Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Co. Board of Education et al

Filing 45

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/26/2017. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
HOPE E. LEE-THOMAS
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-2010

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution is the motion
for summary judgment filed by Defendant Board of Education of
Prince George’s County (“Defendant” or “the Board”).
41).

(ECF No.

The issues have been fully briefed, and the court now

rules, no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the following reasons, the motion for summary judgment will
be denied.
I.

Background1
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff Hope E. Lee-Thomas (“Plaintiff”) suffers from a
hearing impairment, chronic vertigo, and carpal tunnel syndrome.
(ECF No. 41-2, at 23, 25).

She has been a Paraprofessional at

Andrew Jackson Academy, a school in the Prince George’s County
Public Schools system (“PGCPS”), since March 25, 2014.
41-8, at 1-2).
1

(ECF No.

Prior to her current placement, Plaintiff had

Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are
undisputed and construed in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff.

worked for Defendant at other PGCPS schools and had previously
notified

Defendant

disabilities.

of

her

need

for

accommodations

for

her

(ECF No. 43, at 3).

On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a formal request for a
disability accommodation.

(ECF No. 41-2, at 21-24).

These

requests are referred to as “4172” requests within PGCPS because
the Board’s processes related to disability accommodations are
described
4172.

in

a

formal

policy

(See id. at 14).

called

Administrative

Procedure

In her 4172 request, Plaintiff asked

for: (1) an upright support chair, (2) handrails in both adult
bathrooms,

(3)

an

amplified,

flashing

telephone

in

her

classroom, (4) a portable loop system in her classroom, (5) a
portable

loop

system

in

the

multi-purpose

room,

and

(6)

an

American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter or a Communications
Access Realtime Translation (“CART”) system for any meetings,
programs, or workshops held outside of these two rooms.
21).

On

May

30,

Elizabeth

Davis,

PGCPS’s

Equal

(Id. at

Employment

Opportunity (“EEO”) Compliance Officer, responded by including
Plaintiff on an email to another PGCPS employee asking him to
set a time to “fit” her for an ergonomic chair.
at 40).

(ECF No. 43-1,

Defendant did not contact Plaintiff about any of the

other requested accommodations before the end of the school year
on June 18.

(ECF Nos. 41-2, at 37; 43, at 4; 44-1, at 3).

2

In
requested

the

absence

of

any

accommodations,

further

Plaintiff

information
submitted

a

about

her

charge

of

discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), which was received on July 16.

(ECF No. 41-3).

That

same month, Amana Simmons had taken over as the EEO Compliance
Officer for PGCPS.

(ECF No. 41-2, at 1).

On the same day that

Plaintiff filed her EEOC charge, Ms. Simmons contacted Plaintiff
to determine whether she had received the accommodations she
sought in her 4172 request.

(Id. at 3).

Plaintiff notified Ms.

Simmons of her pending EEOC charge, and no further action was
taken during the summer vacation to provide Plaintiff with the
requested accommodations.

(Id.).

When she returned to work for the new school year on August
18,
When

Plaintiff
Ms.

contacted

Simmons

Ms.

attempted

Simmons

about

her

to

up

meeting,

set

a

4172

request.
Plaintiff

refused to meet without her union representative, who was out of
town for the week.

(Id.).

The next day, Plaintiff notified Ms.

Simmons that she was having trouble understanding the material
presented during a Professional Development workshop held in the
multi-purpose room, which had not been outfitted with a portable
loop

system

as

Plaintiff

had

requested.

(Id.

at

3-4).

Defendant had provided two ASL interpreters for the workshop.
Plaintiff, however, is not fluent in ASL and relies on reading
the lips of interpreters, and the interpreters at the training
3

were

not

mouthing

the

words.

(Id.

at

4).

When

no

ASL

interpreter was present at a training on August 20, Plaintiff’s
principal,

Veronica

training.

Richardson,

allowed

her

to

leave

the

(Id. at 30-36).

In an email dated August 21, Ms. Simmons told Plaintiff
that she had obtained Plaintiff’s classroom assignment from Dr.
Richardson,

and

that:

(1)

a

portable

loop

system

would

be

installed in her classroom, (2) Dr. Richardson had relieved her
of the obligation to attend meetings in the multi-purpose room,
(3)

a

technology

support

employee

would

ensure

that

her

telephone had blinking lights, (4) there was already a handrail
installed in the bathroom closest to her classroom, (5) Ms.
Simmons was submitting a work order to have a handrail installed
in one of the bathrooms in the office, and (6) they were still
determining the status and location of the ergonomic chair that
Plaintiff had been fitted for in May.

(Id. at 31).

Plaintiff

and Ms. Simmons met to follow up on these accommodations on
September

4.

confirmed

that

(Id.
there

at

38).

was

a

At

the

blinking

meeting,
light

on

Ms.

Simmons

Plaintiff’s

telephone, that the portable loop system would be installed in
her classroom, and that a new ergonomic chair would be ordered
and delivered.
in

the

women’s

Although a handrail had already been installed
faculty

bathroom,

Ms.

Simmons

agreed

that

Defendant would install a handrail in the men’s faculty bathroom
4

“in

the

event

that

she

needs

to

use

the

men’s

restroom.”

Plaintiff’s requests to have a loop system installed in the
multipurpose room or to use CART were still “being evaluated”
after the meeting.

(Id.).

On September 9, the loop system was

installed in Plaintiff’s classroom.

(Id. at 39).

On November

21, she received the ergonomic chair.

(ECF No. 43-2, at 3).

On January 29, 2015, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right to
sue notice on her 2014 charge.

(ECF No. 41-4).

On February 27,

Plaintiff filed an updated charge with the EEOC.
5).
for

(ECF No. 41-

Where her 2014 charge complained only about her requests
a

portable

loop

system

and

an

amplified,

flashing-light

telephone (ECF No. 41-3), Plaintiff’s 2015 charge also included
her

requests

for

handrails,

an

upright

chair,

an

ASL

interpreter, CART, and a portable loop system for the multipurpose room (ECF No. 41-5).

The EEOC responded by reopening

its investigation and revoking its right to sue notice.
No. 41-6).

On April 20, the EEOC issued a right to sue notice

for Plaintiff’s updated charge.
In

May

discuss

the

2015,

accommodation.
discussions,

(ECF

Ms.

Board’s

(ECF No. 41-7).

Simmons

and

responses

to

Plaintiff

Plaintiff’s

(ECF No. 41-2, at 5, 40).
Ms.

Simmons

told

again

Plaintiff

began

requests

to
for

As part of these
that

the

school’s

building engineers had advised her that it was not feasible to
install a portable loop system in the multi-purpose room.
5

(Id.

at 42).
Plaintiff

Instead, ASL interpreters would be provided if and when
“desire[d]

to

meetings” in that room.

attend

(Id.).

special

programs

or

other

Ms. Simmons further stated that

CART was still being evaluated.

(Id.).

Plaintiff met with Ms.

Simmons again on June 16 and recapped these issues before the
summer break.
B.

(Id. at 6-7).

Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on July 9,
2015, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §
791, et seq., and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”),
42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.

(ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 14-17).

Defendant

filed

on

No.

a

motion

to

dismiss

October

26.

(ECF

Plaintiff responded and filed an amended complaint.
16; 16-1; 20).

13).

(ECF Nos.

Defendant consented to Plaintiff amending her

complaint, withdrew its motion to dismiss, and filed its answer
on December 7.

(ECF Nos. 17; 18).

After discovery, Defendant

filed the instant motion for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 41).

Plaintiff responded (ECF No. 43), and Defendant replied (ECF No.
44).
II.

Standard of Review
A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if there

exists no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving
party

is

entitled

to

judgment

as

a

matter

of

law.

See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
6

(1986);

Anderson

v.

Liberty

Lobby,

Inc.,

477

U.S.

242,

250

(1986); Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008).

A

dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is
such

that

a

nonmoving

reasonable

party.”

jury

could

a

Lobby,

Liberty

return

verdict

477

U.S.

at

for

the

249.

In

undertaking this inquiry, a court must view the facts and the
reasonable

inferences

drawn

therefrom

“in

the

light

most

favorable to the party opposing the motion,” Matsushita Elec.
Indus.

Co.

(quoting

v.

Zenith

United

Radio

Corp.,

v.

Diebold,

States

475

U.S.

Inc.,

574,

369

587

U.S.

(1986)

654,

655

(1962)); see also EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397,
405 (4th Cir. 2005), but a “party cannot create a genuine dispute
of

material

fact

through

inferences,”

Shin

v.

mere

Shalala,

speculation
166

or

F.Supp.2d

compilation
373,

375

of

(D.Md.

2001) (citation omitted).
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving
party generally bears the burden of showing that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact.

No genuine dispute of

material fact exists, however, if the nonmoving party fails to
make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case as
to which he would have the burden of proof.
at 322–23.
party

has

Celotex, 477 U.S.

Therefore, on those issues on which the nonmoving
the

burden

of

proof,

it

is

his

responsibility

to

confront the summary judgment motion with an “affidavit or other
7

evidentiary showing” demonstrating that there is a genuine issue
for trial.

See Ross v. Early, 899 F.Supp.2d 415, 420 (D.Md.

2012), aff’d, 746 F.3d 546 (4th Cir. 2014).
III. Analysis
A.

Claims in Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff’s

original

complaint

was

filed

in

July

2015,

before the start of the 2015-16 school year, and only alleged
violations

as

of

that

date.

Plaintiff’s

amended

complaint,

filed in December 2015, makes no reference to any events that
occurred after her original complaint was filed.
20).2

(See ECF No.

Despite the temporal limits of Plaintiff’s complaints, the

parties

have

provided
occurred

evidence
during

and

the

substantial

2015-16

and

argument

2016-17

on

events

that

school

years.

It is well established that a plaintiff “is bound by the

allegations contained in [her] complaint and cannot, through the
use of motion briefs, amend the complaint.”

Zachair, Ltd. V.

Driggs, 965 F.Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D.Md. 1997) aff’d, 141 F.3d
(4th

1162

Cir.

1998)

(unpublished

table

opinion).

Rather,

“[u]nder Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d), a plaintiff must move the court for
leave to file a supplemental pleading setting forth occurrences
which happen[] after” the suit is brought.
2

Skipper v. Giant

Plaintiff’s amended complaint also appears to have been
prompted by Defendant’s motion to dismiss on res judicata
grounds. (See ECF Nos. 13; 16). If anything, then, Plaintiff’s
amended complaint sought to narrow, rather than to expand, the
timeframe of her allegations.
8

Food, Inc., 187 F.Supp.2d 490, 493 n.2 (D.Md. 2002) (citing
Young-Henderson v. Spartanburg Area Mental Health Ctr., 945 F.2d
770, 775 (4th Cir. 1991)).

Accordingly, events occurring after

July 9, 2015, are not properly before the court, and will not be
considered in adjudicating the pending motion.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s arguments related to static from the
portable loop system in her 2014-15 classroom have not been
properly

pleaded.

In

her

amended

complaint,

Plaintiff

identifies the need for handrails, an upright chair, an ASL
interpreter, an amplified telephone, and a portable loop system
for the multi-purpose room, but omits any mention of issues with
the loop system in her classroom.

(ECF No. 20 ¶ 11).

Moreover,

in both her original complaint and her updated EEOC charge,
Plaintiff specifically stated that Defendant had accommodated
her disability in the classroom, without mention of any issues
with the loop system in that room.
1).
the

(ECF Nos. 1 ¶ 9; 41-5, at

Because Plaintiff’s allegations as to the effectiveness of
loop

system

in

her

classroom

were

not

included

in

the

complaint, arguments related to that system also will not be
considered.
B.

Failure to Accommodate

Plaintiff brings two claims, one for violation of Section
501 of the Rehabilitation Act and one for violation of the ADA.

9

(ECF No. 20 ¶¶ 16-24).3

The ADA prohibits discrimination against

“a qualified individual on the basis of disability.”
§

12112(a).

reasonable

One

form

of

discrimination

accommodations

to

the

known

is

“not

to-accommodate

making

or

mental

physical

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual.”
12112(b)(5)(A).

42 U.S.C.

42 U.S.C. §

To establish a prima facie case for a failureclaim,

a

plaintiff

must

show

“that

(1)

she

qualifies as an ‘individual with a disability’ . . . ; (2) the
[defendant] had notice of her disability; (3) she could perform
the

essential

accommodation;

functions
and

(4)

the

reasonable accommodation.”

of

her

job

[defendant]

with
refused

a
to

reasonable
make

any

Reyazzudin v. Montgomery Cty., Md.,

789 F.3d 407, 414 (4th Cir. 2015) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794(a);
Wilson v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 717 F.3d 337, 345 (4th Cir. 2013)).

3

The standards used to evaluate claims brought under the
Rehabilitation Act are the same as those brought under the ADA.
29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (“The standards used to determine whether
this section [of the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a
complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section
shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the provisions of sections 501
through 504, and 510, of the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990.”); Doe v. Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261, 1264
n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Because the language of the two statutes is
substantially the same, we apply the same analysis to both.”).
There are “three distinct grounds for relief: (1) intentional
discrimination or disparate treatment; (2) disparate impact; and
(3) failure to make reasonable accommodations.” A Helping Hand,
LLC v. Balt. Cty., Md., 515 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff brings her claims for a failure to accommodate.
10

Defendant
provided

disputes

Plaintiff

a

only

the

fourth

reasonable

element,

accommodation.

whether
As

to

it
a

reasonable accommodation, the House Report on the matter states:
[T]he
reasonable
accommodation
requirement is best understood as a process
in
which
barriers
to
a
particular
individual’s equal employment opportunity
are removed.
The accommodation process
focuses on the needs of a particular
individual
in
relation
to
problems
in
performance of a particular job because of a
physical or mental impairment.
. . .
Having identified one or more possible
accommodations, the [next] step is to assess
the reasonableness of each in terms of
effectiveness
and
equal
opportunity.
A
reasonable accommodation should be effective
for the employee.
Factors to be considered
include the reliability of the accommodation
and whether it can be provided in a timely
manner.
. . . [A] reasonable accommodation
should provide a meaningful equal employment
opportunity.
Meaningful equal employment
opportunity means an opportunity to attain
the
same
level
of
performance
as
is
available to nondisabled employees having
similar skills and abilities.
H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), as quoted in Bryant v. Better Business
Bureau of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F.Supp. 720, 736-37 (D.Md.
1996).

Accordingly,

“[i]n

order

to

be

reasonable,

the

accommodation must be effective (i.e., it must address the jobrelated difficulties presented by the employee’s disability),
and it must allow the employee to attain an ‘equal’ level of
11

achievement, opportunity, and participation that a non-disabled
individual
Merrill

in

v.

the

same

McCarthy,

position

184

would

F.Supp.3d

be

221,

able

236

to

achieve.”

(E.D.N.C.

2016)

(quoting Fleetwood v. Harford Sys. Inc., 380 F.Supp.2d 688, 699
(D.Md. 2005)); see also Bryant, 923 F.Supp. at 736; 29 C.F.R.
pt. 1630, app. § 1630.9 (2014) (“The reasonable accommodation
that is required by this part should provide the individual with
a

disability

with

an

equal

employment

opportunity.

Equal

employment opportunity means an opportunity to attain the same
level of performance, or to enjoy the same level of benefits and
privileges

of

employment

as

are

available

to

the

average

similarly situated employee without a disability.”).
On the other hand, an employer “may reasonably accommodate
an employee without providing the exact accommodation that the
employee

requested.”

Reyazuddin,

789

F.3d

at

415.

The

accommodation chosen by the employer need not be the “‘best’
accommodation possible, so long as it is sufficient to meet the
job-related needs of the individual being accommodated.”

29

C.F.R. §1630.9 app.; see also Corrigan v. Perry, 139 F.3d 888
(4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table opinion).

Under the ADA, a

reasonable accommodation may include “making existing facilities
used

by

employees

readily

accessible

to

and

usable

by

individuals with disabilities” or “job restructuring, part-time
or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position,
12

acquisition

or

appropriate

modification

adjustment

of

or

modifications

or

equipment

of

training materials or policies.”

devices,

[or]

examinations,

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9).

As

noted above, the employer has the “ultimate discretion to choose
between effective accommodations,” Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 41516, and a court goes too far when the effect of an injunction
“would

be

to

give

preferential

treatment

to

people

with

disabilities, rather than put them on equal footing as intended
by

Congress,”

Pathways

Psychological

v.

Town

Md., 223 F.Supp.2d 699, 717 (D.Md. 2002).

of

Leonardtown,

Generally, whether a

provided accommodation constitutes a reasonable accommodation is
a question of fact.

Pandazides v. Va. Bd. of Educ., 13 F.3d

823, 833 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Reyazuddin, 789 F.3d at 416
(citing Pandazides); Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis.,
669 F.3d 454, 464 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the “determination
of the reasonableness of a proposed modification is often factspecific”).
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment
because

it

accommodations.
that

it

has

provided

Plaintiff

(ECF No. 41-1, at 20).

provided

her

with

a

with

reasonable

Specifically, it argues

portable

loop

system

in

the

classroom where she worked, provided her an ergonomic chair,
installed handrails in the bathroom closest to her classroom,
provided Plaintiff with a flashing light telephone, relieved her
13

from any required meetings or duties in the multipurpose room,
and offered to provide an ASL interpreter as needed for meetings
or events that she sought to attend.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not provided her with
reasonable
required

accommodations.

to

purpose

provide

room.

insufficient,

a

(Id.
she

She

hearing
at

contends

accommodation

12-13).

maintains,

that

Defendant

for

Limiting

because

it

the

her

was

multi-

duties

marginalized

is
her

importance, distanced her from her peers, and prevented her from
obtaining

the

information

necessary

administration of the school.

to

be

involved

in

the

(Id.; ECF No. 43-2, at 5).

She

argues that the flashing light phone was not a satisfactory
accommodation because she could not see the blinking light if
she were turned away from the phone.

(Id. at 14).

She also

states that not enough of the restrooms had handrails installed,
requiring

her

to

use

unsupported

toilets

on

at

least

three

occasions because the supported toilets were in use by other
employees.
argues

that

(Id. at 14-15; ECF No 43-2, at 1-2).
Defendant

has

repeatedly

delayed

Finally, she
in

providing

accommodations, forcing her to work without accommodations for
long periods of time.

(ECF No. 43, at 15-20).

She did not

receive her ergonomic chair, for instance, until November 21,
2014, more than six months after submitting her 4172 request on
May 19.
14

Several of Defendant’s arguments rely on the theory that
Plaintiff’s “self-serving affidavit” is insufficient to create a
dispute of fact at the summary judgment stage.
5, 7, 18-19).
serving

Defendant overstates the limitation on self-

affidavits.

inadequate

(ECF No. 44, at

where

Courts

there

is

have

powerful

found

such

documentary

affidavits

evidence

that

contradicts the affidavit, see Jeandron v. Bd. of Regents of
Univ. of Md., 510 F.App’x 223, 228 (4th Cir. 2013), where they
provide

only

conclusory

opinions

uncorroborated

by

factual

allegations, see Williams v. Giant Food Inc., 370 F.3d 423, 433
(4th Cir. 2000), or where a Plaintiff contradicts his own sworn
statements, see Sky Angel U.S., LLC v. Discovery Commc’ns, LLC,
28 F.Supp.3d 465, 484 n.6 (D.Md. 2014) (citing cases describing
the “sham affidavit” rule).

The general rule, however, remains

that a court should not weigh the credibility of testimony of
one

party

against

the

testimony

of

another

judgment stage, even if it is self-serving.

at

the

summary

See Harris v. Mayor

& City Council of Balt., 429 F.App’x 195, 198 n.5 (4th Cir. 2011)
(refuting

the

notion

that

self-serving

affidavits

are

insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment so long as
the affidavit complies with the requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56
and does not contradict one’s prior testimony); Pitter v. Cmty.
Imaging Partners, Inc., 735 F.Supp.2d 379, 391 (D.Md. 2010).
Therefore, Plaintiff’s affidavit must be considered.
15

Here, Defendant has clearly provided Plaintiff with several
modifications,
modifications

but
are

a

question

reasonable

remains

whether

accommodations.

Some

these
of

the

differences between what Plaintiff received and what she asked
for – for example, handrails in one bathroom instead of two, a
phone with only a flashing light as opposed to a flashing light
and an amplifier, her chair being provided, but only after two
fittings and many months of waiting - seem minor.

A factfinder,

however, must decide whether these accommodations removed the
barriers to equal employment opportunity in a timely manner.4

A

question also remains as to whether relieving Plaintiff from
duties in the multi-purpose room was a reasonable accommodation
4

ADA regulations provide that the employee and employer
should engage in “an informal, interactive process” in order to
“identify the precise limitations resulting from the disability
and potential reasonable accommodations that could overcome
those limitations.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3). The parties must
act in good faith in the interactive process.
Jacobs v. N.C.
Admin. Office of Courts, 780 F.3d 562, 581 (4th Cir. 2015). “A
party that obstructs or delays the interactive process is not
acting in good faith.” Allen v. City of Raleigh, 140 F.Supp.3d
470,
485
(W.D.N.C.
2015)
(quoting
Crabill
v.
Charlotte
th
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 423 F.App’x 314, 323 (4
Cir. 2011)).
An employer cannot be found liable solely for a failure to
engage in the interactive process where it has provided a
reasonable accommodation.
Walter v. United Airlines, Inc., 232
F.3d 892 (4th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion) (citing
Rehling v. City of Chi., 207 F.3d 1009, 1016 (7th Cir. 2000)).
It is inherent in the good-faith requirement, however, that the
interactive process may not be delayed unreasonably and without
progress, especially where, as with Plaintiff’s chair here, the
parties readily identified and agreed to the appropriate
accommodation, but Defendant delayed in providing it. To do so
may have been a failure to accommodate, if only for a limited
period of time.
16

that would allow her to attain “an ‘equal’ level of achievement,
opportunity, and participation that a non-disabled individual in
the same position would be able to achieve.”5

Accordingly, the

jury must decide whether the accommodations Defendant provided
constitute a reasonable accommodation, and Defendant’s motion
for summary judgment will be denied.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment

filed by Defendant Board of Education of Prince George’s County
will be denied.

A separate order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge
5

Defendant also avers that it offered ASL interpreters for
any programs or meetings upon request, but Plaintiff never made
such a request, which constitutes bad faith by Plaintiff in the
interactive process. (ECF No. 41-1, at 18).
“‘If an employer
engages in the interactive process with the employee in good
faith, for the purpose of discussing alternative reasonable
accommodations, but the employee fails to cooperate in the
process, then the employer cannot be held liable under the ADA
for failure to provide reasonable accommodations.’”
Allen, 140
F.Supp.3d at 483 (quoting EEOC v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 774
Although Plaintiff clearly
F.3d 127, 132 (1st Cir. 2014)).
preferred the installation of a loop system or the provision of
a CART system, she does not argue that an ASL interpreter who
mouthed the words would have been ineffective.
However, it is
unclear whether Defendant provided Plaintiff with this option
throughout the 2014-15 school year.
(See ECF No. 41-1, at 18
(“Following the June 16, 2015 interactive meeting . . . ,
Plaintiff had failed to cooperate with Ms. Simmons’ prior
requests to provide dates, times, and locations of PGCPS events
that Plaintiff wished to attend.”)).
Accordingly, summary
judgment is not appropriate on the current record.
17