation Admin. v. Project
Mgmt. Enters., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 785,803 (D. Md. 2002). "[AJ defendant is liable for gross
negligence 'only when he inflicts injury intentionally or is so utterly indifferent to the rights of
others that he acts as if such rights did not exist.'" Pasternak & Fidis, P. C. v. Recall Total Info.
Mgmt., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 3d 886, 895 (D. Md. 2015) (quoting Brooks v. Jenkins, 104 A.3d 899,

21

908 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2014». Plaintiffs Amended Complaint alleges no facts that establish
the elements of gross negligence for any of Defendants' actions.
Consequently, this Court grants summary judgment to Gott, Phelps, Cress, and Evans in
their individual capacities on the basis of MTCA immunity for state officials with respect to the
state law claims.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants summary judgment to Defendants on all

counts except for the unreasonable search and seizure claim in Count I with respect to Gott,
Phelps, and Evans in their individual capacities. A separate Order follows.

/tJ/---

Dated: September2.- ~016

GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge

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