Lyles v. Prawdzik et al

Filing 30

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART 27 Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, to Bifurcate. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 6/22/2016. (kns, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
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RONNIE D. LYLES,
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Plaintiff,
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v.

Case No.: PWG-15-1056
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CPL JEFF PRAWDZIK, et al.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
While arresting Ronnie Lyles for his failure to wear a seatbelt, Town of Riverdale Park
(“Riverdale Park”) Police Officers Corporal Jeff Prawdzik, PFC Blanco, and Sgt. Slattery
allegedly assaulted Lyles, shooting him with a Taser and beating him. Lyles has brought this
case against the police officers and Riverdale Park under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants have
filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, to bifurcate, Defs.’ Mot., ECF No. 27, some
portions of which are not disputed.1 Counts I and II will be dismissed with respect to Defendants
Prawdzik, Blanco, and Slattery in their official capacities only and with respect to Defendant
Riverdale Park. Because I find that Lyles has not pleaded facts sufficient to support his Monell
claims, Counts III and IV will be dismissed.

Because I will dismiss Counts III and IV,

Defendants’ motion in the alternative to bifurcate will be denied as moot.
I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

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Accompanying Defendants’ motion is a memorandum of law. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 271. Lyles has filed an opposition, Opp’n, ECF No. 28, and Defendants have filed a reply, Reply,
ECF No. 29. A hearing is unnecessary in this case. See Loc. R. 105.6.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for “the dismissal of a complaint if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Velencia v. Drezhlo, No. RDB-12-237,
2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (D. Md. Dec. 13, 2012). This rule’s purpose “‘is to test the sufficiency
of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the
applicability of defenses.’” Id. (quoting Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th
Cir. 2006)). To that end, the Court bears in mind the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009),
when considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, a complaint must
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and must state “a plausible claim for relief,” as “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. See Velencia, 2012 WL 6562764, at *4 (discussing standard from
Iqbal and Twombly). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. I must accept the facts as alleged in Plaintiffs’
complaint as true. See Aziz v. Alcolac, 658 F.3d 388, 390 (4th Cir. 2011).
II.

DISCUSSION
A. Counts I and II

Defendants seek dismissal of Counts I and II with respect to Defendants Prawdzik,
Blanco, and Slattery in their official capacities and with respect to Defendant Riverdale Park.
Lyles states in his opposition that “[t]o clarify, Counts I and II were not directed toward and not
intended to plead any claims against the Town of Riverdale Park.” Opp’n 1. Accordingly,

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Counts I and II will be dismissed with respect to Riverdale Park. Lyles also states that Counts I
and II were
meant to refer to the individual Defendants, who are the only parties mentioned in
the counts themselves. As a result, insofar as the defense motion is targeted any
respondeat superior, “official capacity” or claims against the Town of Riverdale
in Counts I and II, is it [sic] moot as no such claims are asserted.
Id. It is unclear if Lyles is also conceding that Counts I and II should also be dismissed against
Defendants Prawdzik, Blanco, and Slattery in their official capacities.
A local government entity is a “person[] which may be sued under § 1983 although . . .
not on a respondeat superior basis.” DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d 354, 368 (Md. 1999); see
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[O]fficialcapacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.55. Indeed, a local government only
may be sued through an official-capacity action, which “is really an action against the
governmental entity, of which the official was merely an agent,” where the official
“‘implement[s] governmental law, policy, or custom,’ i.e., the deprivation underlying the § 1983
claim is ‘caused by a statute, regulation, policy, or custom of the governmental entity’ that the
official was implementing.” DiPino, 729 A.2d at 369 (quoting Ashton v. Brown, 660 A.2d 447,
468 (Md. 1995)). The suit against the officers in their official capacity is duplicative because
Lyles also has brought a Monell claim against Riverdale Park. See Ulloa v. Prince George’s
County, Md., No. DKC-15-257, 2015 WL 7878956, at *6 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 2015) (“Accordingly,
because Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible Monell claim alleging that a policy or custom of
the County caused the deprivation of Plaintiffs’ rights, Plaintiffs have similarly failed to state a
claim under § 1983 against [the police officers] in their official capacities.”). Because I will
dismiss Lyles’s Monell claims against Riverdale Park as discussed below, I will also dismiss
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Lyles’s claims, to the extent that these claims were intended, against Defendants Prawdzik,
Blanco, and Slattery in their official capacities.2
B. Counts III and IV
Counts III and IV allege Monell claims against Riverdale Park for violations of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment. See Am. Compl. 10–13, ECF No. 21. With respect to both
of these counts, Lyles has alleged liability based on Riverdale Park’s failure “to adequately train,
supervise, and discipline officers” and that Riverdale Park “instituted and maintained formal and
informal customs, policies, and practices that foster, promote and encourage officers” to violate
individuals’ protected constitutional rights. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 79, 80, 83, 84. For Count III,
Lyles states that that these practices included
a. The use of excessive force occurs so frequently that it has become accepted
manner by the Defendants and other employees of Riverdale Park. This is a result
of Riverdale Park’s failure to establish effective procedures, rules, orders,
guidelines and practices to ensure that excessive force will not be used and to
ensure that allegations of excessive force will be thoroughly investigated and
appropriately punished when found to have occurred. As a result of this failure,
there has been a regular pattern and practice of excessive force, failure to provide
adequate medical care, cover-up, and failure to investigate. This pattern and
practice has been manifested in other prior incidents involving town officers.

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Lyles brought two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against all Defendants: Count (I) under the
Fourteenth Amendment for violation of Lyles’s “freedom from summary punishment and
excessive and unreasonable force” and Count (II) under the Fourth Amendment for violation of
Lyles’s “freedom from unreasonable search and seizure and arrest without probable cause.”
Defendants argue that these counts should be consolidated into a single count under the Fourth
Amendment, but they only discuss the excessive and unreasonable force allegation of Count I
and not the summary punishment allegation. Although Defendants are correct that an excessive
force claim should be brought under the Fourth Amendment, see Estate of Ronald Armstrong v.
Village of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 899 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 388 (1989)), Defendants have provided no support for why Count I as it relates to Lyles’s
freedom from summary punishment allegation should be brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment. As a result, I will treat Lyles’s excessive force claim as being part of Count II
under the Fourth Amendment, but I will not consolidate Counts I and II.

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b. Riverdale Park has failed to effectively instruct officers that they have a duty to
prevent and report excessive force when it occurs.
c. Riverdale Park has failed to keep accurate records as to the number of injuries
to citizens by members of its police force. This policy encourages the use of force
in an improper manner and inhibits Riverdale Park from critically evaluating the
need for a change in training.
d. Riverdale Park lacks an effective internal affairs procedure and has no
meaningful system to control and monitor the recurrence of excessive force by
officers who have a pattern or history of such behavior.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80.a–d. For Count IV, Lyles states that that these practices included
a. Arrest without probable cause occurs so frequently that it has become accepted
manner by the Defendants and other employees of Riverdale Park. This is a result
of Riverdale Park’s failure to establish effective procedures, rules, orders,
guidelines and practices to ensure that arrests will be supported by probable cause
and to ensure that allegations to the contrary will be thoroughly investigated and
appropriately punished when found to have occurred. As a result of this failure,
there has been a regular pattern and practice of arrest without probable cause,
cover-up, and failure to investigate. This pattern and practice has been manifested
in other prior incidents involving town officers.
b. Riverdale Park has failed to effectively instruct officers that they have a duty to
prevent and report false arrest when it occurs.
c. Riverdale Park has failed to keep accurate records as to the number of false
arrests by members of its police force. This policy encourages arrests without
probable cause and inhibits Riverdale Park from critically evaluating the need for
a change in training.
d. Riverdale Park lacks an effective internal affairs procedure and has no
meaningful system to control and monitor the recurrence of false arrest by officers
who have a pattern or history of such behavior.
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 84.a–d.
In Riverdale Park’s view, Counts III and IV allege no specific facts to support a Monell
claim and are based on “boilerplate, conclusory allegations of municipal wrongdoing.” See
Defs.’ Mem. 3, 5. Lyles counters that his claims “contain all of the specificity required at this
stage and, in many cases, all of the specificity possible” prior to discovery and based on the

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specific allegations that “the Monell claim turns on the absence of certain policies, procedures
and training.” Opp’n 4.
Riverdale Park is a “‘person[]’” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as stated in
Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91. DiPino, 729 A.2d at 368. But, “[u]nder Monell, a municipality’s
liability ‘arises only where the constitutionally offensive actions of employees are taken in
furtherance of some municipal ‘policy or custom.’” Walker v. Prince George’s Cnty., MD, 575
F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229 (4th
Cir. 1984)); see Rockwell v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., No. CIV.A. RDB-13-3049, 2014
WL 949859, at *11 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2014) (citing Walker). Thus, a Monell claim is a form of
§ 1983 action under which a municipality, such as Riverdale Park, is liable “where a
policymaker officially promulgates or sanctions an unconstitutional law, or where the
municipality is deliberately indifferent to the development of an unconstitutional custom.” Smith
v. Ray, 409 Fed. App’x 641, 651 (4th Cir. 2011). The government’s policy or custom must have
“played a part in the deprivation” underpinning the plaintiff’s claim. DiPino v. Davis, 729 A.2d
354, 369 (1999). The policy or custom may be “an express policy, such as a written ordinance or
regulation”; a decision by “a person with final policymaking authority;” “an omission, such as a
failure to properly train officers, that manifest[s] deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens;”
or “a practice that is so persistent and widespread as to constitute a custom or usage with the
force of law.” Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must allege that “‘(1) the municipality [had] actual or
constructive knowledge of the custom and usage by its responsible policymakers, and (2) there
[was] a failure by those policymakers, as a matter of specific intent or deliberate indifference, to

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correct or terminate the improper custom and usage.’” Rockwell, 2014 WL 949859, at *11
(quoting Randall, 302 F.3d at 210 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The plaintiff also must
allege that there was “a ‘direct causal link’ between the policy or custom and the deprivation of
rights.” Id. (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 386–86 (1989)). Notably,
“‘there must be numerous particular instances of unconstitutional conduct in order to establish a
custom or practice,’” because “[a] municipality is not liable for mere ‘isolated incidents of
unconstitutional conduct by subordinate employees.’” Smith v. Ray, 409 Fed. App’x 641, 651
(4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2003)).3
Monel claims based on a failure to adequately train face a higher standard:
A municipality’s culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous
where a claim turns on a failure to train. To satisfy the statute, a municipality’s
failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to “deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come
into contact.” Only then “can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city
‘policy or custom’ that is actionable under § 1983.”
“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a
municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”
Thus, when city policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular
omission in their training program causes city employees to violate citizens’
constitutional rights, the city may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the
policymakers choose to retain that program. The city’s “policy of inaction” in
light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations “is the
functional equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.”
A less stringent standard of fault for a failure-to-train claim “would result in de
facto respondeat superior liability on municipalities . . . .”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61-62 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
Lyles’s boilerplate allegations are not sufficient to plead his Monell claims against
Riverdale Park, either with respect to the general Monell standard or the higher standard for

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Although Lyles correctly argues that a “a single decision by municipal policymakers”
may support a Monell claim under certain circumstances, see Opp’n 7 (quoting Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)), Smith clarifies that this is not the case in situations, like
here, that involve allegedly unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.
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failure to train claims.4 Lyles amended complaint contains no specifics with respect to the
policies and practices that Riverdale Park does or does not employ. The claims are generalized
and contain no details about these policies and practices and how they are inadequate, inaccurate,
or ineffective. Lyles has only identified his own “isolated incident” of alleged liability on the
part of Riverdale Park with any particularity, which is a far cry from the “numerous particular
instances of unconstitutional conduct” necessary “to establish a custom or practice.” Lytle, 326
F.3d at 473; see Smith, 409 Fed. App’x at 651.
Lyles has stated that both the use of excessive force and arrest without probable cause
“occur[] so frequently that [they] ha[ve] become accepted manner by the Defendants and other
employees of Riverdale Park.” See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 80.a & 84.a. If true, Lyles should have had
no difficulty pleading particular facts to back up this conclusory allegation, yet he does not
provide reference any specific occurrences of these alleged violations of constitutional rights. I
“may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record” when reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). A search for
United States District Court for the District of Maryland cases against Riverdale Park police
reveals only one case. See Iroegbu v. Town of Riverdale Park, No. TDC-13-3593, 2014 WL
6460602 (D. Md. Nov. 14, 2014). This case was dismissed with prejudice because the plaintiff
failed to participate in discovery. See id. This single instance is not “numerous” and does not
“establish a custom or practice.” See Lytle, 326 F.3d at 473; Smith, 409 Fed. App’x at 651.
Consequently, this case does not support Lyles’s assertion that Riverdale Park had a policy or
custom that violated § 1983. See Lytle, 326 F.3d at 473; Smith, 409 Fed. App’x at 651.

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The parties dispute which standard applies to the failure to supervise claim: the general
Monell standard or a higher standard applied in failure to supervise claims brought against
officials in their individual capacity. See Shaw v. Stroud, 13. F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff fails to meet his pleading requirements under either standard.
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In sum, Plaintiff has not pleaded an adequate description of the alleged custom or
practice, nor established it through sufficient examples. See Rockwell, 2014 WL 949859, at *11;
Walker v. Prince George’s Cnty., 575 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court
conclusion that “appellants ‘failed to make any allegations in their complaint in regards to the
existence of the County’s policy, custom, or practice, therefore failing to plead’ a viable Monell
claim”); see also Smith, 409 Fed. App’x at 651 (affirming summary judgment in favor of city
where plaintiff “failed to present any convincing evidence that a policy or custom ha[d]
developed regarding the use of excessive force, sexual assaults or any other unconstitutional
actions by officers”). Therefore, Counts III and IV will be dismissed.
III.

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to bifurcate is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part. Counts I and II are dismissed against Riverdale Park and Prawdzik,
Blanco, and Slattery in their official capacities. Counts I and II against Prawdzik, Blanco, and
Slattery in their individual capacities remain. Counts III and IV are dismissed against Riverdale
Park. Defendants’ motion in the alternative to bifurcate with respect to the Monell claims against
Riverdale Park is denied as moot.
Separately, I will enter a Scheduling Order and a Discovery Order and schedule a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 16 conference call with the parties to discuss further pretrial proceedings.
ORDER
Accordingly, it is this 22nd day of June, 2016, hereby ORDERED that Defendants’
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to bifurcate, ECF No. 27, is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part as follows:

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1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Counts I and II against Riverdale Park and
Prawdzik, Blanco, and Slattery in their official capacities IS GRANTED;
2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss with respect to Counts III and IV against Riverdale Park
IS GRANTED; and
3. Defendants’ motion in the alternative to bifurcate IS DENIED as moot.
So ordered.

/S/
Paul W. Grimm
United States District Judge
dpb

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