Grant v. Prince George's County Dept. et al

Filing 41

MEMORANDUM OPINION (c/m to Plaintiff, Defendant Hillman, and Defendant Tyrone 6/29/16 sat). Signed by Judge Deborah K. Chasanow on 6/29/2016. (sat, Chambers)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
:
DECONTEE S. GRANT
:
v.

:

Civil Action No. DKC 15-2433

:
PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY DEPT.,
et al.

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil
rights case are the following: (1) a motion to dismiss filed by
Defendant Jonathan Hill (“Defendant Hill”) (ECF No. 13); (2) a
motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Doctor’s Hospital, Inc.
(“Defendant Doctor’s Hospital” or the “hospital”) (ECF No. 19);
(3)

a

motion

to

dismiss

filed

by

Defendant

Prince

George’s

County Police Department (“Defendant PGPD”) (ECF No. 25); (4) a
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment
filed by Defendant Tisha S. Hillman (“Defendant Hillman”) (ECF
No. 30); (5) a motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Erick R.
Tyrone (“Defendant Tyrone”) (ECF No. 32); and (6) a motion to
compel filed by Plaintiff Decontee S. Grant (“Plaintiff”) (ECF
No. 38).

The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules,

no hearing being deemed necessary.

Local Rule 105.6.

For the

following reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Hill
will be construed as a motion to quash service and will be

granted.

The motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Doctor’s

Hospital will be granted.
will be denied.
the

Defendant Hillman’s motion to dismiss or, in

alternative,

Defendant

Defendant PGPD’s motion to dismiss

for

Tyrone’s

summary

motion

to

judgment

will

be

granted.

dismiss

will

be

granted.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel will be denied as moot.
I.

Background
A.

Factual Background

1.
Allegations Against Defendants Doctor’s Hospital and
PGPD
Unless otherwise noted, the facts outlined here are set
forth in the complaint and construed in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff alleges that while unconscious during a

medical procedure on or about February 18 or 19, 2012, she was
sexually assaulted by the staff at Defendant Doctor’s Hospital.
(ECF No. 16, at 10).
a

“different,

Plaintiff contends that she was subject to

inferior,

abusive,

brutal[,]

and

degrading

treatment than that which Defendant [Doctor’s Hospital] gives to
white female patients.”

(Id.).

In September 2012, Plaintiff reported the alleged sexual
assault to Defendant Detective J. Hill (“Defendant Hill”), who
contacted Defendant Doctor’s Hospital.

The hospital informed

Defendant Hill that Plaintiff was “knocked out” for a pelvic
exam and had woken up before the doctors could start the second

2

part of the exam.

(Id. at 3).

Defendant Hill declined to

conduct an investigation.
Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Hill.
id.

at

5).

In

November

2012,

Sergeant

Plaintiff in response to her grievance.

T.

Nalley

(See

contacted

Plaintiff alleges that

Sergeant Nalley asked “where are you from?” when asking for her
personal information and said that he would look at her medical
record and make a decision.

(Id.).

He subsequently closed her

grievance.
In

December

2012,

regarding

her

Plaintiff

informed

pages

information

of

assault”

were

Plaintiff

complaint

against

Lieutenant

missing

for
from

met

with

Lieutenant

Defendant

Doctor’s

Webster

that

time

interval

the
the

copy

of

record in Lieutenant Webster’s possession.

Hospital.

“several
of

Webster

crucial

the

Plaintiff’s
(Id.).

sexual
patient

Plaintiff

gave Lieutenant Webster an updated copy of her medical record.
(Id.

at

6).

Upon

Lieutenant

Webster’s

inquiry,

Plaintiff

disclosed that she had spoken with a lawyer but was unable to
pay

for

legal

services.

Plaintiff

alleges

that

Lieutenant

Webster and another officer “exchanged glances” and Lieutenant
Webster refused to investigate the sexual assault.

(Id.).

Plaintiff filed a complaint for negligence, assault, and
battery against Defendant Doctor’s Hospital in the Circuit Court

3

for Prince George’s County.

(ECF No. 19-2, at 2).1

On December

4, 2013 the circuit court granted a motion to dismiss filed by
Doctor’s Hospital.

(ECF No. 19-3, at 2).

In July 2014, Sergeant B. Selway informed Plaintiff that he
was

investigating

her

grievance

against

Defendant

Hill.

Plaintiff gave Sergeant Selway a copy of her medical files.

At

a later meeting, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Selway’s “face
became

angry

when

Plaintiff

[Lieutenant] Webster.”

[spoke]

(Id. at 7).

about

her

meeting

with

Plaintiff alleges that PGPD

personnel have interfered with her grievances and investigation
since then.

Plaintiff received a letter from Captain Rodriguez

stating that her grievance against Defendant Hill was closed.
In

November

regarding

a

2014,

Sergeant

letter

Plaintiff

Senator’s office.

Dillingham
had

sent

contacted
to

a

Plaintiff

United

States

He informed Plaintiff that her complaint for

sexual assault would not be investigated because it had already
been

closed

Defendant

by

PGPD

Lieutenant
was

Webster.

“tracking,

1

According

monitoring,

and

to

Plaintiff,

intimidating

Plaintiff refers to a civil case against Defendant
Doctor’s Hospital throughout the complaint.
In reviewing a
motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court may
consider allegations in the complaint, matters of public record,
and documents attached to the motion to dismiss that are
integral to the complaint and authentic.
See Philips v. Pitt
Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). Here, the
court will consider Exhibits 1 and 2 attached to Defendant
Doctor’s Hospital’s motion to dismiss because they are matters
of public record. (ECF Nos. 19-2; 19-3).
4

Plaintiff . . . in order to keep the sex[ual] assault case and
subsequent cover-up from being exposed.”
asserts
class

that

she

person,”

was

and

re-victimized,
“suffers

from

(Id. at 9).

treated

as

[a]nxiety,

“an

Plaintiff
inferior

sleeplessness,

violation of her privacy, and violation of trust in the public
institution whose mission [it] is to enforce the laws equally.”
(Id.).
2.

Allegations against Defendants Hillman and Tyrone

On or about November 22, 2013 Plaintiff hired Defendants
Hillman and Tyrone to represent her in her civil case against
Defendant Doctor’s Hospital in state court.
and

Tyrone

allegedly

violated

Defendants Hillman

attorney-client

privilege

by

discussing Plaintiff’s information while acting as her attorney.
Additionally,
Tyrone

Plaintiff

demanded

more

alleges
money

that

than

was

Defendants
agreed

Hillman

upon

in

and
their

original contract and failed to notify her about proceedings and
decisions regarding her civil case.

(Id.).

Plaintiff declined

to enter into a new contract.
In October 2014, Plaintiff sought legal representation for
her state court case from “Attorney [B].”

Plaintiff alleges

that after Attorney B had her files for two months and spoke
with

Defendant

Hillman,

Attorney

B’s

“usually

pleasant

voice

became accusatory, even sounding angry at Plaintiff” and she
refused

to

take

the

case.

(Id.).
5

Plaintiff

asserts

that

subsequently

several

other

attorneys

initially

accepted

her

case, but then changed their minds and spoke to Plaintiff in
“the same accusatory tone as Attorney [B] did.”

(Id. at 13).

In December 2014, “Attorney [C]” declined to represent Plaintiff
because

the

statute

February 2015.
Tyrone

of

limitations

was

going

to

expire

in

Plaintiff believes that Defendants Hillman and

discouraged

other

attorneys

from

taking

her

case.

Plaintiff also alleges that when she received her case files in
the mail from Attorney B and Attorney C, they were “torn open”
or were “slashed [open],” and that she “received an unsigned
Christmas card with no name, no note, and no return address,
[which was] another taunt.”
B.

(Id.).

Procedural Background

Plaintiff,

proceeding

pro

se,

filed

a

complaint

against

Defendants Doctor’s Hospital, PGPD, Hill, Hillman, and Tyrone on
August 17, 2015.

(ECF No. 1).

On September 17, Defendant

Doctor’s Hospital filed a motion to strike the complaint and/or
for

a

more

definite

statement

(ECF

responded in opposition (ECF No. 15).

No.

6),

and

Plaintiff

Defendants Hillman and

Tyrone filed a motion to dismiss a week later.

(ECF No. 12).

On September 25, Defendant Hill filed a motion to dismiss.
No. 13).

(ECF

After each motion to dismiss, Plaintiff was provided

with a Roseboro notice, which advised her of the pendency of the
motion to dismiss and her entitlement to respond within 17 days.
6

(ECF Nos. 11, 14); see Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309, 310
(4th Cir. 1975) (holding that pro se plaintiffs should be advised
of

their

right

to

file

responsive

material

to

a

motion

for

summary judgment).
On September 30, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (ECF
No. 16), which mooted the earlier motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim (see

ECF No. 21).2

The amended complaint

asserts violations of: 18 U.S.C. § 242 against Defendants PGPD
and Hill (Count I); 42 U.S.C. § 1981 against Defendants Hillman
and

Tyrone

(Count

II);

the

Fourteenth

Amendment

against

Defendants PGPD and Hill (Count III); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)–(3)
against all Defendants (Count IV); 42 U.S.C. § 1986 against
Defendant PGPD (Count V); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants
PGPD and Hill (Count VI); and 18 U.S.C. § 241 against Defendants
Doctor’s Hospital, Hillman, and Tyrone (Count VII).

Plaintiff

seeks monetary and injunctive relief.
On October 2, 2015 Defendant Doctor’s Hospital filed the
pending motion to dismiss, which is fully briefed.
19; 24; 26).3

(ECF Nos.

Subsequently, Defendant PGPD filed the pending

2

Defendant Hill has not filed a renewed motion to dismiss
after the filing of the amended complaint, nor has he answered.
Although he should have refiled his motion, the motion is not
moot because it asserts insufficient service of process, which
could not have been remedied by amending the complaint.
3

Plaintiff also filed a surreply. (ECF No. 29). “Unless
otherwise ordered by the Court, surreply memoranda are not
7

motion to dismiss (ECF No. 25), Defendant Hillman filed the
pending motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgement (ECF No. 30), and Defendant Tyrone filed the pending
motion

to

dismiss

(ECF

No.

32).

Plaintiff

opposition to each of these motions.
After

each

of

Defendants’

motions

provided with a Roseboro notice.

responded

in

(ECF Nos. 28; 33; 37).
was

filed,

Plaintiff

(ECF Nos. 20; 27; 31; 34).

was
On

November 5, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendant Tyrone
to provide proof of service for his motion to dismiss.4
38).

Plaintiff filed an emergency motion for protection, (ECF

No. 39), which was denied.
II.

(ECF No.

(ECF No. 40).

Standard of Review
The purpose of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is

to test the sufficiency of the complaint.

Presley v. City of

Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006).

A complaint

need only satisfy the standard of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is

entitled

to

relief.”

“Rule

8(a)(2)

still

requires

a

permitted to be filed.”
Local Rule 105.2(a).
The court may
permit a surreply when a party would not otherwise have an
opportunity to respond to arguments raised for the first time in
the opposing party’s reply.
See Khoury v. Meserve, 268
F.Supp.2d 600, 605 (D.Md. 2003). Defendant Doctor’s Hospital’s
reply contains no new arguments. Therefore, the court will not
consider Plaintiff’s surreply.
4

Plaintiff has already filed a response in opposition to
Defendant
Tyrone’s
motion
to
dismiss.
(ECF
No.
37).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied as moot.
8

‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to
relief.”
(2007).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 n.3
That showing must consist of more than “a formulaic

recitation

of

the

elements

of

a

cause

of

action”

or

assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).
stage,

all

considered

well-pleaded
as

true,

allegations

Albright

v.

in

a

Oliver,

complaint
510

U.S.

“naked

Ashcroft
At this
must
266,

be
268

(1994), and all factual allegations must be construed in the
light

most

favorable

to

the

plaintiff.

See

Harrison

v.

Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 783 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134
(4th Cir. 1993)).

In evaluating the complaint, unsupported legal

allegations

not

need

be

accepted.

Revene

Comm’rs, 882 F.2d 870, 873 (4th Cir. 1989).

v.

Charles

Cnty.

Legal conclusions

couched as factual allegations are insufficient, Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678, as are conclusory factual allegations devoid of any
reference to actual events.
604

F.2d

844,

847

(4th

United Black Firefighters v. Hirst,
Cir.

1979);

see

also

Francis

v.

Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009).
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed and held to a less
stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.

Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
9

(1972).

Liberal construction means that the court will read the

pleadings

to

state

a

valid

claim

to

the

extent

that

it

is

possible to do so from the facts available; it does not mean
that the court should rewrite the complaint to include claims
Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th

never presented.
Cir. 1999).

Even when pro se litigants are involved, however,

the court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that
support a viable claim.

Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901

F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
III. Analysis
A.
Defendant Hill’s Motion to Dismiss for Insufficient
Process
Defendant Hill moves to dismiss for insufficient process
under

Fed.R.Civ.P.

12(b)(5)

because

Plaintiff

mailed

the

complaint and summons to the Prince George’s County Executive.
Plaintiff

bears

the

process was valid.
476 (D.Md. 2006).

burden

of

establishing

that

service

of

See O’Meara v. Waters, 464 F.Supp.2d 474,
“Generally, when service of process gives the

defendant actual notice of the pending action, the courts may
construe Rule 4 liberally.”

Id.

The “plain requirements for

the means of effecting service of process,” however, “may not be
ignored.”

Id.

Fed.R.Civ.P 4(e) provides that an individual may be served
either

by

“following

state

law

10

for

serving

a

summons

in

an

action brought in courts of general jurisdiction” or by “(A)
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the
individual

personally;

(B)

leaving

a

copy

of

each

at

the

individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of
suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C) delivering
a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law
to

receive

service

of

process.”

Maryland

Rule

2-121(a)

generally mirrors Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) and states:
Service of process may be made within
this State or, when authorized by the law of
this State, outside of this State (1) by
delivering to the person to be served a copy
of the summons, complaint, and all other
papers filed with it; (2) if the person to
be served is an individual, by leaving a
copy of the summons, complaint, and all
other
papers
filed
with
it
at
the
individual’s dwelling house or usual place
of abode with a resident of suitable age and
discretion; or (3) by mailing to the person
to be served a copy of the summons,
complaint, and all other papers filed with
it by certified mail requesting: “Restricted
Delivery--show to whom, date, address of
delivery.” Service by certified mail under
this Rule is complete upon delivery.
Here, Plaintiff, by mailing the complaint and summons to the
County Executive, did not comply with either Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e)
or Maryland Rule 2-121(a).
Insufficient

service

necessitate dismissal.

of

process,

however,

does

not

Where “the first service of process is

ineffective, a motion to dismiss should not be granted, but

11

rather the [c]ourt should treat the motion in the alternative,
as one to quash the service of process and the case should be
retained on the docket pending effective service.”

Vorhees v.

Fischer & Krecke, 697 F.2d 574, 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (quoting
Bailey v. Boilermakers Local 667 of Int’l Bhd. Of Boilermakers,
480

F.Supp.

274,

prejudice

to

prospect

that

278

the

(N.D.W.Va.

defendant

service

may

1979)).

and

“there

yet

be

Where
exists

obtained,”

there
a

is

no

reasonable

dismissal

is

inappropriate and courts have generally allowed the plaintiff
another opportunity to effect service.
969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).
given

Plaintiff’s

pro

se

See Umbenhauer v. Woog,

In the interest of justice, and

status,

Plaintiff

will

be

provided

another opportunity to effectuate service on Defendant Hill in
accordance

with

Fed.R.Civ.P.

4(e)

and

Md.

Rule

2-121.

Accordingly, Defendant Hill’s motion, construed as a motion to
quash process, will be granted, and Plaintiff will have fortyfive (45) days to serve properly Defendant Hill.
B.

Improper Criminal Counts

Plaintiff alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242, which
are criminal statutes.

It is beyond the court’s purview in this

civil matter to provide relief under criminal statutes.

Cf.

United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124 (1979) (“Whether
to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand
jury

are

decisions

that

generally
12

rest

in

the

prosecutor’s

discretion.”).

“If

[P]laintiff

seeks

to

pursue

criminal

charges, she must bring her allegations to the attention of law
enforcement authorities.”

Randolph v. Holder, No. ELH-15-982,

2015 WL 1656733, at *2 (D.Md. Apr. 9, 2015), appeal dismissed
(June

22,

2015).

Accordingly,

Counts

I

and

VII

will

be

dismissed.
C.

Claim against Defendant Doctor’s Hospital

Defendant Doctor’s Hospital argues that the complaint fails
to state a claim under 12(b)(6) for Count IV, which alleges a
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985.5
To state a claim under § 1985, Plaintiff
must allege: (1) a conspiracy of two or more
persons, (2) who are motivated by a specific
class-based,
invidiously
discriminatory
animus to (3) deprive Plaintiff of the equal
enjoyment of rights secured by the law to
all, (4) and which results in injury to
Plaintiff as (5) a consequence of an overt
act committed by Defendants in connection
with the conspiracy. Unus v. Kane, 565 F.3d
In addition,
103, 126 (4th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff must “show an agreement or a
‘meeting of the minds’ by defendants to
violate
the
claimant’s
constitutional
5

Defendant Doctor’s Hospital argues that Plaintiff failed
to comply with Maryland’s Health Care Malpractice Claims Act
(“HCMCA”).
(ECF No. 19-1, at 6-8).
Under the HCMCA, a
plaintiff must first file a medical malpractice claim with the
Health Care Alternative Dispute Resolution Office as a condition
precedent to any judicial action.
See Md. Code Ann., Cts. &
Jud. Proc. § 3–2A–01 et seq.
Here, while the underlying facts
may concern medical malpractice, this is a civil rights case.
Accordingly, the HCMCA is inapplicable.
See Arnold v. Corr.
Med. Servs., Inc., No. DKC-10-283, 2010 WL 2889116, at *2 (D.Md.
July 19, 2010) (applying HCMCA to a medical malpractice claim,
but not to a civil rights claim).
13

rights.” Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1377
(4th Cir. 1995).
Dutton v. Montgomery Cty., Maryland, No. DKC-2008-3504, 2009 WL
2496844, at *7 (D.Md. Aug. 11, 2009), aff’d, 368 F.App’x 362 (4th
Cir. 2010).

It appears that Plaintiff brings her § 1985 claim

under subsection three of the statute for depriving persons of
rights or privileges.

(See ECF No. 16, at 10).

Plaintiff

alleges that she was subject to a “different, inferior, abusive,
brutal[,]

and

degrading

treatment

than

that

which

Defendant

[Doctor’s Hospital] gives to white female patients.”

(Id.).

The complaint is devoid of factual allegations regarding the
existence of a conspiracy, and does not offer sufficient details
supporting

Plaintiff’s

assertion

that

Defendant

Doctor’s

Hospital’s alleged misconduct was motivated by a discriminatory
animus.
withstand

Plaintiff’s unsupported conclusory accusations cannot
12(b)(6)

Iqbal,

review.

556

U.S.

at

678

(2009)

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported

by

mere

conclusory

statements,

do

not

suffice.”).

Accordingly, Count IV against Defendant Doctor’s Hospital will
be dismissed.
D.

Claims against Defendant PGPD

Defendant

PGPD

argues

for

dismissal

because

the

“Prince

George’s County Police Department” is not a legal entity that
can be sued.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b)(2) states that a corporation’s

14

capacity to be sued is determined by the law under which it was
organized.
Charter

Pursuant

mandates

to

that

state

the

law,

Prince

corporate

name

George’s

of

the

County

County

is

“Prince George’s County, Maryland,” and that the County shall be
designated as such in all actions and proceedings touching its
liabilities and duties.

Prince George’s County Charter § 103.

Consequently, according to the Defendant PGPD, there is no legal
entity

designated

as

the

“Prince

George’s

County

Police

Department” and Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed as to
this

Defendant.

subject

to

a

Plaintiff’s

less

drafted by lawyers.

stringent

pro

se

standard

pleading,
than

however,

formal

is

pleadings

“It would elevate needlessly form over

substance to dismiss completely a claim because Plaintiff named
the

specific

county

entities

that

opposed to the county itself.”

allegedly

harmed

[her]

as

Abunaw v. Prince George's Corr.

Dep't, No. DKC-13-2746, 2014 WL 3697967, at *1-2 (D. Md. July
23, 2014).

Courts have dismissed claims against specific county

departments as superfluous when the county was also named as a
party.
2916,

See, e.g., Dodson v. Prince George’s Cnty. No. JKS-132016

WL

67255

(D.Md.

Jan

6,

2016);

Stewart

v.

Prince

George’s Cnty., Md., No. AW-01-302, 2001 WL 759890 (D.Md. May
23,

2001).

Here,

however,

the

County

was

not

named

as

a

defendant, and therefore claims against Defendant PGPD will be

15

construed as being against Prince George’s County.

Accordingly,

Defendant PGPD’s motion to dismiss will be denied.
E.

Claims against Defendants Hillman and Tyrone

Defendants

Hillman

and

Tyrone

move

to

dismiss

for

insufficient process and service of process and for failure to
state a claim.

Counts II and IV allege violations of 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981 and § 1985.
Defendants

Hillman

and

Tyrone

argue

that

service

and

service of process was improper because the certified deliveries
were

unrestricted

personally

sign

and
for

Defendants
them.

In

Hillman
the

and

Tyrone

alternative,

did

not

Defendants

Hillman and Tyrone assert that even if they were being sued as
entities,

are

the

service

on

behalf

accept

they

only

registered

of

their

agents

authorized

respective

law

to

offices.

Insufficient service of process, however, does not necessitate
dismissal, particularly in light of Plaintiff’s pro se status.
Plaintiff’s

claims

against

Defendants

Hillman

and

Tyrone,

however, will be dismissed on other grounds.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]ll
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens[.]”
1981(a).
contracts”

42 U.S.C. §

The statute broadly defines the term “make and enforce
as

“the

making,

performance,
16

modification,

and

termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits,
privileges,

terms,

relationship.”

and

conditions

of

the

contractual

42 U.S.C. § 1981(b).

To state a cause of action in a § 1981
action like the one presently before the
court, a plaintiff must show: (1) he or she
is a member of a racial minority; (2) the
defendant intended to discriminate on the
basis of race; and (3) the discrimination
concerned one or more of the activities
protected by the statute.
Buchanan v.
Consolidated Stores Corp., 125 F.Supp.2d
730, 734 (D.Md. 2001) (citing Hill v. Shell
Oil Co., 78 F.Supp.2d 764, 776 (N.D.Ill.
1999); Bobbitt v. Rage Inc., 19 F.Supp.2d
512, 517 (W.D.N.C. 1998)).
Baltimore-Clark v. Kinko’s Inc., 270 F.Supp.2d 695, 699 (D.Md.
2003).

Here,

Plaintiff

appears

to

allege

that

Defendants

Hillman and Tyrone discriminated against her by convincing other
attorneys

to

refuse

her

case.

Assuming

arguendo

that

Plaintiff’s § 1981 claims are proper, she has not set forth any
facts which, if proven, would establish that Defendants Hillman
and Tyrone’s alleged misconduct was motivated by discriminatory
animus.

Her

complaint

merely

states

that

other

attorneys

listened to Defendants Hillman and Tyrone and “placed a high
value on, and accepted the words of[,] someone with a title
[and/or] rank that lawyers respect over and above the words of
an African American [w]oman of no title or rank.”
at

14).

Plaintiff’s

conclusory

allegations

(ECF No. 16,

that

Defendants

Hillman and Tyrone’s “actions were discriminatory, malicious,
17

and wicked” are not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
(Id. at 13).
Plaintiff also argues that Defendants Hillman and Tyrone
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).

Under § 1985(2), Plaintiff has to

allege “force, intimidation, or threat.”
Plaintiff

alleges

that

her

case

files

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).
were

“torn

open”

and

“slashed open” when mailed to her home, and that she received an
unsigned Christmas card as a taunt.
does

not

specify
states

that

Plaintiff

who

performed

(ECF No. 16, at 14).

these

Defendants

acts.

Hillman

Plaintiff’s civil case hostage for ransom.”

She

Additionally,

and

Tyrone

“held

(Id. at 12).

These

allegations are not sufficient to show that Defendants Hillman
and

Tyrone

used

force,

intimidation,

or

threats

to

hinder

Plaintiff from attending or testifying in a court proceeding.
Finally,

Plaintiff

asserts

that

Defendants

Tyrone conspired in violation of § 1985(3).

Hillman

and

Under § 1985(3), a

plaintiff must allege a conspiracy by “show[ing] an agreement or
a ‘meeting of the minds’ by defendants to violate the claimant’s
constitutional
Simmons,
statements

47

rights.”
F.3d

that

at

Dutton,
1377).

Defendants

WL

2496844,

Plaintiff

Hillman

and

at

offers

Tyrone

*7

(quoting

conclusory

“conspired

to

hinder, obstruct justice, and defeat Plaintiff’s civil case” and
that their “actions were discriminatory, malicious, and wicked.”
(ECF No. 16, at 12-13).

Such statements do not sufficiently
18

allege a conspiracy or that Defendants Hillman and Tyrone were
motivated by a discriminatory animus.
Accordingly,

all

claims

against

Defendants

Hillman

and

Tyrone in Counts II and IV will be dismissed.
IV.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Jonathan Hill will be construed as a motion to quash
service and will be granted.

The motion to dismiss filed by

Defendant Doctor’s Hospital will be granted.
motion to dismiss will be denied.

Defendant PGPD’s

Defendant Hillman’s motion to

dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment will be
granted.

Defendant Tyrone’s motion to dismiss will be granted.

Plaintiff’s motion to compel will be denied as moot.

A separate

order will follow.

/s/
DEBORAH K. CHASANOW
United States District Judge

19