Horowitz et al v Federal Insurance Company

Filing 19

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 5/27/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ROBERT HOROWITZ, et al.
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-1959

:
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
d/b/a Chubb & Son

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

insurance

case

judgment

is

filed

(“Plaintiffs”).
briefed,

and

necessary.

a

by

motion

Local

ready
to

Plaintiffs

(ECF

the

and

No.

court
Rule

16).

now

for

alter

rules,

105.6.

or

Robert
The

resolution
amend

and

issues
no

For

the

Cathy
have

hearing

the

in

court’s
Horowitz

been

being

following

this

fully
deemed

reasons,

Plaintiffs’ motion will be denied.
I.

Background
The factual and procedural background to this case may be

found in the memorandum opinion issued on January 4, 2016.
ECF No. 14, at 1-2).

(See

That opinion and an accompanying order

granted a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Federal Insurance
Company

(“Defendant”).

On

February

1,

Plaintiffs

pending motion pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).

filed

the

(ECF No. 16).

Defendants responded (ECF No. 17), and Plaintiffs replied (ECF
No. 18).

II.

Standard of Review
Courts have recognized three limited grounds for granting a

motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e): (1) to accommodate
an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new
evidence not previously available; or (3) to correct clear error
of law or prevent manifest injustice.

See United States ex.

rel. Becker v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 305 F.3d 284,
290 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Pacific Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire
Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998)).
A Rule 59(e) motion “may not be used to relitigate old
matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could
have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.”
Co.,

148

F.3d

at

403

(quoting

11

Wright,

et

Pac. Ins.

al.,

Federal

Practice & Procedure § 2810.1, at 127–28 (2d ed. 1995)); see
also Medlock v. Rumsfeld, 336 F.Supp.2d 452, 470 (D.Md. 2002),
aff’d, 86 F.App’x 665 (4th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (“To the
extent that Plaintiff is simply trying to reargue the case, he
is not permitted to do so.

Where a motion does not raise new

arguments, but merely urges the court to ‘change its mind,’
relief is not authorized.”).

“In general, ‘reconsideration of a

judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should
be used sparingly.’”

Pac. Ins. Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (quoting

Wright, et al., supra, § 2810.1, at 124).

2

III. Analysis
Plaintiffs

assert

that

reconsideration

is

necessary

“to

prevent clear errors of law and ensure adherence to the standard
of review that requires facts pleaded in the complaint to be
deemed true.”

(ECF No. 16, at 1).

complaint

contained

attempted

to

sufficient

collect

a

Plaintiffs contend that the

facts

consumer

showing

debt

without

that

Defendant

obtaining

the

license required by the Maryland Collection Agency Licensing Act
(“MCALA”).

According to Plaintiffs, the court incorrectly held

that a defendant is only required to obtain a license if it
“regularly” engages in the business of collecting or soliciting
consumer

debt.

(ECF

No.

16,

at

4-5).

Plaintiffs

cite

to

Fontell v. Hassett, 870 F.Supp.2d 395, 409 (D.Md. 2012), a case
in which Judge Williams held that an entity may violate the
MCALA even if it is not “regularly” engaged in the collection
business.
Plaintiffs’
unpersuasive.
dismissal

was

arguments

and

citation

to

Fontell

are

In the memorandum opinion, the court held that
warranted

for

two

basic

reasons.

First,

Plaintiffs did not “allege plausibly that Defendant is engaged
in

the

claims.”

business

of

collecting

(ECF No. 14, at 7-8).

or

soliciting

consumer

debt

Second, Plaintiffs did not

allege that “Defendant was ‘collecting or attempting to collect
an alleged debt’ sufficient to state a viable claim under the
3

[Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act (‘MCDCA’)].”

(Id. at 7).

The court held that Plaintiffs’ complaint put forth nothing more
than

unsupported

“summary

assertions,”

which

failed

to

show

plausibly that Defendant engaged in any sort of debt collection.
(Id. at 6).

Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertions, the court did

not hold that a defendant must be engaged in “regular” debt
collection to be liable for a violation of the MCALA.1

Rather,

the court explained that “the alleged facts show that Defendant
funded Selzer’s defense of the malpractice claim,” which was
distinct from any collection attempt.

(Id.).

Plaintiffs failed

to plead sufficient facts alleging that Defendants engaged in
any debt collection, which distinguishes this case from Fontell.
In short, Plaintiffs’ motion is an attempt to relitigate
the

motion

to

dismiss.

Plaintiffs

continue

to

assert

that

Defendant engaged in debt collection, but this assertion is not
sufficiently

supported

motion

does

not

persuasively

clear

error

of

law

reiteration

of

prior

by

or

factual

allegations.

articulate

manifest

arguments

how

dismissal

injustice.

reveals

a

Plaintiffs’

‘mere

was

a

“Plaintiff[s’]
disagreement’

with the court’s decision and thus is an insufficient basis for
1

Notably, Plaintiffs do not argue that the memorandum
opinion explicitly stated that “regular” debt collection is
required for a violation of the MCALA.
Instead, Plaintiffs
include an altered quotation from the opinion (ECF No. 16, at 45) and contend that the “tone” of the opinion insinuated that
“regular” debt collection was required (ECF No. 18, at 2). Such
general assertions ignore much of the opinion’s analysis.
4

[the] extraordinary remedy” of reconsideration under Rule 59(e).
Panowicz v. Hancock, No. DKC-11-2417, 2015 WL 5895528, at *3
(D.Md. Oct. 5, 2015) (citing

Hutchinson v. Staton, 994 F.2d

1076, 1082 (4th Cir. 1993)).
Plaintiffs put forth two additional arguments, neither of
which warrants significant analysis.

First, Plaintiffs assert

that the investigation by the Maryland Insurance Administration
(the “MIA”) is “inconsistent with this court’s conclusions about
pleaded facts” because the MIA investigation has been ongoing
for “more than seven months.”

(ECF No. 16, at 8-9).

Defendant

counters that the MIA issued a letter to Plaintiffs on January
29, 2016 determining that Defendant did not violate Maryland
insurance law.

(ECF Nos. 17, at 2; 17-1).

It is not clear how

the investigation is relevant to the pending motion, and the
MIA’s

January

29

letter,

Plaintiffs’ position.

at

the

very

least,

undermines

Finally, Plaintiffs’ contention that res

judicata does not apply is irrelevant.

As the court held in its

memorandum opinion, res judicata may bar Plaintiffs’ claims, but
it is “not necessary . . . to consider this question in light of
Plaintiffs’ failure to state a claim under the MCDCA.”
14,

at

8

n.1).

Accordingly,

none

of

Plaintiffs’

(ECF No.
arguments

warrant the extraordinary remedy of altering or amending the
court’s judgment under Rule 59(e).

5

IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to alter or amend the

court’s judgment filed by Plaintiffs will be denied.

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

6