Fadlalla et al v. Dyncorp International LLC et al

Filing 374

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Paula Xinis on 8/29/2022. (heps, Deputy Clerk)

Case 8:15-cv-01806-PX Document 374 Filed 08/29/22 Page 1 of 13

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ex rel.
ELGASIM MOHAMED FADLALLA, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,
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Civil Action No. 8:15-cv-01806-PX
v.
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DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL LLC, et al., *
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Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court are the motions for leave to amend answers to the Second
Amended Complaint filed by Defendants KMS Solutions, LLC (“KMS”) (ECF No. 324); Global
Linguist Solutions, LLC (“GLS”) (ECF No. 326); Thomas Wright, Inc. (“Wright”) (ECF No.
327); Tigerswan, Inc. (“Tigerswan”) (ECF No. 328); Dyncorp International, LLC (“Dyncorp”)
(ECF No. 329); and Shee Atika Languages, LLC (“Shee Atika”) (ECF No. 330). The motions
have been fully briefed, and no hearing is necessary. See D. Md. Loc. R. 105.6. For the
following reasons, the motions are DENIED.
I.

Background
Plaintiff-Relators (“Relators”) were hired to provide translation services to the United

States armed forces in the Middle East. ECF No. 286 ¶ 5. They bring this qui tam action
pursuant to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq.(“FCA”), and the Trafficking
Victims Protections Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1581, et seq. Id. ¶¶ 528–633. The Court
previously summarized the relevant factual and procedural background at length in its September
5, 2019 Memorandum Opinion and Order (ECF No. 145) and incorporates those facts here. See

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ECF No. 145 at 1–7. The Court focuses only on those facts necessary to resolve the pending
motions.
On December 5, 2007, the Commander, Headquarters, United States Army Intelligence
and Security Command (“INSCOM”) identified Defendant GLS as a “proposed awardee” of
Contract W911W4-08-D-0002 (“Contract 1”), a $4.6 billion contract for “the provision of
linguists to support U.S. military and intelligence-gathering efforts in the middle east.” ECF No.
286 ¶¶ 2–3, 91–92. To secure Contract 1, INSCOM required GLS to submit a “Small Business
Subcontracting Plan” which set forth the portion of contract funds to be expended through
various categories of small businesses. Id. ¶¶ 101–102. As part of this plan, and as a material
term of Contract 1, INSCOM required GLS to submit annual reports itemizing the subcontractor
expenditures. Id. ¶¶ 109–11.
To win the bid, GLS teamed up with Defendants Dyncorp and AECOM National
Security Programs, Inc. (“AECOM”), 1 and entered into “Teaming Agreements” with
Defendants KMS, Shee Atika, Wright, Tigerswan, and Invizion. (“Small Business Defendants”).
ECF No. 286 ¶¶ 20–29. GLS represented to INSCOM “that it intended to utilize the Small
Business Defendants in accordance with the subcontracting requirements of Contract 1.” Id. ¶
116. Unbeknownst to INSCOM, however, the Teaming Agreements defined the Small Business
Defendants as “GLS affiliates” and not “bona fide independent small business entities.” Id. ¶¶
117–18.
Relators allege that GLS, with DynCorp and AECOM, performed on Contract 1 while
misleading INSCOM into believing that in fact the Small Business Defendants had performed

1

No. 346.

AECOM has already filed its Answer and has no motion to amend pending before the Court. See ECF

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the same work. Id. ¶ 120. Relators particularly aver that they interacted exclusively with GLS
managers, and the Small Business Defendants only nominally appeared on the employment
contracts. Id. ¶¶ 119–22. Relators thus claim that “GLS received unjustified payments from the
U.S. by falsely representing its employees, including Relators, as working for the Small Business
Defendants.” Id. ¶ 149.
On June 19, 2015, Relators filed this qui tam action on behalf of the United States
pursuant to the FCA. ECF No. 1. The FCA generally assigns liability to “any person who . . .
knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval” to the United States. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). Private parties, like Relators, may
bring FCA actions on behalf of the United States when the Department of Justice declines to
pursue the action. See id. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
Although this litigation has gone on for years, Defendants now claim that Relators are
likely barred from pursuing the FCA claim. ECF Nos. 326-3 at 8–9; 327-1 at 8–12; 328-3 at 7–
10; 329-1 at 1; 330-1 at 9–12. Defendants ground this argument in GLS having sought previous
reimbursement on behalf of KMS and Invizion, pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C.
§§ 7101–7109 (“CDA”), for services rendered pursuant to Contract 1. See, e.g., ECF No. 326-3
at 8–12; see also ECF No. 331-3 at 5.
In the course of GLS submitting requests for periodic payment under Contract 1, the
Defense Contract Audit Agency (“DCAA”) 2 began investigating various irregularities in the
execution of the contract to include whether GLS’ payment requests complied with the contract
terms, were free of misrepresentation or other fraud, and whether the payment was properly

The DCAA is a government agency that “provides audit and financial advisory services to [Department of
Defense] and other federal entities responsible for acquisition and contract administration . . . The Agency’s primary
function is to conduct contract audits and related financial advisory services.” DCAA: Defense Contract Audit
Agency, Our Agency, https://www.dcaa.mil/ (last visited July 29, 2022).
2

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supported. ECF No. 326-3 at 2–3; see generally ECF No. 331-3. As part of DCAA’s due
diligence, it conducted several audits, specifically of Invizion and KMS, and ultimately
concluded that neither KMS nor Invizion maintained a “labor force of its own regarding the GLS
contract.” See ECF No. 331-3 at 6, 8. DCAA next issued several “Form 1 Notices,” which are
referrals to the Army Criminal Investigation Command for subsequent possible investigation of
potential contractor fraud. Id. at 6. DCAA also denied GLS’ request for payment totaling
$4,505,280. Id. at 11.
In response, GLS went on the offensive. It submitted a “certified claim” on behalf of
KMS and Invizion pursuant to the procedures set forth in the CDA (“the CDA Action”). See
ECF No. 331-1 at 53. The CDA provides a comprehensive administrative scheme whereby
government contractors may seek review of the suspended payments through submitting a
certified claim to a Government Contracting Officer (“GCO”). See 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103–7104. If
the GCO denies the certified claim, the contractor may appeal the decision to the appropriate
Board of Contract Appeals within 90 days or file a claim against the government in the Court of
Federal Claims. See 41 U.S.C. § 7104 (a)–(b).
Ultimately, the GCO denied GLS’ claim because the demand for payment was
“inadequately supported or otherwise questionable, and not appropriate for reimbursement under
the contract terms.” ECF No. 331-3 at 11. GLS then appealed the denial to the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (“ASBCA”). ECF No. 331-1 at 56. On appeal, the Army, through
the United States Army Legal Services Agency, defended the GCO’s denial of the claim. See
generally ECF No. 331-1.
After a two-day hearing, GLS and the Army entered into a settlement agreement that
fully resolved the CDA Action. ECF No. 331-2. The parties agreed that GLS was to be paid

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$3,275,000 on the claim as amounts owed for Invizion and KMS’ pass-through claims for
compensation. See id. In exchange, GLS withdrew its appeal. Id.
Relevant here, the parties also agreed to a mutual release of all liabilities related to the
“matters appealed” to the ASBCA. ECF No. 331-2 at 3. Notably, the parties expressly agreed
that this release did not preclude the United States from pursuing future litigation for claims
arising under the FCA. The settlement agreement reads in relevant part:
Notwithstanding any terms of this Agreement, specifically reserved and excluded
from the scope and terms of this Agreement as to any entity or person (including
Appellant) are the following claims of the United States: (a) any civil, criminal or
administrative liability arising under the Title 26, U.S. Code (Internal Revenue
Code); (b) any criminal liability; (c) any civil liability for false or fraudulent
claims, including civil liability arising under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729-3733, and/or claims at common law; (d) any liability for personal injury,
property damage or liability to third parties; and (e) any administrative liability
outside the scope of the Contracting Officer’s authority to release, including the
suspension and debarment right of any federal agency. Further, both the
Government and Appellant reserve and exclude from this Settlement Agreement
any liability based upon such obligations as are created by this Settlement
Agreement.
ECF No. 331-2 at 5–6 (emphasis added).
Defendants now move to amend their Answers to plead as an affirmative defense that
Relators are precluded from bringing a qui tam action under what is known as the “government
action bar” of the FCA. The government action bar precludes an FCA qui tam suit that is “based
upon allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative civil
money penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a party.” See 31 U.S.C. § 3730
(e)(3). Defendants allege that the ASBCA appeal and related events qualify as “a civil suit or an
administrative civil money penalty proceeding” under this bar and thus precludes Relators’ FCA
claims. See ECF Nos. 326-3 at 8–9; 327-1 at 8–12; 328-3 at 7–10; 329-1 at 1; 330-1 at 9–12.
Relators oppose Defendants’ amendment as futile and prejudicial. See generally ECF No. 331.
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The Court agrees with Relators that amendment would be futile as a matter of law, and so
amendment will be denied.
II.

Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)(1) requires a defendant’s responsive pleading to

“affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). At the same
time, Rule 15 permits courts to grant leave to amend such a pleading “when justice so requires.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The decision to grant or deny a motion for leave to amend is confined
to the discretion of this Court. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); McCall-Scovens
v. Blanchard, No. ELH-15-3433, 2016 WL 6277668, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 27, 2016). Leave to
amend may be denied for prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, or
futility of amendment. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir. 1999). 3
III.

Analysis
The government action bar is customarily invoked when the government has previously

pursued separate action to thwart fraud committed against it. See Found. for Fair Contracting,
Ltd. v. G &M E. Contracting & Double E, LLC, 259 F. Supp. 2d 329, 336 (D.N.J. 2003) (citing
Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 675–76 (8th Cir. 1998)). The bar is designed to
prevent “parasitic suits by opportunistic late-comers,” that is the relators, “who add nothing to
the exposure of the fraud” by pursuing a qui tam action. Costner, 153 F.3d at 675–76; see also
U.S. ex rel. Dugan v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. DKC-2003-3485, 2008 WL 11509757, at *7 (D.

Although Defendants have sought leave to amend their Answers, they maintain that the government
action bar is jurisdictional, and so can be raised at any time. See ECF Nos. 326-3 at 3–4; 327-1 at 3; 328-3 at 3; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Relators disagree. See ECF No. 331 at 14–16. The Court need not resolve this
question because Defendants seek only to amend their Answers to preserve this defense. In this respect, the
propriety of allowing amendment pursuant to Rule 15 does not depend on whether the defense itself implicates the
Court’s jurisdiction. See United States ex rel Doe v. Odom, No. 20-cv-00803-CMC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194229,
at *7–9 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2021) (declining to consider whether government action bar is jurisdictional when the
defense failed as a matter of law).
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Md. Sept. 24, 2008) (government action bar is designed to preclude citizen suits that have no
“useful or proper return to the government.”). The government action bar reads:
In no event may a person bring an action under subsection (b) which is based upon
allegations or transactions which are the subject of a civil suit or an administrative
civil money penalty proceeding in which the Government is already a party.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3).
The Defendants bear the burden of demonstrating that the government action bar applies
to this suit. See S. Appalachian Mountain Stewards v. A & G Coal Corp., 758 F.3d 560, 569 (4th
Cir. 2014) (citing Ray Commc’ns, Inc. v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 673 F.3d 294, 299 (4th
Cir. 2012)) (“As with any such [affirmative] defense, the defendant bears the burden of proving
that it may validly advance it.”).
In a nutshell, Defendants assert that their pursuit of contract payments in the CDA Action
triggers the government action bar under the FCA. Defendants argue that the qui tam action is
“based upon” the same “allegations or transactions” that were the subject matter of the ASBCA
appeal, which, in their view, is a “civil suit or an administrative civil money penalty proceeding.”
As such, Defendants maintain that this suit gives no useful return to the Government and so,
must not go forward. See ECF Nos. 326-3 at 8–9; 327-1 at 8–12; 328-3 at 7–10; 329-1 at 1; 3301 at 9–12.
Defendants’ argument demands that this Court construe two very interrelated statutes, the
CDA and FCA. Accordingly, the Court must read both “in harmony and not in conflict,” so as to
“give full effect to both[.]” Shumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362, 365 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974)); see State v. United States, 7 F.4th 160, 164 (4th
Cir. 2021) (quoting Morton, 417 U.S. at 551) (“‘[W]hen two statutes are capable of co-

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existence,’ we cannot say that one nullifies the other ‘absent a clearly expressed congressional
intent’ to that effect.”).
In 1978, Congress enacted the CDA to provide “a fair, balanced, and comprehensive
statutory system of legal and administrative remedies in resolving government contract claims.”
Montano Elec. Contractor v. United States, 114 Fed. Cl. 675, 680 (2014) (citing Winter v.
FloorPro, Inc., 570 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2009)), aff’d, 610 F. App’x 987 (Fed. Cir. 2015);
see also Contract Disputes Act of 1978, S. Rep. No. 95-1118, at *1 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235 (noting that a purpose of the CDA is to “induce resolution of more contract
disputes by negotiation prior to litigation.”). The statute provides the exclusive mechanism for
government contractors to dispute payments received pursuant to government contracts. See
Texas Health Choice, L.C. v. Off. of Pers. Mgmt., 400 F.3d 895, 898 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting
Dalton v. Sherwood Van Lines, Inc., 50 F.3d 1014, 1017 (Fed. Cir. 1995)) (noting that “[w]hen
the Contract Disputes Act applies, it provides the exclusive mechanism for dispute resolution.”).
Notably, the CDA expressly exempts from its reach claims involving fraud. Under the
CDA, no agency head may “settle, compromise, pay, or otherwise adjust any claim involving
fraud.” 41 U.S.C. § 7103(c)(1). From this, courts have held that “where the specific events,
transactions, and contracts at issue in the lawsuit give rise to fraud allegations, the CDA no
longer applies.” U.S. ex rel. Mayman v. Martin Marietta Corp., 894 F. Supp. 218, 224 (D. Md.
1995) (quoting United States v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1131, 1135 (N.D. Ga.
1992)).
Similarly, the CDA makes clear that Boards of Contract Appeals, such as the ASBCA,
cannot adjudicate “a claim or dispute for penalties or forfeitures prescribed by statute or
regulation that another Federal agency is specifically authorized to administer, settle, or

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determine.” 41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(5). Because the FCA is a “statute” where fraud related claims,
disputes, and penalties are “prescribed,” and the FCA reserves prosecution to another agency,
namely, the Department of Justice, then Boards of Contract Appeals simply cannot reach any
claims covered by the FCA. See United States v. EER Sys. Corp., 950 F. Supp. 130, 134 (D.
Md. 1996) (noting the text of the CDA “expresses Congress’ intent that all government contract
disputes involving fraud were not to be affected by the CDA.”); United States v. Unified Indus.,
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 947, 950 (E.D. Va. 1996) (quoting Mayman, 894 F. Supp. at 224) (instructing
that the CDA no longer applies when the “events, transactions, and contracts at issue in the
lawsuit give rise to fraud allegations”); see also UMC Elec. Co. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 507,
509 (1999) (“Moreover, the contracting officer was without authority to determine fraud without
referral to the Department of Justice.”).
The legislative history of the CDA further supports that the statute does not entertain
claims involving fraud. Indeed, Congress made clear that the CDA was not intended to usurp the
Department of Justice’s province related to identifying and pursuing procurement fraud, which
notably includes FCA actions. See S. Rep. 95-1118, at *5; see also Martin J. Simko Const., Inc.
v. United States, 852 F.2d 540, 543–44 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining legislative history of CDA);
41 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(5) (review under CDA “does not extend to a claim or dispute for penalties
or forfeitures prescribed by statute or regulation that another Federal agency is specifically
authorized to administer, settle, or determine.”); 48 C.F.R. 33.210 (2022) (instructing that GCOs’
authority “does not extend to . . . [t]he settlement, compromise, payment, or adjustment of any
claim involving fraud”); Defense Logistics Agency—Request for Advance Decision, B-230095,
1988 U.S. Comp. Gen. LEXIS 275, at *4 (Mar. 16, 1988) (“Under the CDA, as reflected in the

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FAR, a contracting agency shall not settle, compromise pay or otherwise adjust any claim
involving fraud.”).
Indeed, only in very narrow circumstances not present here have questions of contractor
fraud arisen in actions pursued under the CDA. Occasionally, the ASBCA has voided
government contracts ab initio when the contract was procured by fraud. See, e.g., C & D
Constr., Inc., ASBCA No. 38661, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,256. Or the ASBCA has given preclusive
effect to another court’s finding that a contract had been procured by fraud. See, e.g., Atlas Int’l
Trading Corp., ASBCA No. 59091, 15-1 BCA ¶ 35,830. 4 But by and large, CDA actions are
confined to disputes arising from the terms of a government contract.
By contrast, matters concerning fraudulent procurement of contract payments are covered
by the FCA. The FCA specifically permits the Department of Justice to proceed criminally or
civilly against any person or corporation that knowingly attempts to obtain government payments
through “false or fraudulent” representations. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729, et seq.;
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 176, 180 (2016). Where, as here, the
Department of Justice declines to pursue such an action, relators may prosecute the matter on
behalf of the government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3). But even then, the Department of Justice
ultimately decides whether the action will proceed, and also whether it may be settled or
dismissed. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)–(c); Simko, 852 F.2d at 548. This process makes sense
given that the purpose of the FCA is to prevent fraud on the government as the real party in
interest. See Nasuti v. United States, No. 14-398C, 2014 WL 12543799, at *4 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 4,
2014) (stating that the “Government alone owns a qui tam claim.”); aff'd, 581 F. App’x 904 (Fed.

Whether the ASBCA may entertain these arguments at all has been the subject of much debate. See
generally Major Elinor J. Kim, Why “Green Dreams” Should Not Come True: Keeping Boards of Contract Appeals
Off the Scales of Justice, 224 Mil. L. Rev. 1073 (2016); Davidson, Michael, Claims Involving Fraud: Contracting
Officer Limitations During Procurement Fraud Investigations, 2002-Sep’t Army Law. 21.
4

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Cir. 2014); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (noting that a qui tam plaintiff may bring an FCA action
“in the name of the Government”).
With this statutory background in mind, the Court turns to Defendants’ argument.
Defendants broadly contend that because GLS sought contractual reimbursement in the CDA
Action, Relators are now prevented from raising a fraud action under the FCA. Defendants
argue that the appeal before the ASBCA alone constitutes a “civil suit” for which the
Government is a party. Thus, the mere pursuit of their contractual right to payment before the
ASBCA, say Defendants, precludes any further action under the FCA. See ECF Nos. 326-3 at 8–
9; 327-1 at 8–12; 328-3 at 7–10; 329-1 at 1; 330-1 at 9–12. The Defendants are wrong as a
matter of law and fact.
As a matter of law, if the Court credited Defendants’ reading of the CDA as entertaining
fraud claims, then almost any action for payment under a government contract, if appealed to the
ASBCA, would preclude the Government from later contending that the same contractors
violated the FCA. But this cannot be. Indeed, the CDA exempts fraud claims in the first
instance. 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (a)(5), (c)(1). Thus, if the CDA claim cannot involve fraud, then it
cannot, as the government action bar requires, be “based upon” the same “allegations or
transactions” as the FCA claim. Cf. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3). To conclude otherwise would give
no force and effect to the CDA provision that expressly exempts fraud allegations from its reach.
Nor can the Court discern any specific facts arising from the CDA Action to support that
it had been “based upon” any “allegations or transactions” sounding in fraud, thus triggering the
government action bar. The GCO’s decision centered exclusively on whether GLS satisfied its
contractual terms such that it was owed the amounts set forth in the certified claim. See
generally ECF No. 331-3. And the appeal to the ASBCA never reached final resolution. See

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generally ECF No. 331-2. Instead, the parties settled the claim and expressly exempted from the
mutual release of claims any future FCA action. See ECF No. 331-2 at 4–5. On these
undisputed facts, the Court cannot see how the government action bar could ever apply when the
CDA Action culminated in reserving future suit under the FCA.
For the same reasons, the Court rejects Defendants’ alternative argument that the CDA
Action constitutes an “administrative civil money penalty proceeding” such that the bar applies.
The government action bar requires that whether the prior action was a “civil suit” or an
“administrative civil money penalty proceeding,” it must be “based upon allegations or
transactions” that are the subject of the FCA claim. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3). Because the
Court concludes that the CDA Action is not based on the same allegations or transactions of the
FCA claim, it is of no moment whether the CDA Action was a “civil money penalty
proceeding.” 5
In sum, the Court approaches with great skepticism the contention that a CDA claim,
even if litigated before the ASBCA, can trigger the FCA’s government action bar. Given that the
CDA limits its application to government contract disputes—and expressly exempts matters
involving fraud from its reach—it will be a rare case that a CDA claim bars future FCA suits.
This case is not that. Moreover, the CDA Action settled before final resolution, and the

5
That said, the Court is not convinced that the CDA Action could ever constitute a “civil money penalty
proceeding.” The CDA simply does not provide for money penalties as a sanction. Cf. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7101–7109.
Nor do Defendants claim they actually faced any sanction in any “proceeding” that could be construed as a “civil
money penalty.” Cf. Schagrin v. LDR Indus., LLC, No. 14 C 9125, 2018 WL 2332252, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 23,
2018) (“The few district courts to have addressed what constitutes an ‘administrative civil money penalty
proceeding’ for purposes of § 3730(e)(3) agree that whether the government has already imposed a ‘penalty’ against
the defendant is key to determining whether § 3730(e)(3) bars a subsequent FCA claim.”); U.S. ex rel. Johnson v.
Shell Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 923, 927 (E.D. Tx. 1998) (payment demands and audits by Mineral Management
Services not an administrative civil money penalty proceeding when demands only informed defendant of possible
assessment of civil penalties); United States v. FastTrain II Corp., No. 12-cv-21431, 2017 WL 606346, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. 2017) (Department of Education preliminary program review not a civil money penalty proceeding when report
did not include a demand for money penalty). Thus, Defendants cannot make plausible that the CDA Action
involved a “civil money penalty proceeding.” See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(3).

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settlement agreement expressly allowed for future FCA litigation. Because the CDA Action is
not based upon the same allegations or transactions as the FCA claim, the government action bar
does not apply.
IV.

Conclusion
Defendants’ proposed amendments to their Answers to add the government action bar as

a defense fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, the proposed amendments would be futile.
Defendants’ motions to amend their Answers, therefore, must be denied.
A separate order follows.

August 29, 2022
Date

/S/
Paula Xinis
United States District Judge

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