Crumb v. McDonald's Corporation et al

Filing 136

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff 12/6/17 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 12/6/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
EALISE CRUMB
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-1719

:
McDONALD’S CORPORATION, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

discrimination case are a motion for summary judgment filed by
Defendants

McDonald’s

Corporation

and

Ram

Foods,

Inc.

(“RAM

Foods”) (collectively, “Defendants”) (ECF No. 129) and a motion
to deny or defer summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d)
filed by Plaintiff Ealise Crumb (“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 133).
The

issues

have

been

briefed,

and

hearing being deemed necessary.
following

reasons,

the

motion

the

court

now

rules,

Local Rule 105.6.
for

summary

judgment

no

For the
will

be

granted in part, and denied in part, and the motion to deny or
defer summary judgment will be denied.
I.

Background
A more complete recitation of the factual and procedural

background

of

this

memorandum

opinion

case

can

resolving

(ECF No. 67, at 2-8).

be

found

in

Defendants’

the
motion

court’s
to

prior

dismiss.

The remaining counts against Defendants

are racial discrimination in a place of public accommodation in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (“Title II”) (Count II), racial
discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count II),
retaliation

(Count

Plaintiff’s

IV),

claims

and

stem

fraud

from

and

two

deceit

visits

to

(Count
a

VII).1

McDonald’s

restaurant in Oxon Hill, Maryland (the “restaurant”), which is
owned and operated by Defendant RAM Foods, Inc. (“RAM Foods”).
Plaintiff alleges that on March 19, 2013, after requesting hot
fries

“right

out

of

the

grease,”

restaurant

employee

Ashley

Alston “placed the bag of food on the counter and . . . [w]hen
Plaintiff

reached

to

pick

up

the

bag,

Plaintiff a ‘big fat black hussy.’”

[Ms.]

Alston

called

(ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 39-43).

Plaintiff complained to the restaurant manager, Greg Edwards,
and relayed what Ms. Alston had called her.

(Id. ¶¶ 66-68).

Mr. Edwards asked Plaintiff to allow him to handle her complaint
at

the

franchise

Corporation.
to

the

without

(Id.).

restaurant

involving

Defendant

McDonald’s

Plaintiff alleges that when she returned
on

May

27,

Ms.

Alston

refused

to

serve

Plaintiff and ordered the cashier who took Plaintiff’s order to

1

In its prior memorandum opinion, the court construed Count
II of Plaintiff’s complaint as also asserting a claim of racial
discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects against
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private
contracts, including the contractual relationship that arises
between proprietor and customer in a restaurant setting.
(See
ECF No. 67, at 22); Gennell v. Denny’s Corp., 378 F.Supp.2d 551,
557 (D.Md. 2005) (citation omitted).
2

return Plaintiff’s money and refuse to serve her.

(Id. ¶¶ 91-

94).
Defendants filed the pending motion for summary judgment on
July 19, 2017.

(ECF No. 129).

Plaintiff filed a motion to deny

or defer Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on August 4.
(ECF No. 133).
motion

for

Defendants submitted a reply in support of their

summary

judgment

(ECF

No.

134),

and

Plaintiff

submitted a reply in support of her motion to deny or defer (ECF
No. 135).
II.

Motion to Deny or Defer Summary Judgment
A.

Standard of Review

Ordinarily,

summary

judgment

is

inappropriate

if

“the

parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery.”
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d
435, 448 (4th Cir. 2011).

Rule 56(d) allows the court to deny a

motion for summary judgment or delay ruling on the motion until
additional discovery has occurred if the “nonmovant shows by
affidavit or declaration that, for specified reasons, it cannot
present

facts

Fed.R.Civ.P.
situations

essential

56(d).

where

the

“Such

to
a

justify

motion

discovery

is

sought

its
only

could

obtained during the course of normal discovery.”
Novartis

Pharms.

Corp.,

(citation omitted).

287

F.R.D.

357,

363

opposition.”
appropriate
not

have

in

been

Zimmerman v.
(D.Md.

2012)

Notably, “Rule 56(d) does not authorize
3

‘fishing expedition[s].’”

Nautilus Ins. Co. v. REMAC Am., Inc.,

956 F.Supp.2d 674, 683 (D.Md. 2013) (citation omitted).
interpreting

Rule

56(d)

have

consistently

held

Courts
that

a

nonmovant’s request may be denied if “the additional evidence
sought for discovery would not have by itself created a genuine
issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”
Ingle ex rel. Estate of Ingle v. Yelton, 439 F.3d 191, 195 (4th
Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Poindexter v.
Mercedes–Benz Credit Corp., 792 F.3d 406, 411 (4th Cir. 2015)
(upholding the district court’s summary judgment ruling despite
the

plaintiff's

Rule

56(d)

request

because

she

“has

not

explained . . . how the information [sought in discovery] could
possibly create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient for
her to survive summary judgment, or otherwise affect the court’s
analysis”).

“In

other

words,

a

nonmovant

must

provide

‘a

reasonable basis to suggest that [the requested] discovery would
reveal triable issues of fact’ in order for such a request to be
granted.”

Agelli v. Sebelius, No. DKC–13–497, 2014 WL 347630,

at *9 (D.Md. Jan. 30, 2014) (quoting McWay v. LaHood, 269 F.R.D.
35, 38 (D.D.C. 2010)).
B.

Analysis

Plaintiff’s
discovery.
discovery

Rule

56(d)

affidavit

seeks

several

forms

of

First, Plaintiff requests that the court “permit []
to

be

completed”

because
4

“[Defendants]

have

not

provided substantial answers to the interrogatories and requests
to produce, objecting to most of them, not answering some of
them and providing only sketchy and evasive answers to most of
the rest.”

(ECF No. 133-3 ¶ 65).

Discovery in this case closed

on September 6, 2016.

Plaintiff has had multiple opportunities

to

compel

file

a

responses.

motion

to

regarding

Defendants’

discovery

Plaintiff filed two motions for an extension of time

to file a motion to compel, which the court granted, as well as
a third motion for an extension of time, which the court denied,
refusing to allow Plaintiff’s alleged discovery dispute to delay
the resolution of this case indefinitely.

(See ECF Nos. 120;

124; 128, at 3).
Plaintiff also states that she is entitled to discovery on
“the true identity of the employee who discriminated . . . and
retaliated against [her]” and that she “should not have to rely
on the Defendants” to tell her whether the employee’s true name
is

Ashley

Plaintiff
department

Alston

or

requests
of

motor

Ashley

this

Austin.

court

vehicles

to

for

“true identity of this individual.”

(ECF
issue

No.

a

Plaintiff
(Id.).

133-3

¶

69).

to

the

ascertain

the

subpoena
to

This request stems

from an insurance form in which the employee’s last name was
recorded as “Austin,” instead of Alston.

“Defendants contend

that the form contains a typo (ECF No. 84, at 1), and have
repeatedly and consistently identified the employee’s name as
5

‘Alston.’”
employee’s
genuine

(ECF
last

issue

No.

name

of

95,

is

at

Alston

material

fact

6).
or

Moreover,
Austin

whether

does

not

to

defeat

sufficient

judgment and Plaintiff’s request will be denied.

the

create

a

summary

Additionally,

Plaintiff requests this court to issue a subpoena to the Prince
George’s County Human Relations Commission “so that [Plaintiff]
can inspect the Commission’s file.”

(ECF No. 133-3 ¶ 79).

The

Commission is no longer a party to this case as all claims
against it were dismissed.

(ECF No. 68 ¶ 5).

Plaintiff’s

request is not only a fishing expedition but would not reveal
triable

issues

granted.
In

of

fact

in

order

for

such

a

request

to

be

Accordingly, her request will be denied.
addition

to

the

above

discovery,

Plaintiff

seeks

numerous categories of documents and identifies five witnesses
that she wants to depose.
80).

(ECF No. 133-3 ¶¶ 72, 73, 76, 77,

Plaintiff had the opportunity to pursue such discovery

within the limits of the rules and within the discovery period
set by the court’s scheduling order.

Plaintiff’s motion to deny

or defer summary judgment to allow for additional discovery will
be denied.
III. Motion for Summary Judgment
A.

Standard of Review

Plaintiff has failed to submit an opposition in response to
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
6

Plaintiff’s failure,

however, does not fulfill the burdens imposed on Defendants by
Rule 56.

Custer v. Pan Am. Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 410, 416 (4th

Cir. 1993).

A motion for summary judgment will be granted only

if there exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
Although the failure of a party to respond
to a summary judgment motion may leave
uncontroverted those facts established by
the motion, the moving party must still show
that the uncontroverted facts entitle the
party to “a judgment as a matter of law.”
The failure to respond to the motion does
not automatically accomplish this.
Thus,
the court, in considering a motion for
summary judgment, must review the motion,
even if unopposed, and determine from what
it has before it whether the moving party is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of
law.
Custer, 12 F.3d at 416.
B.

Analysis

1.

Vicarious Liability

Plaintiff

alleges

that

McDonald’s

Corporation

is

the

franchisor of RAM Foods and thus is liable for the actions of
former RAM Foods employee Ms. Alston.

(ECF No. 2 ¶ 8); see

DiFederico v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 130 F.Supp.3d 986, 992 (D.Md.
2015) (noting that a franchisor may be held vicariously liable

7

if it exercises direct control over a particular activity of the
franchisee

that

results

in

injury).

Defendants

argue

that

McDonald’s Corporation is not an appropriate defendant because
the franchisor is actually McDonald’s USA, LLC, not McDonald’s
Corporation.

(ECF

No.

129-1,

at

9).

Defendants

sufficient evidence to support their assertion.
at 36-37).

put

forth

(ECF No. 129-3,

Therefore, summary judgment will be granted in favor

of McDonald’s Corporation.2
Citing

to

cases

to

support

the

proposition

that

“a

negligent supervision claim may not be predicated upon a race
discrimination claim,” Defendant argues that it “cannot be held
vicariously

liable

for

[Ms.

Alston’s]

discrimination as a matter of law.”

alleged

racial

(ECF No. 129-1, at 8-9).

Plaintiff’s negligent supervision claim was dismissed by this
court in its prior memorandum opinion (ECF No. 67, at 19-20),
and Plaintiff’s racial discrimination claims under § 1981 and
Title II remain.

An employer can be liable under § 1981 and

Title II for the actions of its employees when they are acting
within the scope of employment.

Callwood v. Dave & Buster’s,

Inc., 98 F.Supp.2d 694, 709 (D.Md. 2000).

Therefore, Defendant

is not entitled to summary judgment and can be held liable for
Ms. Alston’s actions within the scope of her employment.

2

Unless otherwise noted,
“Defendant” refer to RAM Foods.
8

all

further

references

to

2.

Discrimination in Public Accommodations

In Count II, Plaintiff contends that she was denied equal
enjoyment of the services at the restaurant on the basis of race
in violation of Title II.

Under Title II, “[t]o prevail, if the

defendant is a restaurateur, the plaintiff must establish that
(1) the restaurant affects commerce; (2) the restaurant is a
public accommodation; and (3) the restaurateur denied plaintiff
full and equal enjoyment of the establishment” for reasons based
on race.
2000a;

Callwood, 98 F.Supp.2d at 709 (citing 42 U.S.C. §

Wooten v. Moore, 400 F.2d 239, 241 (4th

Cir.),

cert.

denied, 393 U.S. 1083 (1969); United States v. DeRosier, 473
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1973)).

Defendant does not put forth any

argument against Plaintiff’s Title II claim.

Therefore, in the

event that Defendant intended to move for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s Title II discrimination claim, the motion will be
denied.
3.

Section 1981

To establish a prima facie case of § 1981 discrimination in
a restaurant setting, Plaintiff must show that (1) she is a
member of a protected class; (2) she made herself available to
receive

and

pay

for

services

ordinarily

provided

by

the

defendant to all members of the public in the manner in which
they are ordinarily provided; and (3) she did not enjoy the
privileges and benefits of the contracted for experience under
9

factual circumstances which rationally support an inference of
unlawful discrimination in that (a) she was deprived of services
while

similarly

situated

persons

outside

the

protected

class

were not deprived of those services, and/or (b) she received
services in a markedly hostile manner and in a manner which a
reasonable person would find objectively unreasonable.

Gennell

v. Denny’s Corp., 378 F.Supp.2d 551, 558 (D.Md. 2005) (citing
Callwood, 98 F.Supp.2d at 707; Murrell v. Ocean Mecca Motel,
Inc., 262 F.3d 253, 257–58 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting with approval
the Callwood formulation)).
Defendant
Douglas

structures

burden-shifting

its

argument

framework,

under

arguing

the

that

McDonnell
it

has

a

nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Alston’s conduct and thus the
burden shifts to Plaintiff to demonstrate that the reason is not
pretext.

(ECF No. 129-1, at 3).

As the court noted in its

prior memorandum opinion denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s
inapplicable

§

where

discrimination.”
Grafton

1981

School,

claim,
the

“the

plaintiff

McDonnell
presents

Douglas

direct

test

is

evidence

of

(ECF No. 67, at 26-27) (quoting Eruanga v.
Inc.,

181

F.Supp.2d

514,

520

(D.Md.

2002))

(citing Denny v. Elizabeth Arden Salons, Inc., 456 F.3d 427, 434
n.2 (4th Cir. 2006)).

In the case cited by Defendant, Hill v.

Abercrombie & Fitch, No. ELH-11-00910, 2011 WL 4433573 (D.Md.
Sept. 20, 2011), the plaintiff did not set forth any facts to
10

support his allegation that he was discriminated against on the
basis of race when he was approached as a suspected shoplifter
and asked to leave the retail establishment, and thus, his §
1981 claim was dismissed.

See Hill, 2011 WL 4433573, at *5-6.

Here, Plaintiff testified in deposition that Ms. Alston called
her a “big, fat, black hussy” when serving Plaintiff with her
order on March 19.
direct

evidence

McDonnell

(ECF No. 129-3, at 17-18).

of

Douglas

a

racial

motivation

burden-shifting

to

Because there is
discriminate,

framework

is

the

inapplicable.

See Denny, 456 F.3d at 434 (noting that “[t]here can be no doubt
that

plaintiffs

have

presented

not

only

strong

but

direct

evidence of the salon’s intent to discriminate,” which included
a statement by an employee that the salon did not do “black
people’s hair”).

In Denny, the Fourth Circuit explained that

“[w]hile there may be a more benign explanation for the salon’s
refusal

to

fully

serve

plaintiffs,

the

receptionist’s

racial explanation creates a trial dispute.”

overt

Id. at 435.

Defendant next argues that the alleged insult by Ms. Alston
is

not

damages.
argues

sufficiently

atrocious

to

(ECF No. 129-1, at 6).
that

“[P]laintiff

must

support

a

claim

for

money

Citing to Gennell, Defendant
show

that

[]

[D]efendant’s

behavior was ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to
be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
11

community.’”

(Id.)

(citing

Gennell,

378

F.Supp.2d

at

560).

Defendant recites the standard for an intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim, which Plaintiff has not brought in
this

case.

Therefore,

this

argument

fails

and

Defendant’s

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s § 1981 claim will be
denied.
4.

Retaliation

The court construed Plaintiff’s retaliation claim as being
brought under Title II.

(See ECF No. 67, at 24-25).

Title II’s

antiretaliation provision provides that “[n]o person shall . . .
punish

or

attempt

to

punish

any

person

for

exercising

or

attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by” Title
II.

42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2.

Plaintiff testified in deposition

that Ms. Alston did not serve her on May 27 in retaliation for
Plaintiff reporting Ms. Alston’s comments on March 19 to Mr.
Edwards.

(ECF

No.

129-3,

at

25).

Defendant

argues

that

Plaintiff’s complaint to Mr. Edwards is not a protected activity
and “cannot form the basis for a retaliation claim.”
129-1, at 11).
its

prior

Here, Defendant again cites to cases it did in

motion

to

dismiss

construing

provisions of the ADA, not Title II.
memorandum

(ECF No.

opinion

denying

the

antiretaliation

As this court stated in it

Defendant’s

motion

to

dismiss

Plaintiff’s retaliation claim, “case law interpreting Title II’s
antiretaliation

provision

is

scarce
12

.

.

.

.

It

appears,

however,

that

Plaintiff’s

complaint

protected activity under Title II.
her

right

to

the

full

and

to

Mr.

Edwards

is

a

She attempted to exercise

equal

enjoyment

of

a

public

accommodation without discrimination by complaining about Ms.
Alston’s racially charged comment to Mr. Edwards.”3

(ECF No. 67,

at 28-29).
Alternatively, Defendant argues that “[e]ven if a colorable
retaliation

claim

could

be

based

on

her

complaint

to

Mr.

Edwards, Plaintiff’s own deposition testimony shows it was she,
not Ms. Alston, who refused service.”

(ECF No. 129-1, at 11).

The

does

evidence

assertion.

presented
Plaintiff

by

Defendant

testified

in

not

deposition

support
that

“if

this
[Ms.

Alston] had brought the food and put it on the counter, yes, I
would have told her then, I don’t want you to serve me,” but,
more importantly, “[Ms. Alston] never even gave [Plaintiff] the
opportunity” to say that.
added).

(ECF No. 129-3, at 11) (emphasis

Plaintiff’s complaint to McDonald’s headquarters states

that while she was waiting in line to place her order at the
restaurant, Ms. Alston spoke to a cashier who subsequently never

3

The court’s analysis followed the general approach courts
take to Title VII retaliation claims regarding a plaintiff’s
complaints of discrimination in the workplace.
ECF No. 67, at
29, n.11 (citing Burgess v. Bowen, 466 F.App’x 272, 282 (4th Cir.
2012) (holding “that an employee’s complaint constitutes
protected activity when the employer understood, or should have
understood, that the plaintiff was opposing discriminatory
conduct.”)).
13

asked to service Plaintiff.

(Id. at 4).

When Plaintiff placed

her order with another cashier, Jonelle Carr, Plaintiff asked
Ms. Carr to bag her food in order to avoid an encounter with Ms.
Alston.

(Id.).

When Ms. Carr went to bag Plaintiff’s food, Ms.

Alston ordered Ms. Carr to return to her register and to “[g]ive
[Plaintiff] her money back because she’s not going to be served
here.”

(Id. at 4-5).

Ms. Carr stated during an investigation

of the incident that, “[Plaintiff] said she didn’t want [Ms.
Alston] bagging her food,” “[Ms. Alston] refunded [Plaintiff]
her money,” and that “in [her] opinion,” Plaintiff was denied
service.
on

(ECF No. 129-3, at 7-8).

what

Plaintiff

would

have

Defendant’s argument based

done

if

Ms.

Alston

served

her

ignores the evidence that Plaintiff was refused service on May
27

and

is

refused
complaint

irrelevant

to

serve
of

to

the

inquiry

of

whether

Plaintiff

in

retaliation

discrimination

to

Mr.

Edwards

for
on

Ms.

Alston

Plaintiff’s
March

19.

Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim and its motion will be denied.
5.

Fraud or Deceit

To establish an action for fraud or deceit Plaintiff must
prove
(1)
that
the
defendant
made
a
false
representation to the plaintiff, (2) that
its
falsity
was
either
known
to
the
defendant or that the representation was
made with reckless indifference as to its
14

truth, (3) that the misrepresentation was
made for the purpose of defrauding the
plaintiff, (4) that the plaintiff relied on
the misrepresentation and had the right to
rely on it, and (5) that the plaintiff
suffered compensable injury resulting from
the misrepresentation.
Moscarillo v. Prof’l Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 398 Md. 529, 544
(2007) (citations omitted).
engaged

in

multiple

policies

and

procedures,

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

misrepresentations
including:

(1)

regarding
“that

the

company
basis

for

their entire business is that they are ethical, truthful, and
dependable”; (2) “that they place the customer experience at the
core of all they do”; (3) “that supervisors must follow up on
allegations of wrongdoing that are brought to their attention
and

take

appropriate

corrective

or

disciplinary

action”;

(4)

“that they accept the obligation to stop or prevent actions that
could harm customers, the System or McDonald’s reputation, and
to report any such actions as soon as they occur”; and (5) that
they are “caring of their customers and the community” and “want
every customer to have a great experience every time they visit
McDonald’s.”

(See ECF No. 2 ¶¶ 376-81).

Defendant refutes only

Plaintiff’s allegation that it misrepresented that supervisors
will follow up on allegations of wrongdoing by employees and
take corrective or disciplinary action.
it

is

clear

from

Plaintiff’s

Defendant asserts that

deposition

testimony

that

Plaintiff’s fraud or deceit claim is “based on Mr. Edwards’
15

false assurance that he would take care of her complaint against
Ms. Alston in an effort to keep her from filing a complaint with
McDonald’s Corporation.”
The

portion

of

(ECF Nos. 129-1, at 12; 129-2 ¶ 12).

Plaintiff’s

deposition

testimony

submitted

by

Defendant, however, is not as clear as they purport it to be.
Plaintiff testified in deposition that, “the basis for my claim
is outlined in my complaint . . . .
that,

first,

situation.

Mr.

Edwards

that

they

They would investigate.

(ECF No. 129-3, at 27).
statement

said

But my basis for fraud is

that

subsequent

he

failure

handle

the

And they did nothing.”

Plaintiff testifies that Mr. Edwards’

would
to

would

take

care

investigate

of

her

and

take

complaint

and

corrective

or

disciplinary action was only one of the bases for her fraud or
deceit claim.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was not deceived

by Mr. Edwards’s statement because she did not rely on it, and
has

presented

Plaintiff’s

deposition

testimony

that

“[she]

really didn’t expect him” to do anything about her complaint.
(ECF No. 129-3, at 31-32).
to

whether

Plaintiff

Accordingly, there is no dispute as
relied

on

Mr.

Edwards’

alleged

misrepresentation, and thus her fraud or deceit claim cannot
stand alone on that basis.
argument

to

refute

the

other

Defendant has not put forth any
bases

of

Plaintiff’s

fraud

or

deceit claim.

Therefore, the court will grant summary judgment

in

Defendant

favor

of

only

as
16

to

Plaintiff’s

claim

that

Defendant

misrepresented

that

supervisors

will

follow

up

on

allegations of wrongdoing by employees and take corrective or
disciplinary action.
Lastly,
special

Defendant

damages.”

states

(ECF

No.

that
129-1,

“[Plaintiff]
at

12).

claims

no

Defendant’s

statement is irrelevant as Plaintiff is not required to claim
special

damages,

only

that

she

suffered

compensable

damages

directly resulting from the misrepresentation whether general or
special.

See

Moscarillo,

398

Md.

at

544.

Therefore,

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fraud or
deceit claim will be denied.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed by Defendants McDonald’s Corporation and RAMS Food will be
granted in part, and denied in part, and Plaintiff’s motion to
deny or defer summary judgment will be denied.

A separate order

will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

17