Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Co. Board of Education et al
Filing
45
MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/26/2017. (sat, Chambers)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
HOPE E. LEE-THOMAS
:
v.
:
Civil Action No. DKC 15-2010
:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, et al.
:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is the motion
for summary judgment filed by Defendant Board of Education of
Prince George’s County (“Defendant” or “the Board”).
41).
(ECF No.
The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now
rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.
Local Rule 105.6.
For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will
be denied.
I.
Background1
A.
Factual Background
Plaintiff Hope E. Lee-Thomas (“Plaintiff”) suffers from a
hearing impairment, chronic vertigo, and carpal tunnel syndrome.
(ECF No. 41-2, at 23, 25).
She has been a Paraprofessional at
Andrew Jackson Academy, a school in the Prince George’s County
Public Schools system (“PGCPS”), since March 25, 2014.
41-8, at 1-2).
1
(ECF No.
Prior to her current placement, Plaintiff had
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.
worked for Defendant at other PGCPS schools and had previously
notified
Defendant
disabilities.
of
her
need
for
accommodations
for
her
(ECF No. 43, at 3).
On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a formal request for a
disability accommodation.
(ECF No. 41-2, at 21-24).
These
requests are referred to as “4172” requests within PGCPS because
the Board’s processes related to disability accommodations are
described
4172.
in
a
formal
policy
(See id. at 14).
called
Administrative
Procedure
In her 4172 request, Plaintiff asked
for: (1) an upright support chair, (2) handrails in both adult
bathrooms,
(3)
an
amplified,
flashing
telephone
in
her
classroom, (4) a portable loop system in her classroom, (5) a
portable
loop
system
in
the
multi-purpose
room,
and
(6)
an
American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter or a Communications
Access Realtime Translation (“CART”) system for any meetings,
programs, or workshops held outside of these two rooms.
21).
On
May
30,
Elizabeth
Davis,
PGCPS’s
Equal
(Id. at
Employment
Opportunity (“EEO”) Compliance Officer, responded by including
Plaintiff on an email to another PGCPS employee asking him to
set a time to “fit” her for an ergonomic chair.
at 40).
(ECF No. 43-1,
Defendant did not contact Plaintiff about any of the
other requested accommodations before the end of the school year
on June 18.
(ECF Nos. 41-2, at 37; 43, at 4; 44-1, at 3).
2
In
requested
the
absence
of
any
accommodations,
further
Plaintiff
information
submitted
a
about
her
charge
of
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), which was received on July 16.
(ECF No. 41-3).
That
same month, Amana Simmons had taken over as the EEO Compliance
Officer for PGCPS.
(ECF No. 41-2, at 1).
On the same day that
Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, Ms. Simmons contacted Plaintiff
to determine whether she had received the accommodations she
sought in her 4172 request.
(Id. at 3).
Plaintiff notified Ms.
Simmons of her pending EEOC charge, and no further action was
taken during the summer vacation to provide Plaintiff with the
requested accommodations.
(Id.).
When she returned to work for the new school year on August
18,
When
Plaintiff
Ms.
contacted
Simmons
Ms.
attempted
Simmons
about
her
to
up
meeting,
set
a
4172
request.
Plaintiff
refused to meet without her union representative, who was out of
town for the week.
(Id.).
The next day, Plaintiff notified Ms.
Simmons that she was having trouble understanding the material
presented during a Professional Development workshop held in the
multi-purpose room, which had not been outfitted with a portable
loop
system
as
Plaintiff
had
requested.
(Id.
at
3-4).
Defendant had provided two ASL interpreters for the workshop.
Plaintiff, however, is not fluent in ASL and relies on reading
the lips of interpreters, and the interpreters at the training
3
were
not
mouthing
the
words.
(Id.
at
4).
When
no
ASL
interpreter was present at a training on August 20, Plaintiff’s
principal,
Veronica
training.
Richardson,
allowed
her
to
leave
the
(Id. at 30-36).
In an email dated August 21, Ms. Simmons told Plaintiff
that she had obtained Plaintiff’s classroom assignment from Dr.
Richardson,
and
that:
(1)
a
portable
loop
system
would
be
installed in her classroom, (2) Dr. Richardson had relieved her
of the obligation to attend meetings in the multi-purpose room,
(3)
a
technology
support
employee
would
ensure
that
her
telephone had blinking lights, (4) there was already a handrail
installed in the bathroom closest to her classroom, (5) Ms.
Simmons was submitting a work order to have a handrail installed
in one of the bathrooms in the office, and (6) they were still
determining the status and location of the ergonomic chair that
Plaintiff had been fitted for in May.
(Id. at 31).
Plaintiff
and Ms. Simmons met to follow up on these accommodations on
September
4.
confirmed
that
(Id.
there
at
38).
was
a
At
the
blinking
meeting,
light
on
Ms.
Simmons
Plaintiff’s
telephone, that the portable loop system would be installed in
her classroom, and that a new ergonomic chair would be ordered
and delivered.
in
the
women’s
Although a handrail had already been installed
faculty
bathroom,
Ms.
Simmons
agreed
that
Defendant would install a handrail in the men’s faculty bathroom
4
“in
the
event
that
she
needs
to
use
the
men’s
restroom.”
Plaintiff’s requests to have a loop system installed in the
multipurpose room or to use CART were still “being evaluated”
after the meeting.
(Id.).
On September 9, the loop system was
installed in Plaintiff’s classroom.
(Id. at 39).
On November
21, she received the ergonomic chair.
(ECF No. 43-2, at 3).
On January 29, 2015, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right to
sue notice on her 2014 charge.
(ECF No. 41-4).
On February 27,
Plaintiff filed an updated charge with the EEOC.
5).
for
(ECF No. 41-
Where her 2014 charge complained only about her requests
a
portable
loop
system
and
an
amplified,
flashing-light
telephone (ECF No. 41-3), Plaintiff’s 2015 charge also included
her
requests
for
handrails,
an
upright
chair,
an
ASL
interpreter, CART, and a portable loop system for the multipurpose room (ECF No. 41-5).
The EEOC responded by reopening
its investigation and revoking its right to sue notice.
No. 41-6).
On April 20, the EEOC issued a right to sue notice
for Plaintiff’s updated charge.
In
May
discuss
the
2015,
accommodation.
discussions,
(ECF
Ms.
Board’s
(ECF No. 41-7).
Simmons
and
responses
to
Plaintiff
Plaintiff’s
(ECF No. 41-2, at 5, 40).
Ms.
Simmons
told
again
Plaintiff
began
requests
to
for
As part of these
that
the
school’s
building engineers had advised her that it was not feasible to
install a portable loop system in the multi-purpose room.
5
(Id.
at 42).
Plaintiff
Instead, ASL interpreters would be provided if and when
“desire[d]
to
meetings” in that room.
attend
(Id.).
special
programs
or
other
Ms. Simmons further stated that
CART was still being evaluated.
(Id.).
Plaintiff met with Ms.
Simmons again on June 16 and recapped these issues before the
summer break.
B.
(Id. at 6-7).
Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on July 9,
2015, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
791, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.
(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14-17).
Defendant
filed
on
No.
a
motion
to
dismiss
October
26.
(ECF
Plaintiff responded and filed an amended complaint.
16; 16-1; 20).
13).
(ECF Nos.
Defendant consented to Plaintiff amending her
complaint, withdrew its motion to dismiss, and filed its answer
on December 7.
(ECF Nos. 17; 18).
After discovery, Defendant
filed the instant motion for summary judgment.
(ECF No. 41).
Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 43), and Defendant replied (ECF No.
44).
II.
Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there
exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party
is
entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.
See
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
6
(1986);
Anderson
v.
Liberty
Lobby,
Inc.,
477
U.S.
242,
250
(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).
A
dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such
that
a
nonmoving
reasonable
party.”
jury
could
a
Lobby,
Liberty
return
verdict
477
U.S.
at
for
the
249.
In
undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the
reasonable
inferences
drawn
therefrom
“in
the
light
most
favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Matsushita Elec.
Indus.
Co.
(quoting
v.
Zenith
United
Radio
Corp.,
v.
Diebold,
States
475
U.S.
Inc.,
574,
369
587
U.S.
(1986)
654,
655
(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute
of
material
fact
through
inferences,”
Shin
v.
mere
Shalala,
speculation
166
or
F.Supp.2d
compilation
373,
375
of
(D.Md.
2001) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party generally bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.
No genuine dispute of
material fact exists, however, if the nonmoving party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case as
to which he would have the burden of proof.
at 322–23.
party
has
Celotex, 477 U.S.
Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving
the
burden
of
proof,
it
is
his
responsibility
to
confront the summary judgment motion with an “affidavit or other
7
evidentiary showing” demonstrating that there is a genuine issue
for trial.
See Ross v. Early, 899 F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md.
2012), aff’d, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. Analysis
A.
Claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff’s
original
complaint
was
filed
in
July
2015,
before the start of the 2015-16 school year, and only alleged
violations
as
of
that
date.
Plaintiff’s
amended
complaint,
filed in December 2015, makes no reference to any events that
occurred after her original complaint was filed.
20).2
(See ECF No.
Despite the temporal limits of Plaintiff’s complaints, the
parties
have
provided
occurred
evidence
during
and
the
substantial
2015-16
and
argument
2016-17
on
events
that
school
years.
It is well established that a plaintiff “is bound by the
allegations contained in [her] complaint and cannot, through the
use of motion briefs, amend the complaint.”
Zachair, Ltd. V.
Driggs, 965 F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D.Md. 1997) aff’d, 141 F.3d
(4th
1162
Cir.
1998)
(unpublished
table
opinion).
Rather,
“[u]nder Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d), a plaintiff must move the court for
leave to file a supplemental pleading setting forth occurrences
which happen[] after” the suit is brought.
2
Skipper v. Giant
Plaintiff’s amended complaint also appears to have been
prompted by Defendant’s motion to dismiss on res judicata
grounds. (See ECF Nos. 13; 16). If anything, then, Plaintiff’s
amended complaint sought to narrow, rather than to expand, the
timeframe of her allegations.
8
Food, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 490, 493 n.2 (D.Md. 2002) (citing
Young-Henderson v. Spartanburg Area Mental Health Ctr., 945 F.2d
770, 775 (4th Cir. 1991)).
Accordingly, events occurring after
July 9, 2015, are not properly before the court, and will not be
considered in adjudicating the pending motion.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s arguments related to static from the
portable loop system in her 2014-15 classroom have not been
properly
pleaded.
In
her
amended
complaint,
Plaintiff
identifies the need for handrails, an upright chair, an ASL
interpreter, an amplified telephone, and a portable loop system
for the multi-purpose room, but omits any mention of issues with
the loop system in her classroom.
(ECF No. 20 ¶ 11).
Moreover,
in both her original complaint and her updated EEOC charge,
Plaintiff specifically stated that Defendant had accommodated
her disability in the classroom, without mention of any issues
with the loop system in that room.
1).
the
(ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 9; 41-5, at
Because Plaintiff’s allegations as to the effectiveness of
loop
system
in
her
classroom
were
not
included
in
the
complaint, arguments related to that system also will not be
considered.
B.
Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff brings two claims, one for violation of Section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act and one for violation of the ADA.
9
(ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 16-24).3
The ADA prohibits discrimination against
“a qualified individual on the basis of disability.”
§
12112(a).
reasonable
One
form
of
discrimination
accommodations
to
the
known
is
“not
to-accommodate
making
or
mental
physical
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual.”
12112(b)(5)(A).
42 U.S.C.
42 U.S.C. §
To establish a prima facie case for a failureclaim,
a
plaintiff
must
show
“that
(1)
she
qualifies as an ‘individual with a disability’ . . . ; (2) the
[defendant] had notice of her disability; (3) she could perform
the
essential
accommodation;
functions
and
(4)
the
reasonable accommodation.”
of
her
job
[defendant]
with
refused
a
to
reasonable
make
any
Reyazzudin v. Montgomery Cty., Md.,
789 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a);
Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013)).
3
The standards used to evaluate claims brought under the
Rehabilitation Act are the same as those brought under the ADA.
29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (“The standards used to determine whether
this section [of the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section
shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the provisions of sections 501
through 504, and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.”); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264
n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Because the language of the two statutes is
substantially the same, we apply the same analysis to both.”).
There are “three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional
discrimination or disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and
(3) failure to make reasonable accommodations.” A Helping Hand,
LLC v. Balt. Cty., Md., 515 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff brings her claims for a failure to accommodate.
10
Defendant
provided
disputes
Plaintiff
a
only
the
fourth
reasonable
element,
accommodation.
whether
As
to
it
a
reasonable accommodation, the House Report on the matter states:
[T]he
reasonable
accommodation
requirement is best understood as a process
in
which
barriers
to
a
particular
individual’s equal employment opportunity
are removed.
The accommodation process
focuses on the needs of a particular
individual
in
relation
to
problems
in
performance of a particular job because of a
physical or mental impairment.
. . .
Having identified one or more possible
accommodations, the [next] step is to assess
the reasonableness of each in terms of
effectiveness
and
equal
opportunity.
A
reasonable accommodation should be effective
for the employee.
Factors to be considered
include the reliability of the accommodation
and whether it can be provided in a timely
manner.
. . . [A] reasonable accommodation
should provide a meaningful equal employment
opportunity.
Meaningful equal employment
opportunity means an opportunity to attain
the
same
level
of
performance
as
is
available to nondisabled employees having
similar skills and abilities.
H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), as quoted in Bryant v. Better Business
Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F.Supp. 720, 736-37 (D.Md.
1996).
Accordingly,
“[i]n
order
to
be
reasonable,
the
accommodation must be effective (i.e., it must address the jobrelated difficulties presented by the employee’s disability),
and it must allow the employee to attain an ‘equal’ level of
11
achievement, opportunity, and participation that a non-disabled
individual
Merrill
in
v.
the
same
McCarthy,
position
184
would
F.Supp.3d
be
221,
able
236
to
achieve.”
(E.D.N.C.
2016)
(quoting Fleetwood v. Harford Sys. Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 688, 699
(D.Md. 2005)); see also Bryant, 923 F.Supp. at 736; 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2014) (“The reasonable accommodation
that is required by this part should provide the individual with
a
disability
with
an
equal
employment
opportunity.
Equal
employment opportunity means an opportunity to attain the same
level of performance, or to enjoy the same level of benefits and
privileges
of
employment
as
are
available
to
the
average
similarly situated employee without a disability.”).
On the other hand, an employer “may reasonably accommodate
an employee without providing the exact accommodation that the
employee
requested.”
Reyazuddin,
789
F.3d
at
415.
The
accommodation chosen by the employer need not be the “‘best’
accommodation possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the
job-related needs of the individual being accommodated.”
29
C.F.R. §1630.9 app.; see also Corrigan v. Perry, 139 F.3d 888
(4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table opinion).
Under the ADA, a
reasonable accommodation may include “making existing facilities
used
by
employees
readily
accessible
to
and
usable
by
individuals with disabilities” or “job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
12
acquisition
or
appropriate
modification
adjustment
of
or
modifications
or
equipment
of
training materials or policies.”
devices,
[or]
examinations,
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).
As
noted above, the employer has the “ultimate discretion to choose
between effective accommodations,” Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 41516, and a court goes too far when the effect of an injunction
“would
be
to
give
preferential
treatment
to
people
with
disabilities, rather than put them on equal footing as intended
by
Congress,”
Pathways
Psychological
v.
Town
Md., 223 F.Supp.2d 699, 717 (D.Md. 2002).
of
Leonardtown,
Generally, whether a
provided accommodation constitutes a reasonable accommodation is
a question of fact.
Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d
823, 833 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 416
(citing Pandazides); Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis.,
669 F.3d 454, 464 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the “determination
of the reasonableness of a proposed modification is often factspecific”).
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment
because
it
accommodations.
that
it
has
provided
Plaintiff
(ECF No. 41-1, at 20).
provided
her
with
a
with
reasonable
Specifically, it argues
portable
loop
system
in
the
classroom where she worked, provided her an ergonomic chair,
installed handrails in the bathroom closest to her classroom,
provided Plaintiff with a flashing light telephone, relieved her
13
from any required meetings or duties in the multipurpose room,
and offered to provide an ASL interpreter as needed for meetings
or events that she sought to attend.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not provided her with
reasonable
required
accommodations.
to
purpose
provide
room.
insufficient,
a
(Id.
she
She
hearing
at
contends
accommodation
12-13).
maintains,
that
Defendant
for
Limiting
because
it
the
her
was
multi-
duties
marginalized
is
her
importance, distanced her from her peers, and prevented her from
obtaining
the
information
necessary
administration of the school.
to
be
involved
in
the
(Id.; ECF No. 43-2, at 5).
She
argues that the flashing light phone was not a satisfactory
accommodation because she could not see the blinking light if
she were turned away from the phone.
(Id. at 14).
She also
states that not enough of the restrooms had handrails installed,
requiring
her
to
use
unsupported
toilets
on
at
least
three
occasions because the supported toilets were in use by other
employees.
argues
that
(Id. at 14-15; ECF No 43-2, at 1-2).
Defendant
has
repeatedly
delayed
Finally, she
in
providing
accommodations, forcing her to work without accommodations for
long periods of time.
(ECF No. 43, at 15-20).
She did not
receive her ergonomic chair, for instance, until November 21,
2014, more than six months after submitting her 4172 request on
May 19.
14
Several of Defendant’s arguments rely on the theory that
Plaintiff’s “self-serving affidavit” is insufficient to create a
dispute of fact at the summary judgment stage.
5, 7, 18-19).
serving
Defendant overstates the limitation on self-
affidavits.
inadequate
(ECF No. 44, at
where
Courts
there
is
have
powerful
found
such
documentary
affidavits
evidence
that
contradicts the affidavit, see Jeandron v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Md., 510 F.App’x 223, 228 (4th Cir. 2013), where they
provide
only
conclusory
opinions
uncorroborated
by
factual
allegations, see Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 433
(4th Cir. 2000), or where a Plaintiff contradicts his own sworn
statements, see Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc’ns, LLC,
28 F.Supp.3d 465, 484 n.6 (D.Md. 2014) (citing cases describing
the “sham affidavit” rule).
The general rule, however, remains
that a court should not weigh the credibility of testimony of
one
party
against
the
testimony
of
another
judgment stage, even if it is self-serving.
at
the
summary
See Harris v. Mayor
& City Council of Balt., 429 F.App’x 195, 198 n.5 (4th Cir. 2011)
(refuting
the
notion
that
self-serving
affidavits
are
insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment so long as
the affidavit complies with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56
and does not contradict one’s prior testimony); Pitter v. Cmty.
Imaging Partners, Inc., 735 F.Supp.2d 379, 391 (D.Md. 2010).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s affidavit must be considered.
15
Here, Defendant has clearly provided Plaintiff with several
modifications,
modifications
but
are
a
question
reasonable
remains
whether
accommodations.
Some
these
of
the
differences between what Plaintiff received and what she asked
for – for example, handrails in one bathroom instead of two, a
phone with only a flashing light as opposed to a flashing light
and an amplifier, her chair being provided, but only after two
fittings and many months of waiting - seem minor.
A factfinder,
however, must decide whether these accommodations removed the
barriers to equal employment opportunity in a timely manner.4
A
question also remains as to whether relieving Plaintiff from
duties in the multi-purpose room was a reasonable accommodation
4
ADA regulations provide that the employee and employer
should engage in “an informal, interactive process” in order to
“identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome
those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The parties must
act in good faith in the interactive process.
Jacobs v. N.C.
Admin. Office of Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 581 (4th Cir. 2015). “A
party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not
acting in good faith.” Allen v. City of Raleigh, 140 F.Supp.3d
470,
485
(W.D.N.C.
2015)
(quoting
Crabill
v.
Charlotte
th
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 F.App’x 314, 323 (4
Cir. 2011)).
An employer cannot be found liable solely for a failure to
engage in the interactive process where it has provided a
reasonable accommodation.
Walter v. United Airlines, Inc., 232
F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion) (citing
Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)).
It is inherent in the good-faith requirement, however, that the
interactive process may not be delayed unreasonably and without
progress, especially where, as with Plaintiff’s chair here, the
parties readily identified and agreed to the appropriate
accommodation, but Defendant delayed in providing it. To do so
may have been a failure to accommodate, if only for a limited
period of time.
16
that would allow her to attain “an ‘equal’ level of achievement,
opportunity, and participation that a non-disabled individual in
the same position would be able to achieve.”5
Accordingly, the
jury must decide whether the accommodations Defendant provided
constitute a reasonable accommodation, and Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment will be denied.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Board of Education of Prince George’s County
will be denied.
A separate order will follow.
/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
5
Defendant also avers that it offered ASL interpreters for
any programs or meetings upon request, but Plaintiff never made
such a request, which constitutes bad faith by Plaintiff in the
interactive process. (ECF No. 41-1, at 18).
“‘If an employer
engages in the interactive process with the employee in good
faith, for the purpose of discussing alternative reasonable
accommodations, but the employee fails to cooperate in the
process, then the employer cannot be held liable under the ADA
for failure to provide reasonable accommodations.’”
Allen, 140
F.Supp.3d at 483 (quoting EEOC v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774
Although Plaintiff clearly
F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 2014)).
preferred the installation of a loop system or the provision of
a CART system, she does not argue that an ASL interpreter who
mouthed the words would have been ineffective.
However, it is
unclear whether Defendant provided Plaintiff with this option
throughout the 2014-15 school year.
(See ECF No. 41-1, at 18
(“Following the June 16, 2015 interactive meeting . . . ,
Plaintiff had failed to cooperate with Ms. Simmons’ prior
requests to provide dates, times, and locations of PGCPS events
that Plaintiff wished to attend.”)).
Accordingly, summary
judgment is not appropriate on the current record.
17
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