Demaria v. Target Corporation
Filing
88
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/12/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LAURA DEMARIA
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 15-1270
:
TARGET CORPORATION
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is
the motion for a new trial filed by Plaintiff Laura Demaria
(“Plaintiff”).
(ECF No. 83).
The issues have been briefed, and
the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule
105.6.
For
the
following
reasons,
that
unrefuted
the
motion
Local
will
be
denied.
Plaintiff
argues
the
evidence
at
trial
showed Defendant Target Corporation (“Defendant”) knew about a
danger,
reason
refused
for
its
to
eliminate
refusal,
the
and,
danger,
therefore,
and
the
lacked
verdict
a
good
finding
Defendant not liable was against the weight of the evidence and
Plaintiff should receive a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
59.
(ECF
No.
83,
at
5)
(“Since
Target’s
reason
for
not
eliminating the danger has no merit, the overwhelming weight of
the evidence demonstrates that Target’s deliberate choice to not
eliminate the danger was unreasonable.”).
Defendant does not
dispute the foreseeability of an injury but argues that its
decision was reasonable considering all relevant factors.
(ECF
No. 85, at 4-5).
In
diversity
actions,
a
district
court
applies
the
substantive law and choice of law rules of the state in which
the court sits.
Padco Advisors, Inc. v. Omdahl, 179 F.Supp.2d
600, 605 (D.Md. 2002) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S.
64
(1938)).
In
a
tort
action,
Maryland
law
requires
applying “the substantive tort law of the state where the wrong
occurs.”
Hauch
accident
in
this
v.
Connor,
case
Maryland law applies.
295
occurred
See id.
Md.
in
120,
123
Maryland,
(1983).
and,
The
therefore,
Maryland law does not, however,
govern procedural rules in this court, even when jurisdiction is
based
on
diversity,
and
it
does
not
apply
when
there
is
conflicting federal law.
Under Maryland law, “the proprietor of a store is not an
insurer of his customers while they are on the premises,” and
“no presumption of negligence on the part of the proprietor
arises merely from showing that an injury was sustained in his
store.”
Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 118-19
(1955).
Even where a defendant knows of a danger and does not
eliminate it, a defendant is not liable unless allowing the
danger
to
persist
was
unreasonable.
Giant
Food,
Inc.
v.
Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 642 (1994) (“‘Even though the intervening
2
cause
may
be
regarded
as
foreseeable,
the
defendant
is
not
liable unless the defendant’s conduct has created or increased
an
unreasonable
risk
of
harm
through
its
intervention.’”
(quoting W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §
44, at 305 (5th ed. 1984))).
In a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, a district court
must “set aside the verdict and grant a new trial if . . . the
verdict
is
against
the
clear
weight
of
the
evidence[.]”
Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99
F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996).
“[O]n a motion for new trial
under Rule 59(e) a district court is permitted to weigh the
evidence.”
Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290
F.3d 639, 650 (4th Cir. 2002).
“[T]he district court has a duty
to order a new trial to prevent an injustice.”
Johnson & Towers
Balt., Inc. v. Vessel Hunter, 824 F.Supp. 562, 566 (D.Md. 1992).
However,
“‘[c]ourts
reasonably
grant
trials
error
has
unless
is
11
&
Arthur
R.
Procedure § 2803 (3d ed. 2017).
new
trial
rests
with
the
Miller,
crept
it
record or that substantial justice has not been done.’”
Wright
prejudicial
new
the
Alan
that
not
into
Charles
clear
do
Federal
Practice
&
The decision to grant or deny a
discretion
of
the
district
court.
Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1433 (4th Cir. 1985).
3
Here, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that some risk of harm
existed and that the risk was foreseeable.
(ECF No. 85, at 4)
(“Target did not dispute that it was foreseeable at the time of
the accident that a customer could place a cart onto the down
escalator.”).
The
parties
disagreed
whether
the
risk
was
unreasonable, and Plaintiff had the burden of establishing at
trial that the risk was unreasonable by a preponderance of the
evidence.
(Id. at 3-5); Kruvat v. Dickerman, 18 Md.App. 1, 3-4
(1973).
Plaintiff
offered
an
expert
who
testified
that
Defendant acted unreasonably in designing its escalator because
Defendant could have eliminated any risk.
Defendant offered an
expert who testified that the design plan for the escalator
reflected a careful balancing of different safety concerns and
that the risk was not unreasonable because any potential fix
would
create
other
safety
issues.
Facing
this
competing
evidence, the jury found that the Plaintiff had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the risk was unreasonable.
The jury’s decision was not against the clear weight of the
evidence.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
4
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?