Allen v. TV One, LLC et al

Filing 96

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 10/4/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
NIKKI WEBBER ALLEN
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-1960

:
TV ONE, LLC
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently

pending

and

ready

for

resolution

in

this

employment discrimination case are a motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant TV One (“Defendant”) (ECF No. 89), and a
cross

motion

for

summary

judgment

filed

Webber Allen (“Plaintiff”) (ECF No. 90).

by

Plaintiff

Nikki

The issues have been

fully briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed
necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the

motions for summary judgment will be denied.
I.

Background
Factual Background1

A.

A more complete recitation of the factual background can be
found

in

the

court’s

prior

Defendant’s motion to dismiss.

memorandum

opinion

(ECF No. 27, at 1-8).

denying
Plaintiff

began working as Director of Talent Relations and Casting for
1

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed or presented in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, the nonmoving party as to Defendant’s summary
judgment motion. Plaintiff’s cross motion for summary judgment
will be analyzed separately.

Defendant when the television network launched in 2004.

(ECF

Nos. 89-4, at 34, pp. 127-28, 43, p. 164; 90-5, at 4).2

Among

other

responsibilities,

Plaintiff

was

charged

with

booking

talent for TV One shows, including TV One-on-One, hosted by TV
One’s founder, chairperson, and board member Catherine Hughes.
(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 34, p. 127; 90-6, at 34, p. 127).
is

also

the

mother

of

TV

President Alfred Liggins.

One

Chief

Executive

Ms. Hughes
Officer

(ECF No. 90-5, at 4).

and

Plaintiff

asserts that she was subjected to a pervasive pattern of sexual
harassment and gender discrimination by Ms. Hughes during the
course of her employment at TV One.

(ECF No. 90-1, at 7).

The

crux of Plaintiff’s claim is that Ms. Hughes insisted repeatedly
that Plaintiff take up a romantic relationship with Mr. Liggins.
(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 45-46, pp. 173, 175-77).

During a business

trip to Chicago in October 2004, Ms. Hughes allegedly said to
Plaintiff, “I’m going to be your mother one way or another.
Either you will marry [Mr. Liggins] or I will marry your father
and be your stepmother.”
at

45,

p.

questioned

173).
why

On

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 45, p. 173; 90-6,
another

Plaintiff

had

occasion,
not

married

Ms.
Mr.

Hughes

sternly

Liggins

yet,

stating that Plaintiff was old and “[her] babies would probably
be retarded.”

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 49, p. 187; 90-6, at 49, p.

2

References to the record will be by ECF document and page
numbers. For depositions printed with four pages per sheet, the
internal page numbers will also be included.
2

187, 54, p. 207).
Plaintiff
workplace

to

On various occasions, Ms. Hughes introduced

others

rumors

as

her

that

romantically involved.

“future

Plaintiff

daughter-in-law,”
and

Mr.

fueling

Liggins

were

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 46, pp. 176-77; 90-6,

at 46, pp. 176-77, 49, pp. 188-89).

When Plaintiff complained

directly to Mr. Liggins about the rumors, he responded, “at
least it makes me look good.”

(ECF No. 90-6, at 32, p. 118).

Once Ms. Hughes realized that Plaintiff was not going to marry
Mr. Liggins, she began to “baselessly attack” Plaintiff’s job
performance, including publicly berating Plaintiff in front of
her

co-workers

Plaintiff
standard

make

(Id.

at

requests

industry

53-54,
for

protocol

pp.

talent
(Id.

at

205-06);
in

a

demanding

manner

54-55,

pp.

that

contrary
208-13);

to
and

chastising Plaintiff for taking time off for her wedding and
honeymoon in 2012 (Id. at 56-57, pp. 214-18).

At a gathering of

TV One employees in January 2014, Mr. Liggins gave a speech
about the history of TV One and screened a video demo reel.
During his speech, Mr. Liggins falsely stated that Plaintiff
joined him in his hotel room to review the video when he was on
a business trip in Los Angeles.

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 27-28, pp.

101-02; 90-6, at 27-28, pp. 101-02).
this

statement

further

fueled

According to Plaintiff,

rumors

Plaintiff were romantically involved.

3

that

Mr.

Liggins

and

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 27-28,

pp. 101, 104-05, 31, pp. 114-15; 90-6, at 28, pp. 104-05, 31,
pp. 114-15).
Plaintiff’s

employment

was

terminated

in

late

June

2014

following a dispute with Ms. Hughes regarding the Essence Music
Festival (the “Festival”).

(ECF No. 90-19, at 2-3).

Earlier in

the month, Plaintiff’s supervisor informed Plaintiff that Ayiko
Broyard, an advertising agency executive and personal friend of
Ms. Hughes, wanted the R&B Divas to perform on the McDonald’s
stage at the Festival.
90-6,

at

129-30,

pp.

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 129-30, pp. 367-71;
367-71).

However,

the

R&B

Divas

already booked for a performance on Walmart’s stage.

were

(ECF Nos.

89-4, at 127, p. 366; 90-6, at 131, pp. 377-78, 132, p. 382).
Concerned about jeopardizing TV One’s relationship with Walmart,
Plaintiff communicated with Denise Bennett, the talent manager
and

TV

One’s

account

representative

handling

the

Walmart

account.

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 132, pp. 383-86; 90-6 at 131, pp.

376-77).

After being told by Ms. Bennett that Walmart expected

exclusivity with the R&B Divas, Plaintiff issued instructions to
notify Ms. Broyard that TV One was unable to accommodate her
request because of an existing agreement with Walmart.

(ECF

Nos. 89-4, at 131, p. 382, 359-60; 90-6, at 128, p. 366, 136,
pp. 396-97).

On June 22, Ms. Broyard informed Ms. Hughes that

her request had been denied, and Ms. Hughes called Plaintiff’s
supervisor regarding the matter.
4

(ECF No. 89-11, at 66, pp.

254-55, 67, p. 257).

That afternoon, Plaintiff’s supervisor e-

mailed Plaintiff, asking her to call Ms. Hughes.

(ECF Nos. 89-

4, at 137, pp. 403-04, 362; 89-12, at 38, p. 141; 90-6, at 138,
pp. 403-04).
Most of the remaining facts are in dispute.

According to

Plaintiff, when she called Ms. Hughes in the afternoon on June
22,

Ms.

yelled

Hughes

and

“immediately

cursed

at

her

started

for

not

directly regarding her request.
While

Plaintiff

diffuse

the

tried

to

situation,”

yelling at [Plaintiff].”

speaking

[her]
with

off”

Ms.

and

Broyard

(ECF No. 90-6, at 138, p. 405).

speak
Ms.

telling

calmly

Hughes

with

“ke[pt]

(Id. at 138, p. 406).

Ms.

Hughes

jumping

in

“to
and

When Ms. Hughes

demanded that Plaintiff participate on a conference call the
following day, Plaintiff informed Ms. Hughes that she would be
unavailable

and

on

husband’s family.
don’t

give

a

approved

leave

out

of

town

visiting

her

In response, Ms. Hughes told Plaintiff, “I

damn

about

your

husband’s

family.”

(Id.).

Believing that she hung up the phone on Plaintiff, Ms. Hughes
began speaking to others in her company, referring to Plaintiff
as “arrogant” and “incompetent,” and stating in reference to
Plaintiff, “I don’t know who the hell this girl thinks she is,
but I am writing her ass up.”
10).

According

to

(ECF No. 90-6, at 139, pp. 408-

Defendant,

Plaintiff during the conversation.
5

Ms.

Hughes

never

yelled

at

Rather, Plaintiff yelled so

loudly at Ms. Hughes that Plaintiff’s voice could be overheard
by others through the phone.

(ECF Nos. 89-8, at 49, pp. 190-92,

63, pp. 246-48, 75, p. 294; 89-11, at 68, pp. 263-64; 89-13, at
2; 89-14, at 2-3).

According to Ms. Hughes, she told Plaintiff,

“calm down,” “[w]e only need five minutes of your time,” and
attempted to schedule a time for the conference call.
89-11, at 68, pp. 263-64).

(ECF No.

After Plaintiff refused, Ms. Hughes

hung up the phone on Plaintiff.

(Id. at 68, p. 264)

At about 9:30 a.m. on June 23, Plaintiff called TV One’s
Human Resources Vice President Sharon Alston and left a voice
message stating:
“I am making a complaint against Ms. Hughes
for harassment. . . . [S]he cursed me out in
a phone conversation yesterday when I told
her that I was with my husband’s family in
Minnesota . . . I think she wants me fired
because I told her previously that I
wouldn’t marry her son.
Please call me as
soon as possible so I can give you more
details about my complaint.”
(ECF No. 90-11, at 2-3).

Plaintiff also e-mailed Ms. Alton,

directing Ms. Alston to her voice message.

(Id. at 3).

Ms.

Alston was not available but responded to Plaintiff’s e-mail,
stating that she was available to speak with Plaintiff in the
afternoon.

Plaintiff

was

not

available

at

that

time

and

requested to speak with Ms. Alston the following day (ECF No.
89-4, at 140, pp. 416-18, 366).

6

In the afternoon on June 23, Ms. Hughes contacted Jackie
Kindall, Radio One’s Senior Vice President of Human Resources,
and told her about the call with Plaintiff.

(ECF Nos. 89-8, at

29, pp. 110-11, 40, p. 155; 89-11, at 68-69, pp. 264-65).

Ms.

Hughes stated that she “wants [Plaintiff] out,” “didn’t want
[Plaintiff] back in the building” and “Kimberly Dawkins can help
fill in on the talent side for TV One when we fire [Plaintiff].”
(ECF No. 89-8, at 36-37, pp. 140-43, 38, pp. 145-47).

Ms.

Kindall then contacted Ms. Alston, who “handle[s] TV One HR
issues,” and told her that, “[Ms. Hughes] wants [Plaintiff] on
administrative

leave,”

and

instructed

Ms.

Alston

to

tell

Plaintiff not to report to Los Angeles for a planned photo shoot
because she is on administrative leave.
87).

(Id. at 73, pp. 286-

According to Defendant, Ms. Alston and Ms. Kindall agreed

during their conversation that they would investigate the matter
between Plaintiff and Ms. Hughes.

Ms. Alston would speak with

Plaintiff regarding the dispute and Ms. Kindall would speak with
Tony Washington and Jody Williams who were “witnesses to the
conversation with [Plaintiff] and Ms. H[ughes].”
at 47-49, pp. 182-90).

(ECF No. 89-8,

Ms. Alston then called Mr. Washington

and Ms. Williams, who corroborated Ms. Hughes’ account of the
June 22 phone conversation with Plaintiff.

(Id.).

According to

Plaintiff, this investigation was a cover-up for Ms. Hughes’

7

instructions to Ms. Kindall the day before to fire Plaintiff.
(ECF No. 90-13, at 38, pp. 146-47).
When Plaintiff spoke with Ms. Alston on the morning of June
24

regarding

her

voice

message

and

e-mail

sent

on

June

23,

Plaintiff recounted the phone conversation with Ms. Hughes on
June 22 and provided a full history of her treatment by Ms.
Hughes at TV One.
Alston

informed

(ECF No. 90-15, at 2-4).
Plaintiff

that

she

was

In response, Ms.
being

administrative leave pending an investigation.

placed

on

(ECF Nos. 89-4,

at 141, p. 420; 90-6, at 145, pp. 431-32).
In

the

afternoon

Kindall,

Linda

Officer,

and

on

Vilardo,
in-house

June

24,

Ms.

Alston

met

Chief

Administrative

Radio

One’s

legal

counsel,

to

with

discuss

Ms.

her

investigation of the dispute between Plaintiff and Ms. Hughes.
(ECF No. 89-8, at 64, pp. 250-52).

According to Defendant, at

that meeting, Ms. Vilardo determined that Plaintiff’s employment
should be terminated for insubordination.

(ECF Nos. 89-8, at

80, pp. 314-15; 89-15, at 73, p. 283; 89-16, at 34, p. 131).
Plaintiff was not notified of the decision to terminate her
employment

on

June

24

because,

on

June

25,

Ms.

Kindall

preparing a severance package to be offered to Plaintiff.

was
(ECF

Nos. 89-8, at 91, p. 358, 95, p. 373-74, 160-61; 89-16, at 42,
pp. 163-64).
Alston

a

On the morning of June 26, Plaintiff sent to Ms.

written

complaint

against
8

Defendant

for

gender

discrimination and harassment.
375; 90-18, at 2).

(ECF No. 89-4, at 144, p. 434,

Later that day, Plaintiff was informed by

letter that her employment had been terminated effective June
24.

(ECF Nos. 89-4, at 148, pp. 448-49, 377-389; 90-19, at 2-

3).
B.

Procedural Background

On March 13, 2017, Defendant moved for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 89).

On March 27, Plaintiff filed an opposition and

moved for summary judgment with respect to Defendant’s seventh
and ninth affirmative defenses asserted in its answer.
90).

Defendant replied and filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s

motion on April 10.

(ECF No. 91).

Plaintiff filed a reply and

amended reply to Defendant’s opposition.
II.

(ECF No.

(ECF Nos. 92; 93).

Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there

exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
prevail

on

a

motion

for

summary

judgment,

the

moving

250
To

party

generally bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact.
248-50.

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at

A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the
9

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party.”
inquiry,

a

court

must

Id. at 249.

view

the

In undertaking this

facts

and

the

reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom “in the light most favorable to the
party

opposing

Zenith

Radio

the

motion,”

Corp.,

475

Matsushita

U.S.

574,

587

Elec.

Indus.

(1986)(quoting

Co.

v.

United

States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)); see also
EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 405 (4th Cir.
2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute of material
fact

through

mere

speculation

or

compilation

of

inferences.”

Shin v. Shalala, 166 F.Supp.2d 373, 375 (D.Md. 2001) (citation
omitted).
When faced with cross motions for summary judgment, the
court must consider “each motion separately on its own merits to
determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a
matter of law.”

Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 523 (4th

Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The

court

for

reviews

each

motion

under

summary judgment outlined above.

the

familiar

standard

Desmond v. PNGI Charles Town

Gaming, L.L.C., 630 F.3d 351, 354 (4th Cir. 2011).

The court

must deny both motions if there is a genuine dispute of material
fact, “[b]ut if there is no genuine issue and one or the other
party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law, the court will

10

render

judgment.”

10A

Charles

A.

Wright,

et

al.,

Federal

an

employer

Practice & Procedure § 2720 (3d ed. 1998).
III. Analysis
1.

Gender Discrimination

Under

Title

VII,

it

is

unlawful

for

“to

discriminate against an individual with respect to . . . terms,
conditions,

or

privileges

individual’s . . . sex.”

of

employment

because

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1).

of

such

In Count

I, Plaintiff asserts claims of gender discrimination based on
unlawful harassment in violation of Title VII.3
Courts have long endorsed and adopted the
EEOC’s interpretation that sexual harassment
is a form of prohibited sex discrimination.
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 65–66 (1986). Actionable workplace
sexual harassment claims come in two forms:
(1) claims of a hostile work environment due
to severe or pervasive sexual harassment and
(2)
claims
of
quid
pro
quo
sexual
harassment.
See Fitter v. Cmty. Imaging
Partners, Inc., 735 F.Supp.2d 379, 390
(D.Md. 2010).
Bruce v. Fair Collections & Outsourcing, Inc., No. CCB-13-3200,
2014 WL 3052477, at *3 (D.Md. June 30, 2014).

Here, Plaintiff

claims that she was subjected to a hostile work environment on
the

basis

of

gender

as

a

result

3

of

“severe

and

pervasive

In the court’s memorandum opinion denying Defendant’s
motion to dismiss, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims to the
extent that Count I alleges unlawful gender discrimination
beyond a claim for hostile work environment.
(ECF No. 27, at
18).
11

harassment . . . by her supervisors.”
establish

a

hostile

work

(ECF No. 16 ¶ 82).

environment

claim

based

on

To

gender,

Plaintiff must show that: (1) the harassment was unwelcome; (2)
the harassment was based on her gender; (3) the harassment was
sufficiently

severe

or

pervasive

to

alter

the

conditions

of

employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is
some basis for imposing liability on the employer.

See Matvia

v. Bald Head Island Mgmt., 259 F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2001).
a.

Timeliness

Defendant

first

discrimination

and

argues

that

harassment

are

Plaintiff’s
time-barred

claims
because

of
the

alleged discriminatory acts occurred more than 300 days before
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge on August 5, 2014.
1, at 19).

(ECF No. 89-

Plaintiff contends that the continuing violation

theory applies to her hostile work environment claim and allows
the court to look beyond the EEOC filing period.

(ECF No. 90-1,

at 32).
Generally, under Title VII, a charge of discrimination must
be

filed

unlawful
5(e)(1).

with

the

employment

EEOC

within

practice

180

days

occurred.

after
42

the

U.S.C.

alleged
§

2000e-

In a “deferral” jurisdiction, however, the period is

extended to 300 days.

See Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 300 F.3d

400, 404 n.3 (4th Cir. 2002); Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc., 813
F.Supp.2d 654, 661 (D.Md. 2011).
12

Maryland is a deferral state

under Title VII, and the 300-day timeframe applies.

See, e.g.,

Burgess v. Sys. High Corp., No. ELH-14-3895, 2015 WL 6956516, at
*3 (D.Md. Nov. 10, 2015).

The statutory window applies to any

“discrete acts” of discrimination, “such as termination, failure
to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire . . . .
incident

of

discrimination

and

each

retaliatory

Each

adverse

employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful
employment practice.’”
536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002).

Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,
“Charges filed outside [the statutory

window] are barred, but a discriminatory allegation may still
constitute

relevant

background

evidence

for

valid

claims.”

Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962 (4th
Cir. 1996) (citing United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S.
553, 558 (1977)).
Under the continuing violation theory,
“[i]f one act in a continuous history of
discriminatory conduct falls within the
charge filing period, then acts that are
plausibly or sufficiently related to that
act, which fall outside the filing period,
may
be
considered
for
purposes
of
liability.”
Lewis v. Norfolk S. Corp., 271
F.Supp.2d 807, 812 (E.D.Va. 2003).
The
continuing
violation
theory
applies
to
hostile work environment claims, which are
“composed of a series of separate acts that
collectively
constitute
one
unlawful
employment practice” and are timely if “any
act contributing to the claim occur[red]
within the filing period.”
[Morgan, 536
U.S. at 117] (“It does not matter . . . that
some of the component acts of the [claim]
fall outside the statutory time period.”).
13

The acts that occur within the filing period
need not, standing alone, constitute a
violation of Title VII for the continuing
violation doctrine to apply. See Gilliam v.
S. Carolina Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 474
F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2007).
Williams v. Silver Spring Volunteer Fire Dep’t, 86 F.Supp.3d
398, 411 (D.Md. 2015); see White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375
F.3d

288,

293

(4th

Cir.

2004)

(holding

that

a

hostile

work

environment claim “may appropriately extend even to acts that
occurred

before

the

relevant

limitations

period,

because

the

hostile work environment continued within the limitations period
as well”).
Here, Plaintiff testified in deposition that the alleged
offensive conduct by Ms. Hughes and Mr. Liggins commenced with
Ms. Hughes’ comments urging a romantic relationship with Mr.
Liggins in late October 2004 (ECF No. 90-6, at 45, p. 173),
outside the 300-day filing period.

Plaintiff further testified

that the offensive conduct continued throughout the tenure of
her employment with TV One (Id. at 25-26, pp. 90-97, 31-32, pp.
114-21, 46, pp. 176-77, 49, pp. 187-89, 50, pp. 190-92, 53-55,
pp. 205-13, 56-57, pp. 215-18, 124, pp. 347-50), and culminated
with Mr. Liggins’ statements at a gathering of TV One employees
in January 2014 and her termination after a dispute with Ms.
Hughes in June 2014 (Id. at 27-28, pp. 101-02, 138-39, pp. 40510), within the 300-day filing period.

14

Viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has identified
specific acts within the limitations period that contributed to
the

hostile

work

environment.

Therefore,

the

continuing

violation doctrine might apply, and Defendant’s motion on this
issue

will

be

denied.

Morgan,

536

U.S.

at

117;

Zidan

v.

Maryland, No. SKG-10-1792, 2012 WL 2923150, at *7 (D.Md. July 7,
2012)

(holding

that

the

plaintiff’s

claim

for

hostile

work

environment was not time barred because the plaintiff testified
in deposition that the alleged offensive conduct continued up
until her termination, within the limitations period).
b.

Harassment Based on Gender

Defendant

next

argues

that

“Plaintiff

cannot

establish

gender-based harassment because the incidents about which she
complains had nothing whatsoever to do with her sex.”

(ECF No.

89-1, at 23).
To

establish

that

the

conduct

was

based

on

gender,

Plaintiff must show that “but for” her gender, she “would not
have been the victim of the alleged discrimination.”
First

Union

(citation

Nat’l

omitted).

Bank,

202

F.3d

Gender-based

234,

242

animosity

(4th
can

Smith v.
Cir.

be

2000)

shown

by

direct evidence of discrimination, or differential treatment of
similarly situated male employees.
142;

See Gilliam, 474 F.3d at

Causey v. Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 801–02 (4th

Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff need not show that “sexual advances or propositions”
15

were involved.

Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 335 F.3d 325,

331 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted).
In Ocheltree, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit determined that “much of the sex-laden and sexist
talk

and

conduct

in

the

production

shop

plaintiff] because of her sex . . . .

was

aimed

at

[the

Much of the conduct, a

jury could find, was particularly offensive to women and was
intended to provoke [the plaintiff’s] reaction as a woman.”
at

332.

Plaintiff

testified

in

deposition

that

Ms.

Id.

Hughes

repeatedly stated that she wanted Plaintiff to marry Mr. Liggins
and

would

introduce

daughter-in-law,”

Plaintiff

fueling

to

colleagues

workplace

rumors

relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Liggins.

as

her

of

a

“future
romantic

(ECF No. 90-6,

at 25, p. 92, 46, pp. 176-77, 49, pp. 188-89).

On another

occasion, Ms. Hughes commented to Plaintiff that she did not
know why Plaintiff had not married Mr. Liggins yet, stating that
Plaintiff was old and her babies would likely be retarded.
at 49, p. 187, 54, p. 207).

(Id.

Plaintiff’s testimony that she was

the subject of workplace rumors that she and Mr. Liggins were
romantically involved (Id. at 25-26, pp. 90-95) is corroborated
by

former

Officer

TV

Karen

One

Executive

Wishart’s

Vice

deposition

President
testimony

and

Chief

that

she

Legal
heard

about the rumors from other TV One employees (ECF No. 90-7, at
28, p. 101).

When Plaintiff went to Mr. Liggins to address the
16

rumors, Mr. Liggins responded, “at least it makes me look good.”
(ECF

No.

90-6,

at

32,

p.

118).

Viewed

in

the

light

most

favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that, but
for

her

status

as

a

woman,

Plaintiff

would

not

have

been

subjected to the alleged offensive conduct by Ms. Hughes and Mr.
Liggins

and

the

workplace

rumors

that

she

was

involved

romantically with Mr. Liggins.
c.

Severe and Pervasive Conduct

Defendant further argues that it is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim because
Plaintiff cannot establish that the alleged offensive conduct
was sufficiently severe and pervasive.
A hostile work environment is marked by “extreme” conduct,
and “simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents
(unless

extremely

serious)

will

not

amount

to

discriminatory

changes in the terms and conditions of employment.”
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998).

Faragher v.

The conduct must

be both subjectively and objectively offensive in order to be
cognizable

under

Title

VII.

Id.

at

787;

EEOC

Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008).
whether

the

offending

conduct

was

v.

Sunbelt

In determining

sufficiently

severe

or

pervasive, the court must consider: “(1) the frequency of the
discriminatory
physically

conduct;

threatening

(2)
or

its

severity;

humiliating,
17

or

(3)
a

whether
mere

it

is

offensive

utterance; and (4) whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee’s work performance.”

Smith, 202 F.3d at 242; see also

Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315.
need

not

be

both

severe

and

Furthermore, “[t]he behavior

pervasive:

the

more

severe

the

conduct, the less pervasive the plaintiff need prove that it
is.”

Reed

v.

(D.Md.

2008)

Airtran

(citations

Airways,

531

omitted).

F.Supp.2d
Plaintiffs

660,
in

669

the

n.15

Fourth

Circuit
must clear a high bar in order to satisfy
the severe or pervasive test.
Workplaces
are not always harmonious locales, and even
incidents that would objectively give rise
to bruised or wounded feelings will not on
that account satisfy the severe or pervasive
standard. Some rolling with the punches is a
fact of workplace life.
Thus, complaints
premised
on
nothing
more
than
“rude
treatment
by
[coworkers],”
Baqir
v.
Principi, 434 F.3d 733, 747 (4th Cir. 2006),
“callous behavior by [one’s] superiors,”
Bass, 324 F.3d at 765, or “a routine
difference
of
opinion
and
personality
conflict with [one’s] supervisor,” Hawkins
v. PepsiCo, Inc., 203 F.3d 274, 276 (4th Cir.
2000), are not actionable under Title VII.
Sunbelt Rentals, 521 F.3d at 315-16.

“[A] supervisor’s strict

management style or degree of supervision is not evidence of
actionable

harassment.

However,

a

work

environment

can

be

considered hostile if it is consumed by remarks that intimidate,
ridicule, and maliciously demean the status of women.”

Engler

v. Harris Corp., No. GLR-11-3597, 2012 WL 3745710, at *5 (D.Md.
Aug. 28, 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
18

Plaintiff has presented evidence that, beginning in 2004,
Ms. Hughes repeatedly stated that she wanted Plaintiff to marry
Mr. Liggins and would introduce Plaintiff to colleagues as her
“future daughter-in-law.”
176-77, 49, pp. 188-89).

(ECF No. 90-6, at 25, p. 92, 46, pp.
Ms. Hughes often stated her desire for

Plaintiff and Mr. Liggins to marry in front of others, fueling
workplace rumors of a romantic relationship between Plaintiff
and Mr. Liggins.
rumors

from

(Id. at 25, p. 92).

multiple

colleagues

in

Plaintiff heard these

the

workplace

[times] to count” and the rumors “never stopped.”
26, pp. 93-94).

“too

many

(Id. at 25-

Even after Plaintiff married her husband in

2012, she was subjected to jokes that she “[should have] just
married

[Mr.

Liggins]

like

[she]

was

supposed

to.”

(Id.).

According to Plaintiff, when Ms. Hughes realized that Plaintiff
was not going to marry Mr. Liggins she began to continuously
harass Plaintiff, including publicly berating Plaintiff in front
of her co-workers (Id. at 53-54, pp. 205-07); demanding that
Plaintiff
standard

make

requests

industry

for

protocol

talent
(Id.

at

in

a

manner

54-55,

pp.

contrary
208-13);

to
and

chastising Plaintiff for taking time off for her wedding and
honeymoon (Id. at 56-57, pp. 214-18).
Plaintiff has also presented evidence that, in addition to
being

frequent

and

pervasive,

the

conduct

severe to create a hostile work environment.
19

was

sufficiently

“When evaluating

the context in which harassment takes place, [the Fourth Circuit
has]

often

focused

on

the

harasser and the victim.”
609

F.3d

quotation

320,

329

marks

(4th

disparity

in

power

between

the

EEOC v. Fairbrook Med. Clinic, P.A.,
Cir.

omitted).

2010)
The

(citation

severity

and

of

the

internal
alleged

harassment is exacerbated when a supervisor is the tormentor.
See Emond v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc., No. JKB-10–1680, 2011 WL
2712749, at *7 (D.Md. July 12, 2011).
Liggins

exercised

significant

As Ms. Hughes and Mr.

authority

over

Plaintiff,

severity of the alleged harassment is enhanced.

the

In addition,

degrading and humiliating conduct can be severe or pervasive
even if not physically threatening.

See Jennings v. Univ. of N.

Carolina, 482 F.3d 686, 698-99 (4th Cir. 2007).

Plaintiff has

presented evidence that she began therapy in 2008 to cope with
depression resulting from Ms. Hughes’ conduct, workplace rumors,
and colleagues thinking that she only got her job by sleeping
with

Mr.

Liggins.

(ECF

No.

90-6,

at

157-58,

pp.

479-84).

Certainly, the effect on the employee’s psychological well-being
is relevant to determining whether the environment was hostile
or abusive.
(1993).

Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 22-23

Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude that
the alleged conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a
hostile work environment.
20

d.

Affirmative Defense

Defendant argues that even if Plaintiff can establish a
prima facie case for hostile work environment, it cannot be held
liable because (1) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and
promptly

correct

any

sexually

harassing

behavior,

and

(2)

Plaintiff unreasonably failed to take advantage of preventative
or corrective opportunities.

(ECF No. 89-1, at 30).

The holdings of Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.
775, 807–08 (1998), and Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998), establish that an employer is not
vicariously liable for an actionable hostile work environment
created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher)
authority over the employee when:
(a) [ ] the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior, and
(b) [ ] the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive
or corrective opportunities provided by the
employer or to avoid harm otherwise.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765.
available

to

an

The Faragher/Ellerth defense is not

employer,

however,

when

a

“supervisor’s

harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.”

Faragher,

524 U.S. at 808 (citing Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63).

Fourth

Circuit precedent requires “some nexus between the harassment
and the tangible employment action” for the defense to become
21

unavailable.

Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323,

332 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Lissau v. S. Food Serv., 159 F.3d
177, 182 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Tangible employment actions, if not
taken for discriminatory reasons, do not vitiate the affirmative
defense.”).

Plaintiff argues that the affirmative defense is

not available to Defendant because a tangible employment action
was taken against Plaintiff.

(ECF No. 90-1, at 44-45).

In its

reply, Defendant asserts that because the decision to terminate
Plaintiff

was

unrelated

to

the

alleged

harassment,

affirmative defense is still available to it.
19-20).

Here,

Plaintiff’s

tangible employment action.

discharge

was

the

(ECF No. 91, at
unquestionably

a

A genuine dispute of material fact

exists, however, as to whether some nexus exists between the
alleged harassment by Ms. Hughes and Plaintiff’s termination.
According to Defendant, its decision to terminate Plaintiff’s
employment was made on June 24, 2014, after concluding that
Plaintiff was “belligerent” and “insubordinate” to Ms. Hughes on
June 22.

(ECF Nos. 89-8, at 64, pp. 249-52, 71, p. 278, 75, pp.

294-95, 79, p. 312, 80, pp. 314-15; 89-15, at 63, pp. 242-43;
89-16, at 34, pp. 130-31).
evidence

that

investigation

in
by

the
Ms.

However, Plaintiff has presented

afternoon
Kindall

on
and

June
Ms.

23

-

Alston

before
and

any

before

Defendant’s alleged termination decision - Ms. Hughes instructed
Ms. Kindall to discharge Plaintiff (ECF No. 90-13, at 38, p.
22

146).

Drawing

all

reasonable

inferences

in

the

light

most

favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find a nexus
between the alleged harassment by Ms. Hughes and the decision to
discharge Plaintiff.
fact

exists

available

as

to

Therefore, a genuine dispute of material

to

whether

Defendant,

the

and

Faragher/Ellerth

Defendant’s

motion

defense
for

is

summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim will be
denied.
2.

Retaliation

Defendant
granted

next

against

Plaintiff

argues

Plaintiff

cannot

establish

that
on

summary

her

that

judgment

retaliation
she

engaged

should

claim
in

be

because
protected

activity or that “but for” her alleged protected activity she
would not have been discharged.

(ECF No. 89-1, at 32).

To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff
must show the following elements: (1) she engaged in a protected
activity; (2) her employer took an adverse employment action
against her; and (3) there was a causal connection between the
protected

activity

and

the

adverse

employment

action.

See

Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 443 (4th Cir.
1998).

The plaintiff’s burden in this regard is “not onerous,”

and requires only that she prove each element by a preponderance
of the evidence.
450

U.S.

248,

See Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,

253

(1981).

If
23

the

plaintiff

makes

such

a

showing,

the

burden

shifts

to

the

employer

to

offer

a

non-

discriminatory basis for the adverse employment action.
Matvia, 259 F.3d at 271.

See

The employee then has the opportunity

to prove that the asserted reason is pretextual.

Id.; see also

Smith, 202 F.3d at 248 (“The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
scheme

applies

in

analyzing

retaliation

claims

under

Title

VII.”).
Title

VII

makes

it

unlawful

for

“an

employer

to

discriminate against any of [its] employees . . . because [s]he
has

opposed

subchapter,

any
or

practice
because

made

[s]he

an
has

unlawful
made

a

practice
charge,

by

this

testified,

assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”
2000e–3(a).

42 U.S.C. §

“Protected activity of an employee, therefore, can

take the form of either opposing a practice prohibited under
Title

VII

charge,

(pursuant
testifying,

to

the

opposition

assisting,

or

clause)

or

participating

making

a

in

an

investigation, proceeding, or hearing under Title VII (pursuant
to

the

participation

clause).”

Pitter

v.

Cmty.

Imaging

Partners, Inc., 735 F.Supp.2d 379, 395 (D.Md. 2010).
a.

Protected Activity

Defendant

argues

that

Plaintiff

cannot

show

that

she

engaged in protected activity because “refusal of a suggestion
of marriage is not protected activity as a matter of law.”
24

(ECF

No.

89-1,

at

33).

Here,

Plaintiff

has

presented

evidence

showing that she engaged in protected activity by (1) making an
informal

complaint

to

Human

Resources

Vice

President

Sharon

Alston when she left a voice message on June 23, 2014, alleging
harassment

by

Ms.

Hughes

(ECF

No.

90-11,

at

2-3);

and

(2)

submitting a complaint via email to Ms. Alston against Defendant
for “gender discrimination and harassment” on the morning of
June 26, 2014 (ECF No. 90-18, at 2).

EEOC v. Navy Federal

Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[P]rotected
oppositional activities may include ‘staging informal protests
and voicing one’s own opinions in order to bring attention to an
employer’s discriminatory activities,’ as well as ‘complain[ts]
.

.

.

about

suspected

violations.’”

(internal

citations

omitted)).
In its reply to Plaintiff’s opposition, Defendant contends
that Plaintiff’s verbal complaint on June 23 does not constitute
protected activity because nothing in her voicemail indicates
that she was alleging gender-based harassment.
14).

(ECF No. 91, at

In her verbal complaint, Plaintiff stated that she was

“making a complaint against Ms. Hughes for harassment,” that Ms.
Hughes “cursed [her] out . . . when [she] told her that [she]
was with [her] husband’s family in Minnesota,” and that Ms.
Hughes “wants [her] fired because . . . [she] wouldn’t marry
[Mr. Liggins].”

(ECF No. 90-11, at 2-3).
25

Title VII “protects

activity in opposition not only to employment actions actually
unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions an employee
reasonably believes to be unlawful.”

Navy Federal, 424 F.3d at

406; see also DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 417
(4th

Cir.

2015)

“unlawful

(noting

employment

that

the

practice”

Fourth

Circuit

broadly).

As

interprets

noted

above,

Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence that, prior to her
complaint

on

June

harassment

in

the

23,

she

workplace,

was

subjected

including

Ms.

to

gender-based

Hughes

repeatedly

urging a romantic relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Liggins
and

Ms.

workers

Hughes
once

publicly

Ms.

berating

Hughes

Plaintiff

realized

that

interested romantically in Mr. Liggins.
and

record

presented,

there

is

in

front

Plaintiff

of

co-

was

not

In light of the facts

sufficient

evidence

that

Plaintiff held a subjectively and objectively reasonable belief
that Ms. Hughes’ offensive conduct, because of her refusal to
marry Mr. Liggins, was an unlawful employment practice.
Adams

v.

Giant

Food,

225

F.Supp.2d

600,

606

(D.Md.

See
2002).

Therefore, Plaintiff has put forth sufficient evidence that she
engaged in protected activity when she made a verbal complaint
to Ms. Alston on June 23.

26

b.
Causal Connection Between Protected Activity and
Termination
Defendant
protected

argues

activity,

that

Plaintiff

even

if

cannot

Plaintiff
show

that

engaged
but

for

in
her

protected activity she would not have been terminated because
(1) regardless of any protected activity, Defendant would have
fired Plaintiff for being belligerent and insubordinate to Ms.
Hughes on June 22, 2014; and (2) Plaintiff’s alleged protected
activity came after Defendant’s decision to terminate had been
made on June 24.

(ECF No. 89-1, at 33, 34).

“Normally, very little evidence of a causal connection is
required

to

establish

a

prima

facie

F.Supp.2d at 396 (citation omitted).
adverse

employment

action

“shortly

case.”

Pitter,

735

If the employer takes the
after”

learning

about

the

protected activity, courts may infer a causal connection between
the two.

Price v. Thompson, 380 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 2004),

abrogation on other grounds recognized by Waag v. Sotera Def.
Sols., Inc., 857 F.3d 179, 192 (4th Cir. 2017).

Where temporal

proximity

however,

is

the

only

evidence

of

causation,

temporal proximity must be very close,” as it is here.
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001).

“the
Clark

According

to Defendant, the decision to terminate Plaintiff was made on
June 24 and communicated to Plaintiff on June 26.

Defendant

argues that because it made a tentative decision to discharge

27

Plaintiff on June 24, before Plaintiff submitted her written
complaint

on

June

26,

the

fact

that

it

proceeded

with

its

decision to discharge Plaintiff does not demonstrate causality.
(ECF

No.

89-1,

at

37)

(citing

Breeden,

532

U.S.

at

272).

Defendant’s argument fails, however, because even assuming that
it made a tentative decision to terminate Plaintiff on June 24,
that decision was made the day after Ms. Alston learned about
Plaintiff’s complaint alleging harassment by Ms. Hughes on June
23.

(ECF Nos. 90-11, at 2-3; 90-12, at 2).

Under these facts,

there is sufficient evidence of a causal connection between the
protected

activity

and

Therefore,

Plaintiff

has

the

adverse

put

forth

employment

sufficient

action.

evidence

to

support her retaliation claim.
Defendant
reasons

for

has

set

forth

Plaintiff’s

legitimate,

termination,

non-discriminatory

i.e.,

that

she

was

terminated for being belligerent and insubordinate to Ms. Hughes
on June 22.
Plaintiff

to

(ECF No. 89-1, at 34).
prove

by

a

Thus, the burden returns to

preponderance

of

the

evidence

that

Defendant’s reasons were not its true reason, but were pretext
for

discrimination.

Hill

v.

Lockheed

Martin

Logistics

Management, Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff

argues, inter alia, that “the fact that Ms. Hughes told Ms.
Kindall

that

[Plaintiff]

was

to

be

fired

proves

that

subsequent investigation and conclusion were pretextual.”
28

any
(ECF

No. 90-1, at 42).

Although Defendant insists that Ms. Kindall

was the investigator into the dispute between Plaintiff and Ms.
Hughes on June 22, and Linda Vilardo was the decision maker for
Plaintiff’s termination, Plaintiff has presented evidence that
on June 23 – before Defendant’s alleged decision to terminate
Plaintiff on June 24 - Ms. Hughes instructed Ms. Kindall to have
Plaintiff fired.
“[t]he

court

department

(ECF No. 90-13, at 38, p. 146).

‘does

not

sit

as

weighing

the

a

prudence

kind

of

of

Although

super-personnel

employment

decisions,’”

Hunter v. Vilsack, No. DKC-07-2655, 2010 WL 1257997, at *12
(D.Md. Mar. 26, 2010) (citations omitted), “a complaining party
may

demonstrate

employment

that

action

discrimination

if

.

.

.

motivated

the

an

individual

adverse

with

the

discriminatory animus ‘possessed such authority as to be viewed
as the one principally responsible for the [adverse employment]
decision or the actual decisionmaker for the employer,’” Vicino
v.

Maryland,

982

omitted).

F.Supp.2d

Here,

although

discriminatory

reasons

has

sufficient

presented

termination

were

Defendant’s

motion

601,

for

611

(D.Md.

Defendant

Plaintiff’s
evidence

pretext
for

for

29

(citations

proffered

termination,
the

judgment

on

non-

Plaintiff

reasons

discrimination.

summary

retaliation claim is denied.

that

has

2013)

for

her

Therefore,
Plaintiff’s

IV.

Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff

moves

for

summary

judgment

with

respect

to

Defendant’s seventh and ninth affirmative defenses asserted in
its answer.

Plaintiff argues that because Defendant took a

tangible employment action against her, the affirmative defense
is

not

available

to

Defendant.

(ECF

No.

90-1,

at

44-45).

Defendant argues in its opposition that, because the decision to
terminate Plaintiff was unrelated to the alleged harassment, the
affirmative defense is still available to it.

(ECF No. 91, at

19-20).
The

Faragher/Ellerth

employer

when

a

tangible

employment

defense

“supervisor’s
action,

undesirable reassignment.”

such

is

not

harassment
as

available
culminates

discharge,

to
in

demotion,

an
a
or

Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (citing

Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762–63). However, “some nexus between the
harassment and the tangible employment action” is required for
the defense to become unavailable.

Dulaney, 673 F.3d at 332.

As noted above, a genuine dispute of material fact exists
as to whether some nexus exists between Plaintiff’s termination
and

Ms.

Hughes’

affirmative

alleged

defense

is

harassment

available

to

and

thus

Defendant.

whether

the

Therefore,

Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment with respect to
Defendant’s use of the Faragher/Ellerth defense as a reasonable
jury could find the defense to be applicable.
30

V.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the cross motions for summary

judgment are denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

31