Shields v. Prince George's County, Maryland et al
Filing
160
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge George Jarrod Hazel on 8/2/2019. (kns, Deputy Clerk)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
Southern Division
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REGINA SHIELDS Individually and as
the Personal Representative of the Estate
of Samuel Shields
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Plaintiff,
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v.
Case No.: GJH-15-1736
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PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY,
MARYLAND, et al.,
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Samuel Shields died while detained at the Prince George’s County Correctional Facility
on June 17, 2014 after being arrested for failing to pay a bus fare. Mr. Shields’s spouse, Plaintiff
Regina Shields, filed this action, individually and on behalf of Mr. Shields’s estate, against
Prince George’s County, Maryland (PG County) and Correctional Officers Chandler Hines,
Andrew Jackson, Erik Wood, Keith Funderburk, Emmanuel Odion, and Armando Rodriguez
(collectively, the “Correctional Defendants”); and against Corizon Health Inc. and Nurses
Zewdiensh Admassu and Gbemisola Adebayo (collectively, the “Corizon Defendants”).
Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint alleges a variety of state and federal claims, including
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution; violations of the
American with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 704 of the Rehabilitation Act; negligence; wrongful
death pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-901, et. seq.; assault and battery; and
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
1
After the parties completed Phase I of a bifurcated discovery process, the Defendants
moved for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 131 & 139.1 Specifically, the Corizon Defendants filed
a motion for partial summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims, ECF No.
131, and the Correctional Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims brought
against them, ECF No. 134. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2016).
Plaintiff now concedes that Counts XII, XIII, and XIV fail as a matter of law, and that
governmental immunity precludes negligence claims asserted against Defendant PG County.
ECF No. 150-1 at 11–12 ¶¶ 1–3. Based on these concessions, the Court will grant the
Correctional Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to these Counts and issues.
Otherwise, for the following reasons, the Correctional Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part; and the Corizon Defendants’ partial Motion
for Summary Judgment will be denied.
I.
BACKGROUND2
A. Lead up to Mr. Shields’s Arrest
Mr. Shields was forty-nine and suffered from several medical conditions, including
hypertension, congestive heart failure, atypical chest pain, chronic renal insufficiency, diabetes,
asthma, psychosis, and schizophrenia. ECF No. 131-3 at 2.3 He weighed 347 pounds and was six
feet tall. ECF No. 134-23.
As a symptom of his schizophrenia, Mr. Shields would sometimes suffer from what his
wife, Plaintiff Regina Shields, described as manic episodes. ECF No. 131-4 at 45:1–3, 61:6–21.
1
The Court bifurcated discovery in two phases: Phase I for the individual defendants, and Phase II, if necessary, for
the institutional defendants (i.e., Defendant PG County and Defendant Corizon). The parties have only completed
Phase I of discovery. ECF No. 130.
2
These facts are either undisputed or viewed in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff as the non-moving party.
3
Pin cites to documents filed on the Court’s electronic filing system (CM/ECF) refer to the page numbers generated
by that system except for exhibits of deposition testimony and video footage.
2
Around June 13, 2014, Plaintiff noticed that Mr. Shields had begun to exhibit symptoms of
another “episode.” Id. at 59:21, 60:1, 61:4–5. He began calling her “the devil” and acting
strangely. Id. at 60:2–25, 63:14–21, 64:1–6. They were staying with Plaintiff’s daughter at the
time, and when her daughter noticed Mr. Shields’s strange behavior, she asked that Mr. Shields
go to his sister’s house for a while to give her a break. Id. at 66:13–16. Plaintiff and Mr. Shields
ended up sleeping in the hallway of the apartment building. Id. at 71:14–21. The next morning,
Plaintiff and Mr. Shields started to walk together to McDonald’s for breakfast. Id. at 73:8–17.
Plaintiff thought that Mr. Shields was following her because he would often walk behind her, but
when she arrived, she realized Mr. Shields had not followed her. Id. For the next several hours,
Plaintiff tried to locate her husband. Id. at 74:3–17. She continued to look for him for the next
few days. Id. 74:20–21.
B. Detention Center Processing and Isolation
On June 17, 2014, Mr. Shields was arrested for failing to pay a bus fare. ECF No. 134-13
at 2. He was pepper sprayed and eventually transported to the Prince George’s County Detention
Center. Id.; ECF. 131-4 at 12–21, 80:1.
He arrived at the detention center around 12:38pm. ECF No. 147-5 at 2. Correctional
officers inventoried his personal effects, including multiple prescription drugs. Id.; ECF No. 14810 at 3; ECF No. 148-7 at 19:2–5. The medications that were in Mr. Shields’s possession
included carvedilol, torsemide, hydralazine, isosorbide, spironolactone, lisinopril, and an inhaler.
ECF No. 148-7 at 20:4–6. These medications are for high blood pressure, heart failure, chest
pain, and respiratory problems, respectively. Id. at 20:9–21:2. The correctional officer who
checked in Mr. Shields’s personal effects noted that “he had a lot of medication.” ECF No. 14810 at 3. This raised a concern for her that Mr. Shields might have preexisting medical conditions.
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Id. Based on this concern, she asked Mr. Shields, who was loudly singing in the processing area,
whether he had any injuries from his arrest and for his medical history. Id. at 2. He “kept
singing,” rather than answering her questions. Id. Other correctional officers at intake also
observed Mr. Shields singing to himself and speaking indiscernibly. ECF No. 134-14 at 2; ECF
No. 134-15 at 2.
Plaintiff’s expert in emergency medical care, Andrew Lawson, M.D., reviewed video of
Mr. Shields during this period and noted that Mr. Shields was “talking to himself loudly, and it
was hard to understand what he was saying” because it “sounded like gibberish.” ECF No. 48-4
at 11:23–12:1. According to Dr. Lawson, Mr. Shields was possibly experiencing “auditory
hallucinations”; appeared “withdrawn”; was not making eye contact; and was “distracted by the
singing and thoughts, or at least the things he [was] saying to himself.” Id. at 12:2–6. He
appeared, “just by the way he [was] holding himself and the lack of his ability to follow basic
commands” to be “mentally ill.” Id. at 14:20–15:4.
When someone comes into the detention center and is demonstrating symptoms of a
mental health issue, correctional offices “do a psych form,” contact the mental health providers
with the medical unit, and “expedite” the detainee to a “safer environment.” ECF No. 145-2 at
37:21–38:3. Sometimes if a detainee is “agitated and combative and unable to stay” in the
processing area, he will be brought to the medical unit. ECF No. 145-3 at 137:7–12. The nurses
“call the doctor or the psychiatrist” for an order, which allows medical to keep the detainee. ECF
No. 145-3 at 137:7–15. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Mr. Shields’s favor, no one filled
out a mental health form in reference to Mr. Shields. ECF No. 134-10 at 18:4–7.
Shortly after he arrived, correctional officers decided to place Mr. Shields in full
restraints because he continued being loud and singing. ECF No. 134-15 at 2; ECF No. 148-10 at
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2; ECF No. 147-4 at 49:1–12. Mr. Shields was moved to an isolation cell without incident, ECF
No. 134-15 at 2, and he was left in the restraints in isolation for approximately eight hours. ECF
No. 147-4 at 46:9–12, 49:1–12. Drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, during this
time, Mr. Shields did not have access to his medications. ECF No. 148-4 at 64:18.
At the time, Alesia Burr was employed as the shift commander responsible for the
detention center’s processing and reception area. ECF No. 134-10 at 10:13–22, 11:1–13. Around
8:45pm, Burr and another officer removed Mr. Shields’s restraints and let him out of the
isolation cell, returning him to the processing area. ECF No. 147-5 at 2. For the next hour or so,
Mr. Shields moved around various chairs in the processing area, getting up and sitting back
down often. Id. Burr noticed that Mr. Shields came in with a lot of medication and called the
center’s medical desk. ECF No. 134-10 at 18:22–19:3. She “read off the medicines” and
someone told her “to get him to the medical unit.” Id. at 19:2–3. Mr. Shields was not combative
towards Burr and she observed him to be “a compliant person.” ECF No. 145-2 at 43:20, 44:6–7.
However, he was not complying with her order to get up from the processing area and get
dressed in a detention center uniform. Id. 45:12–13. Burr cannot recall whether Mr. Shields said
anything in response to her order. Id. at 45:14–15. And he did not make any movements towards
her. Id. at 45:16–18. He appeared agitated and was speaking loudly. ECF No. 147-5 at 2.
C. Emergency Response Team Incident
At 9:56pm, Burr called the Emergency Response Team (ERT) to help Mr. Shields get
dressed in a detention center uniform so that he could be taken to the medical unit. ECF No. 1452 at 44:16–17, 48:5–8. The ERT team sometimes helps inmates with mental health challenges
get changed. Id. 48:9–14. As Burr explained, “[e]veryone has to get dressed one way,” so
sometimes the ERT team observes while “the detainees do it on their own,” and other times they
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“help them and assist them getting their clothes changed.” Id. at 45:5–14. Typically, inmates
must change into a detention center uniform before they can leave the processing area to go to
the medical unit. ECF No. 134-10 at 55:10–14, 57:4–6, 58:15–19. But exceptions are made when
appropriate. ECF No. 145-3 at 137:7–15, 138:1–3.4
The ERT unit that responded to Burr’s signal of a “minor disturbance” consisted of
Emanuel Odion, Erik Wood, Andrew Jackson, Keith Funderburk, Chandler Hines, and Armando
Rodriguez. ECF No. 134-4 at 26:9–13, 60:13–16; ECF No. 134-5 at 31:22–32:1–5,46:6–13,
50:14–16; ECF No. 134-6 at 37:13–15; ECF No. 134-7 at 13:1–17, 14:9–11, 38:7–14; ECF No.
134-8 at 25:17–20; ECF No. 134-9 at 17:3–7, 17:19–22, 18:2.
Odion was the unit’s supervisor and responsible for the team. ECF No. 134-4 at 60:7–10;
ECF No. 134-8 at 76:10–19, 80:7–14. Rodriguez outranked Funderburk, Wood, and Jackson.
ECF No. 146-2 at 206:13–14. Hines was also a superior officer to Funderburk, Wood, and
Jackson. Id. at 206:15–17; ECF No. 147-2 at 130:4-131:15.
When the ERT officers arrived in the processing area, Burr told them that personnel from
the medical unit had asked that Mr. Shields be expedited to the medical unit. ECF No. 145-2 at
104:14–20. Rodriguez began filming the encounter with Mr. Shields. ECF No. 134-5 at 138: 6–
9; ECF No. 134-9 at 66:1–8; ECF No. 145-8.5 Odion ordered Mr. Shields to get on the floor and
place his hands behind his back, but Mr. Shields did not comply and continued to sit in a chair
and speak loudly. ECF No. 147-6 at 6. Wood, Funderburk, and Odion then used two pairs of
handcuffs (because of Mr. Shields’s size) to restrain Mr. Shields, securing his wrists behind his
back. Id.; ECF No. 145-8 at 00:30. Wood and Funderburk then escorted him to a search room.
ECF No. 145-8 at 1:05. Mr. Shields continued to speak in a loud voice and passively resisted the
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5
See also ECF No. 145-2 at 56:4–8, 16–21, 57:20–22, 58:1–8; ECF No. 147-4 at 117:9–120:10.
ECF No. 145-8 is video footage from the incident and pin cites refer to the video timeline.
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officers, not moving along with them. Id. Wood and Funderburk therefore used knee strikes to
Mr. Shields’s peroneal nerve to make him walk. Id. at 2:42; ECF No. 147-6 at 6.
Once Mr. Shields was moved into the search room, the video of the encounter no longer
shows a clear view of him. ECF No. 145-8 at 2:48. Instead, the video shows a view of what is
going on outside the search room. Id. Officers inside the search room slapped and struck Mr.
Shields and commanded him to lift his arms up and stand up. Id. at 3:28, 4:18, 6:40. Mr. Shields
yelled things like “blood clot,” which is a Jamaican slang showing disgust, id. at 4:18; ECF No.
147-6 at 6, “aiyee,” ECF No. 145-8 at 8:11, and “murder,” id. at 11:08. Officers cursed at Mr.
Shields, including calling him a “stupid mother fucker” and asking, “what’s wrong with your
ass.” Id. at 2:55, 5:21; EF No. 149-3 at 268:18–22. Hines handed Jackson a shoe and the next
moment slapping sounds consistent with Mr. Shields being struck by the shoe can be heard in the
video. ECF No. 145-8 at 3:18. Odion testified at his deposition that it would not have been
permissible for the ERT unit to use shoes as a weapon. ECF No. 145-6 at 149:14–16.
At one point, in response to a command that he stand up, Mr. Shields said that he could
not get up because of his knee. ECF No. 145-8 at 6:45; see also ECF No. 145-6 at 165:8–167:6.
Based on the way Mr. Shields was “talking just real loud, yelling and stuff,” Rodriguez “knew
something was wrong” with Mr. Shields mentally or emotionally, but “didn’t know what it was.”
ECF No. 145-5 at 70:9–11, 72:4–5. However, Wood, Hines, and Funderburk claim that they
either did not know that Mr. Shields suffered from a mental illness, could not make that
determination, or could not recall Mr. Shields’s demeanor. ECF No. 134-5 at 132:2–5, 132:14–
16; ECF No. 134-7 at 107:20–21, 149:22–150:20 ECF No. 134-8 at 92:22–93:1–6. The record
does not include evidence about whether Jackson knew that Mr. Shields had a mental illness.
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At one point, Hines took out a pepper spray canister and began to shake it, stating “if you
do not comply you will be sprayed.” ECF No. 147-6 at 7; ECF No. 145-8 at 11:55. However,
Odion had talked to a personnel officer and learned that Mr. Shields was asthmatic, ECF No.
145-6 at 168:4–7; he conveyed this information to Hines, and Hines holstered the spray canister.
ECF No. 145-8 at 12:55. Shields continued to yell, at times incomprehensibly. Id. at 13:04.
Realizing that Mr. Shields may not be understanding the ERT unit’s commands, Hines
called over Officer Junior Granville, who is of Jamaican descent, to try to communicate with Mr.
Shields. Id. at 13:25; ECF No. 147-6 at 7.6 Speaking in the same Jamaican dialect as Mr. Shields,
Granville told Mr. Shields to get dressed. ECF No. 134-22. However, Granville told Odion that
Shields did not comprehend the command. ECF No. 145-6 at 182:6–7. Shields began to yell
“murder” again, ECF No. 145-8 at 14:18, and eventually Granville walked away laughing, id. at
15:40. When asked at his deposition about what he does when he determines or believes that a
detainee does not understand his orders, Funderburk responded that he would most likely use
physical force. ECF No. 149-3 at 156:11–18.
A witness, Latonya Freeman, who had a “good visual of everything” testified at her
deposition that after ten or fifteen minutes of back and forth between the officers and Mr. Shields
“that’s when they started hitting him and kicking him, they literally was hitting them with their
fists, kicking them with their feet, or their boots, which were huge, and then they were taking
their sticks or whatever was on them and hitting him with it.” ECF No. 145-4 at 42:7–12; see
also ECF No. 145-8 at 16:48–19:52. Wood admitted at his deposition that he did punch Mr.
Shields in the dressing room. ECF No. 146-2 at 201:17–21. Funderburk says that he used
“brachial stuns” on Mr. Shields.
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See also ECF No. 134-4 at 180:6–181:22; ECF No. 134-8 at 119:14–120:12, 120:18–121:20; ECF No. 134-22.
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Freeman noted that from her vantage point, Mr. Shields “wasn’t a danger,” and “never
tried to do anything to anybody” before he entered the dressing room. ECF No. 145-4 at 49:19–
21. She saw that “he was just sitting” and “wouldn’t get up.” Id. 49:19–50:1. Once Mr. Shields
was in the dressing room, Freeman recalls that “he wasn’t fighting back” but he also was not
“just laying there,” id. 72:7–14; instead, he did “squirm” the way a child might if they were
trying to get away. Id.
In the opinion of Plaintiff’s correctional expert, Tim Gravette, “[i]t’s not necessary to
strike someone to make them change their clothes.” ECF No. 147-4 at 30:21–25. As he
explained, “if Mr. Shields was fighting with them, lunging at them, all kinds of different things,
that’s different, but he wasn’t doing that.” Id. According to Gravette, there was no basis for the
officers to strike Mr. Shields once he was inside the dressing room “because none of the officers
reported that he was striking or attempting to strike them,” and their goal was to change his
clothes. Id. at 103:14–104:5. The “common-sense thing and practical thing” would have been for
the ERT unit to “restrain him,” “lay him on a bed,” and use “safety scissors” to “cut his clothes
off him.” Id. at 29:12–18. Alternatively, it was not necessary for Mr. Shields to be changed into
the detention center’s uniform before he was seen by medical personnel. Id. at 118:5–20. In
Gravette’s opinion, based on the characteristics displayed by Mr. Shields, officers should have
taken him to get evaluated by a mental health professional. Id. 119:2–15. Gravette further opined
that the ERT officers should have changed their approach “[b]ecause it wasn’t working” and they
were putting themselves and Mr. Shields at risk of getting hurt. Id. at 114:3–6. Even with a
disruptive inmate, it makes sense for officers to change their approach within about six minutes
of realizing they are not successfully achieving their goal. Id. 113:20–25.
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In Gravette’s opinion, only Funderburk, Jackson, and Wood—“predominantly, Wood and
Funderburk”—used unreasonable force. ECF No. 147-4 at 79:23–80:3. Odion never had physical
contact with Mr. Shields once he was inside the dressing room and the force used before that was
reasonable. ECF No 147-4 at 25:23–25. Hines only had physical contact with Mr. Shields when
he used a baton to strike Mr. Shields’s arm after Mr. Shields grabbed Odion’s leg. Id. at 25:13–
20, 80:5–9. This force was reasonably deployed. Id. Gravette did not consider Mr. Shields’s
behavior to be “physically aggressive” and concluded that Mr. Shields did not assault anyone. Id.
at 53:2–20. He explained that although the correctional officers reported that Mr. Shields kicked
Jackson and grabbed Odion’s leg, “when you got that type of situation going on, sometimes you
do get kicked in the shin or something like that. But I didn’t deem that as an assault, as an
assaultive behavior.” Id. at 53:11–20.
Freeman estimates members of the ERT unit “were just beating” Mr. Shields as “he was
just yelling and screaming” for between five and ten minutes. ECF No. 145-4 at 43:1–4. During
this time, Mr. Shields was yelling “murder,” ECF No. 145-8 at 17:10, and “no no,” id. at 17:52,
and was moaning, id. at 18:21. Then, “all of a sudden,” the yelling stopped because Mr. Shields
had become unconscious, and correctional officers “pulled [Mr. Shields] out into the hallway”
ECF No. 145-4 at 42:20–43:11; ECF No. 145-8 at 19:52. The other women observing the
situation from Freeman’s position were yelling “You killed him. You killed him.” ECF No. 1454 at 48:16–17. Freeman remembers saying to them “Be quiet before they come kill us.” Id. at
47:19–20.
D. Signal 89 - Medical Emergency
Mr. Shields’s handcuffs were removed after he became unconscious. ECF No. 134-4 at
254:17–20. Once ERT officers realized that Mr. Shields was unresponsive, they provided
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emergency medical assistance, including CPR. ECF No. 134-5 at 168:8–14, 169:18-22, 170:2–8,
171:6–10, 172:2–173: 1–3, 174:2–4, 195:12–14, 208:4–10, 209:13–17, 210:9–13, 214:9–11,
215:2–10, 215:19–22; 216:12–217:1–22. All correctional officers and ERT members are
required to be certified in CPR. ECF No. 131-4 at 284:4–9.
Mr. Shields was breathing when ERT officers were providing emergency medical
assistance. ECF No. 134-7 at 354:3–9. The ERT officers called a “Signal 89” to indicate a
medical emergency two minutes after they began CPR. ECF No. 139-6 at 5; ECF No. 145-8 at
22:20. Two nurses—Nurses Admassu and Adebayo—then arrived at the scene. ECF No. 139-6
at 5; ECF No. 145-8 at 22:23; ECF No. 134-11 at 20: 1–17, 22:7–20, 30:6–8; ECF No. 134-12 at
11:1–6, 23:5–9, 24:11–22, 25:11–18. About thirty seconds later, a correctional officer stated,
“call 911.” ECF No. 139-6 at 5; ECF No. 145-8 at 22:20:30.
The Nurses were employed by Corizon Inc, a medical contractor, which provides medical
and mental health treatment to detainees at the detention center. ECF No. 134-10 at 101:17–22,
102:20–22, 103:1–5. When Nurse Admassu first arrived at the scene, Mr. Shields was laying on
the ground, and correctional officers, whom she knew to be trained in CPR, were performing
chest compressions. ECF No. 131-7 at 8–19. She then checked his pulse and his breathing. Id. at
45:13–22, 46:1–7. However, she failed to check his pulse for the necessary five to ten seconds,
only checking for a pulse for three seconds, and failing to position his neck properly to determine
a pulse. ECF No. 139-6 at 6. Because of Mr. Shields’s size, placing fingers on his neck for three
seconds was “not an effective way” to check his pulse. ECF No. 139-5 at 71:9–17. She also did
not check his airway or to see if his chest was rising. Id. at 72: 2–3. Nurse Admassu also failed to
to check for a pulse every two minutes. ECF No. 139-6 at 6. As a result, she could not know
whether “he was really oxygenating” such that CPR could have been effective. ECF No. 139-5 at
11
71:25–72:5. Nurse Admassu testified at her deposition that after checking Mr. Shields’s pulse,
she then gave the correctional officers instructions to continue chest compressions and was
“observing all over and assisting whatever help they need[ed].” ECF No. 131-7 at 46:2–11.
Nurse Adebayo had never utilized an ambu bag, a medical device used for aeration, prior
to this incident but had received specialized training on its proper usage during her nursing
training. ECF No. 131-8 at 68:3–20. Prior to this incident, Nurse Adebayo had never responded
to a scene of an individual who was unconscious or not breathing, or of an individual who did
not have a pulse. Id. at 73:11–22, 74:1–3. Nurse Adebayo substituted the ERT unit’s rescue
breaths by using the ambu bag for aeration, but after thirty seconds, a correctional officer yelled
“pump it” because she was not fully squeezing the bag. ECF No. 139-6 at 5; ECF No. 145-8 at
22:24. She also did not secure the ambu mask to cover Mr. Shields’s airway, meaning proper
aeration could not have been achieved. ECF No. 139-5 at 70:8–72:15; ECF No. 139-6 at 6. She
failed to assess whether Mr. Shields’s chest was rising or aerating during breaths, and there were
several interruptions in ventilation. ECF No. 139-6 at 6. Nurse Admassu testified that she
supervised the use of the ambu bag and believed it was properly used. ECF No. 131-7 at 47:12–
16. In the meantime, another nurse went to retrieve an oxygen tank, which was attached to the
ambu bag when she returned. ECF No. 139-6 at 5; ECF No. 145-5 at 22:27.
Rodriguez expressed frustrations with the way the nurses handled the medical
emergency. ECF No. 139-4 at 98:2–4. He testified at his deposition that he was concerned about
“the way they were doing the CPR.” Id. According to him, “we,” meaning the ERT unit, “were
doing everything, basically,” even though the medical staff “should have taken over.” Id. at
98:3–6. While the ERT staff “were doing the breathing, the pumps, the 30 pumps,” the nurses
were “in panic mode.” Id. at 99:5–8.
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After between seven and nine minutes of CPR, a correctional officer suggested using the
AED (defibrillator). ECF No. 139-5 at 74:18–19; ECF No. 145-5 at 22:27:03. Nurse Admassu
and another nurse took about two minutes to set up the AED, which according to Plaintiff’s
expert in the nursing standard of care, suggests that “they were uncomfortable with how to use
it.” ECF No. 139-5 at 76:18–22. The AED pads were placed on Mr. Shields’s left breast and
upper abdomen even though for someone of Mr. Shields’s size this was not the proper
placement. Id. at 77:7–12. The pads should have been placed to the left of Mr. Shields’s nipple
and on the midline of his chest so that he could get a shock. Id.
Freeman could not see precisely what medical staff were doing because of Mr. Shields’s
position on the floor, ECF No. 131-9 at 116:19–20, but it appeared to her that the correctional
and medical staff were genuinely attempting to resuscitate Mr. Shields, id. at 114:15–19, 123:8–
11. Consistent with what Freeman witnessed, Plaintiff’s expert in the nursing standard explained
that while watching the video of the code response she “witnessed an attempt at resuscitation”
and “had no reason to doubt it wasn’t done properly or any reason to say anything about it.” ECF
No. 139-12 at 59:15–25, 60:1–2.
Eventually, EMS arrived and took over CPR. ECF No. 139-6 at 5; ECF No. 145-8 at
22:34. Mr. Shields was in the EMS bus 34 minutes after the medical emergency code was called.
ECF No. 139-6 at 5. Mr. Shields was transported to a hospital where he was pronounced dead.
E. Cause of Death
An autopsy was conducted at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in Baltimore,
Maryland. ECF No. 134-23. Mr. Shields’s cause of death was determined to be Non-Ischemic
Cardiomyopathy and the manner of death was classified as natural. Id.; ECF No. 134-24 at 8:21–
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9:8, 31:9–13. The autopsy also determined that schizophrenia and obesity were significant
contributing factors. ECF No. 134-23; ECF No. 134-24 at 9:9–17.
Plaintiff’s expert in forensic pathology, Mark Flomenbaum, M.D., opines that although
Mr. Shields “did have a bad heart” and did suffer from “non-ischemic cardiomyopathy,” Mr.
Shields “did not die from that alone.” ECF No. 148-7 at 46:10–12. Instead, “the extenuating
factors of what happened in the detention center is what caused [Mr. Shields’s] heart to stop
functioning[.]” Id. at 14–16. To be sure, Mr. Shields’s “heart was significantly pathological” and
“he could have had a heart attack almost any time,” but he had “been living with that heart” and
“what pushed him over the edge was not purely natural disease”; rather, it was “the way he was
treated in that center, which made his heart work above and beyond what it was designed to do.”
Id. at 47:25–48:19.
The autopsy documented forty-four discrete injuries that Mr. Shields likely incurred
while at the Detention Center. Id. at 41:10–42:10. Further, Mr. Shields had not received his
medications for high blood pressure, heart failure, or chest pain. ECF No. 148-4 at 64:9–18. Dr.
Lawson testified at his deposition that if a person is prescribed medication for hypertension and
they go a substantial period without the medicine, that can cause the person’s blood pressure to
rise. Id. at 64:19–24. When the blood pressure rises to a very high level in certain circumstances,
it can cause the individual to have a stroke or a heart attack. Id. at 64:1–3. When a person who
has not received their medication undergoes a strenuous situation, it is even more likely for them
to have a stroke or a heart attack. Id. 64:4–9. In Dr. Lawson’s opinion, the Detention Center’s
failure to provide Mr. Shields with his hypertension medication, along with the stress and
physical trauma he experienced because of his encounter with the ERT unit, caused Mr.
14
Shields’s blood pressure to rise to dangerously high levels and put him at a high risk of heart
attack or stroke. Id. at 64:1–66:9.
F. Procedural Background
Plaintiff, Mr. Shields’s surviving spouse, filed this suit on June 12, 2015. ECF No. 1. On
August 1, 2018, Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 123. The Third
Amended Complaint named Rodriguez as a Defendant for the first time because Plaintiff learned
during discovery that Rodriguez was a superior officer to Funderburk, Wood, and Jackson, and
could therefore have given them orders. ECF No. 150-1 at 14. However, Rodriguez was never
served with the Third Amended Complaint or Summons. See Docket, Shields v. Prince George’s
County, Maryland et al., Case No. 15-cv-01736-GJH.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate only when
the Court, viewing the record as a whole and in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
determines that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). The
burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there exists no genuine dispute of material
fact. Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). To defeat the
motion, the nonmoving party must submit evidence showing facts sufficient for a fair-minded
jury to reasonably return a verdict for that party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 252 (1986).
15
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Defendant Armando Rodriguez – Statute of Limitations
The Correctional Defendants argue that the claims against Defendant Rodriguez must be
dismissed because he was not named as a Defendant until the Third Amended Complaint, which
was filed on August 1, 2018—over a year after the three-year statute of limitations had run on
Plaintiff’s claims. However, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1), an amendment
to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when, among other undisputed
requirements,
(C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in
by amendment:
(i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits; and
(ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to satisfy this requirement
because Rodriguez was never formally served with the Third Amended Complaint. ECF No. 158
at 11. However, Defendant Rodriguez received notice of the action within the period provided by
Rule 4(m) such that he will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits. Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint alleged, among other claims, that Odion was responsible for the conduct of
Hines, Jackson, Wood, and Funderburk because of his supervisory role. The Second Amended
Complaint referenced Rodriguez by name six times, ECF No. 82 ¶¶ 90, 266–70, but it was not
until Plaintiff deposed Jackson that she learned that Rodriguez was also a superior officer to
Jackson, Wood, and Funderburk. Given that Rodriguez, like Odion, served as a supervisor and
was present during the incident, he knew that the action would have been brought against him
16
but for Plaintiff’s mistake about his role. Additionally, Defendant Rodriguez is represented by
the same counsel as the other Correctional Defendants. See Docket, Shields v. Prince George’s
County, Maryland et al., Case No. 15-cv-01736-GJH. And the Third Amended Complaint did
not raise any new claims, meaning counsel was already prepared to defend against Plaintiff’s
claims on the merits. Compare ECF No. 82 with ECF No. 123. Because Rule 15(c)(1)(C)’s
requirements are satisfied, the addition of Rodriguez to the Third Amended Complaint relates
back to the date of the original pleading, which was within the statute of limitations.
B. Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Wood, Jackson, and Funderburk violated Mr. Shields’s
constitutional rights by using excessive force against him. Although Plaintiff acknowledges that
Defendants Rodriguez, Odion, and Hines either had no physical contact with Mr. Shields or did
not use unreasonable force, Plaintiff asserts that these Correctional Defendants are liable for the
other officers’ conduct because they served in supervisory roles and tacitly authorized the
conduct that resulted in Mr. Shields’s constitutional injuries. Plaintiff also asserts that the
Correctional Defendants and Corizon Defendants violated Mr. Shields’s Fourteenth Amendment
rights by acting with deliberate indifference in the face of his serious medical needs. The Court
now addresses these constitutional claims in turn.
i.
Excessive Force (Defendants Wood, Jackson, and Funderburk)
The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution forbids punishment that
involves “the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976). The substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits punishment
of pretrial detainees based on essentially the same principles as those applied under the Eighth
Amendment to post-conviction detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979); Riley v.
17
Dorton, 115 F. 3d 1159, 1166–67 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds, Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010).
Courts determine whether force used by prison officials is excessive, in violation of the
Constitution, by inquiring if “force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7
(1992). A court must look at “the need for application of force,” “the relationship between that
need and the amount of force used,” “the extent of the injury inflicted,” “the extent of the threat
to the safety of staff and inmates as reasonably perceived by prison officials,” and “any efforts
made to temper the severity of the response.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986).
Here, the record reflects a fundamental disagreement between the parties about whether
the force used by Defendants was in good faith or maliciously to cause harm without
accomplishing Defendants’ stated purpose. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6–7. Although Defendants claim
that they applied force only to achieve their goal of changing Mr. Shields’s clothes, the record
includes evidence that they continued to hit him “with their fists” and “sticks or whatever was on
them” and to kick him after it became clear that Mr. Shields might not have understood or been
able to comply with their commands. ECF No. 145-4 at 42:7–12; ECF No. 145-6 at 182:6–7; see
also ECF No. 145-8 at 16:48–19:52. Genuine disputes of material fact thus exist about the need
for application of force and the relationship between the need and the amount of force used. As
Plaintiff’s expert, Tim Gravette, explained, “[i]t’s not necessary to strike someone to make them
change their clothes.” ECF No. 147-4 at 30:21–25. Nor was the approach effective. Id. at 114:3–
6. Gravette based these conclusions on the fact that the ERT unit could have employed other
common-sense tactics. Id. at 29:12–18; id. at 118:5–20.
18
Given that officers did not elect to take another approach—such as restraining Mr.
Shields and cutting his clothes off with safety scissors or escorting him to medical without
changing his clothes—genuine disputes of material fact remain over the efforts made to use force
that was reasonable for the situation. To be sure, Odion and Hines at times sought to deescalate
the situation; Odion did so when he instructed Hines to holster his pepper spray canister, ECF
No. 145-8 at 12:55; and Hines did so when he called Officer Granville in to speak with Mr.
Shields in their shared Jamaican dialect, id. at 13:25; ECF No. 147-6 at 7. But these facts do not
entitle Defendants Wood, Funderburk, and Jackson to summary judgment because there is
evidence that they continued “just beating” Mr. Shields as “he was just yelling and screaming”
for between five and ten minutes, ECF No. 145-4 at 43:1–4, even after Officer Granville
indicated that Mr. Shields could not comprehend their orders, ECF No. 145-6 at 182:6–7. In fact,
they never changed their course of action despite its ineffectiveness in getting Mr. Shields to
comply; rather, they only stopped using physical force when Mr. Shields became nonresponsive.
As for the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and inmates, Freeman thought Mr.
Shields “wasn’t a danger,” ECF No. 145-4 at 49:19–21, and Gravette opined that there was no
basis for officers to even strike Mr. Shields once he was inside the dressing room, ECF No. 1474 at 103:14–104:5. In fact, according to Gravette, the force applied increased the risk of harm to
staff and Mr. Shields. Id. at 114:3–6. For example, while Mr. Shields was never combative and
did not fight back, he did kick Jackson and grab Odion’s leg in response to them engaging him,
id. at 53:11–20.
Finally, Mr. Shields’s injuries were significant. He died. ECF No. 148-7 at 46:10–12; id
at 46:14–16; id. at 47:25–48:19 (Plaintiff’s expert Dr. Flomenbaum opining that Mr. Shields died
because of the force that officers applied). Further, the autopsy documented forty-four discrete
19
injuries that Mr. Shields likely incurred while at the Detention Center. Id. at 41:10–42:10. The
extent of these injuries would likely be serious under any circumstances, but they are especially
significant considering the officers’ goal was merely to change Mr. Shields’s clothes and escort
him to the medical unit.
In sum, Defendants Wood, Jackson, and Odion are not entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s excessive force claims.
ii.
Supervisory Liability (Defendants Odion, Hines, Rodriguez)
“[S]upervisory officials may be held liable in certain circumstances for the constitutional
injuries inflicted by their subordinates.” Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). To
establish supervisory liability, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the supervisor had actual or
constructive knowledge that his subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed ‘a pervasive and
unreasonable risk’ of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor’s
response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show ‘deliberate indifference to or tacit
authorization of the alleged offensive practices’; and (3) that there was an ‘affirmative causal
link’ between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the
plaintiff.” Id. at 799.
Here, the record indicates that Odion, Hines, and Rodriguez outranked Wood, Jackson,
and Funderburk had a duty to prevent the injuries inflicted by these subordinates. Odion was the
unit’s supervisor and responsible for the team. ECF No. 134-4 at 60:7–10; ECF No. 134-8 at
76:10–19, 80:7–14. Both Rodriguez and Hines were superior officers to Wood, Funderburk, and
Jackson, and their orders would have been followed. ECF No. 146-2 at 206:13–14; id. at 206:15–
17; ECF No. 147-2 at 130:4-131:15. There is no dispute that each of the potential supervisors
had actual knowledge of the rest of the ERT unit’s conduct because they were all present
20
overseeing or filming the scene. Given that genuine disputes of material fact exist about whether
Wood, Jackson, and Funderburk’s conduct constituted excessive force in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment (see § III.B.1 supra), disputes precluding summary judgment also exist
about whether the observing officers knew the ERT unit’s conduct posed an unreasonable risk of
constitutional injuries to Mr. Shields.
Although, as previously described, Odion and Hines took some steps to attempt to
deescalate the situation, they, at other times, authorized the alleged offensive practices either
tacitly or deliberately. For example, Hines handed Jackson a shoe, and drawing all reasonable
inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, an officer hit Mr. Shields with the shoe. ECF No. 145-8 at 3:18.
Neither Odion nor Rodriguez stepped in to stop this conduct even though Odion testified at his
deposition that it would not have been permissible for the ERT unit to use a shoe as a weapon
under the circumstances. ECF No. 145-6 at 149:14–16. Further, based on the way Mr. Shields
was behaving, Rodriguez “knew something was wrong” with him mentally or emotionally, but
he never directed his subordinates to take a different approach to changing Mr. Shields’s clothes.
ECF No. 145-5 at 70:9–11, 72:4–5. The record supports a finding that there was an “‘affirmative
causal link’ between the supervisor’s inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered”
by Mr. Shields because the subordinates were required to comply with their supervisors’ orders.
ECF No. 134-4 at 60:7–10; ECF No. 134-8 at 76:10–19, 80:7–14; ECF No. 146-2 at 206:13–14,
206:15–17.
Taken together, Defendants Odion, Hines, and Rodriguez are not entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that they be held liable for failing to stop Wood, Jackson, and
Funderburk’s excessive force.
21
iii.
Qualified Immunity (Correctional Defendants)
The Correctional Defendants also move for summary judgment, arguing that they are
entitled to qualified immunity. However, Defendants’ assertion of qualified immunity does not
currently provide a basis for judgment as a matter of law. Qualified immunity affords a
government official protection from suits for monetary damages when the official has acted in
good faith. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). This brand of immunity applies
to “gray areas, where the law is unsettled or murky,” rather than situations where the government
actors were “plainly incompetent or . . . knowingly violate[d] the law.” Occupy Columbia v.
Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 118 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 286 (4th
Cir. 2001)).
In ruling on a defense of qualified immunity, a court must (1) identify “the specific right
allegedly violated,” (2) determine “whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was
clearly established,” and (3) if so, then decide “whether a reasonable person in the officer’s
position would have known that doing what he did would violate that right.” Pritchett v. Alford,
973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir. 1992). The first two criteria are pure questions of law to be resolved
by the court. See id. The third criterion, which requires an evaluation of the objective
reasonableness of the conduct in question, may necessitate the resolution of disputed factual
issues surrounding the conduct. See id. For example, “[i]n instances where there is a material
dispute over what the defendant did, and under the plaintiff’s version of the events the defendant
would have, but under the defendant’s version of events he would not have, violated clearly
established law, it may be that the qualified immunity question cannot be resolved” without
weighing the evidence at trial. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 795 (4th Cir. 1995). This case
presents that situation.
22
It is a clearly established constitutional right that a pretrial detainee not be subjected to
willful, wanton, and outrageous punishment in the form of being kicked, stomped on, and
punched. See Sawyer v. Asbury, 537 F. App’x 283, 288 (4th Cir. 2013); Simms ex rel. Simms v.
Hardesty, 303 F. Supp. 2d 656, 669 (D. Md. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Simms v. Bruce, 104 F. App’x
853 (4th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff supports her allegation that Wood, Jackson, and Funderburk beat
Mr. Shields with record evidence. To credit only Defendants’ alternative version of events—
good-faith use of force to maintain or restore discipline—would be to disregard Plaintiff’s
evidence to the contrary. But at the summary judgment stage, the Court must view the facts in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party. As such, the Court cannot yet conclude that
Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
iv.
Deliberate Indifference (All Defendants)
Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendants violated Mr. Shields’s right to be free from
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” through deliberate indifference to his serious
medical needs. The Supreme Court has made clear that “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (internal citations omitted).
“To establish that a health care provider’s actions constitute deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as
to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Miltier v. Burton, 896 F.2d
848, 851 (4th Cir. 1990). A non-medical-provider prison official must have both known of a
serious risk of harm and recognized that his or her actions were insufficient or “inappropriate in
light of that risk.” Parrish ex rel. Lee v. Cleveland, 372 F.3d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 2004). To
succeed on a deliberate indifference claim, the medical need “must be both apparent and serious,
23
and the denial of attention must be both deliberate and without legitimate penological objective.”
Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999).
“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard – a showing of mere negligence will not
meet it.” Id. Instead, “deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or
reckless disregard.” Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851. “A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a
substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a
reasonable person in the defendant’s position.” Id. at 851-52. A mistake is not sufficient to
establish a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments because “the Constitution is
designed to deal with deprivations of rights, not errors in judgment, even though such errors may
have unfortunate consequences.” Id.
It is undisputed that Mr. Shields suffered from a serious medical need, apparent to all
Defendants when he became unconscious in the dressing room. And it is also undisputed that the
ERT Unit and medical staff were genuinely attempting to resuscitate Mr. Shields. ECF No. 1319 at 116:19–20; id. at 114:15–19, 123:8–11; ECF No. 139-12 at 59:15–25, 60:1–2. However, the
record also supports the conclusion that the Corizon Defendants’ efforts to save Mr. Shields’s
life were so grossly incompetent or inadequate as to constitute reckless disregard for the
substantial risks facing Mr. Shields. The Corizon Defendants failed to check Mr. Shields’s pulse
effectively. ECF No. 139-6 at 6; ECF No. 139-5 at 71:9–17. They did not check his airway or to
see if his chest was rising. ECF No. 139-5 at 72: 2–3. They did not properly secure the ambu
bag. ECF No. 139-5 at 70:8–72:15; ECF No. 139-6 at 6. They did not properly squeeze the ambu
bag to ensure proper aeration. ECF No. 139-6 at 5; ECF No. 145-8 at 22:24. And they did not
take control of the emergency or remain calm as is necessary. ECF No. 139-4 at 98:2–8.
24
Based on allegations of this conduct, this Court previously concluded that Plaintiff’s
pleadings included sufficient factual matter to allege a deliberate indifference claim against the
Corizon Defendants. Shields v. Prince George’s Cty., No. GJH-15-1736, 2016 WL 4581327, at
*6 (D. Md. Sept. 1, 2016). Now, Plaintiff has supported her previous allegations with record
evidence, which the Court determines could allow a jury to conclude that “the medical care
provided was so cursory as to amount to no treatment at all.” Ancata v. Prison Health Services,
Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 704 (11th Cir. 1985).
The Corizon Defendants point out that Freeman believed the nurses were trying their best
to save Mr. Shields’s life. ECF No. 131-9 at 123:8–11. However, Freeman’s perspective only
shows that the Nurses did not intend to breach the standard of care, it does not shed light on
whether the care provided was so grossly incompetent as to be equivalent to depriving Mr.
Shields of treatment all together. Similarly, that one of Plaintiff’s experts indicated she “had no
reason to doubt” the appropriateness of the resuscitation attempt, only shows that the Corizon
Defendants’ competency is in dispute; it does not entitle the Corizon Defendants to summary
judgment on the issue given that evidence to the contrary exists in the record. ECF No. 139-12 at
59:15–25, 60:1–2. In sum, a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to whether the Corizon
Defendants merely made mistakes with serious consequences or were so grossly incompetent
such that they entirely deprived Mr. Shields of medical treatment.
As for Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against the Correctional Defendants,
Plaintiff concedes that these Defendants worked to address the medical emergency once Mr.
Shields was unconscious. ECF No. 150-1 at 24. However, she argues that the ERT members
knew when they first encountered Mr. Shields that he “was suffering from a medical condition
and that he needed to see members of the medical team for treatment” but they approached this
25
serious medical need with deliberate indifference. Id. at 35. This argument fails though because
Plaintiff has not shown that Mr. Shields’s medical needs were “both apparent and serious” when
the ERT unit first encountered him. Grayson, 195 F.3d at 695. Although the ERT members knew
that their task was to eventually bring Mr. Shields to the medical unit, there is no evidence that
the seriousness of Mr. Shields’s health conditions was apparent to them.
Ultimately, the Correctional Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
claims for deliberate indifference through failure to provide medical care but Plaintiff’s same
claim against the Corizon Defendants may proceed to trial.
C. ADA and Rehabilitation Act (Defendants PG County)
The Correctional Defendants also move for summary judgment on Count VII, which
alleges that Defendant PG County violated Mr. Shields’s rights under Title II of the American
with Disabilities Act (ADA) and § 704 of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff maintains that
Defendant PG County failed to make reasonable accommodations for Mr. Shields considering
his obvious mental disorder.
To establish a claim pursuant to Title II of the ADA, Plaintiff must show: (1) Mr. Shields
had a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some
public entity’s services, programs, or activities for which they were otherwise qualified; and (3)
the exclusion, denial of benefits or discrimination was by reason of the disability. Constantine v.
George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 498 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,
467 (4th Cir. 1999).
To succeed on a ADA claim for the failure to provide medical treatment for a disability,
the denial of medical treatment must have occurred because of the disability. See Miller v.
Hinton, 288 Fed. Appx. 901, 902–03 (4th Cir. 2008) (The alleged denial of medical treatment did
26
not violate the ADA absent a showing that the inmate was treated in that manner because of his
disability); see also Spencer v. Easter, 109 Fed. Appx. 571, 573 (4th Cir. 2004) (The failure to
provide timely refills is not an ADA violation absent a showing that it was based on the
prisoner’s disability); Marshall v. Farrelly, No. CIV.A. GLR-15-2265, 2015 WL 5165427, at *2
(D. Md. Sept. 2, 2015) (“Where no discrimination is alleged, the ADA is not violated by a
prison’s failure to attend to the medical needs of its disabled.”).
Mr. Shields suffered from schizophrenia, which qualifies as a disability. ECF No. 131-3
at 2; see 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); Thompson v. Wakefern Food Corp., No. CV RDB-15-1240,
2015 WL 9311972, at *6 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2015); see also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581
(1999). Plaintiff has also introduced some evidence that county employees knew Mr. Shields
suffered from a mental illness. Specifically, Dr. Lawson testified at his deposition, that
symptoms of Mr. Shields’s mental illness were readily observable. 48-4 at 14:20–15:4.
Commenting on footage of Mr. Shields at the Detention Center, Dr. Lawson explained:
He appears, just by the way he is holding himself and the lack of his ability to
follow basic commands, that he appears mentally ill. And by his actions and by his
speaking out in -- whether it is another language, which would be something they
would need to find out about and try to speak with him correctly and find the right
language to speak with him so he understands what they were doing. But it also
appears by the singing and by the behavior, that there was mental illness that was
present.
Id. He also opined that “in general, people that are not following commands and singing loudly
in an open area to themselves are probably suffering from some mental illness” because “[t]hat is
not normal behavior.” Id. at 15:17–20. The correctional officer who inventoried Mr. Shields’s
personal effects observed Mr. Shields singing loudly to himself. ECF No. 148-10 at 3. She also
observed his inability to answer basic questions or follow commands when she asked for his
medical history, and he “kept singing,” rather than answering. Id. at 2. Other correctional officers
27
at intake also observed Mr. Shields singing to himself and speaking indiscernibly. ECF No. 13414 at 2; ECF No. 134-15 at 2. Based on the way Mr. Shields was “talking just real loud, yelling
and stuff,” Rodriguez also “knew something was wrong” with Mr. Shields mentally or
emotionally, but “didn’t know what it was.” ECF No. 145-5 at 70:9–11, 72:4–5. Thus, at least
some employees observed Mr. Shields engaged in the behaviors that, according to Dr. Lawson,
made it apparent that he was suffering from a mental illness.
However, rather than filling out a “psych form,” contacting the mental health providers
with the medical unit, or expediting Mr. Shields to a “safer environment,” ECF No. 145-2 at
37:21–38:3, the correctional officers decided to restrain Mr. Shields and place him in isolation
for approximately eight hours, ECF No. 134-15 at 2; ECF No. 148-10 at 2; ECF No. 147-4 at
49:1–12. They did so because he was being disruptive by loudly talking to himself and singing.
Id. Or, put another way, they moved him to isolation because he was exhibiting symptoms of his
mental illness. While in isolation, Mr. Shields did not receive his medications. ECF No. 148-4 at
64:9–18. Thus, a jury could find that because of his disability, Mr. Shields was denied access to
his medications and to medical care addressing his mental health episode. As a result, Defendant
PG County is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA claim.
D. State Law Claims
The Court now addresses the Correctional Defendants’ request for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s negligence, wrongful death, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress claims.
i.
Negligence (Defendants Wood, Hines, Funderburk, Jackson, Rodriguez,
and Odion)
The Correctional Defendants also seek summary judgment on Count XI—Plaintiff’s
negligence claim. Although the correctional officers enjoy public official immunity for
28
negligence claims, see Livesay v. Baltimore, 384 Md. 1, 12–13 (Md. 2004), they are not immune
to suits based on gross negligence, Cooper v. Rodriguez, 118 A.3d 829, 854 (Md. 2015).7 Gross
negligence is “an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the
consequences as affecting the life or property of another.” Id. at 845. Conduct constituting gross
negligence “implies a thoughtless disregard of the consequences without the exertion of any
effort to avoid them.” Id. at 845–46 (internal citation omitted). “Ordinarily, unless the facts are
so clear as to permit a conclusion as a matter of law, it is for the trier of fact to determine
whether a defendant’s negligent conduct amounts to gross negligence.” Id. at 846 (quoting
Taylor v. Harford Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 862 A.2d 1026, 1034 (Md. 2004)). Here, the facts
are not so clear as to permit a conclusion in the Correctional Defendants’ favor as a matter of
law. The record would support a jury conclusion that ERT members were asked to deliver Mr.
Shields to the medical unit but instead subjected him to physical abuse. Given that their goal was
to change his clothes so that he could get medical treatment, the decision to ineffectively strike,
punch, and kick him, or to tacitly authorize this conduct, “implies a thoughtless disregard of the
consequences” (i.e., Mr. Shields’s injuries) “without the exertion of any effort to avoid them.”
Cooper, 118 A.3d at 854 (citation omitted). Thus, the Correctional Defendants are not entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s gross negligence claim.
7
Plaintiff also contends that the public-official-immunity defense cannot be asserted by the Correctional Defendants
because they acted with malice. However, “[m]alice is established by proof that [a defendant] intentionally
performed an act without legal justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive influenced by hate, the
purpose being to deliberately and willfully injure [the plaintiff].” Kebe v. Brown, 161 F.Supp.2d 634, 644–45 (D.
Md. 2001). And no such proof exists here.
29
ii.
Wrongful Death and Survival Action (Correctional Defendants)
The Correctional Defendants request summary judgment on Plaintiff’s wrongful death
and survival action claims. The Corizon Defendants do not seek summary judgment on these
claims.
In Maryland, a wrongful death action “may be maintained against a person whose
wrongful act causes the death of another.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-902. A
wrongful act is “an act, neglect, or default including a felonious act which would have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages if death had not ensued.” Id. § 3901(e).
Wrongful death actions require the act complained of to be a proximate cause of the harm
alleged. Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 243 (Md. 2009). To satisfy this requirement, the
act must be both (1) a cause-in-fact, and (2) a legally cognizable cause. Id. Where “two or more
independent negligent acts bring about an injury . . . the substantial factor test” determines
whether causation-in-fact exists. Id. at 244. The substantial factor test asks whether it is “‘more
likely than not’ that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff’s
injuries.” Id. (quoting Reed v. Campagnolo, 332 Md. 226, 240 (Md. 1993). Under this test, courts
consider:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the
extent of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor’s conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in
continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not
responsible; and
(c) lapse of time.
Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC, 433 Md. 170, 246 (Md. 2013) (quoting Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 433). Furthermore:
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If the effects of the actor’s negligent conduct actively and continuously operate to
bring about harm to another, the fact that the active and substantially
simultaneous operation of the effects of a third person’s innocent, tortious, or
criminal act is also a substantial factor in bringing about the harm does not protect
the actor from liability.
Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Goslee Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc., 26 Md. App. 452, 470 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1975) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 439)).
Having already established that genuine disputes of material fact exist over whether the
Correctional Defendants acted, at the very least, negligently, what remains to be considered is
whether their conduct was a substantial factor in Mr. Shields’s death. On this question, the record
reflects a dispute. Pointing to Mr. Shields’s autopsy, the Correctional Defendants assert that Mr.
Shields died naturally of Non-Ischemic Cardiomyopathy with schizophrenia and obesity as
significant contributing factors. ECF No. 134-23; ECF No. 134-24 at 8:21–9:17, 31:9–13.
However, Plaintiff’s expert in forensic pathology, Dr. Flomenbaum, says that Mr. Shields did not
die from these factors alone. ECF No. 148-7 at 46:10–12. Instead, “the extenuating factors of
what happened in the detention center is what caused [Mr. Shields’s] heart to stop functioning[.]”
Id. at 14–16. As Dr. Flomenbaum explains, while Mr. Shields’s “heart was significantly
pathological” and “he could have had a heart attack almost any time,” he had “been living with
that heart all along” and “what pushed him over the edge was not purely natural disease”;
instead, it was “the way he was treated in that center, which made his heart work above and
beyond what it was designed to do.” Id. at 47:25–48:19. Dr. Lawson, Plaintiff’s expert in
emergency care, agrees. In his opinion, the Detention Center’s failure to provide Mr. Shields
with his hypertension medication, along with the stress and physical trauma he experienced
because of his encounter with the ERT unit caused Mr. Shields’s blood pressure to rise to
dangerously high levels and put him at a high risk of heart attack or stroke. ECF No. 148-4 at
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64:1–66:9. Therefore, there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Correctional
Defendants caused Mr. Shields’s death, and their Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim
will be denied.
iii.
Assault and Battery (Correctional Defendants)
Battery is defined as an intentional and unlawful touching, which is harmful or offensive.
Elias v. Maryland, 339 Md. 169 (1995). An assault is an attempt to commit a battery. Cont’l Cas.
Co. v. Mirabeile, 52 Md. App. 387, 398 (1982). Because Rodriguez and Odion never had or
threatened physical contact with Mr. Shields once he was in the dressing room, they are entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ assault and battery claims. Further, since the only physical
contact Hines had with Plaintiff was objectively reasonable, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the
“unlawful touching” element of a battery claim against Hines. Williams v. Prince George’s
Cnty., 112 Md. App. 526, 554 (1996) (“when the force used is not excessive,” an officer can only
be held accountable for a battery where “there is no legal authority or justification” for the
conduct). However, Hines may have assaulted Mr. Shields when he threatened to use pepper
spray against him. ECF No. 145-8 at 11:55. There is a genuine dispute of material fact about
whether Mr. Shields’s ongoing screams were in response to this threat. Id. Thus, Defendant
Hines is not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s assault claim. Further, because the
record indicates that Wood, Jackson, and Funderburk may have used unreasonable force without
legal justification against Mr. Shields, they are not entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
assault and battery claims.
iv.
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Correctional Defendants)
To prevail on a claim of an intentional infliction of emotional distress at trial, Plaintiff
must present evidence that shows: (1) the conduct was intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct
32
was extreme and outrageous; and (3) the conduct resulted in severe emotional distress. Williams,
112 Md. App. at 555. He must show that a defendant “desired to inflict severe emotional distress,
knew that such distress was certain or substantially certain to result from his conduct, or acted
recklessly in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will
follow.” Foor v. Juvenile Services Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 175 (1989).
Here, evidence would support a finding by a trier of fact that the Correctional Defendants
conduct was reckless, extreme, and outrageous. The conduct appeared to shock the conscious of
witnesses and of Mr. Shields. Witnesses observing the situation with Freeman were yelling “You
killed him. You killed him,” when Mr. Shields became unconscious, ECF No. 145-4 at 48:16–
17, and Freeman remembers saying to them “be quiet before they come kill us.” Id. at 47:19–20.
Further, Mr. Shields was screaming “murder” during the encounter. ECF No. 145-8 at 11:08,
14:18, 17:10. Yet Defendants continued to engage in this conduct, despite the fact that it was
“not necessary.” ECF No. 147-4 at 30:21–25; id. at 103:14–104:5.
However, insufficient evidence exists that the Defendants’ conduct resulted in severe
emotional distress. To prevail on this last element at trial, Maryland law requires a “plaintiff to
show that he suffered a severely disabling emotional response to the defendant’s conduct.”
Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 570 (1977) (emphasis in original). The severity of emotional
distress is measured by factors including its intensity and duration. Caldor, Inc. v. Bowden, 330
Md. 632, 644 (1993); Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md. App. 1, 15 (1985). A plaintiff will prevail if he
can prove that his severely disabling emotional response “hindered his ability to carry out his
daily activities.” Id. Mr. Shields died, meaning he was of course hindered from carrying out his
33
daily activities. However, insufficient evidence shows this result was caused by emotional
distress as opposed to physical injuries.
To be sure, evidence exists in the record that Mr. Shields experienced emotional distress
while interacting with Defendants because he was yelling “murder,” ECF No. 145-8 at 17:10,
“no no,” id. at 17:52, and moaning, id. at 18:21, while they “were just beating” him, ECF No.
145-4 at 43:1–4. Further, evidence exists that this stress was intense enough that, according to
Dr. Lawson, it may have caused Mr. Shields’s blood pressure to rise to dangerously high levels
and put him at a high risk of heart attack or stroke. ECF No. 148-4 at 64:1–66:9. But there is no
evidence that the emotional distress Mr. Shields suffered caused a long-term severe and disabling
psychological condition; instead, the evidence indicates that any emotional stress experienced by
Mr. Shields resulted in long-term physical harm (i.e. death) rather than long-term mental
anguish.
As a result, the Correctional Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the forgoing reasons, the Corizon Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied, and the Correctional Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and
denied in part. A separate order shall issue.
Date: August 2, 2019
/s__________________________
GEORGE J. HAZEL
United States District Judge
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