Francis v. Secretary, Dept. of Public Safety and Corr. Services (DPSCS)
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 11/30/2015. (kns, Deputy Clerk)(c/m 11/30/15)
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IN THE UNITED STATES J)JSTRICT COURT __
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
FIlED
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E_Nll'REO
RECEIVED
Soutltem DiI';s;oll
[0-
NOV 3 02015
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CHRISTOPHER
AT bnc.c.,".c. •. ,
et.ElIK U.S. DlSTRICT COUR,
D'S11\lCT OF MAlMAIIo
S. FRANCIS,
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Plaintiff,
BY
O£PIJTy
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Case No.: G./H-15-1255
v,
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SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY AND
CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES,
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Defendant.
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MEMORANDUM
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OPINION
This is a 42 U.S.C. ~ 1983 Complaint brought by Plaintiff Christopher S. Francis against
the Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("'DPSCS") arising
from Francis's intrastate transfer to a Western Maryland prison. This Memorandum Opinion and
accompanying Order address Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. or in the Alternative. Motion for
Summary Judgment. See ECF No. 10. A hearing is unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.
2014). For the reasons stated below. Defendant' s Motion. treated as a motion for summary
judgment. is GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
Francis, who is confined at the Western Correctional Institution ("WCI") in Cumberland.
Maryland. complains that the administrative chaplain at the Roxbury Correctional Institution in
Hagerstown. Maryland ("'RCI-H") had him moved to a higher security prison. the Western
Correctional Institution. that was a distance Irom his family and "homc plan" address. in
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retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights in Iiling administrative inmate request
fonns and verbally questioning the chaplain's failure to honor "commitments"to
the music
program at RCI-H. He further claims that this caused him to lose his job as a Plant Maintenance
Technician with Maryland Correctional Enterprises (""MCE") and the corresponding income and
diminution credits. Francis claims that the move occurred in spite of his excellent work history
and very good institutional record. ECF No. I. Francis's Complaint seeks punitive and
compensatory damages. as well as "restorative relief' in the way of transfer to a Jessup.
Maryland Correctional facility. back pay. and restoration of his job and lost diminution credits,
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.
Motion to Dismiss
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 12(b)(6)"") authorizes
dismissal of a complaint if it lails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose
of Rule 12(b)(6) is •.to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding
the facts. the merits of a claim. or the applicability of defenses:' Presley \'. City (J{
Charlottesville. 464 F,3d 480. 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations
omitted) (quoting Edll'ards
1'.
City o{Goldshoro.
178 F.3d 231. 243 (4th Cir. 1999», When
ruling on such a motion. the Court must "acceptthe well-pled allegations of the complaint as
true." and "construe the tacts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff:" Iharm \'. United States, 120 F,3d 472. 474 (4th Cir. 1997). But this
Court "need not accept the legal conclusions drawn from the tacts. and need not accept as true
unwarranted interences, unreasonable conclusions or arguments:' Nel11etChevrolel, Lid. \'.
Con.l'lIl11era[{airs.col11,
Inc.. 591 F,3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted),
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The Supreme Court's opinions in Bell Allanlic Corp. v. Twombly. 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
and AshcrrJ/i v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), "require that complaints in civil actions be alleged
with greater specificity than previously was required:' Wallers \'. McMahen, 684 F.3d 435, 439
(4th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Twombly articulated ..[t]wo working principles" that courts
must employ when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. First.
while a court must accept as true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint, legal
conclusions drawn from those tacts are not afforded such deference. Id. (stating that
"[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements ofa cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suftice" to plead a claim). Second, a complaint must be dismissed ifit does
not allege a "plausible" claim for relief. Id. at 678-79 ("A claim has facial plausibility when thc
plaintiff pleads tactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct allcged.").
B.
Summary Judgment
Summmy judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Mesoll \'. GA 7X Tech. Sen's. Corp.,
507 F.3d 803, 806 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
issue of materiallaet
exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party:' Anderson
Y.
Liberly Lobby. Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 248 (J 986).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine dispute exists with regard to
material facts. See Pulliam Inl'. Co.. Inc.
Y.
Cameo Props .. 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987).
Notably, the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact by
establishing that ..there is an absence of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's case:' See
Celalex Corp. \'. Calre/l, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). If the party seeking summary judgment
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demonstrates that there is no admissible evidence to SUPPOlt the nonmoving party's case. the
burden shifts to the nonmoving party to identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. See Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co.. 241 F.R.D. 534.535 (D. Md. 2007).
However, the "mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat
an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment ... :. Anderson, 477 U.S. at
247-48 (emphasis in original). The evidentiary materials presented must show facts from which
the fact finder could reasonably find for the party opposing summary judgment. See ill. at 252.
The facts themselves. and the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts. must be viewed
in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Scol/ v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372. 378 (2007); Iko
v. Shreve. 535 F.3d 225. 230 (4th Cir. 2008). who may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of his pleading but instead must. by aflidavit or other evidentiary showing. set out
specific facts showing a genuine dispute for trial. fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)( I). Supporting and
opposing aflidavits arc to be made on personal knowledge. contain such facts as would be
admissible in evidence. and show aflirmatively the competence of the affiant to testify to the
matters stated in the aflidavit. See fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(4).
Where. as here. defendant's motion relies on materials outside the scope of the pleadings.
the dispositive motions shall be converted into a motion for summary judgment. See MeBl/mey \'.
Cl/eeinelli. 616 F.3d 393. 409 n.2 (4th Cir. 2010), For reasons to follow. the Court-construed
motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
III.ANALYSIS
Plaintiffs Complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U,S,c. ~ 1983. which '''is not itselfa source
of substantive rights.' but provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere
conferred:-- Albright \'. Oliver. 510 U.S, 266. 271 (1994) (quoting Baker \'. MeCo/lan.443
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U,S,
137,144 n.3 (1979)). A suit under ~ 1983 allows "a party who has been deprived ofa federal
right under the color of state law to seck relief:' eily o(M011lerey
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Del M011leDunes £/1
MOnlerey. Lid.. 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). To state a claim under ~ 1983. a plaintifTmust allege
that (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that
the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See lVesl 1'.
Aikins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
This Court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. see 8eOl/l'. Harris, 550 U.S. at 378; Erickson. 551 U.S. at 94, and liberally
construes Francis's pleadings in light of the fact that he is selt~represented, see Gordon \'. Leek,
574F.2d 1147, 1151 (4thCir.I978).
Defendants contend that Administrative Chaplain Keith Kitchen spoke to Francis about
Francis's request to become the inmate facilitator of the band and music activities in the RCl-11
music program. The request was denied. Kitchen states that he had no involvement in the
decision to transfer Francis. ECF NO.1 0-3. RCI-H Case Management Manager, Mark Myers.
maintains that an inmate has a security status review at least once every twelve months and on
August 13,2013. Francis had that review and it was recommended and approved in September
2013 that he be placed on "Any Medium Transfer List:' ECF No. 10-5. A former Case
Management Manager at RCI-H, Frances Geist. states that RCI-H has a Special Needs Unit
("'SNU") as part of its programming. ECF No. J 0-6. Geist states that when she receives a request
for inmates from other institutions to be housed at RCl-lrs
SNU. she needs to transfer an equal
number of inmates from RCI-H to the requesting institution. Id. According to Geist. she
responded to a request to accept the transfer of two inmates from WCI to RCI-II SNU's program
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on or around January 24. 2014. Id. As Francis met the criteria for transfer based upon his security
instruments. his name was submitted for transfer to WCI. Id Geist aflirms that this was a
"routine" transfer and neither Chaplain Kitchen nor the Secretary of the DPSCS had any
involvement in the movemcnt. Id.
In Opposition. Francis seeks recusal of Defendant's counsel. ECF No. 12. He asks that
counsel be appointed to represent him. Id. Francis seemingly maintains that Kitchen has
"misremembered"
the substance and timing of the encounter he had with him. Id. He further
argues that the timing of his transfer. soon alier his tiling of a "staff complaint:' represents a
suspicious chronology and the rationale for his transfer as set out by Ms. Geist is merely a
convenient excuse to "swap" him to a higher security facility. Id. Francis opines that there were
more qualified candidates for transfer to WCI. lie further contends that the conditions at WCl are
more strict and oppressive than those at RCI-Illd.
The basis of Francis's claim is that he was
transferred out of RCI-H to WCI in retaliation for his administrative complaints against
Administrative Chaplain Kitchen. His claim fails.
First. Francis has failed to set out a claim against the named Defendant. the Secretary for
the DPSCS. alleging how he personally participated in violating his rights under the law. 1 See
Shaw v. Shroud. 13 F.3d 791. 799 (4th Cir. 1994); Vinnedge v. Gihhs. 550 F.2d 926. 928 (4th
Cir. 1977). In certain circumstances. supervisory officials may be held liable for the
constitutional injuries inflicted by their subordinates. See Shaw \'. Slroud. 13 F.3d 791. 798 (4th
Cir. 1994) (citing S/akan \'. Porler. 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984)). This liability. however. is not
Under ~ 1983. individual liability must be based on personal conduct. See Wrighl v. Col/illS. 766 F.2d
841.850 (4th Cir. 1985); see also Foole \'. Spiegal. 118 F.3d 1416. 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). Further. absent
subjective knowledge, a prison official is not liable. Farmer \'. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825. 847 (1994); see
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premised on responJem superior. but rather upon "a recognition that supervisory indifference or
tacit authorization of subordinates' misconduct may be a causative factor in the constitutional
injuries they inflict on those committed to their care:' Id. at 798 (quoting Siakan. 737 F.2d at
372-73). "[Ljiability ultimately is determined 'by pinpointing the persons in the decision-making
chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to continue unchecked.' ..
Id at 798 (quoting Siakan, 737 F.2d at 376).
To establish supervisory liability against the Secrctary under
* 1983. Francis must show:
"( 1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that his subordinate was cngaged in
conduct that posed 'a pervasive and unreasonable risk' of constitutional injury to citizcns like the
plaintiff.2; (2) that thc supervisor's responsc to that knowledge was so inadcquate as to show
"deliberate indiffercnce to or tacit authorization ofthc alleged ollcnsive practices"; and (3) that
there was "an 'allirmative causal link' between the supervisor's inaction and the particular
constitutional injury sut1cred by the plaintiff" Shall'. 13 F3d at 799. Francis has not made or
supported any such allegations.
Moreover, Francis's transfer to another prison facility. while possibly proving a travel
hardship for family members who live at a distance. does not implicate a libcrty interest.
Generally, prisoners do not have a constitutional right to demand to be housed in one prison
setting verses another. "[Gjiven a valid conviction. thc criminal defendant has been
Johnson v. Quinones. 145 F.3d 164. 168 (4th Cir. 1998).
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"Establishing a 'pervasive' and 'unreasonable' risk of harm requires evidence that the conduct is
widespread. or at least has been used on several dinerent occasions and that the conduct engaged in by the
subordinate poses an unreasonable risk of harm or constitutional injury." Shall'. 13 F.3d at 799."A plaintiff
may establish deliberate indifference by demonstrating a supervisor's continued inaction in the face of
documented widespread abuses." ld.
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constitutionally
deprived
of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject
him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions
in SandinI'. Conner. 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the focus on mandatory
pronouncement
language in prison regulations
imposes an "atypical
was rejected. A liberty interest may be created when state action
and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents
of prison life" without regard to mandatory
language in prison regulations.
due process inquiry must foeus on the nature of the deprivation
of particular
prison regulations.
experience
segregation.
as an ordinary
and significant
Id. at 484. Thus. the
alleged and not on the language
Id. Following the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sandin. the
Fourth Circuit held that a liberty interest is not implicated
administrative
do not otherwise
Jvleachlllll v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215. 224 (1976). Under the Supreme
violate the Constitution:'
Court's
of confinement
because when compared
when inmates are placed on
with these conditions
incident of prison life, such placement
hardship. See Beverati
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they would expect to
does not constitute
an atypical
SlIlith. 120 F.3d 500. 502-04 (4th Cif. 1997); R~ffill ".
Nixon, 917 F. Supp. 409, 413 (E.D. Va. 1996).
In Beverati. the Fourth Circuit. in aflirming
placement
in segregation
did not comparatively
rise to a liberty interest in avoiding
comprised
the type of hardship necessary to give
See Bel'erati. 120 F.3d at 503. Likewise.
here which shows that the nature of transfer to WCI
the atypical hardship contemplated
reclassification
constitute
such placement.
there is nothing in the record or pleadings
the decision of this Court. held that Beverati's
by Sandin or Beverati. Thus. Francis's
to that facility does not implicate a liberty interest.
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In addition.
following
the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Sandin. it appears that an
inmate has no liberty intcrest in bcing assigned to a specific job3 See Penrod \'. Zamrlls. 94 F.3d
1399. 1407 (10th Cir. 1996): Frazier
I'.
Coughlin. 8 I FJd 3 I 3 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam):
Bulger v. United States Bureau a/Prisons. 65 F.3d 48. 49 (5th Cir. 1995): see also Olill1\'.
Wakinekana, 461 U.S. 238, 244-45 (1983): Paoli \'. [ally. 812 F.2d 1489. 1492-93 (4th Cir.
1987). Francis's
transfer to WCl is not an atypical event in the ordinary day-to-day
prison life and cannot be said to have imposed a significant
incidents of
hardship on him. Simply put. Francis
does not have a general due process right to obtain a particular job.~
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs
Defendant's
Dated:
claims against Defcndant
Motion for Summary
November
Judgment
Secretary arc legally unsupported.
will be GRANTED.
Accordingly.
A separate Order follows.
4-A--
JQ . 20 15
GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge
Prior to Sandin, the Fourth Circuit held that inmates did nol have a constitutionally protected righlto
an institutional job or to remain in a particular job once assigned. See Altizer I'. Paderick. 569 F.2d 812. 815
(4th Cir. 1978): Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 n.2 (4th Cir. 1977): see also Awalt I'. Whalen, 809 F.
Supp.414,416-17(E.D.
Va, 1992).
I,,,
Likewise. Francis's claim that he was transferred in rctaliation
his questions and inmate rcquest
forms regarding Chaplain Kitchen's handling of the RCI-H music program is not actionable, Thc inmatc
alleging retaliation "[b Jears the burden of showing that thc conduct at issue was constitu! ionally protected and
that the protected conduct was a substantial motivating fact in the prison ollicials' decision
Graham ".
Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996). Francis has no constitutional right in making such inquiries or
administrative complaints, See Adams v. Rice. 40 F.3d 72. 75 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Constitution creates no
entitlement to [prison] grievance procedures or access to any such procedurc voluntarily established by a
state,") (citations omitted), Further. Defendant has shown that Francis's transfer occurred in a routine manner
and was put into motion prior to his conduct.
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