Rembold v. Helsel

Filing 7

MEMORANDUM. Signed by Judge Paul W. Grimm on 9/14/2015. (dass, Deputy Clerk) (c/m 9/15/15-das)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
DONALD GARY REMBOLD

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Petitioner

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v.

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DAVID HELSEL, M.D.

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Respondent

Civil Action No. PWG-15-1825

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MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Donald Gary Rembold filed suit on June 19, 2015, claiming that, in the
criminal case in which he is the defendant, he was committed to Spring Grove Hospital Center
without a hearing. ECF No. 1. On August 18,2015, Respondent filed a Limited Response along
with supporting exhibits, ECF Nos. 3 & 3-1, to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, pursuant
to this Court's July 13,2015 Order, ECF NO.2. Petitioner has filed a Reply. ECF NO.4. Based
on the information filed with the Response and for the reasons stated below, the petition must be
dismissed without prejudice.
At the time this case was initiated, Rembold was confined at Spring Grove Hospital
Center ("Spring Grove") pursuant to an order issued by the Circuit Court for Harford County,
Maryland in the context of a criminal case in which Rembold is the defendant.l

Pet. 1-2, 13;

Resp.I.
On January 28, 2015, the circuit court had issued an order for the Department of Health
and Mental Hygiene ("DHMH") to conduct an evaluation of Rembold's competency to stand
trial. Resp. Ex. 4. Pursuant to the order, Dr. Kimberly A. Witczak, Psy.D., a forensic evaluator

I On March 19,2014, Rembold was indicted on multiple counts of sexual abuse of a minor and
third degree sex offense. Resp. Exs. lA & IB.

for the DHMH, examined Rembold at the Harford County Detention Center, where he was
detained, on January 30, 2015. Witczak Report, Resp. Ex. 5. She also interviewed Rembold's
attorneys and reviewed Rembold's past criminal record. !d. In her written report to the circuit
court, Dr. Witczak stated her opinion that Rembold did "not have a factual and rational
understanding
"sufficient

of the nature and object of the proceedings against him," nor did he possess

present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding."

Id. She further concluded that Rembold would present a danger to himself or to

others if released from confinement. Id.
On February 6, 2015, the circuit court issued an order finding Rembold incompetent to
stand trial and, "by reason of a mental disorder ...

a danger to [him]self or the person or

property of another," and committing Rembold to the custody of the DHMH until he becomes
competent to stand trial or is no longer a danger to himself or others. Resp. Ex. 6. The order
requiring Rembold's commitment was based on the evaluation performed by Dr. Witczak and
required Rembold's immediate transportation to Spring Grove or another facility designated by
DHMH. Id. Rembold was admitted to Spring Grove on February 13,2015. Resp. Ex. 7.
Pursuant to state law, the DHMH evaluates persons committed as not competent to stand
trial at least every six months.

See Md. Code Ann., Crim Proc.

S 3-108(a).

Rembold was re-

evaluated in July of 2015 by Dr. Lindsay D. Holbein, Psy.D .. Resp. Ex. 8. She also reviewed
the court and Spring Grove records and interviewed Rembold's father and defense attorney. Id.
Dr. Holbein concluded after conducting the re-evaluation that Rembold is competent to stand
trial and does not suffer from any psychiatric illness.

Additionally, Dr. Holbein noted that

Rembold's treatment team did not believe he has a psychotic disorder and that no medications
had been prescribed for Rembold during his stay at Spring Grove. Id. Dr. Holbein's report is

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dated July 21, 2015, and counsel for DHMH has requested the circuit court hold a hearing by
August 28, 2015, pursuant to Crim. Proc. 93-l06(c)(l)(iii).

Resp. Ex. 9. On September 3,2015,

Rembold was found competent to stand trial by the Circuit Court for Harford County, released
from Spring Grove, and remanded to the custody of the Harford County Detention Center.
Notice ofHr'g

& Release, ECF No.5; see State Ct. Docket, ECF No. 5-1 (stating that Rembold

was "[h ]eld without Bond to HCDC imm[ e]diately upon r[e]lease from Spring Grove").
Rembold asserts that Dr. Witczak's evaluation was improper and that he was entitled to a
hearing prior to being found incompetent to stand trial. Pet.'s Reply. Respondent admits that
Rembold was found incompetent to stand trial and committed to DHMH custody on February 6,
2015, without benefit of the hearing specified in Crim. Proc. 93-l06(b)(l).

Resp.4.

This Court's limited review of this matter is focused on whether circumstances exist that
would permit Rembold to access pre-trial federal habeas relief. Pre-trial federal habeas relief is
available under 28 U.S.C. 9 2241 if the petitioner is in custody, has exhausted state court
remedies, and special circumstances exist that justifY intervention by the federal court.
Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F. 2d 220,224-26

See

(5th Cir. 1987).

In this case, special circumstances justifying

this Court's intervention do not exist

because Rembold is no longer confined at Spring Grove. The issue regarding the validity of his
confinement at Spring Grove is therefore moot. "A habeas corpus petition is moot when it no
longer presents a case or controversy under Article III, 9 2, of the Constitution." Aragon v.
Shanks, 144 F.3d 690, 691 (lOth Cir. 1998) (citing Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1,7 (l998)).
"This case-or-controversy
trial and appellate ....

requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings,

The parties must continue to have a 'personal stake in the outcome' of the

lawsuit." Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v.

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Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101 (1983)). Additionally, the injury for which Rembold sought a remedy,
i.e., his confinement, cannot be "redressed by a favorable judicial decision," as he already has
been released. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7 ("(T]hroughout the litigation, the plaintiff 'must have
suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.'"

(quoting Lewis, 494 U.S. at 477)).

therefore will be dismissed without prejudice by separate Order, which follows.

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The petition