Demaria v. Target Corporation

Filing 88

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/12/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
LAURA DEMARIA
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-1270

:
TARGET CORPORATION
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this case is
the motion for a new trial filed by Plaintiff Laura Demaria
(“Plaintiff”).

(ECF No. 83).

The issues have been briefed, and

the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Rule

105.6.

For

the

following

reasons,

that

unrefuted

the

motion

Local

will

be

denied.
Plaintiff

argues

the

evidence

at

trial

showed Defendant Target Corporation (“Defendant”) knew about a
danger,
reason

refused
for

its

to

eliminate

refusal,

the

and,

danger,

therefore,

and
the

lacked
verdict

a

good

finding

Defendant not liable was against the weight of the evidence and
Plaintiff should receive a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
59.

(ECF

No.

83,

at

5)

(“Since

Target’s

reason

for

not

eliminating the danger has no merit, the overwhelming weight of
the evidence demonstrates that Target’s deliberate choice to not
eliminate the danger was unreasonable.”).

Defendant does not

dispute the foreseeability of an injury but argues that its
decision was reasonable considering all relevant factors.

(ECF

No. 85, at 4-5).
In

diversity

actions,

a

district

court

applies

the

substantive law and choice of law rules of the state in which
the court sits.

Padco Advisors, Inc. v. Omdahl, 179 F.Supp.2d

600, 605 (D.Md. 2002) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S.

64

(1938)).

In

a

tort

action,

Maryland

law

requires

applying “the substantive tort law of the state where the wrong
occurs.”

Hauch

accident

in

this

v.

Connor,

case

Maryland law applies.

295

occurred
See id.

Md.
in

120,

123

Maryland,

(1983).

and,

The

therefore,

Maryland law does not, however,

govern procedural rules in this court, even when jurisdiction is
based

on

diversity,

and

it

does

not

apply

when

there

is

conflicting federal law.
Under Maryland law, “the proprietor of a store is not an
insurer of his customers while they are on the premises,” and
“no presumption of negligence on the part of the proprietor
arises merely from showing that an injury was sustained in his
store.”

Rawls v. Hochschild, Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 118-19

(1955).

Even where a defendant knows of a danger and does not

eliminate it, a defendant is not liable unless allowing the
danger

to

persist

was

unreasonable.

Giant

Food,

Inc.

v.

Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 642 (1994) (“‘Even though the intervening
2

cause

may

be

regarded

as

foreseeable,

the

defendant

is

not

liable unless the defendant’s conduct has created or increased
an

unreasonable

risk

of

harm

through

its

intervention.’”

(quoting W.P. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §
44, at 305 (5th ed. 1984))).
In a motion for a new trial under Rule 59, a district court
must “set aside the verdict and grant a new trial if . . . the
verdict

is

against

the

clear

weight

of

the

evidence[.]”

Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99
F.3d 587, 594 (4th Cir. 1996).

“[O]n a motion for new trial

under Rule 59(e) a district court is permitted to weigh the
evidence.”

Dennis v. Columbia Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290

F.3d 639, 650 (4th Cir. 2002).

“[T]he district court has a duty

to order a new trial to prevent an injustice.”

Johnson & Towers

Balt., Inc. v. Vessel Hunter, 824 F.Supp. 562, 566 (D.Md. 1992).
However,

“‘[c]ourts

reasonably

grant

trials

error

has

unless

is

11

&

Arthur

R.

Procedure § 2803 (3d ed. 2017).
new

trial

rests

with

the

Miller,

crept

it

record or that substantial justice has not been done.’”
Wright

prejudicial

new

the

Alan

that

not

into

Charles

clear

do

Federal

Practice

&

The decision to grant or deny a

discretion

of

the

district

court.

Wilhelm v. Blue Bell, Inc., 773 F.2d 1429, 1433 (4th Cir. 1985).

3

Here, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that some risk of harm
existed and that the risk was foreseeable.

(ECF No. 85, at 4)

(“Target did not dispute that it was foreseeable at the time of
the accident that a customer could place a cart onto the down
escalator.”).

The

parties

disagreed

whether

the

risk

was

unreasonable, and Plaintiff had the burden of establishing at
trial that the risk was unreasonable by a preponderance of the
evidence.

(Id. at 3-5); Kruvat v. Dickerman, 18 Md.App. 1, 3-4

(1973).

Plaintiff

offered

an

expert

who

testified

that

Defendant acted unreasonably in designing its escalator because
Defendant could have eliminated any risk.

Defendant offered an

expert who testified that the design plan for the escalator
reflected a careful balancing of different safety concerns and
that the risk was not unreasonable because any potential fix
would

create

other

safety

issues.

Facing

this

competing

evidence, the jury found that the Plaintiff had not shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that the risk was unreasonable.
The jury’s decision was not against the clear weight of the
evidence.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is DENIED.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

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