Horowitz et al v Federal Insurance Company
Filing
32
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 11/22/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
ROBERT HOROWITZ, et al.
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 15-1959
:
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY
d/b/a Chubb & Son
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently
pending
and
ready
for
resolution
in
this
insurance case is a motion for relief from judgment filed by
Plaintiffs Robert and Cathy Horowitz (“Plaintiffs”).
26).
(ECF No.
The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the motion for relief from judgment
will be denied.
I.
Background
The factual and procedural background to this case may be
found in the memorandum opinion issued on January 4, 2016.
No. 14, at 1-2).
(ECF
That opinion and an accompanying order granted
a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Federal Insurance Company
(“Defendant”).
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to alter or amend
the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) which was denied on
May 27, 2016.
(ECF No. 19).
Plaintiffs appealed, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal.
a
motion
(ECF No. 24).
for
60(b)(2).
relief
(ECF No. 26).
Plaintiffs replied.
II.
from
judgment
pursuant
to
Fed.R.Civ.P.
Defendant responded, (ECF No. 28), and
(ECF No. 31).
Standard of Review
“The
consideration
of
proceeds in two stages:
the
On May 25, 2017, Plaintiffs filed
movant
has
met
a [Fed.R.Civ.P.]
60(b)
motion
first, the court must assess whether
each
of
three
threshold
conditions;
and
second, if the threshold requirements have been met, the court
must determine whether the movant has satisfied one of the six
enumerated grounds for relief under the rule.”
Holland v. Va.
Lee Co., Inc., 188 F.R.D. 241, 248 (W.D.Va. 1999) (citing Nat’l
Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Gray, 1 F.3d 262, 264, 266 (4th Cir.
1996).
The threshold requirements are timeliness, a meritorious
claim or defense, and the absence of unfair prejudice to the
other side.
Rule 60(b) allows for a party to move for relief
from a judgment based on one of six grounds including “newly
discovered evidence.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2).
In determining
whether to exercise the power under Rule 60(b), courts must
engage
in
a
delicate
balancing
of
the
“sanctity
of
final
judgments, expressed in the doctrine of res judicata, and the
incessant command of the court’s conscience that justice be done
in light of ALL the facts.”
Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d
2
96, 102 (4th Cir. 1979) (emphasis in original) (quoting Banker’s
Mortg. Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir. 1970)).
III. Analysis
A.
Timeliness
Plaintiffs
argue
that
the
motion
for
relief
is
timely
because it was filed within a year of the court’s ruling on its
motion
to
alter
or
amend
the
judgment
and
shortly
after
a
decision in the case between these parties before the Maryland
Insurance
Administration
(“MIA”).
(ECF
No.
26,
at
2-5).
Defendant argues that the motion is late because judgment was
entered more than a year before the motion and, regardless,
Plaintiffs did not file within a reasonable time.
(ECF No. 28,
at 2).
In
this
judgment
case,
pursuant
Plaintiffs
to
filed
Fed.R.Civ.P.
59,
“affect the finality of the judgment.”
committee notes to 1995 amendment.
“suspend[]
the
finality
of
the
a
motion
and
to
Rule
amend
59
the
motions
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 advisory
A Rule 59 motion acts to
judgment”
until
the
district
court has ruled.
Communist Party of Ind. v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S.
441, 445 (1974).
Thus, a Rule 59 motion tolls the date of final
judgment for the purposes of “the appeals-limitation period.”
Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978).
Other courts
have also held that a Rule 59 motion tolls the date of final
judgment
for
the
purposes
of
subsequent
3
motions
before
the
district court including motions pursuant to Rule 60.
Int’l
Ctr. for Tech. Assessment v. Leavitt, 468 F.Supp.2d 200, 206
(D.D.C. 2007) (“In other words, the suspension of finality on
the
basis
of
a
timely-filed
applicable to an appeal.
Rule
59(e)
motion
is
not
only
Accordingly, the court concludes that
a timely filed Rule 59(e) motion suspends the finality of a
judgment not just at the appellate level, but at the district
court level as well.”).
persuasive,
it
will
Although that ruling is logical and
not
be
necessary
to
rule
definitively
because, even if timely, the motion will be denied on other
grounds.
Rule
60(b)(2)
requires
not
only
that
a
motion
be
made
within a year of final judgment but also that it be filed within
“a reasonable time.”
Plaintiffs claim that their delay was
reasonable because the delay allowed them to incorporate an MIA
decision into their motion.
(ECF No. 26, at 5).
argues the delay was unreasonable.
Defendant
When a party waits for a few
of months to “strengthen the basis for [a] motion”, the delay is
reasonable.
Bouret-Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maintenance
Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 44 (1st Cir. 2015) (finding reasonable a
three
month
delay
used
to
obtain
additional
support a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)).
information
to
Here, Plaintiffs
delayed six months which allowed for further development in a
related administrative proceeding.
4
This delay is not an example
of a party sleeping on its rights but rather of using additional
time to attempt to improve their case.
Thus, Plaintiffs’ motion
filed shortly after a ruling in the administrative proceeding
was filed within a reasonable time.
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. AMH Roman Two NC, LLC, 859 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2017).
B.
Prejudice
Plaintiffs allege that setting aside the judgment will not
unfairly prejudice Defendant.
does not dispute this.
(ECF No. 26, at 6).
Defendant
(ECF No. 28).
There does not appear to
be any loss of evidence or witnesses.
See Westlake Legal Group
v. Yelp, Inc. 599 F.App’x 481, 484 (4th Cir. Mar 18, 2015).
Therefore,
Plaintiffs’
motion
does
not
unfairly
prejudice
whether
Plaintiffs
Defendant.
C.
Meritorious Claim or Defense
The
final
threshold
consideration
have a meritorious claim or defense.
is
To satisfy this element,
the movants must make “a proffer of evidence which would permit
a finding for the [moving] party[.]”
Holland v. Va. Lee Co.,
Inc., 188 F.R.D. 241, 249 (W.D.Va. 1999) (alteration in the
original and quoting Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc. v. Fodoc
Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 1988)).
In a
motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), the newly discovered evidence
must
call
directly
into
question
refuting
the
“the
validity
underpinning
5
of
of
the
the
judgment
theory
by
which
prevailed.”
11 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2859 (3d ed. 2017).
Plaintiffs
allege
that
an
exhibit
obtained
in
November
during proceedings before the MIA shows that Defendant paid for
debt collection activities. (ECF No. 26, at 7).
an audit report prepared by Defendant.
identify
debts.
claims
any
affirmative
payments
This exhibit is
The report does not
Defendant
made
to
collect
Indeed, it only identifies the disallowance of certain
for
legal
expenses.
(ECF
No.
26-1,
at
114-17).
The
report is consistent with the reasoning in the original judgment
that Defendant did not engage in debt collection activities,
and,
therefore,
judgment.”
11
it
does
Wright,
not
undermine
supra
§
2859.
the
“validity
Plaintiffs’
of
the
motion
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2) will be denied.
IV.
Conclusion
For
the
foregoing
reasons,
the
motion
for
relief
from
judgment filed by Plaintiffs Robert and Cathy Horowitz will be
denied.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
6
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