Jackson v. Early Warning et al

Filing 65

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Peter J. Messitte on 12/13/2016. (c/m 12/14/2016 jf3s, Deputy Clerk)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

AINSWORTH C. JACKSON,
Plaintiff, pro se
v.
EARLY WARNING, et. al.
Defendants.

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Civil No. PJM 15-1233

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Ainsworth C. Jackson (Jackson), pro se, has sued Early Warning Services, LLC (Early
Warning), Equifax Information Services, LLC (Equifax), Trans Union, LLC (Trans Union), and
Experian Information Solutions, Inc. (Experian). His Original Complaint contended that
Defendants, all consumer reporting agencies (CRAs), had violated provisions of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. §
1601, et seq., the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), 15 U.S.C. § 1666, et seq., the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692, et seq., the Maryland Consumer Debt
Collection Act (MCDCA), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law, § 14-201, et seq., and the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Md. Code Ann., Com. Law § 13-101, et seq. He also sued
for common law defamation.
Following an initial round of Motions to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court, on
February 5, 2016, issued a Memorandum Order and Opinion dismissing with prejudice all of
Jackson’s claims except those based on the FCRA and defamation. See Mem. Op. and Order,
ECF Nos. 41, 42. The Court, however, granted Jackson an opportunity to file an Amended
Complaint to fortify his FCRA and defamations claims with appropriately specific factual
allegations. See Mem Op. at 6–7. Jackson subsequently filed a Motion in Response to the Court’s
1

Order, ECF No. 43, which the Court treated as a Supplement to the Complaint. See Mem. Order,
ECF No. 44. Trans Union thereafter filed an answer, ECF No. 45, Early Warning filed a
Renewed Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.
46, and both Equifax and Experian filed Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 47, 48. Jackson filed a
single response in opposition, ECF No. 50, and Early Warning, Equifax, and Experian each filed
replies, ECF Nos. 52, 53, 54.
For the following reasons, Trans Union’s,1 Early Warning’s, Equifax’s, and Experian’s
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 33, 46, 47, and 48) are GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The Original and Supplemental Complaints vaguely assert that Defendants failed to
verify the accuracy of their reporting with respect to certain of Jackson’s credit accounts, and
that these failures negatively impacted his credit rating, thus denying him the opportunity to open
up a checking account and obtain credit. See Compl., ECF No. 2; Suppl. Compl, ECF No. 43. He
seeks $25,000 in damages. See Compl. While the Complaints are largely devoid of material
factual allegations, the Court has been able to glean certain basic facts from the filings submitted
in connection with the Motions to Dismiss.2
CRAs are defined as “companies that collect information and provide reports on
consumers that are used to decide whether to provide consumers credit, insurance, or

1

Although Trans Union did not move to dismiss the Supplemental Complaint, choosing instead to file an
answer, ECF No. 45, because Jackson has failed to cure the deficiencies noted in Trans Union’s original
Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint, his claims will be dismissed as to Trans Union as well.
2
The Court has drawn these facts largely from Jackson’s Motions to Strike Experian’s, Early Warning’s,
and Trans Union’s original Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 25, 32, and 38. Although the Court has denied
these motions as frivolous, ECF No. 40, the Court considers them here to the extent that they provide
factual information otherwise lacking in the Complaints. The Court, however, considers these facts only
to establish a background; these additional filings are not deemed to be “well-pleaded allegations” by
Jackson for the purposes of overcoming a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6).
2

employment, and for other purposes.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), List of
Consumer

Reporting

Agencies,

CFPB

(January

14,

2015,

2:30

p.m.),

http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201501_cfpb_list-consumer-reporting-agencies.pdf.

All

Defendants collected information about Jackson’s credit history and reported that information to
financial institutions, and qualify as CRAs. See Compl. 2–3.
In 2013 and 2014, Jackson says he reviewed credit reports prepared by Defendants and
identified eight inaccuracies. See Suppl. Compl. 1–3; Pl.’s Mot. Strike as Sham and False
Defendant Experian’s Mot. Dismiss (Pl.’s Mot. Strike Experian’s Mot.) 2–3, ECF No. 25; Pl.’s
Mot. Strike as Sham and False Defendant Early Warning’s Mot. Dismiss (Pl.’s Mot. Strike Early
Warning’ Mot.) 1–2, ECF No. 32; Pl.’s Mot. Strike as Sham and False Defendant Trans Union’s
Mot. Dismiss (Pl.’s Mot. Strike Trans Union’s Mot.) 1–2, ECF No. 38. According to Jackson,
the reports included accounts that did not belong to him and accounts that were closed and/or
paid off in full. See Suppl. Compl. 1–3. Jackson alleges that he disputed some of these
inaccuracies by contacting the companies on numerous occasions and demanding that they verify
whether certain of his credit accounts were accurately reported, and whether certain credit
accounts listed in each report even belonged to him. See Pl.’s Mot. Strike Experian’s Mot. 2-3;
Pl.’s Mot. Strike Early Warning’s Mot. 1-2; Pl.’s Mot. Strike Trans Union’s Mot. 1-2. He does
not indicate whether his supposed contacts were purely oral, as opposed to written, with whom
he spoke, what he said, or when. Jackson says he lodged some of these disputes with Defendants
directly, and took up others with the furnishers of the information. See Suppl. Compl. According
to Jackson, his credit reports do not reflect these disputes. Id.

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II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jackson filed a Complaint on March 13, 2015 in the District Court of Maryland for Prince
George’s County. See Compl. The case was removed by Experian to this Court on April 28,
2015. Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. Jackson alleged that Defendants violated a variety of state
and federal statutes, as well as committed common law defamation. See Compl. In a
Memorandum Order and Opinion, the Court dismissed with prejudice five of Jackson’s claims,
but gave him the opportunity to file an Amended Complaint with respect to his FCRA and
defamation claims.
The Court held that the Complaint was insufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 8
because it contained only “unsupported, conclusory allegations.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court was
able to infer that Jackson’s FCRA allegations related to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b), 1681g, and
1681i. Concluding that Jackson had failed to plead his claims under § 1681e(b) and § 1681i in
sufficient detail, the Court instructed him to re-plead those claims or face dismissal. Id. at 10.
Specifically, the Court held that “the Complaint fail[ed] to specify what information was
inaccurately reported and by which Defendants.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court
had trouble discerning how, according to Jackson, Defendants had violated § 1681g, and directed
him to flesh out this claim. Id. at 11. As for Jackson’s defamation claim, the Court held that, “the
Complaint contains only conclusory allegations that defamatory statements were made at some
point by one, possibly all the Defendants.” Id. at 13. Accordingly, it suggested that Jackson
address this deficiency. Id.
On March 3, 2016, Jackson filed a “Motion in Response to Court’s February 5, 2016
Order.” In a Memorandum Order on March 18, 2016, the Court directed the Clerk to docket this
“Motion” as a Supplement to the Complaint. Subsequently, Early Warning filed a Renewed

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Motion to Dismiss or, in the alternative, a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 46, and both
Equifax and Experian filed Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 47, 48. Trans Union filed an answer,
ECF No. 45, to the Supplemental Complaint. However, the Court will consider Trans Union’s
Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint, ECF No. 33.
All four Defendants assert that the Complaint fails as a matter of law to plead intelligible
facts as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or to state a cause of action pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) and should be dismissed for those reasons.
III. ANALYSIS
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) prescribes “liberal pleading standards,” requiring
only that a plaintiff submit a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that [he] is entitled
to relief.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Supplementing Rule 8(a), Rule 8(d), however, states that “[e]ach allegation must be simple,
concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a plaintiff
must plead facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that
a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although a
court will accept factual allegations as true, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Id. Indeed, the court need not
accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or “unwarranted inferences, unreasonable
conclusions, or arguments.” E. Shore Markets, Inc. v. J.D. Associates Ltd. P’ship, 213 F.3d 175,
180 (4th Cir. 2000). In the end, the complaint must contain factual allegations sufficient to

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apprise a defendant of “what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
While federal courts are obliged to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s claims in applying
the above analysis, this requirement “does not transform the court into an advocate.” United
States v. Wilson, 699 F.3d 789, 797 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Fourth Circuit has noted that “[w]hile pro se complaints may ‘represent the work of an
untutored hand requiring special judicial solicitude,’ a district court is not required to recognize
‘obscure or extravagant claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them.’” Weller v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton,
775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1088 (1986)).
Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Jackson’s Complaint as a matter of law. First,
they argue that the Complaint should be dismissed wholesale because it remains an
impermissible shotgun pleading, failing on its face to comply with the requirements of Rule
8(a)(2). Def. Trans Union’s Mot. Dismiss, 4–5, ECF No. 33, Early Warning’s Mot. Dismiss 5–6,
ECF No. 46; Def. Equifax’s Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF No. 47, Def. Experian’s Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF
No. 48. Further, to the extent that the allegations in the Complaint are at all intelligible,
Defendants contend that they fail to state a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). Def. Trans
Union’s Mot. Dismiss 6-14, Def. Early Warning’s Mot. Dismiss 6–12, Def. Equifax’s Mot.
Dismiss 4–7, Def. Experian’s Mot. Dismiss 5–11. The Court agrees with Defendants that
Jackson’s Supplemental Complaint fails to cure the pleading deficiencies identified in its
February 5, 2016 Memorandum Order and Opinion and otherwise fails to state a claim for relief.

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A. Shotgun Pleading
A complaint which “fails to articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow the defendant
to frame a responsive pleading . . . or [one in which] it is virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claims for relief” constitutes a “shotgun
pleading.” SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. v. First Residential Mortgage Servs. Corp., No. 3:12CV162,
2012 WL 7062086, at *7 (E.D. Va. Sept. 11, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:12CV162, 2013 WL 505828 (E.D. Va. Feb. 8, 2013). Rule 8(a)(2) “prohibit[s]” “[p]leadings of
this nature.” Lampkin-Asam v. Volusia Cty. Sch. Bd., 261 F. App’x 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2008).3
Not only do pleadings of this sort fail to apprise the opposing party of the particular claims
against it (and the potential extent of its liability), see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; they also
“water[] down the rights of parties to have valid claims litigated efficiently” and waste scarce
judicial resources, see Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1130-31 (11th Cir. 2001), abrogated on
other grounds by Douglas Asphalt Co. v. QORE, Inc., 657 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 2011).
The Court held that Jackson’s Original Complaint was a “textbook example of a shotgun
pleading,” Mem. Op. 7. His Supplemental Complaint hardly fares better.
The Supplemental Complaint still fails to “pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 663. To be sure, Jackson has heeded the Court’s instructions in part, adding details
specifying eight pieces of allegedly inaccurate information reported by Defendants. As such, the
Court now has a somewhat better understanding of the inaccuracies alleged. However, Jackson
still has not addressed the Court’s requirement that he specify which Defendants made which
3

These pleadings also often violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(b), which requires that parties
state claims or defenses “in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of
circumstances.” See also JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Hayhurst Mortgage, Inc., No. 10-21501-CIV,
2010 WL 2949573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. July 26, 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b)) (noting that shotgun
pleadings fail to comply with Rule 10(b)).
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inaccurate reports. Rather, the Supplemental Complaint, once again pleads various violations
without ascribing any particular actions to any particular Defendant.4 The Supplemental
Complaint repeatedly states that “[a]ll of the named defendants have” listed the various
inaccuracies in Jackson’s credit file. Accordingly, both Defendants and the Court remain unable
to reasonably infer which Defendants are “liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
663. See also Turton v. Virginia Dep't of Educ., No. 3:14CV446, 2014 WL 12539403, at *2
(E.D. Va. Sept. 23, 2014) (“[T]his Amended Complaint is the quintessential ‘shotgun pleading’
that presents many different transactions, occurrences, and series of transactions or occurrences
and that is presented in such a conclusory form that it is virtually impossible to ascertain what
claims are asserted against which defendants and on what legal basis the respective claims are
founded.”).
Like the Original Complaint, the Supplemental Complaint makes bare factual assertions
only minimally connected with the statutes cited. Jackson does not allege individual conduct
that, if proven, would demonstrate that a law was violated or otherwise states a claim for relief
against any particular Defendant. The facts supplied by him simply do not support the individual
claims asserted against Defendants. Rather, he refers generally to 15 U.S.C. § 1681, without
indicating how the allegations correspond to specific FCRA violations asserted. This failure
impedes Defendants’ ability to reasonably respond as they cannot unravel how the allegations
relate to the various elements of §§ 1681e(b), 1681i, and 1681g. The Supplemental Complaint
also references violations committed by non-defendant furnishers, seemingly seeking to hold
Defendants responsible for the purported actions of First Premier Bank, Bank of America, and
American Express, despite the lack of any apparent legal basis for making them liable.
4

The Supplemental Complaint does reference Trans Union individually. However, Jackson fails to refer
to the other Defendants by name, and even his references to Trans Union are unduly vague, as he merely
cites to his Trans Union credit report, which he attaches as an exhibit.
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Because Jackson has failed to fortify his Complaint with appropriately specific
allegations, the Court finds the Complaint insufficient to meet the requirements of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 8.5 Even supplemented, the Complaint continues with unsupported,
conclusory allegations that preclude Defendants from providing meaningful responses. See
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While the Court recognizes that this is a pro se Complaint, “the
leeway extended to a pro se plaintiff must be tempered to require the plaintiff to comply with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the pleading requirements of Rule 8.” Adam v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 2010 WL 3001160, at *3 (D. Md. July 28, 2010). Simply put, as the Court
previously warned, it “cannot construct the plaintiff’s legal arguments for him.” Id.
B. Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted
Apart from the intractable allegations of the Complaint, Defendants argue, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), that it fails to state a cause of action and should be dismissed on that ground.
1) FCRA Claims
Jackson asserts that Defendants have violated the FCRA, specifically 15 U.S.C. §§
1681e(b) (requiring CRAs to follow “reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible
accuracy” of consumer reports), 1681g (requiring CRAs to disclose information in the
consumer’s credit file upon request, subject to certain limitations and exceptions), and 1681i
(requiring CRAs to conduct a proper reinvestigation of the consumer’s file when the accuracy of
the information is disputed). See Compl. 2–3. All Defendants, according to Jackson, are liable
for negligent noncompliance with these provisions of the FCRA by reason of 15 U.S.C. § 1681o.

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“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for
the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Additionally, “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
8(d).
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Id. In support of these allegations, Jackson submits that Defendants reported inaccurate
information concerning his credit history despite his attempts to dispute the inaccuracies, see
Suppl. Compl. 1–3, and that Defendants failed to provide him with certain information in his
credit file, specifically a “consumer contract” with his “wet ink” signature on it. See Compl.
The FCRA does not impose strict liability. See Tinsley v. TRW Inc., 879 F. Supp. 550,
552 (1995), aff’d, 64 F.3d 659 (4th Cir. 1995). Accordingly, Jackson must show that Defendants
willfully or negligently failed to comply with the FCRA. See § 1681n and § 1681o. See also
Ausherman v. Bank of Am., 352 F.3d 896, 899-900 (4th Cir. 2003).
(a)

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) – “Reasonable Procedures Claim”

15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (referred to as a “reasonable procedures claim”) states that
“[w]henever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning the individual
about whom the report relates.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). “Interpreting § 1681e(b), courts have held
that a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie violation of this part of the FCRA, absent a showing
that: (1) the consumer report contains inaccurate information and (2) the [CRA] did not use
reasonable procedures to ensure the accuracy of the information.” Jianqing Wu v. Trans Union,
No. CIVA AW-03-1290, 2006 WL 4729755, at *4 (D. Md. May 2, 2006) (emphasis supplied),
aff'd sub nom. Jianqing Wu v. Equifax, 219 F. App'x 320 (4th Cir. 2007). See also Dalton v.
Capital Associated Indus., Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 415 (4th Cir. 2001). “Nothing in the statute
suggests that a plaintiff is relieved of the burden of showing that the agency failed to follow
reasonable procedures.” Dalton, 257 F.3d at 416. While the failure of a CRA to follow
“reasonable procedures” is ordinarily a “jury question[ ] in the overwhelming majority of cases.”
see id. (quoting Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995)),

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the plaintiff is still required to “minimally present some evidence” of unreasonableness. See id.
(quoting Stewart v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 47, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
Unlike the Original Complaint, the Supplemental Complaint fairly alleges that
Defendants listed inaccurate information in Jackson’s credit file. However, neither the Original
Complaint nor the Supplemental Complaint allege that Defendants failed to use reasonable
procedures to ensure the reports’ accuracy. In fact, neither pleading references a single procedure
implemented (or not implemented) by Defendants. That is, there is absolutely no discussion of
the ways that Defendants did not seek to ensure that their information was accurate, let alone
whether what Defendants did or did not do was reasonable. The implementing regulations of the
FCRA make clear that a CRA in fact follows reasonable procedures if it relies on information
from a reputable source unless it has some notice of systemic problems with the accuracy of its
reports. See Wu at *6 (citing Commentary on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 16 C.F.R. pt. 600
app.). Here, Jackson has not alleged that Defendants had such notice. Therefore, because Jackson
has failed to plausibly assert any specific allegation of unreasonableness on the part of
Defendants, the Court can only presume that Defendants followed reasonable procedures. In
light of this, Jackson’s reasonable procedures claim must be dismissed.
Jackson’s § 1681e(b) claim must also be dismissed because he has failed to allege that
Defendants prepared a credit report about him. Section 1681e(b) only provides protection for a
consumer where “a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report.” See 15. U.S.C.
1681e(b), Other circuits have held that a “[t]here is no consumer report unless there is a
‘communication . . . for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s
eligibility for’ credit or other statutorily enumerated purposes, i.e., there cannot be a consumer
report without disclosure to a third party.” Wantz v. Experian Information Solutions, 386 F.3d

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829 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In short, where there is no evidence of disclosure to a third party, the
plaintiff cannot establish the existence of a consumer report.”) (abrogated on other
grounds, Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56 n. 8 (2007) (citing Renninger v.
ChexSystems, No. 98 C 669, 1998 WL 295497, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. May 22, 1998) (internal
citations omitted)); Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d 263, 267 (5th Cir. 2000)
(“[A] plaintiff bringing a claim that a reporting agency violated the ‘reasonable procedures’
requirement of § 1681e must first show that the reporting agency released the report in violation
of § 1681b.”); Johnson v. Equifax, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (S.D. Ala. 2007) (“Because a
prerequisite to a cause of action under § 1681e(b) is evidence showing that a consumer report
was furnished to a third party, all of [plaintiff’s] FCRA claims fail as a matter of law.”). This
requirement is appropriate for two reasons. First, if inaccurate information is never disclosed to a
third party, the plaintiff cannot claim injury. Second, under the FCRA, a consumer report is
defined as “any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a consumer
reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity,
character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used or
expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer’s eligibility for,” personal credit or insurance purposes, employment
purposes, and other purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1). In order to serve such a purpose, a credit
report would need to be disclosed to a third party.
Put simply, Jackson has in no way pled with specificity that Defendants disclosed his
credit information to a third party. While he alludes to the fact that Defendants have maintained
credits file about him and cites to and attaches his Trans Union credit history, he does not allege

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that Defendants communicated any of this information to a third party.6 Accordingly, even
assuming arguendo that Jackson could establish that Defendants failed to “follow reasonable
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning [him],” he
would not have a viable cause of action under § 1681e(b) because he does explain when and to
whom Defendants disclosed the credit reports.
(b)

15 U.S.C. § 1681i – “Reinvestigation Claim”

15 U.S.C. § 1681i (referred to as a “reinvestigation claim”) permits a consumer to
challenge the content of credit reports. Section 1681i(a) states that where a consumer disputes
“the completeness or accuracy of any item of information contained in a consumer’s file,” and
“notifies the agency . . . of such dispute,” the agency must “conduct a reasonable reinvestigation
to determine whether the disputed information is inaccurate.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). If “an
item of the information is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified,” the agency
must “delete that item of information from the file of the consumer, or modify that item of
information, as appropriate.” Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A)(i). Irrespective of the results of the
reinvestigation, within thirty days of receiving notice, the CRA must “record the current status of
the disputed information, or delete the item from the file.” Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). The CRA must
also provide notice to the consumer of the results of a reinvestigation within five business days
of completing the reinvestigation, id. § 1681i(a)(6), and if the CRA modifies or deletes any
information in the credit file, it must notify the furnisher of that information of the change. Id. §
1681i(a)(5)(A)(ii).
Jackson does not specify which subsection of § 1681i Defendants allegedly violated. The
Original Complaint proclaims only that CRAs “bear grave responsibilities to ensure the accuracy
6

In his Original Complaint, Jackson says that Defendants “published false and inaccurate information
about [him] to third parties who reasonably recognize[d] the information is defamatory . . .” However,
such a conclusory statement is simply insufficient. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
13

of the accounts they report on and that responsibility must consist of something more than
merely parroting information received from other sources.”7 The Supplemental Complaint offers
no more than threadbare recitals of many of § 1681i’s requirements, stating that “individuals . . .
may dispute inaccurate information that appears in a credit report . . . [and CRAs] are required to
investigate disputes and provide a report back to the consumer. If the CRA cannot resolve the
dispute, the individual can add a statement to the credit report. Inaccurate or unverifiable
information must be removed within 30 days of notice of the dispute.”8
As stated above, a CRA’s liability under § 1681i is triggered only when “the
completeness or accuracy [of the information] . . . is disputed by the consumer and the consumer
notifies the agency directly . . . of such dispute.” Id. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). See Petty v. Equifax Info.
Servs., LLC, No. CIV.A. CCB-10-694, 2010 WL 4183542, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 25, 2010). See
also Alston v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., No. GJH-15-3100, 2016 WL 4521651, at *10 (D.
Md. Aug. 26, 2016) (“To state a claim for violation of § 1681i, a plaintiff must allege ‘(1) that
[s]he disputed the accuracy of an item in . . . her credit file; (2) the CRA failed to conduct a
reasonable reinvestigation; and (3) that a reasonable reinvestigation by the CRA could have
uncovered the inaccuracy.”) (quoting Burke v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1064
AJT/TRJ, 2011 WL 1085874, at *3 (E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2011)); Casella v. Equifax Credit Info.

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The Original Complaint loosely mentions FCRA § 611(a)(1)(A) [§ 1681i(a)(1)(A)], with respect to the
allegation that Defendants did not provide Jackson with a copy of original documentation with a wet-ink
signature on it. It also cites to 15 U.S.C. § 1666, the Fair Credit Billing Act, which requires that after a
creditor receives written notice form an obligor of a billing error in a statement, the creditor must conduct
an investigation and send written explanation to the consumer setting forth why the creditor believes the
account was correctly shown in the statement. However, as explained in the Court’s February 5, 2016
Memorandum Opinion, Jackson “does not allege facts to suggest that any Defendant is or was, at any
relevant time, a creditor or credit card issuer—and, in fact, they are not.”
8
The Supplemental Complaint also suggests that furnishers have duties once an individual disputes
inaccurate information with them, likely referring to the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2. However,
because Jackson does not allege facts suggesting that any Defendant is or was, at any relevant time, a
furnisher—and, in fact, they are not—this assertion is meritless.
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Servs., 56 F.3d 469, 474 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Prior to being notified by a consumer, a credit
reporting agency generally has no duty to reinvestigate credit information.”). This requirement
serves an important purpose: “Without notice of a consumer’s dispute, including an explanation
of why a consumer believes his or her report is inaccurate or incomplete, a CRA generally would
not know what information to reinvestigate, how to reinvestigate it, or whether upon
reinvestigation the information is indeed inaccurate or incomplete.” Id. Accordingly, for each of
the inaccuracies alleged by Jackson, the Court must search for a corresponding allegation that
Jackson disputed the inaccuracy with Defendants.
Jackson’s Supplemental Complaint alleges eight separate – and conveniently numbered –
credit file inaccuracies. See Suppl. Compl. With regard to numbers two (Walmart), four (Credit
One Bank), five (FNB Omaha), and seven (Bank of America), Jackson does not allege that he
disputed the alleged inaccuracies with any of these furnishing companies, much less with
Defendants. See id. With respect to numbers one (American Express), three (First Premier
Bank), and six (Capital One), Jackson alleges that he apparently did lodge disputes with these
furnishing companies (as opposed to any Defendant), but he does not allege to whom he brought
the dispute or when. Since he has not pled that he disputed the foregoing supposed inaccuracies
with Defendants at all, as opposed to the furnishers themselves or some third party, no cause of
action has been stated against Defendants.9 This leaves only inaccuracy number eight (the
“Verizon” inaccuracy).

9

Disputing an inaccuracy with a furnisher is not enough. Even if the CRA is informed of the dispute by
the furnisher, the FCRA requires that the information be conveyed by the consumer directly to the credit
reporting agency. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A). See also Whelan v. Trans Union Credit Reporting
Agency, 862 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). Moreover, even if the Supplemental Complaint
adequately alleged that Jackson disputed the inaccuracies related to numbers one, three, and six with
Defendants, Jackson’s § 1681i claims would fail as a matter of law for the reasons stated below with
respect to inaccuracy number eight.
15

In the Supplemental Complaint, Jackson states, “All of the named defendants have listed
the account with plaintiff’s Verizon account as being a collection account; this information is
incorrect and inaccurate because this Verizon account was never a collection account and
plaintiff had paid it off in full and plaintiff disputed this inaccurate information to all named
defendants but they never corrected the inaccuracy of this account.” Suppl. Compl. 3. Unlike the
other alleged inaccuracies, Jackson does explicitly allege that he disputed the Verizon inaccuracy
with Defendants. However, he has failed to plead anything more than that the inaccuracy relates
to the categorization of Jackson’s Verizon account as a collections account and the existence of a
debt owed on that account. Accordingly, Defendants – and the Court – are left with virtually no
understanding of the nature of the dispute. Jackson does not specify when and how he disputed
the information with any one Defendant. C.f. Ogbon v. Beneficial Credit Servs., Inc., 2011 WL
347222 * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2011). Rather, he relies on a blanket statement that he disputed this
inaccuracy with every Defendant. Lacking as it does appropriate specifics (when?, how?, etc.), it
would be patently unfair to take the Defendants to law over allegations as vague as these.
Moreover, other than threadbare recitals of the § 1681i requirements, Jackson does not
allege that Defendants failed to conduct a reasonable reinvestigation or provide him with notice
of the reinvestigations results. The mere failure of a CRA to delete information does not raise a
claim under § 1681i. The statute only requires the deletion of information if the reinvestigation
reveals that the information is “inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified.” 15 U.S.C. §
1681i(a)(5)(A). A claim under § 1681i requires showing that “the CRA failed to respond or
conduct a reasonable reinvestigation of the disputed items . . . .” Parker v. Certified Profile, LLC,
No. 7:14-CV-37-BO, 2014 WL 3534129, at *2 (E.D.N.C. July 16, 2015). In this case,
Defendants might well have fulfilled their obligations under § 1681i by reinvestigating the

16

disputed items and determining that they should not be deleted, regardless of Jackson’s
assertions that they are “inaccurate.” The § 1681i claim is therefore dismissed against all
Defendants.
(c)

15 U.S.C. § 1681g – “Disclosures to Consumers Claim”

15 U.S.C. § 1681g requires CRAs to disclose information in a consumer’s credit file
upon request from the consumer, subject to certain limitations and exceptions. Like the Original
Complaint, the Supplemental Complaint contains only one factual allegation which can
conceivably be tied to this statute. That allegation – related to Defendants’ purported failure to
supply Jackson with verified and validated copies of his original signed certified consumer
contracts – is nearly identical to the allegation rejected by the Court as too vague in its February
5, 2016 Memorandum Opinion. The Complaints seemingly assert that § 1681g requires CRAs to
physically verify the original signed certified consumer contract for all accounts listed on a credit
report, then to supply the customer with these verified documents. However, § 1681g does not
require CRAs either to verify original signed consumer contracts or to send them to consumers.
As the Court noted in the February 5, 2016 Memorandum Opinion, Jackson’s assertions related
to “‘original documentation’ of ‘a consumer contract’ with his signature on it . . . are not
connected in any conceivable way with the statutes Jackson cites.” Mem. Op. 8. Furthermore,
Jackson does not allege, with appropriate specifics (what?, when?, to whom?, etc.) that he
requested the disclosure of a file or file information, as required by the FCRA. See 15 U.S.C. §
1681g (“Every consumer reporting agency shall, upon request, . . . disclose to the consumer
. . .”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, his § 1681ig claim is dismissed against all Defendants.

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2) Defamation Claim
The Supplemental Complaint is altogether silent with respect to the defamation claim.10
Therefore, it does not cure the defects in the Original Complaint, which, in its February 5, 2016
Memorandum Opinion, the Court said contained “only conclusory allegations that defamatory
statements were made at some point by one, possibly all the Defendants.” The Supplemental
Complaint alleges only that an unspecified Defendant “knowingly, intentionally repeatedly
publish[ed] false and inaccurate information about [him] to third parties.” This mere recitation of
the legal standard falls far short of pleading the malice or willful intent to injure which underpin
a defamation claim.11 Furthermore, Jackson does not allege when and to whom Defendants
allegedly reported inaccurate information. In sum, he has failed to state a plausible claim for
defamation. The defamation claim, along with the others, will be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Trans Union’s, Early Warning’s, Equifax’s, and Experian’s
Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 33, 46, 47, and 48) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s suit will be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as set forth in the accompanying Order.

/s/
_
PETER J. MESSITTE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
December 13, 2016

10

Although Jackson’s Response in Opposition states in general that Defendants submitted defamatory
statements to various banks and companies, this allegation cannot be taken as “well-pleaded” for the
purposes of overcoming a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
Dides v. Ocwen Loan Servs., LLC, 2013 WL 153858 at *1 (D. Md. Jan. 14, 2013).
11
Because Jackson fails to allege that Defendants acted with “malice or willful intent to injure,” his
defamation claim is preempted by 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e). See Ross v. F.D.I.C., 625 F.3d 808, 814 (4th Cir.
2010).
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